DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the
Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan

**Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding
for the displacement-affected communities in**

Assalaya, Yassin and Sheiria localities, East Darfur

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ABBREVIATIONS

DSWG Durable Solutions Working Group

CBM/CBRM Community-based management resolution mechanism/Community-based management

CBO Community-based organisation

GoS Government of Sudan

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IOM International Organisation for Migration

INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation

JIPS Joint IDP Profiling Service

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

SUDIA Sudanese Development Initiative

UN-HABITAT- United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WFP World Food Programme

UNAMID United Nations African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur

UNCT United Nations Country Team

KEY TERMS

Displacement affected communities: refers to displaced persons and the communities affected by their presence, such as host communities, communities in areas of return, or other areas where displaced persons are seeking a durable solution to their displacement.[1]

Displaced persons: refers to internally displaced persons, whether they are physically displaced or have returned to the place they lived prior to their displacement.

Durable solutions: a durable solution is achieved when displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. A durable solution can be achieved through return, local integration and resettlement.[2]

Durable solutions process: a community-based approach to durable solutions planning, based on durable solutions targets identified by displacement-affected communities at a decentralized level, in post-conflict or post-disaster settings.[3]

Durable solutions analysis: the purpose of a durable solutions analysis is to provide an evidence base to inform joint responses to displacement. It entails a systematic and principled process in line with the IASC Framework, including IDPs' perspectives and preferences for future settlement options, demographic profile, and the eight durable solutions criteria. The analysis focuses on the specific realities of the displaced populations, whilst making a comparison to the non-displaced populations and taking into account the broader macro environment.[4]

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: these principles are 30 standards that outline the protections available to internally displaced people (IDPs). They detail the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs: from the beginning of their forced displacement, to IDPs protection and assistance during displacement up to the achievement of durable solutions.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.[5]

IDP returnees/return IDPs: displaced persons that have returned to their place of origin.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs: the framework, endorsed by the IASC Working Committee in 2010, addresses durable solutions following

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[1] The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.
[2] Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2010) IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, April 2010.
[3] The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.
[4] Ibid.
[5] UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (22 July 1998) ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.

conflict and natural disasters. It describes the key human rights-based principles that should guide the search for durable solutions.

Non-displaced persons: individuals who are not displaced (and may or may not be living in the same areas as displaced persons).

Peacebuilding: involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore a relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.[6]

Protracted displacement: a situation where IDPs and returnees have been displaced for a longer time period (5 years or more) and where they still have assistance needs linked to their displacement, and are not able to enjoy their human rights for reasons caused by their displacement.[7]

Refugees: individuals displaced outside their country of nationality or habitual residence as a consequence of generalized violence, conflict or well-founded fear of persecution.[8]

Resilience: refers to the ability of displacement-affected communities to absorb and recover from shocks (such as earthquakes, droughts, floods or conflicts), while positively adapting and transforming their structures and means of living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty.[9]

Return refugees: persons who have returned to their home country after seeking international assistance abroad. The home country is legally defined as the country of former habitual residence. It is usually their country of citizenship, but it may be that of their parents or grandparents, who fled many years ago, as many crises span several generations.[10]

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[6] UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2010) UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation
[7] The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (2018) The International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS).

INTRODUCTION

Three decades of war and unrest have dominated the Sudanese political and civil scene but the ousting of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 has offered a window of opportunity for a political transition in Sudan. In 2020, significant political gains were made towards achieving peace in Sudan with the signing of a peace agreement in Juba (South Sudan) between the power-sharing government and five key rebel groups.[11] The current signed peace agreement—a product of a Sudanese-led process—aims to address historically root causes of conflict and marginalized populations in Sudan's conflict zones.

While the political and overall context in Sudan witnessed a historic shift in the last two years, the humanitarian and development aspects have been subject to continuous and significant challenges. Protracted and new displacements continue to be a major issue—as a result of decades of conflict and natural disasters, there are currently approximately 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country and 800,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries.[12] In the context of efforts to build a comprehensive peace and the ongoing UNAMID drawdown, in September 2019 Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok requested that Sudan be declared eligible for the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In his request, the Prime Minister asked that funding be made immediately available in the three priorities areas identified for Darfur; namely, the rule of law, durable solutions, and peacebuilding at the community level.

Durable solutions have to be an integral part of peacebuilding. Peace in Sudan cannot be divorced from durable solutions and thus must tackle the issue of conflict and protracted displacement in Darfur. 'There is much talk about peace, but you cannot talk about peace in Sudan in isolation from durable solutions for IDPs and the issues of land and compensation. Peace cannot be reached without addressing these issues.'[13] The Juba Peace Agreement regards solutions for IDPs as an important element of building peace and establishes durable solutions as a key priority. The agreement looks to resolve the consequences of conflict, such as the safe and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their original lands, whilst also paying attention to compensation, development and reconstruction. To support this, the peace agreement contains a protocol that deals with refugee and IDP return with specific attention paid to the situation in Darfur.

Just as durable solutions are integral to peacebuilding, lack of peace is often an obstacle to achieving solutions that are durable. Thus, solutions programming needs to identify the specific challenges and address these with suitable measures. The Juba Peace Agreement acknowledges these linkages and looks to address the root causes of conflict, such as issues of identity, marginalization, the relationship between religion and state, governance, resource-sharing, land issues and social justice.

IDPs living in protracted displacement can contribute to peacebuilding or be an obstacle. In other words, internally displaced persons are both peace and conflict actors. Displacement is highly political

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[11] Despite the non-signature of two of the most important non-state armed groups—Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Al-Hilu faction and the Sudan Liberation Movement—Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), negotiations continue amongst the parties to join the final agreement.

[12] OCHA (2021) Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview, December 2020.

[13] Donor representative quoted in Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

in Darfur and peacebuilding that includes IDPs and displacement affected communities are less likely to fail. Hence, peacebuilding and supporting durable solutions for IDPs must go together.[14]

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) portfolio involves programming in all of Darfur's five states that supports and underpins peace. The programme strategy recognizes that durable solutions for IDPs, the rule of law and local conflict resolution are building blocks for peace but also interdependent. To build peace and support durable solutions for IDPs and returnees, PBF programming pays special attention to addressing the root causes of Darfur's conflict, thus creating a conducive environment for return and integration of IDPs, strengthening local conflict resolution mechanisms, peacebuilding capacities and the rule of law.

At the request of the Government of Sudan, an integrated political and peacebuilding mission, UNITAMS, has been established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2524 (2020). UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT partners are mandated to support Sudan in achieving a successful transition. UNITAMS has four strategic objectives.[15] The peacebuilding objective provides for support to the implementation of the peace process. It will sustain peace through legitimate and functioning State institutions that provide basic security, protection and services to the population with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

A JOINT ANALYSIS AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACH

The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) in Sudan has been a consistent forum championing joint durable solutions analysis to address protracted displacement. Commencing in 2017, the DSWG oversaw two durable solutions pilots respectively in rural Um Dukhun and two IDP camps situated on the outskirts of El Fasher in North Darfur. The working group followed up this work by commissioning a learning review of the pilots with input and feedback provided by all DSWG members.

The resulting 'lite' durable solutions toolkit and recommendations have provided the foundation and starting point for the PBF programme in Darfur.[16] The DSWG continues to play a strategic role by overseeing and coordinating the overall durable solutions work process and deliverables. In equal measures, the consultative process and the evidence produced need to support the wider humanitarian-development-peace work in Sudan.[17]

Darfur's internal displacement dynamics are complex. This demands that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors require a *shared* multi-sectorial analysis of the needs of the displacement affected communities. Following the collaborative approach piloted in El Fasher, a particular emphasis has been placed on generating shared data and engaging all major stakeholders including IDPs, local and state authorities. Accordingly, the Peacebuilding Fund partners combined all data collection activities using *one* methodology approach and *one* coordinated data collection in eight localities across the five Darfur states—Tawilla, Assalaya, Yassin, Sheiria, Nertiti, Um Dhukun,

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[14] Humanitarian Policy Forum, 2020, Policy Brief 77: Achieving Durable Solutions by including displacement-affected communities in peacebuilding.
[15] The four strategic objectives of UNITAMS under SCR 2524 (2020) are: (i) Assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace. (ii) Support peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements. (iii) Assist peacebuilding, civilian protection, and rule of law, in Darfur and the Two Areas. (iv) Support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.
[16] Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.
[17] The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) is co-chaired by UNHCR, UNDP and DRC. The working group is mandated to inform and advise, develop policy and coordinate work on durable solutions. DSWG is placing a strong focus on data and HLP issues with sub-working groups dedicated to these issues.

Gereida and Jebel Moon—where they are carrying out comprehensive, area-based joint peacebuilding programming.[18]

ACTORS

The DSWG is central to the Durable Solutions Analysis and Baseline process—it not only oversees the durable solutions analysis process and coordinates work streams but also guarantees data has visibility with government authorities as well as the broader humanitarian and development community in Sudan. And works to ensure that data and analysis is used for planning and programming at the locality level and feed into national policy. Support from the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) was requested by the DSWG to develop the methodology approach and indicators for both the survey and area-level analysis. JIPS also conducted the analysis of the results, all in a consultative manner. Remote support and expertise plus Khartoum deployment of a JIPS technical adviser has given quality assurance and provided technical support to field operations and built capacity for the teams deployed in Darfur.

The PBF projects are implemented by UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, UN-Habitat and FAO. The partners have actively taken part in designing the methodology by offering thematic expertise and on-the-ground knowledge of the Darfur localities to develop the indicators and data collection tools. Partners have also been key to raising awareness at the village and locality level, assisting with the training of enumerator teams and trouble-shooting with challenges at the field level in Darfur.

IOM managed all components and stages of the household survey including pre-fieldwork missions, training of enumerators, and operational management of the field data collection. Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA), an experienced national NGO, has been leading the qualitative area-level data collection and analysis. Tasks included development of the qualitative tools, training of interviewers, and identification of respondents in all localities before implementing the key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

PROCESS OVERVIEW

- Methodology approach and objectives shaped with PBF agencies and the DSWG.
- Indicators for population and area-level developed and agreed.
- Survey tools and qualitative tools developed and reviewed by partners and experts.
- Sampling approach designed.
- Testing of the survey tool.
- Pre-field work missions to inform sampling and sketch target villages.
- Training of field teams in all states and pilots.
- Data collection: survey and area-level (December 2020 and January 2021).
- Data analysis of survey results and area-level results jointly, including several thematic consultations with PBF agencies, DSWG and experts for validation.
- Locality-level report with the durable solutions analysis and baseline finalised.[19]

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[18] Making use of a single methodology and joint data collection in all eight localities also sought to mainstream indicators and allow for a holistic analysis to avoid overburdening communities.

[19] In all other localities, targeted under the PBF for data collection and analysis, community consultations were held to validate results with all target groups and to prioritize the identified obstacles to durable solutions from their perspectives. This was not possible in Gereida, due to the delay in data collection, which was moved from December 2020 to June 2021 because of the security situation.

OBJECTIVES OF DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

The durable solutions and baseline analysis exercises in each of the target localities in Darfur aim to:

- Provide the foundation for analysis of displaced and non-displaced populations' progress towards durable solutions, including IDPs, IDP returnees, return refugees and nomads as an integral element to the peacebuilding process.
- Inform PBF programming and durable solutions Action Plan development in each Darfur target locality.
- Provide the baseline of the agreed-upon PBF outcome indicators for measuring programme impact.
- Inform broader Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP) programming beyond the PBF.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The methodology approach was developed based on consultations with the PBF agencies and the DSWG and was strongly shaped by the learning that emerged from the durable solutions analysis conducted in El Fasher in 2019.[20] JIPS consolidated the combination of methods and made sure that agency programming needs, as well as the durable solutions analysis needs, were met. The indicators[21] as were the household survey tool, the key informant interview questions and the joint analysis plan, were reviewed in several rounds by all PBF agencies, relevant technical experts and local partner SUDIA.

TARGET GROUPS & LOCATIONS

In East Darfur three localities were included: Assalaya, Yassin and Sheria. In total the household survey targeted 50 villages in East Darfur.[22] The target groups and locations were identified by UNDP, as the PBF lead agency in East Darfur in coordination with the authorities at the locality level. Target villages, towns and camps were selected based on a conflict sensitive perspective and on the PBF's programmatic scope. The data collection covered three target groups: IDPs that have returned to their village of origin (IDP-returnees), non-displaced residents and, lastly, nomads residing in 'dhamras'. Additionally, through the random sampling approach (explained below) IDPs residing in the target villages were also encountered and included in the study (IDPs 'out of camps').

A MIXED METHODS METHODOLOGY

Both primary qualitative and quantitative data inform the analysis of progress towards durable solutions on the locality level presented in this report. The approach consists of both a sample-based household survey and area-level key informant interviews. The survey data has been used to produce socio-economic population profiles for each target group at the locality level to conduct a comparative analysis between the groups.

The area-level data collection included Key Informant Interviews (23) and mini-FGDs (20) and targeted respondents on the state and the locality level. In total the area level included 78 respondents: 11 ministry respondents in Ed Daein, 22 basic service representatives (education, health, police, water, WES) as well as KIIs and mini-FGDs with native administration (6) and 36 community members including, farmer (7), female community member (6), IDP (9), nomad (5) and youth (9) respondents. The qualitative data collection took place in December 2020. Analysis of the interviews and focus groups discussion focused on the context at the locality level concerning issues

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[20] UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019) Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

[21] The PBF indicators were based on: technical lessons from the interagency durable solutions profiling in El Fasher, the PBF Results Framework plus the Interagency Durable Solutions Indicator Library. https://inform-durablesolutions-idp.org/

[22] Target villages include Assalaya locality: Al Gedamiya, Um Dabaker, Saabota, Um Sawona South, Tuweilei, Sunta, Esheraya, Gargar, Um Warragat, Shurab, Donkie Khamal, Baddal, Shaq Tabaldie, Ahmed Bieda, Um Daie, Hillet Bargo. Yassin locality: Om AlKheirat, Um Boim, Hemedaya, Hillet Bergo, Abushatta, Mali, Umgerggio, El Boad, Salia, Zerafa, Qardud, Om Alkeirat (Alladob), Kilakil Mugo, Um Kirkir, Kasib, Afando, Saniafando, Marrikha, Um Dalal. Sheria: Gaar Hajar, Shanabla, Amar Jadeed, Dabak, Um Habeila, Nur, Jakhara, Arto village, Um Shigara, Eida Shammal, Seryaa, Kazan Jadeed, Abu Dwaimat, Um Dangal, Shanabla.

such as land and resource management, conflict resolution mechanisms, service provision, rule of law and civic participation.

SAMPLING APPROACH

The sampling followed a stratified multi-stage sampling approach in which villages were the primary sampling unit (PSU) and households were the secondary sampling unit (SSU), while stratification was done by target group. Accordingly, for localities with more than 20 villages, specifically Assalaya, the first sampling stage consisted of selecting a sample of villages with probabilities that were proportional to size; villages with higher numbers of households had a higher probability of being selected for the survey. All villages were included in the sample for the localities with less than 20 villages, specifically Yassin and Sheria. A random sample of households was then selected based on systematic skips in each village. Data collection took place in December 2020 and January 2021.

Representative samples of non-displaced and IDP-returnees were achieved by locality. The sample of nomads was inadequate to allow for statistical analysis. Additionally, a representative sample of 'out of camp' IDPs was encountered and analysed across the 3 localities.

Looking at the gender distribution of the respondents to the survey; it is observed that 39% were male and 61% were female. The distribution between male and female respondents remains the same in all 3 localities.

TABLE 1: SAMPLE BY TARGET GROUP IN EAST DARFUR

Target group	Sample size (individuals)	Sample size (HHs)
Non-displaced	5,051	843
IDP-returnees	16,945	2,778
IDPs out of camps	1,848	313
Nomads	449	70

TABLE 2: POPULATION BASELINE OF TARGET VILLAGES AND TOTAL SAMPLES BY LOCALITY[23]

Locality	Population baseline for target villages (HHs)	Sample size targeted (HHs)	Sample size achieved (HHs)
Assalaya	6,770	1,691	1,547
Yassin	6,798	1,346	1,185
Sheria	4,051	1,218	1,272

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[23] The population baseline guestimates were provided by UNDP based on KIIs at the locality level.

SAMPLING LIMITATIONS & SPECIFICATIONS

Following limitations and specification should be kept in mind when reading the analysis:

- Only 71 nomad households were interviewed, which did not allow for a statistical analysis. Therefore, the nomad households are not included in the statistical analysis. Selected results are still included but presented not as percentages but as fragments of the 71 households. These results are then complemented by the area level key informant interviews with nomads.
- The sampling is designed to produce results representative at the target group level per locality. Analysis at the village level is not possible, and therefore no reference to villages or breakdown by villages is done in the report.

- In the analysis results are presented at the locality level for each group, and when relevant results for all three localities are also presented (when no locality level nuances were found) – these are referred to as 'state level' results. Analysis of the target groups across the three localities has been done without applying weights due to the random sampling approach undertaken.

- Samples of non-displaced and IDP returnees are representative at the locality level; whereas the sample of the 'out of camp IDPs' is only representative across the three localities (in the analysis we refer to these results as "state level' results). Out of camp IDPs were not a target group in the study. However, given that some 'out of camp IDPs' were expected to be found in the target villages, the sample sizes were increased to accommodate for an inclusion of these as households that have been found by the random sample. Although simple random selection was followed in the East, the representation of the out of camp IDPs remains unknown given the lack of baseline population data.

DISPLACEMENT HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

What is the general demographic profile of the target population and what is displacement history of the IDPs? And what will this help us understand? The basic demographics and the displacement history will be used to understand the key characteristics of the target populations. Breaking the population data into smaller sub-populations based on basic demographics such as sex, age, location, capacities, vulnerabilities and displacement characteristics, makes it possible to discern how different sub-groups within each target group are faring in comparison, thereby acknowledging that each target group is not a homogeneous entity.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **IDPs make up ca. 7% of the total population in the three localities. Return IDPs amount to about 20% of the population in Yassin and Sheiria (based on 2021 HNO estimates), while no estimates are readily available for Assalaya, where secondary sources point to much lower proportions of returnees.**
- **The IDPs across the three localities are primarily from within these same localities. Hardly any IDPs have returned within the last 12 months, with a majority of returnees relocating back to Assalaya (52%) and Shirea (52%) between 5 and 10 years ago.**
- **The non-displaced population is found to be very mobile, with 52% of the households having resided in their current village less than 5 years.**
- **Overall, the population is very young in all three localities—just above 40% of IDPs, returnees and non-displaced residents are below the age of 20 years.**
- **All localities have a majority of women with women making up 60% of the population plus a third of families are female-headed (34% of IDP and returnee and 36% of non-displaced households).**
- **Literacy is significantly higher for men across all groups by 20–25 percentage points. Literacy rates for respectively men and women are approximately 75% and 50% for the non-displaced, returnee and IDP populations. Notably, literacy rates among the pastoralist population are considerably lower—48% for men and 28% for women.**
- **A much higher proportion of the younger population is literate. 43% below 40 years are literate, whilst only 11% among 40-59-year-olds and 3% of the generation above 60 years.**

EAST DARFUR—ASSALAYA, YASSIN AND SHEIRIA LOCALITIES

East Darfur state is one of five Darfur states. The area was previously part of the state of South Darfur, but in 2012 became a separate state with its own governor as part of changes set out in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD).[24] The three localities, Assalaya, Yassin and Sheiria, are situated between the states of South and North Darfur, but other parts of East Darfur State also border South Sudan and West Kordofan. The three main tribes in East Darfur include the Rezeigat, who are the dominant tribe in **Assalaya** locality but also in the capital of Ed Daein, Bahr el Arab and Abu

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[24] Sudan Tribune, January 10, 2012.

Gabra), while the Birgid tribe are mostly in **Sheiria and Yassin** localities. The Ma'alia tribe dominate the areas of Adila and Abu Karinka.

The three localities of Assalaya, Yassin and Sheiria fall under one conflict system, where the main groups involved in conflict belong to the pastoralist southern Rizeigat and sedentary farmers of African origin, the Birgid and Zaghawa. Conflict in Darfur has often been presented to be between 'Arab' against 'African' tribes, however, it is not necessarily a helpful lens to view the conflict because present-day identities 'operate within a system of perceptions' that are largely ideological distinctions.25 And such distinctions can move attention away from the political nuances of the conflict. The conflict in Darfur has been characterised by allegiances to and splits from the previous regime in Khartoum, plus a number of splits within the main factions that in turn have become smaller splinter groups and party to the conflict. In East Darfur, the conflict takes different shapes and contradicts this stereotype of 'Arab' versus 'African' conflict. The areas now comprising East Darfur has a long history of conflict between the Rizeigat (pastoralists) and Ma'aliya (sedentary farmers) and Rizeigat (pastoralists) against Misseriya (pastoralists), which is driven by control of land, tribal leadership and wider political power plus access to pasture and water.

Livelihoods are mainly dependent on crop agriculture and livestock. One of the most key migratory routes in all of Darfur runs through Yassin and Sheiria locality. During months of migration, the inter-communal conflict between sedentary farmers and pastoralists moving their livestock take place over scarce resources and migratory corridors.

BASIC POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLES

Overall, there are relatively low numbers of IDPs residing in the three localities. In the random survey sample across all three localities, IDPs only made up 8% of the captured population, which corresponds to the 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) baseline figures that estimates the IDP population in the 3 localities to make up 7% of the total population, which amounts to 19,608 persons.[26] According to the same HNO baseline estimates, the proportion of IDP returnees in Yassin and Sheiria amounts to ca. 20% of the total projected population for 2021 (i.e. 14,215 persons in Sheiria and 14,640 persons in Yassin). For Assalaya, no estimates are provided in the HNO baseline, but secondary information points to relatively low numbers of returnees.

