DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the
Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan

Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding for the displacement-affected communities in

Gereida locality, South Darfur

August 2021

Suggested citation: PBF Sudan, DSWG Sudan, UNHCR, JIPS (2021). *Durable Solutions & Baseline Analysis: Key Obstacles to Durable Solutions and Peacebuilding for the Displacement-Affected Communities in Gereida locality, South Darfur.*

With special thanks to Margharita Lundkvist-Houndoumadi (JIPS), Therese Bjorn Mason (consultant to JIPS), Ola Samarah (JIPS) for the analysis and report preparation; Khadra Elmi (UNHCR/ DSWG) for strategic guidance/coordination and the in-depth reviews; Mirjam Kuschnitzki (SUDIA) for the analysis of the area level data and Ghazi Kunna (SUDIA) for the cartography. Profound recognition goes to the communities, who took part in the study and used the findings to identify their priorities, and the Locality and State level authorities for their time, participation, and leadership in the process.

Supported by:

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Commissioned and led by:

UNHCR

With technical guidance by the PBF partners and the Durable Solutions Working Group Sudan:

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SUDIA

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ABBREVIATIONS

DSWG Durable Solutions Working Group

CBM/CBRM Community-based management resolution mechanism/Community-based management

CBO Community-based organization

GoS Government of Sudan

HNO Humanitarian Need Overview

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IOM International Organization for Migration

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization

JIPS Joint IDP Profiling Service

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

SUDIA Sudanese Development Initiative

UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WFP World Food Programme

UNAMID United Nations African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur

UNCT United Nations Country Team

KEY TERMS

Displacement affected communities: refers to displaced persons and the communities affected by their presence, such as host communities, communities in areas of return, or other areas where displaced persons are seeking a durable solution to their displacement.[1]

Displaced persons: refers to internally displaced persons, whether they are physically displaced or have returned to the place they lived prior to their displacement.

Durable solutions: a durable solution is achieved when displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. A durable solution can be achieved through return, local integration and resettlement.[2]

Durable solutions process: a community-based approach to durable solutions planning, based on durable solutions targets identified by displacement-affected communities at a decentralized level, in post-conflict or post-disaster settings.[3]

Durable solutions analysis: the purpose of a durable solutions analysis is to provide an evidence base to inform joint responses to displacement. It entails a systematic and principled process in line with the IASC Framework, including IDPs' perspectives and preferences for future settlement options, demographic profile, and the eight durable solutions criteria. The analysis focuses on the specific realities of the displaced populations, whilst making a comparison to the non-displaced populations and taking into account the broader macro environment.[4]

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: these principles are 30 standards that outline the protections available to internally displaced people (IDPs). They detail the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs: from the beginning of their forced displacement, to IDPs protection and assistance during displacement up to the achievement of durable solutions.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.[5]

IDP returnees/return IDPs: displaced persons that have returned to their place of origin.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs: the framework, endorsed by the IASC Working Committee in 2010, addresses durable solutions following

[1] The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.
[2] Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2010) IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, April 2010.
[3] The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.
[4] Ibid.
[5] UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.

conflict and natural disasters. It describes the key human rights-based principles that should guide the search for durable solutions.

Non-displaced persons: individuals who are not displaced (and may or may not be living in the same areas as displaced persons).

Peacebuilding: involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore a relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.[6]

Protracted displacement: a situation where IDPs and returnees have been displaced for a longer time period (5 years or more) and where they still have assistance needs linked to their displacement, and are not able to enjoy their human rights for reasons caused by their displacement.[7]

Refugees: individuals displaced outside their country of nationality or habitual residence as a consequence of generalized violence, conflict or well-founded fear of persecution.[8]

Resilience: refers to the ability of displacement-affected communities to absorb and recover from shocks (such as earthquakes, droughts, floods or conflicts), while positively adapting and transforming their structures and means of living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty.[9]

Return refugees: persons who have returned to their home country after seeking international assistance abroad. The home country is legally defined as the country of former habitual residence. It is usually their country of citizenship, but it may be that of their parents or grandparents, who fled many years ago, as many crises span several generations.[10]

[6] UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2010) UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation
[7] The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (2018) The International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS).