The households survey show that demographic characteristics are very similar among the non-displaced, IDP returnees and IDPs (residing in villages). Looking at the state level—across all three localities in East Darfur—the population is very young. This is true for all groups, 41% of IDP-returnees and 42% of both IDPs and non-displaced residents are below the age of 20 years. Across all groups, 25% are aged between 20–39 years, and the older people above the age of 40 years make up a third of the population.

Looking at the gender distribution, a majority of women is observed in all groups: non-displaced residents (41% men, 59% women), IDPs (38% men, 62% women) and IDP returnees (39% men, 61% women). A third of families are female-headed households in all three localities, 34% of IDP and returnee households and 36% of non-displaced households. The size of the households is similar for

[25] Prunier, G. (2005) Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide.
[26] OCHA (2015) (Humanitarian Needs Overview Sudan, October 2014.

all three groups; households have on average 6 members.27 In Yassin locality, there is a larger proportion of smaller households (1–5 members) by respectively 9 (Shirea) and 11 (Assalaya) percentage points.

A significant proportion of the household members are reported to be away for more than 6 months per year: 20% of the non-displaced, 17% of the IDP returnees and 24% of the IDPs. These are mainly male household members that are away due to work purposes.

To gain a more complete picture of household vulnerability, the household survey also recorded whether any family members were disabled. 3% of returnees and non-displaced, and 4% of IDPs and pastoralist nomads say they have a disability that stops them from 'coping with all the things they need to'. Across all four population groups, more men report a disability than women (by 1–2 percentage points). Predictably, there is a higher proportion of people living with a disability amongst the older part of the population.

Literacy rates are used to gauge literacy skills, which span a range of proficiencies. Literacy, the ability to read and write amongst those above 15 years of age, is significantly higher for men. The difference between men and women is by 20–25 percentage points for all groups. The literacy is markedly lower among the nomadic population. The data also shows a significant difference between older and younger generations—a much bigger proportion of the younger population can read and write. 43% below 40 years are literate, whilst only 11% among 40–59-year-olds and 3% of the generation above 60 years.

FIGURE 1: LITERACY (ABILITY TO READ AND WRITE) AMONG PERSONS 15 YEARS AND ABOVE - SDG INDICATOR: 4.6.1 (A)

Comparing literacy levels between the three localities highlights a couple of variations. A higher proportion of both non-displaced men (70%) and women (48%) living in Sheiria locality are literate compared to non-displaced persons living in the two neighbouring localities. The difference is 6-9 percentage points for men, whilst literacy rates for non-displaced women in Shirea (49%) are considerably higher than in the other two East Darfur localities; Yassin (32%) and Assalaya (29%).

27 Both the mean and median size is six household members for all groups.

DISPLACEMENT HISTORY OF IDPS AND RETURNEES

The profiling household survey looked at the displacement history of IDP returnees and IDPs (out of camps). The IDPs across the three localities are primarily originating from these same localities: 40% are from Assalaya locality, 30% from Shirea and 20% from Yassin. The household survey shows that a majority of IDPs (46%) have stayed in their current settlement in Assalaya, Sheiria and Yassin for more than 10 years. 35% have lived in their current place between 5 and 10 years, while 20% have arrived during the last 5 years. Recent IDP arrivals have mainly settled in Sheiria locality and not in the other two localities.

Looking at the connection of IDPs to their place of origin, 49% of IDPs have gone back to their place of origin at least once since displacement. Among the IDPs who are going back to their place or of origin, the main reason is farming (50%) and visiting relatives or friends (38%), while 10% return to check on land or their dwelling.

The survey looked at the duration of return among the IDP-returnees: For all the three localities, hardly any IDPs have returned during the last year. In Shirea locality, a larger proportion of returnees have arrived back more recently. 47% have been back for less than between 1 and 5 years in comparison to 26% (Assalaya) and 28% (Yassin). 34% of returnees have been back between 5 and 10 years, whilst 16% arrived back more than 10 years ago from the area where they had sought refuge from the conflict. In Assalaya, a majority (52%) of returnees relocated back between 5 and 10 years ago, whilst 26% returned less than 5 years ago. About a quarter (22%) returned to Assalaya more than 10 years ago. The return pattern for Shirea is similar—a big proportion (52%) of returnees arrived back between 5 and 10 years ago, whilst 28% returned between 1-5 years ago, whilst 21% move back to their area of origin 10 years ago or earlier.

FIGURE 2: DURATION OF RETURN AMONG IDP RETURNEES BY LOCALITY

Interestingly, the non-displaced population is also very mobile. We see that 52% of the non-displaced households across the three localities have resided in the current village less than 5 years; 26% between 5 and 10 years, 17% more than 10 years and only 4% indicate they have lived there 'all their lives'.

LIVELIHOODS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES

Access to livelihoods is a key factor for local integration—durable solutions for IDPs and IDP returnees require access to employment and livelihoods akin to that of the non-displaced population; while often livelihoods of all displacement and conflict affected populations are impacted. Considering in more detail households' sources of income and coping strategies provides a more nuanced picture and a better understanding both of particular vulnerabilities as well as of the livelihood opportunities. Sustainable livelihoods and access to required resources is a key challenge in post-conflict settings and an important element to post-conflict redevelopment.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Crop farming is the main livelihood for the great majority in all groups: 88% of both returnee and non-displaced residents as well as 83% of IDPs. Reliance on crop farming is especially high in Yassin among non-displaced residents (94%).**
- **The population rely on agriculture to a very high degree: respectively 40% and 41% of non-displaced and returnees and 47% of IDPs say crop farming is their only source of livelihood.**
- **About a quarter of non-displaced, IDP and returnee men practice subsistence farming. (But subsistence farming is higher among women by 6–8 percentage points).**
- **Approximately 50% across all surveyed groups work for profit or pay. Crop farming and the private sector are the main industries of paid work. The private sector notably includes commercial farming.**
- **Overall, a higher proportion of women who work for profit or pay are engaged in crop farming compared to men. This trend is stronger among non-displaced women of whom 74% work in crop farming compared to 31% of men.**
- **Large proportions of the work force in employment are under-employed. IDP (58%), non-displaced (53%) and returnee (51%) men are looking for more work, whilst this is the case for 38%–43% of women. A majority across all groups work 5–8 months per year reflecting the agricultural nature of their work.**
- **A large proportion of youths (15–24 years) are outside the labour force, but a majority of male youths are in education—non-displaced (69%), returnee (72%) and IDP (81%) of male youths are studying. In comparison, fewer 'out-of-work-force' female youths are in education (non-displaced (42%), returnee (49%) and IDP (40%) are studying.**
- **Accordingly, the NEET rate is higher amongst female youths with 26% of non-displaced, 24% returnee and 28% of female youths, and this trend is especially pronounced in Assalaya locality.**
- **All three surveyed groups pointed to high food prices as the most significant shock during the last 12 months. A majority in all surveyed groups resorted to 'sustainable' coping strategies to address the most significant shock they faced. Looking closer at the returnee population, households that returned more than 10 years ago use less sustainable coping strategies compared to those that returned later.**
- **The data shows significant differences between the three localities when it comes to shocks to livelihoods caused by drought, water shortages, floods and violence, raiding, looting or robbery.**

- **Fewer households in Assalaya are food insecure (non-displaced 18% and returnees (17%) in contrast to Sheria (32%–35%) and Yassin (25%–30%).**

MAIN LIVELIHOOD SOURCES

In all three localities, agriculture is central to people's livelihoods. They household survey shows that across the three localities 4 in 5 households rely on crop farming; both 88% of non-displaced and returnees depend on crop farming, whilst this proportion is a little lower amongst IDPs (83%). A majority of nomadic pastoralists rely on livestock as 52 from a total of 71 households indicate that livestock is their main livelihoods source, while 9 households specify crop farming. Amongst IDP households, a higher proportion (10%) rely on salaried or wage employment compared to returnee (6%) and non-displaced (5%) households. When considering variations between localities, the data indicate that reliance on crop farming in Yassin is especially high among the non-displaced population—94% of households depend on crop farming and merely 2% on wage labour.

A high proportion of the population list crop agriculture as their *only* source of livelihood. Almost half of IDPs (47%), whilst respectively 40% and 41% of non-displaced and returnees do not have an additional source of income indicating people are relying on agriculture to a very high degree.[28] Among nomads, 30 households (of a total of 71 family units) indicate that they have no secondary source of income. Considering any differences between male and female-headed households, the data shows no real difference in regards to source of livelihood. Only among non-displaced residents, a higher proportion of female-headed family units rely on crop farming (92%), whilst 86% of households headed by a man depend on crop farming.

MAIN OCCUPATION: EMPLOYMENT AND OWN-USE FARMING

Overall, a considerable proportion of the population is working for profit or pay as opposed to subsistence farming.[29] About 50% of men (15–64 years) across all three groups work for profit or pay, whilst a quarter practice subsistence (own-use) farming.[30] This is true as well for the nomadic population in the three localities, as 160 out of a total of 234 individuals work for profit or pay, whereas only 23 nomads say they practise own-use production. Subsistence farming is higher among women compared to men across all surveyed groups (by 6–8 percentage points). Similar proportions of men across the target groups are 'inactive' (neither working for pay/profit nor in own-use farming), respectively 20% (non-displaced), 21% (IDPs), returnees (22%) and nomads 22%.[31] In comparison to men, more women are 'inactive': 33% of returnee plus 29% of non-displaced and IDP women.

When comparing across localities, work for profit/pay is overall higher in **Yassin** among both men (60–63%) and women (42%–49%) although a high proportion of non-displaced men in **Sheria** also work for a salary (59%). Amongst returnee population, less men (17%) and women (26%) in **Yassin**

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[28] In the survey, no secondary income source was indicated by the survey respondents.
[29] To 'work for profit or pay' refers to those in salaried or waged employment, own their own business or sell their agricultural produce. Subsistence or 'own-use' farming refers to those, who work in agriculture but do not sell any of their produce.
[30] Among the non-displaced residents, 52% work for profit or pay, whilst 26% are subsistence farmers. For returnees and IDPs, the split is almost identical; 54% and 25% amongst returnees and 52% and 26% for IDPs.
[31] 51 nomads out of a total of 234 nomads surveyed indicated that they are neither working for profit/pay or engaged in own-use production.

practice subsistence farming compared to **Assalaya** returnee men (23%) and women (28%). An even higher proportion of **Sheria** returnees engage in 'own-use' farming; men (33%) and women (38%).

FIGURE 3: MAIN ACTIVITY OF WORKING-AGE PERSONS (15-64 YEARS) BY SEX

The survey data shows that crop farming and the private sector are the main industries of paid work, however the private sector includes commercial farming and employment related to East Darfur town markets. When it comes to youth (15–24), high proportions are employed in the private sector; IDP (61%), returnees (34%) and non-displaced (31%) compared to other sectors. Crop farming is also an important sector for 15–24-year-olds, but especially so for the non-displaced youth of whom 47% work in crop farming.[32]

Overall, women who work for profit or pay are much more engaged in crop farming than men. This is in line with UNDP figures that point to 60% of agricultural labour force in Darfur is made up of women.[33] This is especially true for non-displaced women, 74% of non-displaced women are working in crop farming compared to 31% of men. Among returnees, 46% of women versus 23% of work in crop farming.[34]

UNDER-EMPLOYMENT

Considering under-employment provides a better grasp of people's employment circumstances. For example, are those who are working searching for more work? Looking for additional work could indicate that people's current work is not providing enough income to support the household. And looking closer at how much people are working can expose whether people are only working part-time or during certain months of the year. Of those that are working in Assalaya, Yassin and Sheria, a large proportion of all three population groups are looking for more work. A larger proportion of men are looking for additional work compared to women. 58% of IDP, non-displaced (53%) and returnee (51%) men want to find more work, whilst this is the case for respectively IDP (43%), non-displaced (41%) and returnee women (38%). Looking at different age groups, there is no difference between youth (15–24 years) and other generations. All population groups point out the same obstacles to

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[32] 17% of IDPs and 35% of returnee youth work in crop farming.
[33] UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.
[34] This trend is not evident among IDPs, respectively 14% and 17% of IDP men and women work in crop farming.

finding work—irregular or lack of work opportunity plus inadequate or a lack of skills. The skill sets that were most singled out and requested by respondents include handicraft skills, agricultural knowledge and competencies plus food processing skills. There is also no availability of micro-credit schemes providing small-scale loans to help individuals become self-employed or grow a business.[35]

The household survey found that a high proportion of households own a mobile phone. Mobile phone ownership is higher amongst men as 54%–60% of men report owning a mobile phone. Mobile phone ownership is lower among pastoralist nomads as 42 individuals of 192 reported (22%) owning a mobile phone. Among non-displaced and IDP returnee women approximately 30% own a mobile phone.[36] A recent ILO report on East Darfur point out that mobile phone could make it easier for businesses and cooperatives to reach markets at regional, state and potentially at national level. Also, the Bank of Khartoum has launched a mobile money service (MBok) that has the potential to provide access to banking services despite the absence of financial services providers. With regards to developing skills, repairing mobile phones could become a useful skill for young people in the target communities.[37]

Using a different lens to view under-employment takes into account how much people are working. A clear majority across all groups work 5–8 months per year—IDPs (69%), returnees (76%) and non-displaced (79%). When looking in closer detail at the group of people that work as subsistence farmers, more than 80% across all groups work in this season pattern (between 5–8 months).

OUTSIDE THE LABOUR FORCE

The population referred to as 'outside of the labour force' are persons, who are of working-age (15–64 years) but economically inactive. A significantly higher proportion of youths (15–24 years) are not engaged in subsistence farming nor working for profit or pay.

Among women youths, close to half are 'outside' the labour force and this proportion is higher compared to young men (by approximately 10 percentage points).[38] In all three localities, the majority of young men who are 'out of the labour force' are in education. 69% of non-displaced, 72% of returnee and 81% of IDP male youths are studying, whilst the remainder is performing household duties, working on the farm without pay and other unpaid activities. In comparison, fewer female youths are enrolled in education. Non-displaced (42%), returnee (49%) and IDP (40%) female youths are studying.

The proportion of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET rate) is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator.[39] It shows the number of young persons as a percentage of the total youth population, who are not in education, employment or training and hence conveys information on the labour market situation for the population of young people. For the three East Darfur localities, there are significantly more women than men in this category. The NEET rate is 11% for non-displaced and returnee male youth and lower still among IDP youth (8%). In contrast, this rate is 26% of non-displaced, 24% of returnee and 28% of IDP female youths. Looking at locality-level

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[35] Assalaya, Yassin and Sheria localities, East Darfur, key informant interviews.

[36] Fewer non-displaced women in Assalaya own a mobile phone (23%), whilst 39% of non-displaced women in Sheiria report owning a mobile phone. Generally about 30% of women own a mobile phone and the proportions for non-displaces women in Assalaya and Sheiria are outlying figures.

[37] ILO (2021) PROSPECTS Sudan Baseline Survey. Draft report. March 2021

[38] Returnee (47%), IDP (46%) and non-displaced (45%) young women (15–24 years) are out of the labour force.

[39] SDG indicator 8.6.1

rates, even higher NEET rates for Assalaya and Sheria stand out. In Assalaya, 30% of non-displaced and 27% of returnee female youth are not in education, employment or training. Whilst this is the case for 32% of non-displaced and 20% returnee female youth in Sheiria.[40] Key informants state that male youths leave school to look for income earning opportunities. [41] A recent study from November 2019 found that youths are vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups and that unemployment and poverty are the main drivers for youth to join conflicts. [42] The same study found that women also join armed groups in Darfur although mainly providing support in terms of cooking, nursing and intelligence gathering.[43]

FIGURE 4: YOUTH BY SEX NOT WORKING AND NOT IN EDUCATION - SDG 8.6.1

SHOCKS TO LIVELIHOODS

During the last couple of years, Sudan has seen soaring price rises for fuel and stable foods such as sorghum, millet and wheat. The household survey also looked at what respondents thought to be the most severe shocks to their livelihoods. Large majorities across all surveyed groups report shocks linked to rising food prices and fuel costs, crop diseases, restrictions linked to COVID-19 and loss of income. The population groups were impacted to similar extents by the different shocks with no great differences between the non-displaced residents, returnees and IDPs. All three surveyed groups pointed to high food prices as the most significant shock during the past 12 months—non-displaced (63%), returnees (63%) and IDPs (59%) residents. The same is the case for the nomad population; all households (71) surveyed say that the rise in food prices is the most significant shock. Secondly, nomads point to loss of livestock and animal diseases as significant shocks.[44] Shocks due to drought, floods and water shortages are singled out as shocks by significantly fewer respondents and so are shocks linked to violence, raiding, robbery or assault.[45]

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[40] Note, the IDP sample size is not large enough to make conclusions at locality level, only when figures are combined for all three localities.
[41] Assalaya locality, East Darfur—key informant (education official).
[42] UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur.
[43] Ibid.
[44] 53 of 71 households say that loss of livestock and 40 of 71 households specify animal diseases as major shocks to their livelihoods.
[45] The number of nomadic households that specify drought as a significant shock is 13/71 households, flooding was flagged by 16/71 households, water shortages by 8/71 households, while 9/71 households say that violence, raiding looting, robbery or assault caused major shocks to their livelihoods.

The data shows differences between the three localities. In Assalaya, a considerable smaller proportion of households reported drought to be a severe livelihoods shock. Merely, non-displaced (12%) and returnees (15%) in contrast to between 29% – 36% of residents in Yassin and Sheria.[46] As this is a shock that affects all groups living in the locality, there are no significant difference between returnees and non-displaced residents. When it comes to water shortages resulting in severe livelihoods shocks, Yassin is the hardest hit locality, but it is also an issue for about a third residents living in Sheria. 46% of non-displaced and 39% of returnee Yassin residents deem water shortages to be a severe livelihood shock, whilst this is only true for respectively 30% and 28% of non-displaced and returnees in Sheria locality.[47] Residents living in Assalaya and Yassin locality are more impacted by floods—one-third regards floods to be shock to their livelihood, whereas this only affects a quarter or less of the population in Sheria.[48] Violence, raiding, looting or robbery that have drastically affected livelihoods is reported by a higher number in Yassin—respectively 16% (non-displaced) and 15% (returnees). Assalaya follows with 11% and 10% (non-displaced and returnees), whilst less Sheiria residents report violence, raiding, looting and robbery to be a shock.

COPING MECHANISMS

How did the surveyed households deal with the shocks to their livelihoods? The households surveyed were asked if and how they had responded to livelihood shocks. Selecting from a broad range of coping mechanisms, a picture emerges of how households have coped. Grouping responses into 'negative' or non-reversible versus 'positive' or sustainable coping strategies is a good predictor of future vulnerability. In other words, to what extend a household is resilient when facing potential future shocks. For example, 'non-sustainable' or more extreme coping mechanisms (selling productive assets) suggest serious long-term consequences. Such strategies are less reversible and thus represent a more severe form of coping.[49]

FIGURE 5: COPING MECHANISMS APPLIED TO MOST SIGNIFICANT SHOCK – STATE LEVEL

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
[46] In Sheria locality, 36% and 30% of respectively non-displaced and returnee residents say that drought was a severe shock to their livelihood during the last 12 months prior to the survey. For Yassin locality, the figure was 29% of both the non-displaced and returnee population.

[47] Water shortages is much less of a problem in Assalaya locality as merely 11% and 12% of the non-displaced and returnee population consider this a shock.

[48] Between 29–33% of the population in Assalaya and Yassin, whilst only 19% (non-displaced) and 14% (returnees) deem this a livelihood shock in Sheria.

[49] The categorization is based on the responses provided to the question 'what do you do when faced with X shock to your livelihood? Modest coping strategies are easily reversible or strategies that do not jeopardize longer-term prospects, while more extreme coping mechanisms have longer-term consequences. Categories for coping were reviewed by UNDP Sudan colleagues. Based on feedback, the coping mechanisms were grouped according to severity into non-sustainable/irreversible and sustainable/reversible. For example, 'sold farm area', 'reduced food consumption', 'selling animals' were categorized as 'non-sustainable', whilst 'selling more crops', 'starting a new business', 'received help from an NGO' were grouped as less severe/reversible coping mechanisms.

Considering the coping mechanisms that residents in all three localities resorted to, the majority in all surveyed groups used 'sustainable' coping strategies to address the most significant shock that the household faced. 55% of non-displaced residents in Assalaya, Yassin and Sheria used 'sustainable' coping mechanisms and so did 57% of IDPs and 65% of returnee households. When it comes to using 'unsustainable' mechanisms to counter livelihood shocks, the non-displaced population used this to a higher degree (40%) compared to returnees (30%).

When looking closer at the returnee population, some differences come to light. Returnee households that have been back for more than 10 years use less 'unsustainable' coping mechanisms (28%) versus households that have returned less than 5 years ago (38%) and between 5 and 10 years ago (36%). The data suggest that IDP households that returned more than 10 years ago are better established and can better withstand livelihood shocks. Across the three localities, the data indicates no great differences apart from in Assalaya locality where the non-displaced residents appear to apply more severe coping strategies. 50% of non-displaced Assalaya inhabitants apply 'unsustainable' coping mechanisms, which is between 12 and 22 percentage points higher than the non-displaced population in Yassin and Sheria.

FOOD SECURITY

Households were asked if there had been times when they did not have enough food or money to buy food during the past 7 days. At the individual locality level, there are differences as the data shows that fewer households in Assalaya respondent that they did not have enough food (or money to buy food): among Assalaya non-displaced households 18% are food insecure and so are 17% of returnee households. This is in contrast to Sheria (32%–35%) and Yassin (25%–30%).

The reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) is an indicator of household food security. The rCSI assesses how people cope when they do not have enough to eat or any money to buy food. The proxy tool takes into account how often particular strategies are used and the severity of the strategies employed, by categorizing the way households are coping into low, medium and high coping strategies with the latter being the most severe.[50] Among these households that did not have food the previous week, the majority of all groups in all surveyed groups applied coping mechanisms of low or medium severity—practically no households used negative coping strategies (1%–3% across all groups).[51]

FOCUS ON FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS

Female-headed households make up one-third of non-displaced and returnee households, and it is therefore important to understand if and to what extend these households may be more vulnerable. Regarding food security, very similar proportion of female-headed family units reported not having enough food during the week preceding the survey among the non-displaced—26% female-headed families versus 23% of male-headed families did not have enough food. Among returnees, there is larger difference with 30% of female-headed in contrast to 22% of male-headed families. Using coping

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[50] The reduced CSI has been developed to compare food security across different contexts. It is a sub-set of the context-specific CSI but food security is calculated using a specific set of behaviours with a universal set of severity weightings for each behaviour. Thus, the reduced CSI uses a standard set of five individual coping behaviours that can assess food security of households in any context: eating less-preferred foods, borrowing food/money from friends and relatives, limiting portions at mealtimes, limiting adult food intake, and reducing the number of meals per day. Maxwell, D. and Caldwell, R. (2008) The Coping Strategies Index. Field Methods Manual (March, 2008).

[51] In all three East Darfur localities, 85% of non-displaced residents resorted to 'low' and 14% resorted to 'medium' coping mechanism.

mechanisms to livelihood shocks as a proxy for vulnerability, the data suggest no significant differences between male- and female-headed households (difference by 1–2 percentage points). When comparing the age-dependency ratio of female and male headed households, the data suggests that households headed up by women are somewhat more vulnerable. Among non-displaced residents in the three localities, 60% of female-headed compared to 54% of male-headed households experience a higher pressure on the working-age members of the family.[52] Amongst IDPs 63% of female-headed versus 54% of male-headed households, whilst this split is 57% and 54% for returnees.[53]

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[52] A higher pressure on the working-age members of the family is evident when the dependency ratio is higher than 1.
[53] Note that no difference was found between the surveyed groups (non-displaced, IDPs and returnees).

HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY: ACCESS AND TENURE

The enjoyment of housing, land and property rights is key to achieving durable solutions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs regards effective accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP) as crucial criteria to determine if IDPs have reached a durable solution. This is because housing, land and property underpin people's livelihoods and standard of living.

This chapter explores IDPs and returnees' access to land.[54] Have they managed to regain their land and rebuild their livelihoods? What are the specific obstacles to this? Drawing on the data of the non-displaced population as a benchmark, the analysis looks to explore and explain obstacles faced by camp IDPs and returnees.

From a peacebuilding perspective, violations of IDPs' housing, land and property (HLP) rights are a major obstacle to durable solutions for IDPs but are also integral to reaching peace, because land is a primary driver cause *and* ongoing driver of conflict between communities. The Juba Peace Agreement recognises the importance of land—land is a resource for the good of all people of Sudan. The agreement specifies that Individuals and communities have the right to restitution of lands lost as a result of the conflict in Darfur and where return of the land is not possible, IDPs are entitled to compensation. As part of the peace agreement a number of structures and institutions have been established with particular mandates relating to land issues.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Renting is the predominance form of agricultural land tenure. Among the non-displaced residents in the three localities: 60% rent land whilst 33% report owning the agricultural land; 67% of returnees rent, whilst 23% own, and 80% among the IDP population rent whilst only 10% own the land they cultivate.**
- **Large proportions of IDP returnees have been able to regain access to the land they cultivated prior to their displacement: 79% of returnees in Assalaya, 82% in Sheiria and 83% in Yassin. The majority of these are renting now the land.**
- **A majority claim customary rights to agricultural land, whilst only a minority hold land registration certificates: In Assalaya, 11% from both groups hold registration certificates to prove ownership. In Sheria, a somewhat higher proportion have registration certificates—non-displaced (17%) and returnees (21%), whilst 21% (non-displaced) and 13% (returnees) in Yassin that have land carry this official ownership document.**
- **Less than 20% of non-displaced and returnee residents in all three localities have demarcated land (with the exception among IDPs returnees in Sheiria, where 25% report demarcated land).**
- **Residential land: the majority reported that they own their housing plot, whilst many also said they live on government-owned land and only few reported renting residential land. In**

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[54] Access refers to obtaining or using land. Access to land is governed through land tenure systems, which is 'relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups with respect to land.' A land tenure system determines who can use what land, for how long and under what terms. FAO (2002) Land Tenure Studies (4). Gender and access to land.

Sheiria, almost half of the non-displaced (49%) report having a registration certificate, whilst only 24% of returnees. In Yassin, 18% of non-displaced compared to 24% of returnees hold this official documentation. In Assalaya, only 7% of non-displaced and 9% of returnees have a land registration certificate.

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ACCESS TO LAND & TENURE SECURITY

Access to land in Assalaya, Sheiria and Yassin is central to many people livelihoods, as livelihoods sources among the sedentary population overwhelmingly depend on crop agriculture. High proportions among IDP returnee and non-displaced residents report having access to land—95% of both non-displaced and returnees, whilst 91% of IDPs state they have access. Access to agricultural land follows a traditional setup, where housing plots are clustered in villages and fields positioned some distance away.[55]

Exploring households' type of tenure of agricultural land, the data shows that renting is the predominance form of tenure—the majority of sedentary residents rent agricultural land rather than own it. Among the non-displaced residents in the three localities, 60% rent land whilst 33% report owning the agricultural land. 67% of returnees rent, whilst 23% own, and 80% among the IDP population rent whilst only 10% own the land they cultivate.

FIGURE 6: TENURE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND BY LOCALITY

Likewise, when asking returnees whether they have been able to regain access to the land they cultivated prior to their displacement, high proportions are accessing the same land. In Assalaya, 74% of returnees regained access to the same land, and so did 79% in Sheiria and likewise 79% in Yassin.

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[55] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

However, of the returnees that are accessing the same land a majority are renting the land—Assalaya (60%), Shirea (63%) and Yassin (64%).

This prevalence of renting agricultural land in the three East Darfur localities can be explained by the specifics of the conflict over land in this part of Darfur. Farming communities were displaced from their settlements by southern Reizegat who, referring to the Hakura system, laid claims to the land. East Darfur IDPs were subsequently allowed to return under certain circumstances. This included renting the land that they previously farmed, which signals that the land belongs to the Reizegat tribe. Hence, renting land is part of a negotiated diplomatic solution that makes it possible for many farmers to access agricultural land. A majority of returnees and IDPs are farmers, and in case they cannot access their land, the next best option is to rent land.[56] What does rent mean in the context of East Darfur? Tributes are different from location to location, but has also changed over time. Rent can be paid in currency, in kind or in services. To start with, payments were small and symbolic in nature but in some cases, farmers are required to pay a high percentage of their harvest yield. On some occasions, farmers are able to negotiate more favourable rent terms when bargaining as a group.[57]

Looking in more detail at access to land and tenure by each locality reveal a few differences. A higher proportion report to own land in **Assalaya;** 27% of returnees and 42% of non-displaced residents. This is in contrast to **Sheiria** locality, where returnees (18%) and non-displaced (19%) own land plus Yassin locality where landownership is reported by 28% of non-displaced and 24% of returnee inhabitants. According to thematic experts this can, at least in part, be explain by the tribal composition of the three different localities. **Assalaya** is dominated by the Reizegat pastoralist tribe, while Sheiria and Yassin localities are part of the Birgid tribe, who are crop farmers. Much higher proportions of the population were displaced from the Sheiria and Yassin localities compared to Assalaya, which has a higher proportion of Reizegat inhabitants. It is likely that the Birgid farming communities have had to negotiate renting land, whereas Rezeigat do not.

When it comes to the pastoralist nomadic population, pastoralist generally report having access to grazing land; 61 of 71 surveyed pastoralist households state they have access to grazing land. Most access communal grazing land (26) or government land (16), whilst 4 households rent and 3 households report ownership.[58] Some respondents included in the area level analysis believe that pastoralist nomads are not interested in owning land as their traditional way of life means that they move with their livestock herds in search of pasture. According to a nomad pastoralist leader in Assalaya locality, this is only partly true. He states that as long as nomads are moving, they do not have a need to access such residential land but also points out that generally there is an interest to gain agricultural land in closer proximity to towns and cities so they can have better access to basic services such as education. And thus, nomads would be willing to change their nomadic lifestyle and diversify their income activities also partly because of climate change among other factors is making nomadic pastoralist way of life harder. However, he states that it is not easy for nomads to receive agricultural land as 'the arable lands are owned by farmers rather than nomads and they do not agree for nomads to own land.[59]

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[56] Consultation with thematic experts and former East Darfur UNAMID staff.

[57] Consultation with UN thematic experts.

[58] Note, not enough pastoralist households were reached through the household survey to make up a representative sample. A total of 71 households were surveyed in the sample, which can give some insights, but cannot be viewed in percentages. Therefore, numbers of households are listed rather than proportions (see methodology for more details).

[59] Assalaya, East Darfur—key informant, nomad leader.

THE DARFURI HAKURA LAND TENURE SYSTEM

Darfur is governed by plural legal land tenure systems. Since the start of the joint authority Anglo-Eqyptian rule of Sudan, modern statutory laws have existed alongside traditional customary laws. In practical terms, this legal pluralism means that there are 'overlapping institutions for accessing land'.[60] The customary 'Hakura' system is the traditional way to manage land in Darfur. Ownership of land does not correspond to the Western legal concept. Following the customary system, rights are not exclusive and land is 'owned' or belong to a community. Land in Darfur is split into tribal homelands, which is named a Dar. Generally, the homeland belongs to a major tribe, which gave this tribe monopoly over land but crucially also leadership and political representation and power.[61] A tribal sheik from the dominant homeland tribe can assign a piece of land (hakura) to a group of people, family or person. Permission is granted for a time period and in case the land allocated is not being used, then the sheik may reallocate it to another person or group.[62] Crucially, not all groups have a Dar—tribes can be categorized as land-holding and non-landing tribes. Sheiks not belonging to a tribe that do not have a homeland are knows as 'sheik of the people' and has no authority over land.[63] A recent UN Habitat report assesses that the customary 'Hakura' system is still the predominant way to manage land in Darfur and that registered land ownership cover less than 1% of the land in Darfur with very few registered parcels of land in rural locales.[64] The East Darfur household survey results are in line with this portrayal—data shows that a great majority of people state their land rights derive from customary law.[65] A majority claim customary rights to agricultural land, whilst only a minority hold land registration certificates. In **Assalaya**, half of those who own agricultural land claim customary rights—returnee (56%) and non-displaced (52%) residents. Of those that own land in **Sheiria** locality, 42% and 41% of respectively non-displaced and returnees report customary ownership. In **Yassin** locality, 43% of non-displaced and 53% of returnee land owners claim customary land rights.

The 'Hakura' system itself represents an obstacle for accessing land for some groups. Key informant interviews (KIIs) with East Darfur respondents flag that women face inequalities when it comes to land ownership, because customary law does not grant women land rights.[66] According to one key informant, the justification is that if a woman marries a man from outside her extended tribal family, the land would be transferred to someone outside the tribe, which is not permitted. The survey found that households headed up by a man report higher ownership of land compared to female-headed households, while equal proportions are able to access rented land. 46% of male-headed versus 34% of female-headed households report owning land. These figures may not present a true picture of landownership by women, as information was captured at the household level. It is plausible that the female-head of the household would not herself own the land, but that a son or other male relative from the household does.

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[60] Young, H. et al. (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management.

[61] Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.

[62] UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.

[63] East Darfur, key informant—Native Administration

[64] UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.

[65] In urban cities like El Fasher, it is common for residents (non-displaced) to hold a registered area certificate (between 94–97% of peri-urban and city centre residents). UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

[66] According to statutory law, women can own land, however, in rural areas customary land rights do allow women access to land. UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.

Pastoralist nomads are also groups that are identified to have little access to land, as an outcome of how the customary 'Hakura' system manages access to land.[67] Nomads do not have access to land due to their movement because traditional land rights are linked to agricultural use of land. Communal ownership of land was traditionally not attainable for nomadic communities. Instead, pastoralist had transient rights including access to water for animals and humans plus access to grazing land and livestock routes.[68] Hence, sheiks from pastoralist communities that do not have a homeland—a Dar— would not have land to offer members of their tribe, whereas leaders of sedentary communities traditionally could assign or lease land. In fact, many Darfur experts argue that the inability of the indigenous 'Hakura' system to allow for full participation by nomadic pastoralists aggravated divisions between sedentary farmers and nomads and thus was a major factor in the development of the conflict. This is because a Dar—a homeland—is traditionally linked to political participation and comes with formal leadership positions in local and regional state institutions and have excluded nomadic pastoralists and smaller tribes.

The customary system also partially excludes 'those not native to a Dar that practices the system'. Therefore, outsiders to a specific Dar, for instance, some internally displaced persons have limited access to land. In **Sheiria**, key informants generally agreed that IDPs cannot own agricultural land in the area of displacement, but could do so in their homeland. In **Assalaya and Yassin,** respondents did not identify any significant differences between IDPs and non-displaced residents with regards to owning land, but pointing to a policy that demands that IDPs are treated the same as other community members. It is unclear why this differs in Assalaya and Yassin, but could be due small numbers of IDPs in these two localities.

DEMARCATION AND REGISTRATION CERTIFICATES FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND

Less than 20% of non-displaced and returnee residents in all three localities have demarcated land (with the exception among IDPs returnees in Sheiria, where 25% report demarcated land). 'Demarcated' land refers to farm land officially surveyed and registered, however, the figures do not correspond to the proportions of the population that report holding registration certificates. This may be explained by the fact that obtaining a registration certificates involves many steps, but the first stage requires the Native Administration to survey and demarcate the land. In **Assalaya**, 11% from both groups hold registration certificates to prove ownership. In **Sheria**, a somewhat higher proportion have registration certificates—non-displaced (17%) and returnees (21%), whilst 21% (non-displaced) and 13% (returnees) in **Yassin** that have land carry this official ownership document.

The commonly held logic behind wanting to demarcate and legally register land is to establish clarity on boundaries and ownership, and in turn reduce conflict over land.[69] Then, how come such a small percentage of people possess a legal certificate documenting ownership of their land? One explanation is that it is a complicated, lengthy and costly process that only grants ownership for a relatively short time period (6-7 years).[70] The process of obtaining a land registration certificate is not only lengthy, but also involves dealing with both the Native Administration, who oversees the customary tenure system, and the formal legal judiciary in charge of formal registration of land.

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[67] Sheiria locality, East Darfur, community representative—youth.
[68] Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.
[69] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181
[70] Consultation from thematic expert from UN Habitat, February 2021.

Some Darfur commentators suggest a different explanation; that demarcation has been 'actively resisted' by the population that claim customary ownership of land. The rejection, it is argued, has to do with limited trust in the government and the government institutions that are involved in demarcation and land registration.[71] Furthermore, thematic experts point out that the process involved in official land registration of farmland is open to manipulation. The process involves the Native Administration to sign and endorse a written form. The claim to land is broadcast on local radio, if no one disputes the claim it will be officially registered using GPS mapping to demarcate. People can register land, but it is very hard to verify that it is, in fact, their land. Are the Omdas, the original tribal leaders of the land in question or more recent arrivals? Therefore, the process itself needs to be strengthened or changed. In addition, IDPs and returnees also complain that the cost of the official GPS demarcation is high; it costs 200 SDG per feddan.[72]

HOUSING AND RESIDENTIAL LAND

When asked about the tenure of residential land, returnees and non-displaced residents mainly reported that they own their housing plot, whilst many also said they live on government-owned land (used by people for free). Only few reported renting residential land. In **Sheiria**, a high proportion of non-displaced (49%) report having a registration certificate, whilst only 24% of returnees. In **Yassin**, 18% of non-displaced compared to 24% of returnees hold this official documentation. In **Assalaya**, 7% of non-displaced whilst 9% of returnees have a land registration certificate proving ownership of their housing plot. According to thematic experts, the land registration process for residential land is easier and it is easier to be awarded relatively small plots of land for housing.[73]

The Juba Peace Agreement sets out some changes to the hierarchy of the statutory and customary land tenure systems. The government of Jafar Numeiri enacted the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, which brought all land not formally registered into government ownership. In practice the Act asserted government ownership over lands that were already claimed under the customary land tenure 'Hakura' system and administered by the Native Administration. The Juba Peace Agreement signed in 2020 explicitly recognises traditional ownership of tribal lands (referred to as Hawakeer), historic rights to lands plus customary livestock routes and opportunities to access water.[74] Moreover, customary law takes precedence in the event that there is a conflict between Sudanese statutory law and customary law relating to land. Subsequently, laws should be amended to include land rights 'according to the norms, traditions, and inherited practices of land tenure in Darfur'.[75] It is unclear whether these changes to land tenure in the peace agreement represent a view as to whether formal land registration in Darfur is the right tool for reducing conflict over land or not. But certainly, some Darfur scholars hold the view that it is the inherent flexibility and ambiguity of customary tenure that allows for the 'elasticity required in the tenure system to accommodate livestock migrations and pursue options in drought years'.[76]

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[71] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181
[72] Consultation with UN thematic experts, March 2021.
[73] Consultation with UN thematic experts, March 2021.
[74] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.1
[75] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.5
[76] Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.

REGAINING ACCESS TO RESIDENTIAL LAND

The majority of returnees in **Assalaya** (80%), **Sheiria** (84%), and **Yassin** (81%) regained access to same residential land in their village of origin. Among those, who are not accessing same land, returnees in **Assalaya** (78%), **Sheiria** (79%), and **Yassin** (62%), do not have documentation to prove ownership. Among returnees not accessing the same residential land, the majority point to land occupation and disputed ownership that hinder their access.

As discussed in a different context above, a majority of returnees have regained access to the same agricultural land in **Assalaya** (74%), **Sheiria** (79%) and **Yassin** (79%), but the majority rent rather than own their agricultural land. Those returnees that moved back earlier have better access to the land they cultivated prior to their displacement. In other words, the longer the duration of return, the more households were able to regain access to the same land.

The vast majority (97%) of IDPs in the three East Darfur localities did not report any issues related to residential land and 50% of IDPs said they own their housing plot. Only 21% of IDPs are accessing the same land before displacement, and among those that are not, the majority (80%) report that they have lost their rights to their land. 43% of IDPs say their land is unlawfully occupied, whilst 32% refer to disputed ownership of the land.

Area-level data confirms the main challenges faced by returnees and IDPs. Key informants point to land occupied by others and it is often the sheik, who has offered this land to others whilst the original occupants were displaced. Respondents in **Assalaya** emphasise that this is often the case in the areas located north of the railway line between the two villages Al-Jalabi and Warqat.[77]

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[77] Assalaya, East Darfur, key informant interviews.

SAFETY, SECURITY, CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW

Perceptions of safety and security are key criteria for durable solutions. The analysis aims to understand if IDPs and returnees experience a higher degree of safety and security incidents in comparison to the non-displaced population. What type of insecurity and conflict do residents face?

Lack of security has the ability to erode the overall confidence in peacebuilding processes and therefore restoring the rule of law is imperative. Peacebuilding is ultimately concerned with transforming post-conflict societies so that political, social disputes and conflict are managed and resolved through non-violent means. The rule of law is a framework for the peaceful management of conflict and fair administration of justice through institutions, mechanisms and procedures.[78] Ensuring the rule of law relies on the capacity of the police and formal courts, but how effective are the police and courts in the East? The role of civil society in conflict resolution and peacebuilding is also important in Darfur and therefore local conflict resolution mechanisms are reviewed and their perceived effectiveness assessed. Key informants also provide insight into the limitations of local conflict resolution mechanisms, but also how local mechanisms can be strengthened and local peacebuilding capacities supported.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Robbery and damage to property and livestock is the most common security incident reported by all surveyed groups. Non-displaced (47%) and 42% of both IDP and returnees report damage to livestock or property during the 12 months preceding the survey, plus 32–36% have experienced at least one robbery. In Yassin locality, returnees and IDPs report more security incidents of all types by 2–6 percentage points. In contrast, a small number of pastoralists reported incidents involving threats, robbery and damage to property.**
- **Across the localities, 15% of returnee households and 14% of IDP households report that they have conflicts linked to their farming land, compared to 8% among non-displaced households. Variation among returnees in the reported conflicts is observed by locality: a higher proportion of conflicts is reported in Assalaya (19%) and Yassin (17%) compared to Sheiria (9%) – whereas the reported conflicts remain more similar among non-displaced by locality.**
- **Land conflict centres around disputed ownership, unlawful occupation, land boundaries and conflict linked to pastoralist grazing routes and is predominantly experienced by returnees and IDPs. Conflict does vary between localities, in Yassin 49% of the households with experienced land conflicts report animal grazing routes as the cause, whilst in Assalaya and Sheiria disputed ownership and unlawful occupation is a major conflict trigger, whilst conflict related to boundaries of land is reported by a smaller proportion of residents. In contrast, a minority (11/70) of surveyed nomads report conflict linked to grazing land.**

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[78] Kritz, N. J. (2007) The Rule of Law in Conflict Management in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.) (2007) Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World.

- **A majority of all surveyed groups do not report security incidents—non-displaced (68%), IDPs (70%) and returnees (71%), while 15% report to the police and 10% turn to a local committee or the Native Administration for help to resolve the dispute. In Sheiria locality, a higher percentage do not report incidents and less people report to the police compared to Yassin and Assalaya, whilst among Yassin residents a higher proportion seek help from local conflict resolution mechanisms.**
- **The is a difference between how residents in the different localities view the effectiveness of resolution mechanisms—among Yassin residents 31% were satisfied with the outcome in contrast to Assalaya (11%) and Sheiria (15%). The police lack staff, vehicles and fuel and cover vast geographical areas and thus have little response capacity, which is likely to be a factor as to why residents prefer not to report crime to the police.**
- **The Joint Committee is considered to be the most effective local community conflict resolution mechanism as all groups are represented, but appears to focus on conflicts related to grazing routes. Water committees also play an important role when it comes to manages competing human and livestock demands for water.**
- **Water Committees are more prevalent in Assalaya, in about two-thirds of communities, but 50% of respondents in Sheiria and 40% in Yassin report having no Water/WASH Committee in their village. And, significant proportions do not think the Water/WASH committee solve problems justly.**
- **The Joint Committee is perceived to be inclusive and representative, but women and pastoralists are not well represented. Sometimes, tribes have their own conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives, but this is also regarded as a challenge because such mechanisms make it difficult to work across tribal lines as one committee.**

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PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY INCIDENTS

In the three East Darfur localities, a high proportion (86%) of all surveyed groups report feeling safe whilst walking around during the day. Perceptions of safety drop about 20 percentage points amongst all groups when asked about feeling safe when walking at night—IDPs (60%), returnees (64%) and non-displaced (66%). 9% of returnee and 10% of IDP residents say they feel unsafe during the night, higher by 5 percentage points compared to non-displaced residents in the three localities.

Comparing people's perceptions of safety between the three localities show that a majority report feeling 'very safe' during the day. This sense of safety, however, is lower among Yassin residents. In **Yassin**, non-displaced (74%) and returnees (76%) say they feel 'very safe' during daylight hours, but this is in contrast to **Sheiria** (94%–97%) and **Assalaya** (88%–91%).[79] This pattern is also evident when reviewing people's perceptions of safety during the night. **Yassin** non-displaced (53%) and returnee (52%) residents say they feel 'very safe' when walking at night, whilst 5% and 10% among respectively non-displaced and returnees report feeling 'unsafe'. This is in contrast to **Assalaya** non-displaced (72%) and returnees (60%) inhabitants and **Sheiria** residents of whom 81% of non-displaced and 77% of returnees say they feel 'very safe' when walking during the hours of darkness.

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[79] In Sheiria locality, non-displaced (97%) and displaced (94%) report feeling 'very safe' during the day, whilst this is the case for non-displaced (91%) and returnee (88%) residents in Assalaya.

A small proportion of **Sheiria** residents feel unsafe walking at night—4% of the non-displaced and 6% of returnees.

Do women feel less safe than men? Perceptions around safety were captured at household level, but it is possible to gain some insight into gender dimensions by looking at female-headed households.[80] In all three localities, somewhat lower proportions of both non-displaced and returnee female-headed households report feeling safe, but only by less than 5 percentage points.

To pinpoint the kinds of confrontations and threats that communities in the East Darfur localities face, respondents were asked about incidents that they had experienced during the year prior to the survey. The data shows robbery and damage to property and livestock was much more common amongst all surveyed groups than verbal and physical threats. And all the types of incidents were experienced by similar proportions amongst all sedentary groups, whilst the majority of nomadic pastoralists interviewed reported no incidents and only a small number report threats, robbery or damage done to property. 47% of non-displaced and 42% of both IDP and returnee residents experienced damage to either livestock or property including crop damage during last 12 months, whilst 32%–36% report at least one incident of robbery. At individual locality level, this picture is more or less the same, but in Yassin locality there is somewhat higher rate of security incidents across the board for both displaced and non-displaced residents. Damage to property and livestock, robbery along with physical and verbal threats are all higher in Yassin by 2–6 percentage points.

FIGURE 7: HOUSEHOLDS THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED AT LEAST ONE SECURITY INCIDENT IN THE 12 MONTHS PRECEEDING THE SURVEY BY TYPE OF INCIDENT

DISPUTED OWNERSHIP AND BOUNDARY CONFLICT

In interviews with key informants on conflict, disputed ownership of land can take various forms. Key informants indicate that conflicts over inheritance of land between family members is common. Conflict over disputed ownership of land is mostly prevalent in IDP return areas between those displaced returning and others that have settled on the land. The conflict may also happen between IDPs and 'Sheiks of land' that have offered their previous agricultural land to someone else.

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[80] Perceptions of safety was captured at household level in the survey.

Conflicts linked to land boundaries also encompass a number of different scenarios. Conflicts between farmers over farm boundaries result from farmers expanding the cultivated land pushing into areas of the neighbouring farms. This kind of conflict cyclical and is reported to happen every year during the rainy seasons when farmers begin planting crops. Boundary conflict are reported to not only take place between individuals but also between communities in neighbouring localities. Yassin locality is said to have disputes with Assalaya locality, Belale locality and Gereida locality.[81] This type of boundary conflict evolves around mobilising revenue from economic activities for the benefit of the residents of the locality. For instance, revenue from a market erected on land that used to be belong to another tribe, but who are now mainly living in the neighbouring locality and therefore no longer profit from the market activities can be a cause of conflict. This type of conflict also happens between the local government, which often claims ownership of residential areas and market places, however, and a particular tribe that believe that the land in question is tribal land.

PREVALENCE OF CONFLICTS LINKED TO LAND

The survey data identify a few chief conflict drivers, but also indicate that those that experience conflict related to agricultural land are predominantly returnees and IDPs. Land conflict centres around disputed ownership, unlawful occupation of land, boundaries of land plus conflict linked to pastoralist grazing routes. Across the localities, 15% of returnee households and 14% of IDP households report that they have conflicts linked to their farming land, compared to 8% among non-displaced households. Variation among returnees in the reported conflicts is observed by locality: a higher proportion of conflicts is reported in Assalaya (19%) and Yassin (17%) compared to Sheiria (9%) – whereas the reported conflicts remain more similar among non-displaced by locality. Zooming into the type of conflicts, the findings show variation between the localities. In **Yassin** locality, 49% of returnees (among the 17% who reported conflicts) point to animal grazing routes as a major conflict trigger, whilst returnees in **Assalaya** report that disputed ownership (58% among the aforementioned 19%), unlawful occupation (15%) and conflict around boundaries of land (16%) are the main causes of conflict. The conflict portrayal in Assalaya is mirrored in **Sheiria** where returnee respondents also highlight disputed ownership (62% of the aforementioned 19%) and conflicts around boundaries of land (17%).

The vast majority of nomadic pastoralists (70/71) report that they have followed designated livestock routes, but 11 respondents say they have experienced conflict linked to grazing land. Issues flagged by the surveyed nomads include disputed ownership (4), grazing routes and rules not followed (4) plus unclear rules and processes regarding grazing land (2).

The area-level study can help clarify and provide context to the household survey findings. Key informants in all three East Darfur localities point to land as the chief cause of conflict and that conflict mostly happen along tribal lines. In **Assalaya**, disputes and conflict often happen between the Reziegat and Ma'alia tribes. The Southern Reizegat tribe is dominant in this locality and the land belongs to the Rezeigat; not many people are said to have been displaced during the conflict. The northern Railway area of Assalaya is different in this regard; Zaghawa villagers have been displaced by people belonging to the Ma'alia people, who now mainly make up recent settlers in this part.[82]

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[81] Yassin locality, East Darfur—key informants (Native Administration)
[82] This area stretches between the two villages of Al-Jalabi and Warqat and encompasses the villages of Al-Fado, Um Sauna, Anqabo, Um Dha and Al-snoot.

According to key informants, the land in this part of Assalaya is fertile and very productive including cash crops such as groundnuts and sesame.[83]

In **Sheiria** locality, key informants refer to a number of inter-tribal conflicts; between the Rezeigat and Ma'alia and the conflict that involves the Birgid tribe and Zaghawa, a minority living in Sheiria locality.[84] In Sheiria and Yassin locality, many respondents refer to conflict relating to rent for using agricultural land. In **Yassin** locality, the majority of inhabitants belong to the Birgid tribe, who are a sedentary farming community. Key informants stress that most conflict is related to land, but also mention conflict related to water. Water shortages in Yassin locality are reported to be particularly extreme. A major migratory route passes through **Yassin** locality, which can help explain the higher proportion of respondents in Yassin who identify conflicts around grazing routes as a key conflict trigger. Conflict linked to pastoralists' grazing routes are seasonal. Darfur pastoralist tribes move their livestock from north to the south in the course of the dry season and head back north during the rainy season dry season[85] The pastoralists use traditional livestock corridors (masarat) and have customary rights to graze their animals on rain-fed farm land (talique) after the harvest.[86] Although the 'Hakura' system gives farmers customary rights to land, these rights are not exclusive and pastoralists have temporary rights to graze their herds on what is left of the harvested crops. A talique date for when pastoralists can graze their animals is normally agreed between farmers and pastoralists with the help of local authorities to avoid crop losses and conflict.[87] Disputes and conflict happen when talique agreements are violated by either side. Violations of these agreements are often caused by a poor rainy season, which press pastoralists to move their herds much earlier in search for pasture and water. This, in turn, causes damage to crops before the harvest and farmers are known to deny pastoralists passage.[88]

REPORTING SAFETY INSTANCES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

The household survey sought to understand how residents report incidents and to who they turn to for solving disputes and effective remedies. Households that experienced a security incident during the preceding 12 months, were asked to think about the most serious incident and indicate whether they sought help. The findings show a tendency towards not reporting security issues—non-displaced (68%), returnees (71%) and IDPs (70%) did not report the incident. Across all groups, about 15% report to the police and 10% to local committees or the Native Administration.

In Sheiria locality, a higher percentage did not report than in Assalaya and Yassin. Among non-displaced and returnees about 78% did not report, whilst 69% did not report in Assalaya. More residents in Yassin locality reported incidents—here 60% of non-displaced and 65% of returnees said that they did not report an incident. Among **Yassin** residents, a higher proportion turn to a local committee or Native Administration for help—19% (non-displaced) and 16% (returnees). This is in contrast to only 3% of non-displaced and 8% of returnee residents in Sheiria, and 7–8% of residents

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[83] Assalaya locality, East Darfur, Native Administration—Omda

[84] Sheiria locality, East Darfur, Native Administration—Omdas (FDG).

[85] UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.

[86] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

[87] The talique date is referred to as a customary institution that has 'evolved through local practices of local communities, their leadership, and formal government structures. Osman, A.M.K., Young, H. Houser, R.F., and Coates, J. C. (2013)) Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur.

[88] Young, H. et al. (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management.

in Assalaya. Reporting to the police is lower among returnees in Sheiria locality—merely 10% go to the police.

FIGURE 8: HOUSEHOLDS WHERE AT LEAST ONE MEMBER HAS EXPERIENCED AT LEAST ONE SECURITY INCIDENT IN THE 12 MONTHS PRECEDING THE SURVEY BY REPORTING APPROACH

Satisfaction with the way an issue was resolved was overall low—among those who did report an incident only 18% were satisfied and thought the matter had been effectively resolved.[89] There is a marked difference between localities when it comes to satisfaction with conflict resolution; the satisfaction rate in Yassin was double that of Assalaya and Sheiria residents. Among Yassin residents, 31% were satisfied and found the solution fair in contrast to merely 11% in Assalaya and 15% in Sheiria.

The trend towards not reporting crime to the police could be linked to low satisfaction with the outcome when reporting to the police. In turn, this could be related to the capacity of the police to respond. In cases where the police manage to investigate and forwards the case to prosecutors, suspects often cannot be apprehended because they have the backing of the tribe resulting in widespread impunity.[90]

Each police post or point covers a large geographic area yet lack staff, vehicles and fuel.[91] In **Yassin** locality, there are 7 police posts located in the larger towns and each staffed by around 33 policing staff. There are a further 14 smaller police points in villages with markets. **Assalaya** locality has a total of 4 police posts in each of the administrative units plus 5 police points, while in **Sheiria locality,** there is one police post situated in each of the administrative units. None of the police posts in Yassin, Sheiria and Assalaya have female police staff, but all policing staff have received training from the Sudan Police Force (SPF) in Assalaya and Yassin localities. In Sheiria, only 24 out of a total of 94 police officers have received police training.[92] In theory, women have equal access to the police, but are reported not to seek help from police forces because local traditions and customs prohibit women from doing so. If the crime is gender-based, there is very limited knowledge when it comes to dealing

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[89] The survey respondent had to indicate if the matter had been resolved and whether they were satisfied with the outcome (very effective: issue is resolved and I'm satisfied).

[90] Thematic expert, former East Darfur UNAMID Officer.

[91] Police points are staffed by around 30–33 policing staff, while the smaller police points situated in villages have 8–10 members of staff. Yassin, Assalaya, Sheiria localities, local government officials.

[92] In Assalaya and Yassin locality all police officers have reported received training from the Sudan Police Force (SPF), while only 20 of 94 police officers have received training in Sheiria locality.

with the victims, whilst sexual crimes are seldom reported. Male family members regard a sexual crime as shameful and such crimes require considerable evidence by sharia law.[93] Nomadic pastoralists have access but are reported to seldom report incidents to the police.

There are a number of community dispute resolution mechanisms alternative to police involvement. None of the localities have a civil court, but the state capital Ed Daein has a civil court.[94] Rural courts currently only exist in **Assalaya** and **Sheiria** locality. There are two rural courts in Assalaya locality—located in Assalaya town and in the state capital Ed Daein. This rural court is not located within Assalaya locality but mainly deals with IDPs issues as many IDPs originally from Assalaya locality relocated to Ed Daein. There are no rural courts serving residents in **Yassin** as the Yassin court has not been functioning since 2005, however, residents from Yassin sometimes access rural courts in Assalaya and Sheiria locality.[95] According to key informants, the main challenges for the rural courts in Assalaya in Sheiria are lack of staff and financial support; there is no funds to pay for vehicles, fuel or staff salaries and few police officers to collaborate with.[96] In terms of access, there is reportedly poor access for women to rural courts. Because of local traditions, women are prohibited from accessing rural courts, while youths are said to prefer other alternatives and IDPs also tend to look to other conflict resolutions mechanisms including reconciliation conferences. Nomadic pastoralists have access on par with all other residents but reportedly do not turn to rural courts.[97]

A number of committees exist at the local level, some with wider mandates such as the Joint Committee and Resistance Committee.[98] Other grassroot level mechanisms manage competing demands and conflict linked to specific areas; these include the Water/WASH Committee, Harvest Protection Committee and Service and Change Committees.

RATING LOCAL COMMUNITY RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

How do the local communities regard these conflict resolution mechanisms? The Water/Wash Committee was also highlighted as key to managing conflict, as it is responsible for mediating if disputes and conflict around access to water arise. According to the household survey, Water Committees are mainly reported to be present in **Assalaya,** while in **Sheiria** and **Yassin** a large proportion report having no Water/WASH Committee in their village. In Assalaya, one-third of non-displaced residents (28%) and IDP returnees (33%) say that there is no such community institution in their village. In **Sheiria**, non-displaced residents (47%) and IDP returnees (49%) report not having a Water Committee, whereas in **Yassin** locality, 39% and 43% of respectively the non-displaced population and IDP returnees say they do not have a Water Committee in their community.

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[93] For example, if a woman is raped and she was accompanied by other women, she will need four witnesses to back her statement and then still it may be questioned why she was out without being escorted by a male relative. Thematic expert, former East Darfur UNAMID officer.

[94] Formal courts at the state level are headed by qualified judges, who are versed in the Sudanese criminal and civil code. Young, H. et al. (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management.

[95] Working with NGOs, UNDP has set up an office in Yassin to host the rural court but this is not in use. Due to internal issues between groups in Yassin locality, this rural court is not operating and its staff are no longer employed. Yassin locality, East Darfur, local government official.

[96] Assayala, East Darfur, FDG—members of the rural court and Sheiria, East Darfur, key informant—Head of rural courts.

[97] Sheiria, East Darfur, key informant—Head of rural courts.

[98] The Resistance Committee is led by youths and so is the Service and Change Committee, which is considered more formal; it distributes commodities such as fuel, bread and medicine.

How are the Water Committees rated by the communities? Respondents were asked whether the committees solve problems justly in communities that has a Water/WASH Committee. In **Assalaya** locality where Water/WASH Committees are more prevalent, non-displaced (50%) and IDP returnees (31%) were satisfied with how the committee solved disputes. In **Sheiria** locality on the other hand, 58% of non-displaced and 49% of returnees say that their committee solved problems in a just way, while this is the case for 39% of non-displaced and 43% of returnees in **Yassin** locality.

The area level analysis points to the Joint Committee as the most frequently mentioned institution, and it is also considered to be the most effective as all groups are represented. The Joint Committee is made up of all concerned parties including farmers, pastoralist nomads, IDPs along with representatives from the Native Administration, Ministry of Agriculture & Natural Resources, the police and the head of the rural courts. The committee predominantly focuses on preventing clashes between nomads and farmers by ensuring on the one hand that farmers do not expand into animal migratory routes and on the other, nomads do only move through the livestock corridors when crossing farming areas. The Joint Committee is well-placed to mediate in disputes and conflicts involving farmers and nomads because all groups are represented, however, aggrieved parties can also turn to Ajaweed (local mediators) and the Native Administration.

Local mediators are part of the Judiya traditional mediation mechanisms at community level that resolve conflict between community members. Judiya is a grassroots system of mediation that centres on reconciliation and repairing of social relationships and tackle low-level crime that do not need to be dealt with by the courts. The Judiya arbitrators are named ajaweed and are respected community members, who have knowledge of customary law and inter-tribal history. They are not neutral mediators, rather their role is to exert pressure on a party to accept the settlement.[99] Parties can also seek informal arbitration from the Native Administration in case of dispute, and when it comes to conflict between communities a Reconciliation Conference can be facilitated with backing from the local government.

When it comes to disputed ownership of land and unlawful occupation of land, respondents in the three East Darfur localities mention a variety of mechanisms by which IDPs try to deal with these challenges.[100] There does not seem to be a specific mechanism that deals with these issues, instead individual farmers or groups of farmers may seek help through various mechanisms. This may change as the Juba Peace Agreement sets out a number of institutions with mandates to govern conflict over land. [101] This includes speaking with the 'sheiks of land' directly, or if direct dialogue does not solve the issue, they may turn to rural courts in order to regain ownership of their land. People may also ask for mediation support from elders and leaders or resort to local committees to help. Sometimes, they also speak directly to the new occupants and try to come to an agreement. For example, dividing the land, share the crops or officially rent the land from the new occupants.

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[99] Young, H. et al. (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management.
[100] As discussed above, the household survey findings show that 43% of IDPs say their land is unlawfully occupied, whilst 32% refer to disputed ownership of the land.
[101] More information included below in this chapter.

STRENGTHENING CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING MECHANISMS

The area level analysis explored challenges and elements that would strengthen the effectiveness of existing conflict resolution mechanisms. The issues flagged by respondents can shed some light on why small proportions of the population turn to committees and conflict resolution mechanisms for help when faced with a security incident or crime.

Respondents pointed out that the various tribes sometimes have their own conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives. Critically, respondents also identified these tribal-based mechanisms as a main challenge, because this set-up makes it difficult for community members to work *across* tribal lines in a committee.

The main challenges and limitations flagged by respondents for community-based mechanisms to be effective include weak Native Administrations and state institutions, which are deemed to require both more technical and financial support to be more effective. Laws and the crucially ability to enforce the law are also characterised as weak and regarded as a chief challenge along with the proliferation of weapons among the tribes.

When asked what is needed to better address conflicts and find sustainable solutions, respondents give a number of suggestions. Firstly, more awareness among farmers and pastoralists of peaceful conflict mechanisms to solve conflict related to land and other natural resources.[102] Also, more support is needed for permanent committees dealing with competing demands for natural resources; and support needs to include early warning systems, conflict management and arbitration.[103] With specific reference to migratory routes and rules, respondents specify that laws and regulations around agriculture and animal production need to be strictly enforced. Suggestions include that enforcement could be performed by a specialist police force tasked with protection of farm areas, animal migratory routes, rangelands, water sources etc.

Other key informants regard it as paramount to place emphasis on complementarity and find ways to change two competing livelihoods activities into activities that complement each other.[104] Key informants also put forward the idea of a new master plan developed for land use, while some believe that new regulations and laws concerning land and natural resources should be developed.[105] Respondents also suggest building partnerships across all concerned bodies including researchers, INGOs, line ministries, farmers, nomadic pastoralists and the Native Administration to jointly address land and other natural resource matters.[106]

THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT AND CONFLICT OVER LAND

Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property is central to achieving durable solutions for IDPs as set out by the IASC Framework. The Juba Peace Agreement is in agreement with the IASC criteria and stipulates that 'all victims of Darfur have a right to seek restoration of property or compensation for their lost or seized property resulting from the conflict in

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[102] Sheiria locality, East Darfur, key informant—Police Commander.
[103] Assalaya locality, East Darfur—key informants (farmer, nomad, IDP, women) and Sheiria locality, East Darfur, key informant—IDP community representative.
[104] Assalaya locality, East Darfur—key informant (Native Administration).
[105] Yassin locality, East Darfur—key informant (local government official).
[106] Assalaya locality, East Darfur—key informant (local government official).

Darfur'.[107] This right to restitution is not only awarded to individuals but also to communities that have a collective right to pursue restitution for communal property, villages, farms and traditional land. Where it is not possible for IDPs to return, they are entitled to compensation for their loss resulting from forced displacement. [108] This right is extended to displaced persons regardless of whether they choose to return to their places of origin or not. [109] Thematic experts warn that the lack of mechanisms to implement restitution and compensation will be an obstacle to durable solutions and peacebuilding efforts.[110]

Interestingly, the peace agreement provides for the review and possible revocation of registration of land that was expropriated or forcibly taken after June 1989.[111] Potentially, this is a powerful tool to deal with land that is unlawfully occupied even when the resent settles hold land registration certificates to prove ownership. There is little mention in the agreement of the rights of the 'secondary' or settlers unlawfully occupying land apart from chapter two, which specifies that basic services should be provided in areas of resettlement for those who inhabited the lands of others illegally. [112]

The agreement sets out several institutions and their mandates that will govern conflict over land and aid peaceful co-existence between communities. The 'Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission' has a mandate to hear and mediate in property restitution claims for individuals, who lost their land because of the conflict in Darfur. It is also tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed land. [113] The National Lands Commission has also been established and is tasked with working in tandem with the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, whilst the Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee Commission has been set up to oversee voluntary return and resettlement.[114] The Commission for the Development of the Nomads is mandated with improving the nomadic pastoralist sector plus regulate relations between farmers and nomadic pastoralists.[115]

The household survey and area level analysis focused on conflict drivers, capacities for peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level. At the time of data collection, none of the institutions and mechanisms stipulated in the Juba Peace Agreement were up and running and it is not clear how these will interact with or support efforts at the locality level.

[107] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.3.

[108] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.3.2.

[109] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020)'' chapter 4.11.8.2

[110] NRC (2021), Housing, Land and Property Rights (HL) in the Juba Peace Agreement. Darfur Track briefing note.

[111] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.8.1.

[112] This task is allocated to the Reconstruction and Development Commission. Juba Peace Agreement, chapter 2.18).

[113] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020)' chapter 7.9.1 and chapter 7.10.11.

[114] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020)', chapter 5.8.

[115] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020)', chapter 7.7.1.

CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

Social cohesion is a multi-faceted concept, however, this chapter focuses on specific aspects including participation and inclusion as well as inter-group contacts and perceptions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs specify that displaced persons should be able to exercise the right to participate in public affairs on an equal footing with the non-displaced population without discrimination due to their displacement. People's civic participation—engagement in public affairs, as well as how groups accept and engage with each other, can offer insights into social cohesion within and between communities. In turn, social cohesion has a bearing on integration and thus are important for durable solutions and peacebuilding. Greater cohesion may facilitate more consensus-oriented or inclusive governance, as well as create resilience to escalating conflict at the individual level.[116]

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Only 18% of targeted returnees live in villages together with non-displaced residents, hence the majority of returnees live as separate communities. This pattern is especially distinct in Sheiria locality as only 13% live together with non-displaced families compared to Assalaya (22%) and Yassin (20%).**
- **Inter-group perceptions are overall very positive, but this is in contrast to non-displaced communities' attitudes towards pastoralist nomads. Nomads are welcome to access services (91%), but non-displaced communities are less accepting when it comes to taking part in local activities (85%), settling in their village (73%) and marriage (67%).**
- **Among non-displaced there is a swing in approval with regards to letting IDPs take part in decision-making (68%), which is on par with attitudes towards nomads taking up leadership positions and participate in decision-making (67%). In comparison, 93% of non-displaced residents welcome returnees to actively take part in decision-making and become community leaders.**
- **Across all three localities, respondents report there to be no women's associations or any civil society organisations advocating for women to actively participate in Darfur peace processes. Women partake less directly in violence and conflict compared to men, but they are key actors in conflict either by supporting armed groups in various way or actively instigating men to resort to violence.**

INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

The survey set out to understand how the different target groups perceive each other. As a starting point, displaced households were asked if they live together with non-displaced families in the same village or location. Only 18% of returnees live together with non-displaced households, whilst this is much more prevalent for the IDP population: 67% of IDPs surveyed live among non-displaced communities. The findings indicate that a majority of returnees live as separate communities—they have returned to villages from where the entire community was displaced during the conflict. The data indicates that this pattern is especially pronounced in **Sheiria**, as merely 13% of returnee households

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[116] For more on social cohesion analysis, see: UNDP 2020. *Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications.*

say they have non-displaced neighbours in comparison to **Assalaya** (22%) and **Yassin** (20%). Posing the same question to the targeted non-displaced households show that they tend to live in more mixed communities. 48% of non-displaced residents live in communities with returnees, 9% live close to IDPs residing in camps, while 27% live in close proximity to pastoralist nomads. When comparing IDP returnees against non-displaced residents, the survey data shows that a large proportion of returnees live in communities made up only of returnee families.

Non-displaced residents' attitudes towards returnees are very positive: ca. 98% of the households are welcoming returnees to settle in their village, participate in local activities and share equal access to services. When it comes IDPs, a large majority among non-displaced communities are also very accepting—percentage figures drop only marginally (92%–97%). IDPs and returnees living among non-displaced similarly overwhelmingly (90%–98%) feel accepted and welcome in the community, and assess they have equal access to services like education and health plus take part in community activities. Non-displaced communities' stance is different vis-à-vis pastoralist nomads—overall nomads are welcome to have equal access to services including education and clean water (91%), but are welcome by a smaller proportion to take part in local activities (85%) and to settle in their village (73%). 77% of non-displaced residents are friends with pastoralist nomads, and less would welcome a neighbour from a nomadic community into their family by marriage (67%). This is in marked contrast to friendships between non-displaced and IDPs (96%) and returnees (99%), and approval of marriage with a returnee or IDP family (92%).

PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC MEETINGS AND DECISION-MAKING

Among key informants, there is a limited awareness of civic initiatives and conflict resolution mechanisms. There is widespread awareness among all communities in the East Darfur localities about the Joint Committee and its remit, but beyond this one local institution few others are mentioned. At least partly, this is due to limited awareness of other mechanisms. For instance, a local government official in Sheiria locality stated that there were 'no community-based initiatives in the locality', whilst other Sheiria key informants highlighted a Water/WASH Committee and other traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

Community-based mechanisms are generally viewed as inclusive, as youth, IDPs and nomads are represented in the Joint Committee. Women are not always included although this seems to vary between the different tribal communities—some tribes appear to allow women to participate in public affairs more than others. Some respondents emphasise that attitudes towards women is slowly changing and initiatives headed by youth are often inclusive of women such as the Resistance Committee.[117] Apart from youth groups, no other groups such as women, nomads or farmers have set up local initiatives.

Participation in public meetings is similar for all surveyed groups—non-displaced (58%), returnees and IDPs (56%) say they have attended a public meeting on communal matters or peacebuilding during the last 6 months. There are no significant differences across the three localities, and the reasons for not attending were similar for the surveyed groups. Reasons primarily included 'not aware of such meeting or event' and 'not interested'.

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[117] Assalaya locality, East Darfur, key informant—youth.

The household survey examined participation along spectrum from involvement to actively taking part in decisions-making at meetings. When considering participation in decision-making, perceptions somewhat change. Returnees are overwhelmingly welcomed by non-displaced communities to take part in decision-making or become community leaders (93%) and a majority of returnees also say that they feel welcome to do so (89%), which is imperative when it comes to building community cohesion. This, however, is not the case for IDPs nor nomadic pastoralists. Significant less non-displaced residents agree that IDPs (68%) and nomads (67%) should have the opportunity to participate in decision-making. This is also reflected in perceptions among IDPs among whom 86% feel able to participate in decision-making or take the lead on issues such as service provision and conflict resolution.

PEACEBUILDING AND COORDINATION AT COMMUNITY-LEVEL

Considering participation in reconciliation and local peace processes, the household survey shows a somewhat higher proportion of non-displaced residents (61%) participating in reconciliation meetings during the last 6 months in comparison to returnees (56%) and IDPs (52%). The area level analysis assessed if any civil society groups in Assalaya, Yassin and Sheiria localities are advocating for women to actively participate in reconciliation and Darfur peace processes. Respondents in all three localities stated that such initiatives do not exist. Women make up 60% of the population in the three East Darfur localities and are important peace and conflict actors. A recent Darfur study by UNDP found that women play a significant role in conflict including instigating men to use violence, prevent pastoralist access to water in Hakamat songs, but also partake directly in conflict by providing cooking, nursing and intelligence to combatants.[118]

As discussed above, findings show that a significant proportion of individuals own a mobile phone. In regards to peacebuilding, mobile phones may present an opportunity to share information or messaging relevant to peacebuilding. The Tadoud programme, for instance, equipped community leaders with mobile phones, credit and facilitated contact between leaders so that in times of crisis they were able to communicate and resolve issues even when in two different locations. With the current fuel shortages, communication by phone might be easier to facilitate than face to face meetings.

The overall perception among respondents in the three localities was that various bodies—local government, Native Administration, and community members are working together well. The Joint Committee is often mentioned as a positive example of their collaboration. All three localities have Education Committees that have community representatives that allow for input at the local level but also serve as a channel to communicate with the local government on education issues.[119]

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[118] UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur.
[119] Sheiria locality, East Darfur, Ministry of Education (FDG).

ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING: AVAILABILITY AND ACCESS TO SERVICES

To assess adequate of living, this analysis draws on indicators such as availability and access to education, health, water, and sanitation. For displaced persons to enjoy an adequate standard of living is important for durable solution. By benchmarking against the non-displaced population's level of access to services, the analysis can shed light on possible challenges and vulnerabilities linked to IDPs' and returnees' displacement.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Primary school attendance is low overall—a little more than half attend school among all surveyed groups. Girls only have slightly lower attendance compared to boys but among nomadic pastoralists enrolment in schools is particularly low as merely 26 of 119 primary age children attend school. The reasons for not sending children to school in all three localities is chiefly because of the cost—41% of boys and 32% of girls are not attending school because the family lacks the funds. Children are also often required to work or take care of siblings and the home, plus distance is also reported as an obstacle for children not attending school.**
- **Quality of education is poor with low student-teacher ratios, many teachers with no formal qualification plus lack of equipment and teaching resources. The area level analysis shows that primary schools in Sheiria and Yassin locality are centralised in towns of the administrative units, while surrounding rural areas have fewer or no primary schools at all.**
- **Access to health services is a challenge for all groups including nomads. The main obstacle flagged by respondents is cost of service or medicine, followed by lack or poor quality of services and long distances to reach health centres.**
- **Access to water is an issue in all three localities, but especially in Yassin among returnees where only 21% of the households have access to improved drinking water sources. Generally, returnees have somewhat less access to water partly due to water points in return areas having been damaged during the conflict. The economic crisis in Darfur has a direct impact on access to water as high fuel prices often result in lack of fuel to run water pumps. The lack of spare part and fuel also means that many pumps are not in operation because they are in disrepair.**
- **Access to sanitation in all three localities is extremely low (1–8%), but especially among returnees where only 1% has access to improved sanitation. The practice of open defecation is a major problem and major cause of death for children under five.**
- **A large majority of all surveyed groups have personal documentation including nomadic pastoralists. Similar proportions in all three localities do not have any personal documentation; on average 20% among non-displaced, 21% among returnees and 27% of the IDP population do not have any form of personal identification, while all the surveyed nomads possessed national ID cards.**
- **Residents with no personal identification highlight the absence of administrative services in their areas as an obstacle, while others point to a lengthy process to obtain personal documents.**

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Overall, primary education attendance is low. A little more than half of 6–13 year-olds in surveyed groups attend primary school for both boys and girls. Among IDP returnees, 54% of boys and 52% of girls are attending school, which is very similar to the non-displaced population in Assalaya, Yassin and Sheiria localities. Respectively, 54% and 51% of boys and girls from non-displaced households are enrolled in school, while this is the case for out of camp IDP boys (54%) and girls (49%). As the figures show, girls of primary school age only have a slightly lower school attendance compared to boys. When it comes to informal Kwalva schools, only a small proportion (mainly) boys attend. School attendance is significantly lower among nomadic pastoralists—merely 26 out of 119 children aged between 6–13 years attend school.

FIGURE 9: NET PRIMARY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE BY SEX AND LOCALITY


FIGURE 10: OVERALL SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AMONGST CHILDREN AGED 6–18 YEARS

Sheiria locality has lower attendance amongst primary school age children. Attendance rates for boys among the Sheiria non-displaced population is 42%, whilst 49% of returnee boys are enrolled in primary school. Attendance rates for primary school children are very similar for **Yassin and Assalaya** for both the non-displaced and returnee population—percentages range between 55% and 58% for boys and 48% and 55% for girls. Interestingly, more girls in Yassin locality compared to boys from non-displaced households attend primary school (48%). Overall, the household survey findings show that a considerable number of school age kids are out of education.

TABLE 3: PRIMARY SCHOOL CAPACITY BY LOCALITY

Locality	Type of school	Teachers			Students						Ratio
		# Trained	# Not trained	Total	Boys		Girls		Total		
					#	%	#	%			
Assalaya Total: 62	Boys; 4 Girls: 5 Mixed: 50	70 (19%)	290 (80%)	360	5,947	**50%**	5919	**50%**	11866		1:58[120]
Yassin Total: 59	Boys: 12 Girls: 8 Mixed: 39	-	-	488	14,144	57%	10478	43%	24622		1:50
Sheiria Total: 31	Boys: 13 Girls: 9 Mixed: 9	58 (17%)	278 (82%)	336	7,099	**59%**	5008	**41%**	12107		1:36

The area level analysis in all three localities confirms that nomadic pastoralists have very limited access to education. This is in line with household survey findings, which show that 26 of 119 children between the age of 6 and 13 attend school. School attendance is considered to be low mainly due to being on the move, but also in part because of lack of awareness around the benefits of education.

The household survey data on high school attendance amongst girls in **Sheiria** is line with area level data. Key informants consider access to education for girls good in Sheiria locality. Official figures indicate that 20% less girls attend primary school in comparison to boys in Sheiria locality, which the survey data does not support.[121] Enrolment figures for Yassin locality specify that 18% more boys attend primary school, while official figures for **Assalaya** locality show an equal enrolment ratio of boys and girls—the Assalaya enrolment percentages for boys and girls do agree with the household survey.

Importantly, the area level analysis shows that primary schools in **Sheiria and Yassin** localities are concentrated in the towns of each administrative unit and less schools serving the population living in the surrounding rural areas. In **Sheiria** locality, all but four schools are located in administrative unit towns meaning access to education in rural areas is minimal simply because there are very few schools.[122] A similar centralised distribution of schools is found within **Yassin** locality albeit to lesser extent—between 41%–69% of schools are situated in the main Administrative Unit towns.[123] This concentration of schools in the Administrative Unit main towns is a legacy from when the rural population was first displaced. Those from rural areas made their way to the towns for safety and schools were set up in these towns to cater for the influx of displaced school age children. Many households have remained living in these towns, where their children attend school. Often the name of the school indicates in which village the school was situated before the outbreak of the conflict.

The household survey shows that access to education is higher in towns, thus the lower number of schools situated in rural areas does affect school attendance. Among non-displaced residents in the three localities, 59% of primary age children (6–13 years) living in towns attend school in contrast to

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[120] This does not include the student/teacher ratio of the school in Maeali Kamal where there is only one teacher for a school with 474 students.

[121] According to official figures for Sheiria locality, among students attending primary school 62% are boys and 42% are girls.

[122] In Sheiria Administrative Unit (AU), 11 out of 13 schools are located in Sheiria town. In Abwdnql AU, all five schools are located in Abwdnql town and in Khazzan Jaded AU, 11 out of 13 schools are situated in Khazzan Jaded town.

[123] In Yassin AU, seven out of 17primary schools are located within Yassin town, in Muhajiria AU, 50% of schools are located in Muhjiiria and in Lbdu town. In Kylkil mawju, seven out of 13 primary schools are located in Kykil Mawju town and in Saylaeuh AU, nine of the total 13 primary schools are located in the main town.

49% of school age children residing in villages. For IDPs, there is a 9 percentage point difference—59% of children between 6 and 13 years attend school, while 51% of village children of the same age are enrolled in school.

The household survey also looked at the main reasons for not attending school in the three localities. Households mainly report financial constraints for not enrolling their children in school—41% of boys and 32% of girls not attending school is because of lacking funds. Among nomadic pastoralist, 20 households (out of 71) refer to lack of finances for not sending their children to school, whilst 16 household deem that 'education is not important'. In Darfur, primary education is in theory free, but fees are often charged by the school to cover running costs plus to payments to as an incentive for volunteer assistants.[124] Families not sending boys (6%) and girls (7%) report distance as an obstacle, while 15% of boys and girls instead are required to work or take care of the home and siblings. Among families with girls not attending primary school, 14% also say that they are not attending as they help out with work at home or cultivating crops or the household states that 'education is not important'.

Assessing the quality of education often takes into account the student-teacher ratio. The teacher/student ratio is on average between 1:36 and 1:58, however, these averages disguise huge differences between individual schools.[125] Schools employ teachers but also rely heavily on untrained teaching assistants to teach in the schools, as less than 20% in both Assalaya and Sheiria locality are trained teachers.[126] According to area level data, schools' capacity in terms of seating differs great. Some schools reported have no seating for students, while others have seats for almost all attending students (90%). In all three localities, school fencing and latrines are constructed out of local materials. Neither lack of seating, fencing or latrines were flagged by respondents as obstacles to children attending school.

Yassin locality has the highest number of secondary schools—a total of 7 secondary schools serving 10,250 students. **Assalaya** and **Sheiria** locality have fewer secondary schools (respectively 4 and 5 secondary schools), and according to official numbers significantly less pupils enrolled in secondary education. Assalaya locality has 342 secondary students, while Sheiria locality has 2,235 students attending secondary school. According to area level data, girls' access to secondary education in Sheiria and Assalaya is hampered by long distances to the limited number of secondary schools plus many girls leave school because they are married young.[127] In Yassin locality, education officials state that there is awareness among the population of the importance of secondary education for girls and women. Reasons for male youth not attending secondary school is due to the youth are looking for money earning opportunities rather than continuing their education. Some male youths are reported to have joined the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while others are work in gold mines or have set up small businesses. Respondents point to the unemployment among university graduates as a deterrent for many to continue their education.[128]

There are several challenges specific to secondary education in the three localities. First, the teaching staff are usually from outside the locality and consequently the schools are required to provide housing and transport for which budget is often lacking. Second, secondary education falls under the

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[124] UNICEF Sudan Education Team insights. UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.
[125] See Annex 2 for teacher/student ratios for individual schools in Assalaya, Yassin and Sheiria locality.
[126] In Assalaya locality employs 70 teachers (19%) and 290 untrained teachers (80%), and Sheiria locality schools have a similar ratio between trained (17%) and untrained teachers (82%).
[127] Sheiria locality, East Darfur—key informant (secondary education representative).
[128] Assalaya locality, East Darfur—key informant (education representative).

responsibility of the East Darfur's Ministry of Education, while primary education is the responsibility of the local government. When it comes to budget support, this means that support including funding has to come from the state-level, which takes considerable time.

ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES

The findings show that access to health services is a challenge for all surveyed groups. A large majority among IDPs (79%), returnees (76%) and non-displaced residents (76%) attempted to access health services in the past 6 months of which 93% in all groups said that they experienced challenges accessing healthcare. Barriers specified by all groups to accessing medical assistance include cost of medicine or services, low quality or lack of services at the health facility or pharmacy, and lastly long distances to health services. Similarly, a majority of nomadic pastoralist (53 of 71) reported having had a need for health services during the last 6 months. All faced challenges and point to cost of medicine and medical services (27/71) and distance to health centre (14/71). Challenges cited match the most reported barriers to healthcare in the 2020 Multi-sector needs assessment that covers all Sudan's states.[129]

The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator and is often used as a proxy for measuring access to healthcare. 20% of births among all surveyed groups was attended by skilled personnel—the vast majority of mothers giving birth are attended by a relative, friend or traditional birth attendant.[130] Zooming in on each locality, findings show that women assisted by a skilled birth attendant is lower among returnees in **Yassin** locality (15%) compared to non-displaced (23%) and non-displaced mothers giving birth in Sheiria (16%). Generally, non-displaced and returnees are deemed by area level findings to have equal access to healthcare, and the SDG indicator on birth attended by skilled health attendants agree with this finding. Ministry of Health informants report that pastoralist nomads face particular challenges accessing healthcare, because of their movement but plans are underway to provide mobile health clinics for the nomadic population in East Darfur.[131]

The area level analysis confirms the results from the household survey. All three localities lack health centres, which impacts residents' ability to access healthcare. And importantly, there are currently no doctors working in any of the health centres in the three localities. Residents are only served by nurses and medical assistant, whom have all been trained by the Ministry of Health (MoH).

In **Assalaya** locality has a total of 7 health centres, of which 3 are currently not operational. All the buildings are new apart from the health centre in Maelia Wasat and were set up by the MoH. All are powered by solar energy but lack clean water and latrines. In Assalaya town, MoH is in the process of transforming the health centre into a rural hospital. The situation is similar in **Sheiria** locality; there is a total of 10 health centres with 4 currently inactive. Most of the health centre buildings are also new, all are fitted with solar energy panels or have electricity and none of them have access to clean

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[129] The Sudan 2020 Multi-sector Needs Assessment show that the two most common barriers to accessing healthcare is 'lack of medicines at the health facility' followed by 'cost of services and/or medicine too high/cannot afford to pay'. REACH (2021) Sudan: 2020 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (March, 2021).
[130] Note that the total number of births captured by the survey among IDPs is low, only 91 births.
[131] Ibid.

water and sanitation is limited.[132] Residents in **Yassin** locality are only served by a total of 4 health centres fitted with solar energy panels.[133]

The East Darfur Ministry of Health officials points a number of challenges, many of which relate to inadequate budgets and lack of trained healthcare personnel. Particularly remote localities lack trained health staff, because staff have left to work elsewhere and health centres are left without staff as a consequence. According to key informants, this challenge has to be addressed jointly by the government, NGOs and the community.[134] Ministry of Health informants report that pastoralist nomads face particular challenges accessing healthcare, because of their movement but plans are underway to provide mobile health clinics for the nomadic population in East Darfur.[135] Public health goes beyond numbers of health clinics, and health awareness campaigns are also deemed to play a powerful role improving the health of residents. For example, defecation in open areas is a common practice among farmers and nomads and changing sanitation habits can have a big impact on the general health of the population.[136]

When it comes to rating healthcare services, a small proportion of households are satisfied. Across the three East Darfur localities, only non-displaced (15%), returnees (14%) and IDPs (12%) say they content. This translates into approximately 85% of all groups *not* satisfied with the healthcare services available. **Assalaya** locality has the smallest proportion of satisfied households—only 11% of both displaced and non-displaced residents say they are content with the healthcare services on offer compared to **Yasssin** (14–18%) and **Sheiria** (17–22%).

ACCESS TO WATER

The household survey measured access to improved sanitation and improved drinking water sources. Access to improved drinking water (mainly tube wells, boreholes, elevated tanks, hand pumps and protected dug wells) is generally better among non-displaced but varies significantly by locality.[137] In **Sheiria** locality, non-displaced residents have better access to improved sources of drinking water (66%) and returnees as well (42%). In **Yassin** and **Assalaya** locality, access to improved drinking water is worse: in Assalaya 27% non-displaced and 26% returnees have access, while in Sheiria we find the lowest access with 32% among non-displaced and 21% among returnees. This corresponds to area level findings that point to less access to improved water sources due the destruction of well and water pumps during the conflict.

The remaining households rely on unimproved drinking water sources: a significant proportion of the returnee population (27%) in all localities obtains drinking water from surface water sources in contrast to only 13% of non-displaced residents and 18% of IDPs. Across all surveyed groups, a significant proportion of the population rely on water trucking for clean water. IDPs (33%), returnees (27%) and non-displaced residents (39%) rely on drinking water to be brought in by trucks. None of the surveyed nomadic pastoralists report accessing water from tube wells, boreholes or hand pumps, but rely on water trucking (27 of 71 households) and surface water (19 of 71). The area level findings indicate

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[132] One health centre is constructed using local materials (see Annex 2 for more details).

[133] Most of the health centres have been provided with solar panels by UN agencies to ensure the cold-chain of vaccines stored on the premises. The health centres have been recently constructed by ARC and CARE working with the MoH.

[134] Ed Daein, East Darfur—Ministry of Health officials.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Improved water sources include piped water, boreholes, tube wells, protection dug wells, protected springs, rainwater plus packaged or delivered water.

that nomads' access to water is governed by seasonal patterns in rainfall; during the rainy season they have good access to surface water sources but during the dry season nomads struggle to access water.

FIGURE 11: ACCESS TO IMPROVED SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY LOCALITY

Judging whether their households have adequate water to meet their needs varies considerably. Overall, the non-displaced population (24%) is more satisfied with amount of water available compared to only 15% of returnees, who deem the amount of water sufficient. This disparity is particular apparent in **Sheiria** locality, where non-displaced (48%) are satisfied with the amount of drinking water, whereas only 18% of returnees say they are content with sufficiency of drinking water. In **Yassin**, the difference in satisfaction levels is 9 percentage points—non-displaced (30%) and returnees (15%) deem they have enough drinking water. In **Assalaya** locality, a very small proportion of both non-displaced (12%) and returnees (8%) are satisfied with the amount of water available. When it comes to rating water services, Assalaya residents are also the most critical—only non-displaced (20%) and returnees (15%) say they are satisfied with water provision services. In comparison, Sheiria locality are the most content as non-displaced (46%) and returnees (24%) say that they are satisfied with services provided, while this is the case for Yassin locality non-displaced (29%) and returnees (24%). Generally, a higher proportion of non-displaced are satisfied with water provision services in comparison to returnees. It is possible that returnees have been used to better water provision during their displacement, but low satisfaction levels can also be explained by more limited access to safe drinking water in return locations where water infrastructure is reported to have been damaged. Besides, a smaller proportion as discussed above among the returnees do report having access to improved drinking water in Yassin (37%) and Sheiria (42%) in comparison to the non-displaced population in Yassin (45%) and Sheiria (66%).

In general, water is scarce in East Darfur. The Water Corporation assess that there is not enough water for consumption, agriculture and livestock.[138] The chronic fuel shortages and resulting high prices of fuel across Sudan due to the economic crisis, are forcing many water pumps to shut down because they rely on diesel to run. There is a general lack of spare parts and vehicles, but the fuel shortages also means that it is hard to reach remote areas by car to make repairs.[139] According to area level data, the lack of water is reported to be particularly acute in Yassin locality. Yassin locality is classified as a 'basement' area, where there is no constant ground water or water sources and availability of water is depending on rainfall only. Also, much of the water is not safe for human

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[138] Assalaya locality, East Darfur, WASH representative—Water Corporation official.

[139] Yassin locality, East Darfur, Rural Water Administration official

consumption, and therefore a large proportion of water consumed is trucked in from Gereida in South Darfur.[140] The southern part of Yassin locality has better potential sources, as there is deemed to be some underground water, but due to lack of financial resources these have not yet been explored. Yassin locality has a total of 18 water points, but only 11 are currently in operation, and has two haffirs in Kassib and Baraka.[141] It is estimated that Yassin locality requires 60 water points to serve all residents with enough water. Importantly, there is a big potential for water harvesting from dams, reservoirs and haffirs.

ACCESS TO SANITATION

The household survey also accessed access to improved sanitation. Residents in all three locations have extremely low access to improved sanitation—only between 1–8%. And the situation is especially acute for returnees as only 1% of returnees in Yassin, Sheiria and Assalaya have access to a latrine, while the vast majority defecate in the open.[142] Satisfaction with sanitation services is low among all surveyed groups; overall IDPs (11%), returnees (10%) and non-displaced residents (12%) are satisfied according to the household survey. There is higher satisfaction with sanitation among the non-displaced population except among Yassin non-displaced residents of whom only 7% deem services to be satisfactory. Non-displaced in Assalaya (14%) and Sheiria (17%) are satisfied in contrast to only 9% of returnees in both Assalaya and Sheiria locality.

The practice of open defecation is a major problem as water and sanitation related diseases are one of the leading causes of death for children under five caused by diarrhoea. It is also a cause of acute malnutrition associated with repeated diarrhoea or worm infections. East Darfur is a priority area for Unicef because of the high prevalence of open defecation. All localities in Yassin, Sheiria and Assalaya have Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion Committees and all committees have received training funded by Unicef in sanitation and community mobilization.[143]

ACCESS TO PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION

The survey asked all persons if they possess any official documentation. The vast majority did possess at least one form of personal documentation. The proportion that does not hold any formal documentation is similar across non-displaced, returnee and IDP residents and all three localities; on average 20% among non-displaced, 21% among returnees and 27% among IDPs did not have any form of personal identification.

A majority of the surveyed nomadic pastoralists also possessed a national ID. Only 13 out of 71 households did not have any form of personal identification. The fact that a high proportion of nomads taking part in the survey hold a national ID is likely the result of recent efforts by the Ministry of Interior. Three years ago, the ministry started an initiative to provide nomads with national ID cards. Most of those with personal documentation hold a national ID card, while birth certificates are held by a small proportion; across all three localities 12% of non-displaced, 14% of returnees, 16% of IDPs and 17/112 of the surveyed nomads.[144]

[140] Yassin locality, East Darfur, Native Administration representative.
[141] Kassib is situated between Mahajeria and Yassin town, and Baraka is in the north-west parts of Yassin town.
[142] Improved sanitation facilities includes pit latrines with slab (shared or not), ventilated pit latrine or flush latrine.
[143] Committees have also received training on financial management plus in technical and engineering. Ed Daein, East Darfur, Water & Environmental Sanitation Project.
[144] IDP cards are held by 7% of both IDPs and returnees with little variation between localities.

FIGURE 12: ACCESS TO DOCUMENTATION: PERSONS REPORTING HAVING NO DOCUMENTATION AT ALL, BIRTH CERTIFICATES AND NATIONAL ID CARDS, BY LOCALITY

Comparing men and women, there is no real difference between the proportion of men and women who hold official documentation. 80% of men (across surveyed groups and localities) hold some form of official documentation, whilst this is the case for 77% of women.

Registering births is important for ensuring the fulfilment of human rights and an SDG indicator (16.9) because it is regarded as the starting point for the recognition and protection of every person's right to identity and existence. The findings show that very few children under 5 have a birth certificate. Among returnees, 12% of under 5 children have birth certificate, while the proportion is lower among the non-displaced population (8%) and IDPs (9%).[145]

The area level information suggests that documentation is not necessary for accessing education and health services, but that administrative processes linked to land registration do require personal documentation. Before the Ministry of Interior national ID card initiative, many nomadic pastoralists did not possess personal documentation, which made it harder for nomads to own residential land.[146]

Respondents with no documentation point to a couple of main reasons for not having documentation. Most highlight the lack of administrative services in their area as an obstacle. Non-displaced (41%), returnee (36%) and IDP (46%) residents report there to be 'no office to obtain documentation in the area'. A significant proportion flag the length of the process as to why they do not possess any personal documentation. IDPs (19%) and returnees, and non-displaced residents (both 27%) say that the 'process takes a long time'. A number of respondents also indicate a 'lack of time to go and obtain documents'—12% of non-displaced plus 14% of both returnees and IDPs.

Looking at satisfaction with official government services (courts, government offices issuing official documents etc.), about a third of non-displaced (33%) and returnees (35%) are satisfied with services, whilst this is considerably lower among IDPs (22%). Satisfaction with government services is higher among Yassin residents as 42% of non-displaced and 52% of returnees are content, in contrast to 24% of residents in Sheiria and 29% and 34% of respecitvely Assalaya non-displaced and returnee inhabitants.

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[145] Among the non-displaced population, there is some variation between the three localities; 7% of non-displaced in Assalaya and 9% in Yassin, while in Sheiria locality 13% of children under 5 have been issued with a birth certificate.

[146] Assalaya, East Darfur, nomad community representative.

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

Displaced persons have a right to make informed and voluntary decisions regarding what durable solution is right for them. Understanding preferences and the perspectives behind the intentions for the future will help relevant actors to support IDPs returnees and IDPs to realise their preferred durable solutions. Displaced households -whether in displacement or in return location- determine whether return, settling elsewhere, local integration or a mix of options is the desired option. This study employs a wide lens and examines the preferences for the future not only amongst IDPs but also amongst IDP-returnees, whose return might not have been durable, as well as amongst non-displaced households, in order to also understand the general mobility in the area.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Similar proportions among *all* groups—IDP returnees, IDPs and non-displaced residents—prefer leaving their current location (on average 20% across the localities). Considering figures for the IDP returnees for each locality shows that 21% in Assalaya want to relocate, while the proportion that prefer leaving is smaller among Yassin (16%) and Sheiria (12%) returnees.**
- **Preferred location: 53% of returnees and 55% of non-displaced households would like to move within another locality with Darfur, whilst 25% of both groups want to relocate to a different village in the locality where they currently live. Equal proportions of IDPs prefer to return to their place of origin and move to a different locality in one of the five states of Darfur.**
- **Among non-displaced residents, the lack of access to education and healthcare is a key push factor (47%), lack of economic opportunities is a key factor for all surveyed groups, while access to land is a key reason for wanting to leave for returnees. Based on the key informant interviews three key factors are identified as affecting IDPs' decision to return: land ownership, access to services and security. Most respondents emphasise that all are important, but often point to security as the decisive factor. And even during relative calm and a stable security situation, the memory of past conflict, the proliferation of weapons and the security forces inability to enforce security influence IDPs' decision.**
- **Among households intending to move, key obstacles making the move difficult include: finding new housing, lack of funds and logistics, while notably, finding land is not reported as an obstacle.**
- **What characterises the households that prefer to leave is: higher proportion of households reporting conflicts linked to the agriculture land, higher proportions of households with food insecurity and higher proportion of households that rely mainly on salaries/wages.**

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

What preferences for the future do IDPs, returnees and non-displaced residents have? Findings show that similar proportions among all surveyed groups consider leaving their current location. Across all three localities, 20% of surveyed IDPs residing outside of camps consider leaving, but similarly 18% of the non-displaced residents and 16% of returnees living in Yassin, Sheiria and Assalaya localities

intend to leave their current place.[147] This situation is very different from Tawila locality in North Darfur, where IDPs was the only group with a significant proportion of households that were considering leaving and heading back to their place of origin. Looking in more detail at IDP returnees in the different localities, show that 21% of returnees in Assalaya consider relocating, while the proportion that prefer leaving is smaller among the Yassin returnee population (16%) and Sheiria (12%). It is worth bearing in mind that IDP returnees, of course, have already relocated back to their area of origin, but are planning to leave again.

Households' intentions paint a picture of how people view their future, therefore, households were asked in more detail about any actual plans. Households that indicated a preference for leaving were asked about when they planned to move. A significant proportion (39%) had plans to leave within the next 12 months, which indicate more tangible plans. To where do households want to go? Just above half of returnees (53%) and non-displaced (55%) households would like to relocate to another locality within Darfur, whilst 25% in both groups say they prefer to move to a different village in the same locality. Among IDPs, equal proportions (42%) want to return to their place of origin and move to a different locality in Darfur.

PUSH AND PULL FACTORS AS REPORTED

The 'pull' factors—the reasons for wanting to stay—that households themselves highlight centre around safety, being in their home area plus access to family as well as employment.[148] For both returnees (37%) and IDPs (28%), family is a key reason to stay and safety in the area is also a pull factor for 19% of returnees and 24% of IDPs. Asked why they would like to stay, access to their home (19%) and employment opportunities (18%) are rated equally by returnees, whilst employment opportunities are a more important factor for IDPs (23%) than access to home (12%). The reasons given for wanting to leave are more nuanced. The 'push' factors are the same for all surveyed groups but given more importance by the different groups. Among the non-displaced population, the reason to leave that really stands out is lack of access to education and healthcare. 47% of non-displaced households want to leave because access to education and healthcare is poor in comparison to 30% of returnees and 24% of IDPs. The lack of economic opportunities is a key concern for all; non-displaced (29%), returnees (31%) and marginally less among IDPs (26%). Notably, access to land is regarded as a reason for leaving for more returnees—22% of returnee households point to lack of land as a push factor compared to only 15% of IDPs and 13% of non-displaced residents. The push factors linked to accessing services and economic opportunities can also be linked to the result showing that somewhat more non-displaced households residing in villages intent to leave their current location compared to those in villages. Specifically, 20% of the rural non-displaced households' intent to leave compared to 15% of the households in villages. This trend cannot be observed among returnees or IDPs.

When households are asked about the main obstacle to pursue moving, a majority amongst all groups report economic reasons—lack of funds or productive assets to re-establish themselves elsewhere. This is the case for 47% of returnees, and respectively 37% and 36% of non-displaced and IDP households. The second most cited obstacle is lack of transportation (21%–23%), whilst finding new housing is flagged 21% of non-displaced, 14% of returnees and 11% of IDPs. Importantly, households

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[147] 70% of the surveyed IDPs originate from East Darfur, whilst 23% come from South Darfur.

[148] Note results are given for the localities combined, as findings only show very little variation between localities.

did not highlight lack of access to land as an obstacle to relocating.[149] This is remarkable given the emphasis on access to land in discussions focusing on conflict dynamics and return of IDPs. Instead, the survey findings indicate that respondents point to obstacles linked to finances and logistics as key obstacles to relocating.

The area level analysis explored through key informant interviews factors that influence IDPs' decision to return in each locality. In **Assalaya** locality, respondents emphasise livelihoods as key, which they deem wholly dependent on land ownership. Respondents view people's livelihoods as closely linked to accessing land and other natural resources.[150] Availability and access to services are seen to have no bearing on IDPs' decision to return, whereas both security and regaining land are perceived to be a precondition for people to return.[151] In the words of one IDP, 'availability and accessibility of basic services has a great effect on the decision of IDPs to return, [but] only if it is associated with security and ability for them to regain their land; otherwise it will not affect their decision'.[152]

In **Sheiria** locality, respondents are of the opinion that land ownership and access to basic services definitely influence the return of IDPs. Better services in camps including access to clean water, education, health and security are perceived to be better in camps and therefore thought to be factors that influence IDPs from relocating back to their areas of origin. Land ownership is seen to affect the decision to return significantly, however, community leaders also point out that owning land is only important for those who owned land in their area of origin. Those that never owned land in the first place, can go back and rent land to cultivate as they did previously.[153] When respondents are asked to identify the single most important factor for return, respondents point to security. And even when the conflict has died down, but past experiences and the fear of renewed conflict prevents many from returning as there is a proliferation of weapons and the police and institutions are regarded as weak and ill-equipped. 'Even though the security situation is good, IDPs still fear the conflict relapse due to the spread of weapons and weak government security. The lessons of past conflicts have a great effect on the return and reintegration of IDPs.'[154]

Key informants in **Yassin** locality say that availability and access to basic services have a significant impact on IDPs' decision to return, and echo the views of Sheiria respondents, who consider better service provision in the IDP camps to play a role as to whether IDPs choose to return. Respondents believe that access to water affects IDPs' decision the most, as Yassin locality has severe water shortages.[155] Land ownership is also singled out to be important, but as emphasised by respondents in Assalaya and Sheiria, land ownership is not a decisive factor in isolation from access to basic services. In Yassin, the security situation is generally stable in return areas, but there are still some parts that are perceived as insecure. And similar to Sheiria key informants, it is stressed that the past conflict and fear of conflict resurging do keep some IDPs from returning.[156]

These key informant interviews highlight that a handful of key factors affect IDPs decisions to return. Key factors include security, land ownership and access to services with the one exception that

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[149] Lack of access to land' was included as an option for this survey question.
[150] Assalaya locality, East Darfur, Native Administration—Omda.
[151] Assalaya locality, East Darfur, key informants—farmers.
[152] Assalaya locality, East Darfur, key informant—IDP.
[153] Sheiria, locality, East Darfur, Native Administration—Omdas.
[154] Sheiria locality, East Darfur, local government official.
[155] Yassin locality, East Darfur, key informants—women, youth, farmers.
[156] Yassin locality, East Darfur, Native Administration representatives.

access to water is regarded as particularly important in Yassin locality. Importantly, these three main factors are all important although for many safety and security are regarded as the decisive factor, because 'security, or the lack thereof, is the one reason why the IDPs left the area in the first place'.[157]

EXPLORING DRIVING FACTORS FURTHER

What characterises the households that prefer to stay and those that want to leave? Additional analysis considered the land tenure situation and land related conflicts, livelihood sources, food security as well as security incidents and lastly specificities amongst female headed households.

- **Agricultural land tenure seems not to play a role for any of the groups**. The proportion of households that rent and own land is the same amongst those who prefer to leave and those who prefer to stay. However, what does play a role is the conflicts related to this land. It is observed that **larger proportions want to leave amongst households that report conflicts linked to their agricultural land.** Specifically, among non-displaced households that report having land conflict, 37% intent to leave, while among household that do not report such conflicts, 16% intent to leave (11 points difference). Among returnees the difference is 26% vs 15% (11 points as well) and among IDPs the difference is 28% versus 19% (9 percentage points difference). **This point is confirmed when looking at the reported security incidents linked to damages on assets (such as crops).** Amongst non-displaced who have experienced damages to assets 26% prefer to leave while amongst the rest 15% intent to leave (11 points difference). Among returnees, this difference is less: 19% vs 15% (4 points) and among IDPs, it is 23% versus 19% (4 points).

- When looking at the main livelihoods source reported by the households that intent to stay and those that intent to leave, it is observed that **those relying mainly on salaries/wages are more likely to leave.** Specifically, looking at the non-displaced: amongst those who rely on crop farming, 18% want to leave; while amongst those who rely on salaries/wages, 24% intent to leave (6 percentage point difference). Looking at returnees: amongst those who rely on crop farming: 16% want to leave while amongst those who reply primarily on salaries/wages, 23% intent to leave (7 percentage points difference).

- **Food security appears to also be a 'push' factor.** There are more food insecure households among those that prefer to leave versus those that want to stay. Among non-displaced households that reported not having enough food the previous 7 days, 31% say they want to leave in contrast to 23% of households that want to stay. These figures are very similar for returnee households; 30% of food insecure returnee households want to stay in contrast to 24% that intend to stay. Similarly, among food insecure IDPs 24% want to stay set against 17% of households that intend to stay in their current location.

- **Higher proportions of male-headed households intend to leave** compared to the female headed households: 21% of the non-displaced male headed households' intent to leave compared to 12% of the female headed households. Amongst returnees and IDPs the difference is less (with only 7 and 4 percentage points difference respectively).

- **Interestingly, the duration of return among returnees seems not to play a role**: The same proportions of households recently arrived and returnees that have been back for many years want to leave and stay.

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[157] Sheiria locality, East Darfur, community representatives—women.

CONCLUSIONS: PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND PEACE BUILDING

ASSALAYA, SHEIRIA, YASSIN IN EAST DARFUR: HOW WAS PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTIONS ANALYSED?

Durable solutions for IDPs living in displacement is part of building peace in Darfur. At the same time, peace is also central to achieving solutions for the displaced population that are durable—the two aspects are intrinsically linked. It is impossible to envisage stability and security in the long-term without sustainable return of those who fled the conflict.

This study paid attention to a number of areas crucial to peace and durable solutions for IDPs and IDP returnees. Importantly, the analysis included the views and concerns of Gereida nomadic communities, whose perspectives need to be mainstreamed into conflict analysis and any peacebuilding approach informing future activities—whether with a humanitarian, development or durable solution focus.

As per the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, 'a durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement'. It is of central importance to focus on the non-discriminatory and voluntary nature of solutions, and to measure local integration—whether in the place where people have found refuge after being uprooted or where they have returned to—as a *process* towards overcoming vulnerabilities linked to their displacement. In other words, durable solutions are not defined or achieved by merely the geographic features of the solutions outlined in the IASC Framework—to return, stay or settle elsewhere. What is key is the principles of non-discrimination and the voluntary nature of reaching long-term solutions.

The approach designed for this study is to measure progress towards durable solutions by way of conducting a **comparative analysis of the socio-economic situation of the displaced populations against the non-displaced**, across the key criteria outlined in the IASC Framework. By identifying the key differences in the situations of displaced and non-displaced, the analysis has pointed to areas where the IDP returnees and IDPs are worse off and can be assumed to still face displacement-linked vulnerabilities. In this way, the analysis pinpoints the key obstacles to reaching solutions.

To strengthen the understanding of the three localities in East Darfur and the peacebuilding capacities, the methodology approach combines the population analysis (based on household survey results) with the area-level analysis of the localities that looks at conflict dynamics, local conflict resolution mechanisms, the capacity of the police and courts to uphold the rule of law, land and resource management structures, availability and capacity of services etc. Lastly, it is critical to also understand the preferences and plans for the future that displaced populations have and the factors that drive their intentions.

The guiding questions for the analysis have been:
- To what extent are the displaced populations who have returned and those who are still in displacement progressing towards durable solutions, and what are the key obstacles and opportunities in this process?

- What are their own preferences for the future and what is driving these intentions?
- How are these integration processes of displaced groups interlinked with the broader peacebuilding process at the locality level?

The above questions were unpacked by analysing the following:
- What is the **rule of law** situation in the locality? Do people feel safe and are they able to access the police and courts?
- What land **governance structures and dispute resolution mechanisms** are in place? How are conflicts and disputes resolved within the community?
- What is the **housing, land and property** situation in the place of displacement and return for both displaced and non-displaced households including nomads?
- How is the **standard of living** for the different populations in terms of access to basic services and livelihoods?
- How **socially cohesive** are the communities, to what extent are different groups participating in decision-making, and how active and equipped are civil society organisations?

PEACEBUILDING CONSIDERATIONS

Rule of law, conflict and local conflict resolutions mechanisms: Robbery and damage to property and livestock is widespread as 47% of non-displaced and 42% of IDPs and returnees experienced such incidents during the last 12 months, while 32–36% report at least one incident of robbery. Yassin locality stands out with higher rates of damage to property, robbery and physical and verbal threats by 2–6 percentage points.

Land conflict centres around disputed ownership, unlawful occupation of land, boundaries of land plus conflict linked to pastoralist grazing routes. Variations exist between the three localities—among those that reported conflict linked to land, 49% say conflict and disputes arise linked to animal grazing routes, whereas in Assalaya conflict around disputed ownership is much more prominent followed by unlawful occupation and boundaries of land.

Across all surveyed groups, only 15% report security incidents to the police, but especially low in Sheiria locality as only 10% of non-displaced residents and returnees turn to the police for help. Also, the satisfaction with the way an issue was resolved was overall low as those that report an incident to the police only 18% were satisfied and thought the matter had been effectively resolved. Key informants point to a proliferation of weapons, a limited capacity of both police and rural courts, which results in widespread impunity which in turn impacts peacebuilding as upholding the rule of law is key to building peace.

When it comes to local conflict mechanisms as an alternative to report incidents to the police, only 10% reported an incident to either local committees or the Native Administration during the last 12 months—a clear tendency not to report. Reporting to a committee or the Native Administration was considerably higher in Yassin, where 19% of non-displaced and 16% of returnees did so in comparison to Sheiria (3% of non-displaced and 8% of returnees) and Assalaya (7% of non-displaced and 8% of returnees). And importantly, overall satisfaction with how an issue was resolved was very low. Among Yassin residents reporting to a committee or Native Administration, 31% were satisfied and found the solution fair in contrast to merely 11% in Assalaya and 15% in Sheiria. In terms of local conflict resolution mechanisms and the Native Administrations capacity to mediate effectively in

disputes and conflict, these results are worrisome. Key respondents point to main challenges and limitations of community-based mechanisms to involve weak state institutions and Native Administration and flag that more technical and financial support is needed if they are to be more effective. Key informants consider security as the main obstacle for IDPs to pursue a return and there is a clear link between security and the ability to enforce the rule of law by police and rural courts plus the ability of local conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve conflict before they turn violence.

The Juba Peace Agreement specifically recognises the Native Administration in relation to administering land, which may help strengthen this institution when it comes to land management and arbitration in disputes. The agreement also stipulates the setting up of the Commission for the Development of the Nomads with a mandate to improve nomadic pastoralist sector plus manage relations between farmers and nomadic pastoralists plus the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, which is tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed land. The establishment of such commissions could help mitigate conflict over land and grazing in Darfur and potentially a key tool in peacebuilding.

Youth: For the three East Darfur localities, there is a high proportion of female youths that are not in education, work or training (24%–26%) compared to 11% among non-displaced and returnee male youths. And a recent study in Darfur flags that both male and female youths joined armed groups mainly driven by unemployment and poverty, hence the NEET rate is an area for concern.

Local participation and cohesion: Importantly, a significant proportion—56% of returnees and 58% of non-displaced—are engaged in community affairs having either attended a public meeting on communal matters or reconciliation meeting in the last 6 months with no significant between the three localities. Importantly, women are not well represented in communal meetings or committees nor are there any civil society groups that activate for women to participate in reconciliation or peace processes. Inter-groups perceptions are overall very positive among non-displaced, returnees and IDP residents, however, attitudes are less positive in regards to nomadic pastoralist communities. Nomads are welcome to access services (91%), but non-displaced communities are less accepting when it comes to taking part in local activities (85%), settling in their village (73%) and marriage (67%). And there is equally low approval when it comes to nomads taking up leadership positions and partake in decision-making (67%).

TO WHICH EXTENT ARE IDP-RETURNEES RE-INTEGRATING?

It is important to state that IDP returnees have not achieved a durable solution merely based on their physical return. Their progress towards a durable solution in their place of origin needs to be assessed, as is done with the IDPs in displacement.

Regaining access to land & livelihoods: a large proportion of returnees in all three localities have regained access to the land they cultivated prior to displacement, though under different a tenure arrangement as most returnees are currently renting land as opposed to owning their agricultural land. In **Yassin** locality, 83% have accessed the same agricultural land and a similar proportion (82%) have re-accessed the same housing plot. In **Sheiria** locality, 82% of returnees have managed to re-access the same agricultural land and 84% the same residential land. It is a similar picture in **Assalaya** locality, where 79% have re-accessed the same land they cultivated prior to displacement, while 80% have managed to return to the same housing plot.

Among those returnees that have managed to access the same land, a majority is renting the land as in **Assalaya** (60%), **Sheira** (63%) and **Yassin** (64%) of returnees rent agricultural land. The household survey shows that renting land is the predominant form of land tenure in all three localities as approximately 60% of non-displaced residents in the recent localities report renting agricultural land, while 33% report ownership.[158] The household survey did not inquire what type of tenure returnees had prior to their displacement, however, the area level analysis indicate that land rental was part of a negotiated diplomatic solution that made it possible for many farmers to access agricultural land. It is unclear how this land tenure—renting of agricultural land—affects peacebuilding and hence will be explored further in the community sessions to follow in the three localities.

Benchmarking returnees against the non-displaced residents when assessing progress towards durable solutions, the findings show that the two population groups have very similar tenure arrangements in **Yassin** locality. 24% of returnees versus 28% of non-displaced own the land they cultivate, but returnees lack behind when it comes to possessing documentation proving ownership. 13% of returnees in contrast to 21% of non-displaced residents in Yassin locality hold land registration certificates. **Sheiria** locality has the lowest proportion of residents owning their agricultural land—only 1 in 5 households own land, however, the proportion is the same for both returnees and non-displaced residents. The same percentage of both population groups hold land registration certificates (20%), which is the highest for all three localities. The picture in **Assalaya** locality is markedly different, as 27% of returnees own land in contrast to 42% of non-displaced residents, but equal proportions hold land registration certificates.

Land in all three localities is closely linked to livelihoods as a majority of residents depend on crop agriculture. In regards to livelihoods, it is also not evident to what extend the rental tenure system impacts the returnees and non-displaced residents, as tributes vary from location to location and are also said by thematic experts to have changed over time. Hence, whether the land tenure system is an obstacle for returnees needs to be explored further in consultation with the communities in Assalaya, Sheiria and Yassin during the community validation sessions.

Even though IDP returnees have access to land and hence a livelihood option, they have *not* overcome vulnerabilities linked to their displacement and key obstacles to achieving solutions persist. What are these main obstacles?

- **Safety and security:** IDP returnees experience somewhat more security incidents in **Sheiria** and **Assalaya** locality including threats and robbery. In **Yassin**, only slightly more returnees experience security incidents and only slightly less feel safe when walking around. Safety and security remain a key obstacle to re-integration—a finding which is supported by the area level analysis.

- **Access to services:** In **Yassin** locality, IDP returnees have worse access to health and water, while access to education for returnee children is marginally better. Access to sanitation is virtually non-existent and is important for health outcomes, but access to services is low for returnees and non-displaced residents alike and thus not linked to their previous displacement. In **Sheiria**, returnees have worse access to improved sources of drinking water but access is better when compared to the Yassin and Assalaya locality. Both population groups have access to access to

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[158] Note that it is also not clear whether non-displaced residents were required to rent land in order to stay.

education although marginally more boys from returnee households attend school. Hence, apart from access to water the low access to services is not linked to displacement but is a challenge for all locality residents. Non-displaced residents and returnee residents have very similar access to services in **Assalaya** locality. Access to all services is low, but it is a shared development challenge and not faced disproportionately by IDP returnees.

- **Prospects of youth**: Both non-displaced and returnee communities have high percentages of female inactive youths. Female youth returnees are found in significant proportions to be outside the labour force—neither working, engaged in subsistence farming, nor in education or training. The NEET rate for female youths is 24% for returnees but proportion is especially high in Assalaya as 27% of female youths are not in education, employment or training. This poses a risk to the prospect of the female youths to continue reintegrating in these village of return, if they have no own means of subsistence.

- **Social cohesion and local participation**: Inter-group perceptions are positive between non-displaced and returnees, although it is important to point out that the two communities live relatively separately. Only 18% of targeted returnees live in villages together with non-displaced residents and especially in Sheiria locality where merely 13% live together with non-displaced families compared to Assalaya (22%) and Yassin (20%).

- **Resilience and future plans:** Marginally fewer returnees report lack food in the previous 7 days—26% compared to 30% of returnees. Sheiria locality has the largest proportion of food insecure households; 32% of returnee and 35% of non-displaced households. Importantly, 20% of returnees prefer to leave their current location and thus are evidently not perceiving their return to their area of origin as durable solution and plan to leave again. When asked why they prefer to leave, returnees point to lack of economic opportunities and basic services and access to land. However, analysing in more detail the household survey findings show that food insecure households are more likely to want to leave, whereas as duration of their return land tenure appear not to be linked to preferring to leave.

TO WHAT EXTENT ARE IDPs INTEGRATING?

Displacement and land conflict: IDPs living outside of camps across the three localities amount to only 7% of the population. IDPs living in Yassin, Sheiria and Assalaya locality are primarily from within these same localities, and hence displacement is localised. The vast majority of IDPs (97%) say they do not have any issues in relation to residential land, but 14% of IDP households report conflict linked to their farming land in contrast to 8% among the non-displaced population. Merely 21% of IDPs are accessing the same land before displacement, and among those that are not, the majority (80%) report that they have lost their rights to their land. 43% of IDPs say their land is unlawfully occupied, whilst 32% refer to disputed ownership of the land. The fact that IDPs are still displaced and cannot access their agricultural land is both an obstacle to durable solutions, and also to peacebuilding as disputes over land is often perceived as unresolved conflict, discrimination and injustice.

There is not a significant IDP sample size in each locality to provide locality specific insights, however, the area level analysis point to specific problems around new settlers occupying land near the Northern Railway area.[159]

Land tenure: 91% of IDPs have access to agricultural land, but IDPs are more vulnerable in regards to land ownership. Only 10% of IDP households report owning agricultural land, while 80% rent the land they cultivate. This is in contrast to non-displaced households (60%) and returnees (67%), hence there is a significant difference when benchmarking against other population groups and barrier for IDPs to progress towards durable solutions. It is unclear to which extent renting land is a less secure tenure situation and to what extent paying rent affects the income of the household, which will need to be explored further in the community workshops.

Conflict and security: 10% of IDP residents say they feel unsafe during the night, higher by 5 percentage points compared to non-displaced residents in the three localities. IDPs experienced security incidents to the same extent as non-displaced residents and incidents are overall high. 42% of IDPs experienced damage to livestock or property, and 32% report at least one incident of robbery within the last 12 months. Although IDPs are experiencing security incidents on par with the non-displaced population, security and the police and courts' inability to enforce the rule of law is obstacle to building peace. And security and perceived safety also influence IDPs future preferences whether to stay in their current location, return or go elsewhere. 20% of surveyed IDPs residing outside of camps consider leaving. Safety in their current area is a significant pull factor and hence their family's safety is the key concern that prevents 24% of IDPs from leaving and pursuing their preferred solution.

Socio-economic situation: When it comes to accessing basic services such as education, health, water and sanitation, IDPs have a similar level of access in comparison to the non-displaced population. In regards to employment, IDPs are in a similar position to the non-displaces population with the exception that a higher proportion (7 percentage points) list crop agriculture as their only source of livelihood. Overall, being an IDP does not appear to affect the adequate standard of living but the availability and quality of services is low across the board and is a development challenged affecting all population groups.

Prospects for youth: IDP female youths are a group, who are particularly vulnerable despite findings pointing towards similar socio-economic conditions for IDPs and non-displaced population. 28% of IDP female youths are neither in education, employment or training, which places them at risk of not integrating and establish livelihoods in their current location, while also not providing them with skills that would allow them to cultivate land. Hence, limited livelihood options combined with a lack of vocational skills and education presents a key obstacle for this group to finding durable solutions whether they decide to return or stay. Furthermore, female youths do join armed groups and recent UNDP conflict analysis findings show that recruitment is linked to unemployment and poverty, which presents a challenge to peacebuilding.

Local participation and reconciliation: 52% of IDPs have participated in a reconciliation meeting and 56% say they have attended a public meeting in the last 6 months, which is the lowest percentage among the three surveyed groups. Non-displaced communities are overall very welcoming of IDPs, but only 68% agree that IDPs should take part in decision-making. Similar numbers among IDPs

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[159] This area stretches between the two villages of Al-Jalabi and Warqat and encompasses the villages of Al-Fado, Um Sauna, Anqabo, Um Dha and Al-snoot.

report security incidents to the police and local committees, and like the non-displaced and returnee population groups only a minority are satisfied with the outcome.

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE—IDPs, RETURNEES AND NON-DISPLACED

Across all three localities, 20% of surveyed IDPs residing outside of camps consider leaving, but similarly 18% of the non-displaced residents and 16% of returnees living in Yassin, Sheiria and Assalaya localities intend to leave their current place.[160] Thus it is not mere IDPs that are wanting to relocate from where they are currently staying. Among the IDP population, equal proportions (42%) want to return to their place of origin and move to a different locality in Darfur. Reasons for wanting focuses on safety (24%), family (28%) but employment opportunities (23%) and access to their home (12%) are also important factors. Push factors for IDPs wanting to relocate include poor education and healthcare services (24%) and lack of economic opportunities (26%), but access to land is less of a factor (15%).

In **Yassin locality,** key informants generally deem the security situation to be stable in return areas, however, fear of the conflict restarting keep some IDPs from returning. Land ownership is regarded as important but return equally hinges on availability of access to services and in Yassin locality especially access to water is seen to be a critical factor. In **Sheiria**, respondents point to security as the single most important factor determining whether IDPs return. The view is that the proliferation of weapons combined with weak and ill-equipped police and government institutions would not be able to contain violence should conflict start up again. And thus, while land ownership and access to basic services influence whether IDPs choose to return, the overriding factor is deemed to be security.

DATA TO INFORM GOVERNMENT-LED AND COMMUNITY DRIVEN PLANNING

The analysis points to specific displacement-linked obstacles that IDP returnees face upon return to their village of origin; these are linked primarily to the security situation and land tenure. The analysis also points to general development linked obstacles that all population groups in three East Darfur localities are facing, such as the poor availability and capacity of basic services as well as employment prospects for youth. When diving into these obstacles to solutions, it is important to take into account on one hand the capacities, skills and vulnerabilities of the populations—which vary not only by displacement status but also by age and sex—and on the other hand the governance structure in East Darfur, the existing community-based organisations and the wider peacebuilding process.

IDPs and returnees have been uprooted by conflict and displacement-affected communities are not merely people in need of assistance, but dynamic actors who must not be left on the side lines. Community-driven planning with displacement-affected communities at the centre is key to finding solutions to displacement. This durable solutions analysis is an important step to inform priorities based on evidence-based analysis that builds on representative samples of the displacement affected population as well as key informant interviews with central stakeholders in Assalaya, Sheiria and Yassin localities. However, inclusion must go beyond ensuring that the realities of the displacement affected communities are analysed. Therefore, key results from this analysis were presented to

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[160] 70% of the surveyed IDPs originate from East Darfur, whilst 23% come from South Darfur.

communities (in May 2021) in order to validate and prioritise the most significant obstacles to solutions and peace as seen from their perspective. The prioritised obstacles and community's vision will form the point of departure for the drafting of the durable solutions Action Plan for the each of the three localities. This will happen during a joint workshop with the relevant stakeholders from locality and state level authorities as well as the humanitarian and development community. The Action Plans will serve as a roadmap to link the results on barriers to solutions in order to concrete programming activities that can support communities in overcoming those same barriers.

ANNEX 1: DURABLE SOLUTIONS INDICATORS OVERVIEW

DURABLE SOLUTIONS CRITERIA	KEY INDICATORS	Assalaya		Yassin		Sheria	
		IDP returnees	Non-displaced	IDP returnees	Non-displaced	IDP returnees	Non-displaced
Long-term safety and security	HHs having experienced physical threats in the past 12 months	13%	6%	14%	14%	5%	4%
	HHs having experienced robbery in the past 12 months	41%	36%	39%	31%	29%	31%
	HHs having experienced damage of property/assets (incl crops) in the past 12 months	42%	49%	49%	45%	37%	45%
	HHs having experienced security incident(s) who reported to police	20%	18%	15%	15%	10%	17%
	HHs having experienced security incident(s) who reported to village committee	9%	7%	15%	19%	8%	3%
	HHs having experienced security incident(s) who did NOT report at all	69%	70%	65%	60%	79%	78%
	HHs having reported incident and reporting that issue was fairly resolved	23%	23%	39%	36%	30%	36%
	Reported feeling of being safe when walking in the night- SDG indicator 16.1.4	86%	94%	87%	91%	93%	96%
Adequate standart of living / access to basic services: health, education, water, sanitation	HHs facing challenges when needing to access health services in the past 6 months	93%	94%	93%	93%	92%	93%
	Births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) - SDG 3.1.2	20%	22%	15%	23%	22%	16%
	Access to improved drinking water sources	26%	27%	37%	45%	42%	66%
	Percpetion of drinking water being sufficient for the HH, the past summer	8%	12%	21%	30%	18%	48%
	Access to improved sanitation facilities	1%	5%	1%	2%	1%	8%
	Primary school attendance amongst boys - 6-13 years old	57%	56%	58%	55%	49%	42%
	Primary school attendance amongst girls 6-13 years old	54%	55%	55%	48%	47%	48%
	Men above 15 years of age who are litterate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	65%	61%	72%	64%	67%	70%
	Women above 15 years of age who are litterate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	30%	30%	34%	32%	30%	49%
	Men who own/access a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	54%	57%	57%	53%	54%	60%
	Women who own/access a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	29%	23%	31%	30%	35%	39%
Access to employment and livelihoods	HHs having NOT had enough food or money to buy food the week preceding the surve	17%	18%	26%	30%	32%	35%
	HHs applying 'high coping' strategies based on the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI)	1%	1%	2%	1%	2%	1%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) working for pofit or pay	53%	49%	63%	60%	47%	59%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) working for pofit or pay	39%	32%	49%	42%	34%	41%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use farming	23%	29%	17%	23%	33%	22%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use farming	28%	32%	26%	39%	38%	27%
	Male youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	13%	15%	10%	8%	9%	7%
	Female youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	27%	30%	24%	19%	20%	32%
	HHs relying on agriculture as their main livelihoods source (whether for own use or selling)	87%	86%	84%	94%	89%	82%
	HHs with access to agricultural land in current location	94%	95%	95%	97%	96%	94%
	HHs with ownership/secure rights over agricultural land - SDG 5.a.1	27%	42%	24%	28%	18%	19%
	HHs with ownership certificates amongst those who report owning land	11%	11%	13%	21%	21%	17%
Access to personal documentation	Persons with birth certificate	9%	7%	12%	10%	13%	16%
	Persons with national ID	75%	79%	81%	81%	74%	72%
	Children under 5 years of age with a birth certificate - SDG 16.9.1	12%	7%	13%	13%	10%	9%
Access to effective mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP)	Displaced HHs that still access the same land as before displacement	74%	/	79%	/	79%	/
	Displaced HHs that do NOT access same land but still have the rights over that land	17%		15%		15%	
	Displaced HHs that do NOT access same land and have issues re-accessing	53%		26%		49%	
	Displaced HHs NOT accessing same land, reporting main issue being: land occupied unlawfully	41%		47%		23%	
	Displaced HHs NOT accessing same land, reporting main issue being: disputed ownership	46%		35%		55%	
	Displaced HHs NOT accessing same land, reporting main issue being: grazing routes not follow	3%		3%		5%	
	Displaced HHs that have re-accessed the same dwelling plot as before displacement	80%		82%		84%	
Civic participation in local community	HHs attended local reconciliation initiatives the past 6 months	57%	64%	59%	61%	54%	56%
	HHs reporting presence of water commitees	67%	72%	57%	61%	51%	53%
	Displaced HHs reporting they can participate in local decision making (linked to SDG 16	92%	n/a	94%	n/a	96%	n/a
	Non-displaced HHs reporting that IDP returnees should be able to participate in local decision m	n/a	93%	n/a	95%	n/a	89%

ANNEX 2: DETAILED OVERVIEW OF SERVICES[161]

Village	School name	Teacher		Ratio	Student number		Fence	Seating seating for x % of students	Latrines
		Trained	Untrained		Male	Female			
Primary Education Assalaya locality – capacity per school									
Assalaya administrative unit									
Aleumda	Aleumda	1	1	1:23	36	10	Local	10%	Local Materials
Alghabsh Mujabi	Alghabsh Mujabi	1	2	1:41	78	45	Local	2%	Local Materials
Aljamilaya	Aljamilaya	1	7	1:20	98	60	Local	9%	Local Materials
Aljubur	Aljubur	1	4	1:26	90	42	Local	70%	Local Materials
Allijam	Allijam	1	0	1:88	56	32	Local	40%	Local Materials
Almahfura	Almahfura	1	3	1:24	63	33	Local	31%	Local Materials
Almujilid	Almujilid	1	6	1:14	45	52	Local	28%	Local Materials
Alnamar	Alnamar	1	4	1:39	125	70	Local	50%	Local Materials
Alrws	Alrws	0	6	1:32	65	125	Local	24%	Local Materials
Altawamat	Altawamat	1	3	1:96	190	194	Local	20%	Fixed Materials
Alwazazin	Alwazazin	1	0	1:80	50	30	Local	0%	Local Materials
Am Dabayba	'Am Dabayba	1	1	1:49	51	47	Local	30%	Fixed Materials
Am Saeida	'Am Saeida	1	6	1:7	27	19	Local	66%	Local Materials
Assalaya	Easalayuh Binin	1	8	1:25	227	0	Fixed materials	80%	Fixed Materials
Assalaya	Esilayat Banat	2	7	1:39	0	354	Local	90%	Fixed Materials
Assalaya	Altaqawi Banat	1	4	1:38	0	190	Fixed materials	40%	Fixed Materials
Assalaya	Yusuf Sulayman	2	8	1:6	55	0	Local	0%	Fixed Materials
Assalaya	Almasar	1	6	1:32	223	0	Local	60%	Fixed Materials
Baqirat Shayla	Baqirat Shayla	1	0	1:60	32	28	Local	20%	Local Materials
Bwat Alkhayl	Bwat Alkhayl	1	6	1:8	36	22	Local	22%	Local Materials
Earafat	Earafat	1	0	1:116	49	67	Local	19%	Local Materials
Eashiraya	Eashiraya	1	2	1:25	25	49	Local	71%	Local Materials

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[161] Villages marked with a * are not included in the maps.

Fati Al'islam	Fati Al'islam	1	6	1:13	66	24	Local	64%	Local Materials
Jamilat	Jamilat	1	0	1:125	69	56	Local	56%	Local Materials
Qiafa	Qiafa	1	5	1:11	36	28	Local	12%	Local Materials
Quty Alkhayrat	Quty Alkhayrat	1	1	1:33	46	20	Local	60%	Local Materials
Sabirin	Sabirin	1	5	1:19	51	64	Local	5%	Local Materials
Shiqun Alkhayr	Shiqun Alkhayr	1	3	1:27	59	47	Local	72%	Local Materials
Shiqun Alnayl	Shiqun Alnayl	1	9	1:11	90	24	Local	66%	Local Materials
Zaybat Alkul	Zaybat Alkul	1	6	1:20	87	52	Local	20%	Local Materials
Abu Saeida Administrative unit									
Abws Alkharijia	Abws Alkharijia	1	2	1:108	177	146	Local	54%	Local Materials
Almaemura	Almakhfura	1	4	1:9	27	19	Local	22%	Local Materials
Alsuntat Zimaqiun	Alsuntat Zimaqiun	1	6	1:21	89	59	Local	33%	Local Materials
Am Tarju	'Am Tarju	1	6	1:56	204	186	Local	14%	Local Materials
Am Waraqat	'Am Waraqat	1	3	1:55	118	102	Local	23%	Local Materials
Damsu	Aljughana	1	6	1:18	66	59	Local	54%	Local Materials
Nalsila	Nalsila	1	5	1:10	46	15	Local	25%	Local Materials
Maeali									
Aljara	Aljara	1	5	1:0	0	0	Local	3%	Local Materials
Alsharab	Alsharab	1	2	1:23	30	38	Local	85%	Local Materials
Am Sayrira	'Am Sayrira	1	5	1:0	0	0	Local	25%	Local Materials
Jinti	Jinti	1	5	1:20	78	43	Local	62%	Local Materials
Lieadadiin	Lieadadiin	1	6	1:0	0	0	Local	54%	Local Materials
Maeali	Maeali	1	5	1:89	256	277	Local	15%	Local Materials
Raqibat Alhamal	Raqibat Alhamal	1	5	1:14	49	37	Local	54%	Local Materials
Kalikli Abwslamuh									
Ahmad Byda	'Ahmad Byda	1	5	1:14	69	80	Local	0%	Local Materials
Ahmad Byda	'Ahmad Byda	1	1	1:25	106	87	Local	0%	Local Materials
Alfudu	Alfudu	1	3	1:97	60	45	Local	59%	Local Materials
Alqadamia	Alqadamia	1	4	1:26	226	175	Local	0%	Local Materials
Am Alqari	'Am Alqari	1	4	1:80	158	175	Local	0%	Local Materials
Am Di	'Am Di	1	7	1:67	106	0	Local	60%	Local Materials
Am Di	'Am Di	1	7	1:13	0	92	Local	19%	Local Materials
Anqabu	Kalikli Abwslamuh	1	8	1:12	311	542	Local	80%	Local Materials

Village	School name	Trained	Untrained	Ratio	Male	Female	Fence	Seating	Latrines
Butat Aldubiyi	Butat Aldubiyi	1	4	1:95	87	91	Local	0%	Local Materials
Ghazalat Jawizat	Ghazalat Jawizat	1	4	1:36	71	67	Local	36%	Local Materials
Kalikli Abwslamuh	Kalikli Abwslamuh	1	4	1:28	130	53	Fixed	50%	Local Materials
Maeali Kamal	Maeali Kamal	1	0	1:37	362	112	Local	35%	Local Materials
Qirqar Alsunta	Qirqar Alsunta	1	6	1:474	124	50	Local	78%	Local Materials
Rahal Klikli	Rahal Klikli	1	5	1:25	79	21	Local	50%	Local Materials
Shiqa Tabaldi	Kalikli Abwslamuh	3	12	1:17	378	325	Local	56%	Local Materials
Um Saeuna	Kalikli Abwslamuh	3	10	1:47	415	285	Local	78%	Local Materials
Umalqraa	Kalikli Abwslamuh	2	8	1:54	0	542	Local	80%	Local Materials
Umalqraa	Kalikli Abwslamuh	3	8	1:54	0	412	Local	78%	Local Materials

Primary Education Sheiria locality – capacity per school

Village	School name	Teacher		Ratio	Student number		Fence	Seating seating for x % of students	Latrines
		Trained	Untrained		Male	Female			
Abu Dnql Administrative Unit									
Abu Dnql Town	Nur Alyaqin	2	8	1:75	320	430	Local	22%	Local Materials
Abu Dnql Town	Hazifa	3	12	1:19	287		Local	60%	Local Materials
Abu Dnql Town	Alzaeim Alazhry	2	9	1:59	350	300	Local	66%	Local Materials
Abu Dnql Town	Khalid Bin Alwalid	2	8	1:31	311		Local	9%	Local Materials
Abu Dnql Town	Almnara	1	10	1:22		237	Local	20%	Local Materials
Khazzan Jadid									
Ab Dowamat	Khalid Ibn Elwaleed	0	8	1:42	179	159	No fence	95%	Improved
Khazzan Jadid Town	Abwbkr	4	7	1:41	450		Local	5%	Local Materials
Khazzan Jadid Town	Abn Zaydun	2	10	1:29	350		Local	66%	Local Materials
Khazzan Jadid Town	Alkhunsa'	1	11	1:36		435	Local	71%	Local Materials
Khazzan Jadid Town	'Am Almawminin	1	14	1:23		350	Local	2%	Local Materials
Khazzan Jadid Town	Eumar Alfaruq	2	8	1:43	430		Local	28%	Local Materials
Khazzan Jadid Town	Dhat Alnataqin	3	12	1:25		375	Local	64%	Local Materials
Khazzan Jadid Town	Alnamuzjia	2	9	1:31		337	Local	31%	Local Materials
Khazzan Jadid Town	Fatat Darfur	2	8	1:25		250	Local	19%	Local Materials
Khazzan Jadid Town	Alzuhara'	1	10	1:23		250	Local	72%	Local Materials

Khazzan Jadid Town	Eazalaslam	4	11	1:17	250		Local	15%	Local Materials
Khazzan Jadid Town	Abn Khalidun	2	10	1:29	350		Local	54%	Local Materials
Shnablah	Hozifa Ibn Elyaman	1	3	1:57	111	117	No fence	75%	Traditional
Sheiria Administrative Unit								
Jakharah	Ell Mnarah	2	1	1:58	105	70	Fixed	50%	Improved
Sheria Town	Alsadiq	1	7	1:45	357		Local	60%	Fixed Materials
Sheria Town	Euthman	1	8	1:64	575		Local	30%	Fixed Materials
Sheria Town	Alhamira'	2	12	1:26		366	Local	20%	Fixed Materials
Sheria Town	'Am Alqari	3	10	1:31		403	Local	50%	Local Materials
Sheria Town	Salman Alfarisi	2	8	1:49	207	280	Local	70%	Local Materials
Sheria Town	Shati Alnayl	2	10	1:26	150	164	Local	10%	Local Materials
Sheria Town	Alsalam	1	8	1:51	280	177	Local	56%	Local Materials
Sheria Town	Abuaebida	4	11	1:34	513		Local	40%	Local Materials
Sheria Town	Almastifiu	2	10	1:27	325		Local	20%	Local Materials
Sheria Town	Fahr Al'islam	1	8	1:57	517		Local	0%	Local Materials
Sheria Town	Alfaruq	1	14	1:22	327		Local	12%	Local Materials
Um Shejarah	Elzaeam Elazhari	1	3	1:166	355	308	Local	95%	Traditional

Primary Education Yassin locality – capacity per school									
Village	**School name**	**Teacher**		**Ratio**	**Student number**		**Fence**	**Seating** seating for x % of students	**Latrines**
		Trained	**Untrained**		**Male**	**Female**			
Kelakle Mawju Administrative Unit									
Am Alkhayrat	'Am Alkhayrat	2	8	1:75	75	400	Local Materials	50%	Local Materials
Ambwaym Sabil	Ambwaym Sabil	0	8	1:69	69	150	Local Materials	50%	Local Materials
Esharaya	Esharaya	8	0	1:75	75	246	Local Materials	100%	No Latrines
Kelakle Mawju	Kelakle Mawju	3	10	1:58	58		Local Materials	51%	Local Materials
Kelakle Mawju	Nusayba	0	8	1:94	94	750	Local Materials	45%	Local Materials
Kelakle Mawju	Radad	1	8	1:36	36	111	Local Materials	73%	Local Materials
Klaju	Klaju	1	8	1:51	51	110	Local Materials	48%	Local Materials
Manaqil Alnayl	Manaqil Alnayl	2	8	1:31	31	160	Local Materials	25%	Local Materials
Merakha	Merakha	1	1	1:124	124	122	Local Materials	50%	No Latrines
Nulwi	Mulwi	5	2	1:48	48	152	Local Materials	75%	No Latrines
Radad	Radad	5	0	1:27	27	69	Local Materials	65%	No Latrines
Um Elkhirat	Um Elkhirat	7	0	1:59	59	196	Local Materials	75%	Traditional Latrines
Umbowam Homaro	Umbowam Homaro	5	1	1:38	38	102	Local Materials	60%	Traditional Latrines
Mahajerya Administrative Unit									
Abou Hadeed	Abou Hadeed			1:23	23	80	Local Materials	63%	No Latrines
Bowarah	El Bohyrat			1:23	23	74	Local Materials	532%	No Latrines
Ejal Bko	Ejal Bko			1:16	16	31	Local Materials	57%	No Latrines
Klajo	Klajo			1:26	26	100	No Fencing	63%	No Latrines
Labado	El Faroug Labado			1:84	84	0	Local Materials	85%	No Latrines
Labado	El Homirah			1:72	72	502	Local Materials	70%	Traditional Latrines
Lbdu	Alkhitab	5	11	1:39	39	250	Local Materials	94%	Local Materials
Lbdu	Albuhayrat	7	6	1:10	10	0	Local Materials	65%	Local Materials
Lbdu	Almajal	2	7	1:19	19	0	Local Materials	50%	Local Materials
Muhajiria	Abn Sina	2	8	1:63	63	0	Local Materials	19%	Local Materials
Muhajiria	Abwbkir Alsadiq	1	16	1:46	46	780	Local Materials	25%	Local Materials
Muhajiria	Alsutan Eali Dinar	2	8	1:108	108	280	Local Materials	21%	Local Materials
Muhajiria	Alfaruq	3	14	1:51	51	0	Local Materials	64%	Local Materials
Rahat Taba	Rahat Taba			1:130	130	73	Local Materials	46%	No Latrines

Shawa	Shawa			1:36	36	157	Local Materials	32%	No Latrines
Shawuu	Shawuu	8	8	1:42	42	350	Local Materials	50%	Local Materials
Saylaeuh Administrative Unit									
Difaq	Difaq	1	9	1:30	30	0	Local Materials	86%	Local Materials
Barkah	Barkah	0	1	1:86	86	23	Local Materials	60%	No Latrines
Dfag	Dfag	1	9	1:20	20	93	Local Materials	50%	No Latrines
Kasib	Kasib	1	6	1:64	64	0	Local Materials	23%	Local Materials
Kassib	Kassib	1	8	1:38	38	169	Local Materials	56%	No Latrines
Khor Sharm	Khor Sharm	3	6	1:61	61	290	Local Materials	51%	Local Materials
Mulwi	Mulwi	2	14	1:40	40	120	Local Materials	64%	Local Materials
Saylaeuh	Abn Eabbas	1	8	1:39	39	150	Local Materials	40%	Local Materials
Saylaeuh	Aljanubia	3	3	1:92	92	300	Local Materials	20%	Local Materials
Saylaeuh	Alsharqia	2	7	1:71	71	360	Local Materials	12%	Local Materials
Saylaeuh	Algharbia	1	8	1:59	59	0	Local Materials	55%	Local Materials
Tor Taan	Tor Taan	2	8	1:38	38	217	Local Materials	51%	Local Materials
Um Bowam Sabeel	Um Bowam Sabeel	0	8	1:7	7	26	No Fencing	12%	No Latrines
Yassin Administrative Unit									
Abnbah	Abnbah	4	0	1:40	40	69	Local Materials	44%	No Latrines
Afundo	Afundo	7	2	1:57	57	259	Local Materials	79%	Yes
Alladoup	Alladoup	3	1	1:86	86	146	Local Materials	58%	No Latrines
Bajo	Bajo	1	0	1:237	237	133	Local Materials	14%	No Latrines
Hejaleaj	Hejaleaj	4	0	1:50	50	80	Local Materials	50%	No Latrines
Rejalah	Rejalah	1	0	1:105	105	41	Local Materials	38%	No Latrines
Shorom	Shorom	3	1	1:40	40	89	No Fencing	38%	No Latrines
Toar Taan	Toar Taan	5	1	1:18	18	51	Local Materials	28%	No Latrines
Tundlti	Tundlti	4	2	1:45	45	117	Local Materials	33%	No Latrines
Umsegata	Umsegata	0	0	0	0	0	No Fencing	0%	No Latrines
Yassin	Blqis Banat	1	11	1:58	58	700	Fixed materials	60%	Fixed Materials
Yassin	Algharbia	0	10	1:65	65	0	Fixed materials	30%	Fixed Materials
Yassin	Abn Alkhitab	1	8	1:72	72	0	Fixed materials	20%	Fixed Materials
Yassin	Yasn Banat	2	10	1:63	63	750	Fixed materials	50%	Fixed Materials
Yassin	Yasun Binin	1	8	1:78	78	0	Fixed materials	70%	Fixed Materials
Yassin	Alsaeida	1	12	1:55	55	720	Local Materials	10%	Fixed Materials

Yassin	Al'umu Banat	2	9	1:30	30	330	Local Materials	56%	Fixed Materials

Health services Assalaya locality – Capacity per health centre

Village	Active	Staff	Condition	Electricity	Clean water	Latrines
Abu Saeida Administrative Unit						
Abu Saeida Town	Active	9 Medical Assistants	New Building	Solar Energy	No	No
Ghazalat Jawizat	Not Active	5 Medical Assistants	New Building	Solar Energy	No	No
Assalaya Administrative Unit						
Assalaya Town	Active	22 Nurses	New	Solar Energy	No	No
Assalaya Town	Not Active	3 Medical Assistants	New Building	Solar Energy	No	No
Kalikli Abwslamuh Administrative Unit						
Kalikli Abwslamuh Town	Active	12 Medical Assistants	New Building	Solar Energy	No	No
Maeali Administrative Unit						
Maeali Sherik	Not Active	No Staff	No Building	Solar Energy	No	No
Maeali Wasat	Active	6 Medical Assistants	Old Building	Solar Energy	No	No

Health services Sheiria locality – Capacity per health centre

| Village	Active	Staff	Condition	Electricity	Clean water	Latrines
Abu Dnql Administrative Unit						
Abu Dnql Town	Not active	1 Medical Assistant	New building	Solar energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Helat Ramadan	active	1 Medical Assistant	local materials	Solar energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Khazzan Jaded Administrative Unit						
Aradeba	Not Active	1 Medical Assistant	Under Constrution	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Khazzan Jadid Town	Active	3 Medical Assistants	New Building	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Rahat Albayar	Not Active	1 Medical Assistant	Under Construction	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Rhazan Rural Area	Active	1 Medical Assistant	Old Building	No Electricity	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Um Sheijra	Not Active	1 Medical Assistant	New Building	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Sheria Administrative Unit						
Abudywymat	Active	1 Medical Assistant	New Building	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Jakhara	Active	14 Nurses	New Building	General	No	good
Shnabla	Active	1 Medical Assistant	New Building	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply

Health services Yassin locality – Capacity per health centre

| Village	Active	Staff	Condition	Electricity	Clean water	Latrines
Kelakle Mawju Administrative Unit						
Kelakle Mawju	Active	10 Medical Assistants	New	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Ambwaym Sabil	Active	6 Medical Assistants	Under Construction	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Muhajiria Administrative Unit						
Lbdu	Active	8 Medical Assistants	New	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Almajal	Active	8 Medical Assistants	New	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Saylaeuh	Active	5 Medical Assistants	New	Solar Energy	No	Latrines available, no reliable water supply
Yassin Administrative Unit						
Yassin	Active	4 Nurses	New	Solar Energy	Yes	Latrines available, no reliable water supply

ANNEX 3: MAPS OF SERVICES[162]

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[162] The maps are created by SUDIA based on key informant interviews; the detailed overview of services can be found in Annex 2.

ASSALAYA

SHEIRIA

YASSIN

Map 1

YASSIN LOCALITY

- Student to Teacher Ratio <60:1
- Student to Teacher Ratio 61-90:1
- Student to Teacher Ratio >90:1
- Village
- Administrative Unit Center
- Yassin Border

Yassin

Bowarah Schools: 1
Labado Schools: 5
Shawuu Schools: 2
Klajo Schools: 1
Muhajiria Schools: 4
Rahat Taba Schools: 1
Klaju Schools: 1
Abou Hadeed Schools: 1
Abnbah Schools: 1
Bajo Schools: 1
Ambwaym Sabil Schools: 1
Kasib Schools: 1
Ejal Bko Schools: 1
Um Bowam Sabeel Schools: 1
Shorom Schools: 1
Toar Taan Schools: 1
Khor Sharm
Kassib Schools: 1
Tunditi Schools: 1
Hejaleaj Schools: 1
Yassin Schools: 7
Saylaeuh Schools: 4
Rejalah Schools: 1
Barkah Schools: 1
Umbowam Homaro Schools: 1
Um Elkhirat Schools: 1
Kelakle Mawju Schools: 3
Am Alkhayrat Schools: 1

GIS information compiled from IOM, UNHCR, UNDP and UNOCHA data. Basic services and capacity indicators were compiled through area-level KIIs with local government representatives and basic service officials as well as state-level ministries.

Map 2

YASSIN LOCALITY

- Yassin Healthcare
- Village
- Administrative Unit Center
- Yassin Border

Yassin

Almajal, New
Lbdu, New
Kelakle Mawju, New
Ambwaym Sabil, Under construction
Saylaeuh, New
Yassin, New

GIS information compiled from IOM, UNHCR, UNDP and UNOCHA data. Basic services and capacity indicators were compiled through area-level KIIs with local government representatives and basic service officials as well as state-level ministries.

Map 3

YASSIN LOCALITY

- Yassin Judiciary
- Administrative Unit Center
- Village
- Yassin Border
- Migratory Routes

Yassin

Labadou, Police Station
Al Ladoob, Police Post
El Senate, Police Post
Kalajo, Police Post
Mahajerya, Police Station
Rejala, Police Post
Bajou, Police Post
Tor Taan, Police Post
Kassib, Police Post
Kelakle, Police Station
Shorom, Police Post
Afundo, Police Station
Baraka, Police Post
Selaah, Police Station
Yassin, Rural Court
Hegaleag, Police Post
Yassin, Police Station
Um Bowame, Police Post
Esharaya, Police Post

GIS information compiled from IOM, UNHCR, UNDP and UNOCHA data. Basic services and capacity indicators were compiled through area-level KIIs with local government representatives and basic service officials as well as state-level ministries.

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