INTRODUCTION

Three decades of war and unrest have dominated the Sudanese political and civil scene but the ousting of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 has offered a window of opportunity for a political transition in Sudan. In 2020, significant political gains were made towards achieving peace in Sudan with the signing of a peace agreement in Juba (South Sudan) between the power-sharing government and five key rebel groups.[11] The current signed peace agreement—a product of a Sudanese-led process—aims to address historically root causes of conflict and marginalized populations in Sudan's conflict zones.

While the political and overall context in Sudan witnessed a historic shift in the last two years, the humanitarian and development aspects have been subject to continuous and significant challenges. Protracted and new displacements continue to be a major issue—as a result of decades of conflict and natural disasters, there are currently approximately 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country and 800,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries.[12] In the context of efforts to build a comprehensive peace and the ongoing UNAMID drawdown, in September 2019 Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok requested that Sudan be declared eligible for the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In his request, the Prime Minister asked that funding be made immediately available in the three priorities areas identified for Darfur; namely, the rule of law, durable solutions, and peacebuilding at the community level.

Durable solutions have to be an integral part of peacebuilding. Peace in Sudan cannot be divorced from durable solutions and thus must tackle the issue of conflict and protracted displacement in Darfur. 'There is much talk about peace, but you cannot talk about peace in Sudan in isolation from durable solutions for IDPs and the issues of land and compensation. Peace cannot be reached without addressing these issues.'[13] The Juba Peace Agreement regards solutions for IDPs as an important element of building peace and establishes durable solutions as a key priority. The agreement looks to resolve the consequences of conflict, such as the safe and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their original lands, whilst also paying attention to compensation, development and reconstruction. To support this, the peace agreement contains a protocol that deals with refugee and IDP return with specific attention paid to the situation in Darfur.

Just as durable solutions are integral to peacebuilding, lack of peace is often an obstacle to achieving solutions that are durable. Thus, solutions programming needs to identify the specific challenges and address these with suitable measures. The Juba Peace Agreement acknowledges these linkages and looks to address the root causes of conflict, such as issues of identity, marginalization, the relationship between religion and state, governance, resource-sharing, land issues and social justice.

IDPs living in protracted displacement can contribute to peacebuilding or be an obstacle. In other words, internally displaced persons are both peace and conflict actors. Displacement is highly political

[11] Despite the non-signature of two of the most important non-state armed groups—Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Al-Hilu faction and the Sudan Liberation Movement—Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), negotiations continue amongst the parties to join the final agreement.

[12] OCHA (2021) Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview, December 2020.

[13] Donor representative quoted in Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

in Darfur and peacebuilding that includes IDPs and displacement affected communities are less likely to fail. Hence, peacebuilding and supporting durable solutions for IDPs must go together.[14]

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) portfolio involves programming in all of Darfur's five states that supports and underpins peace. The programme strategy recognizes that durable solutions for IDPs, the rule of law and local conflict resolution are building blocks for peace but also interdependent. To build peace and support durable solutions for IDPs and returnees, PBF programming pays special attention to addressing the root causes of Darfur's conflict, thus creating a conducive environment for return and integration of IDPs, strengthening local conflict resolution mechanisms, peacebuilding capacities and the rule of law.

At the request of the Government of Sudan, an integrated political and peacebuilding mission, UNITAMS, has been established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2524 (2020). UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT partners are mandated to support Sudan in achieving a successful transition. UNITAMS has four strategic objectives.[15] The peacebuilding objective provides for support to the implementation of the peace process. It will sustain peace through legitimate and functioning State institutions that provide basic security, protection and services to the population with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

A JOINT ANALYSIS AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACH

The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) in Sudan has been a consistent forum championing joint durable solutions analysis to address protracted displacement. Commencing in 2017, the DSWG oversaw two durable solutions pilots respectively in rural Um Dukhun and two IDP camps situated on the outskirts of El Fasher in North Darfur. The working group followed up this work by commissioning a learning review of the pilots with input and feedback provided by all DSWG members.

The resulting 'lite' durable solutions toolkit and recommendations have provided the foundation and starting point for the PBF programme in Darfur.[16] The DSWG continues to play a strategic role by overseeing and coordinating the overall durable solutions work process and deliverables. In equal measures, the consultative process and the evidence produced need to support the wider humanitarian-development-peace work in Sudan.[17]

Darfur's internal displacement dynamics are complex. This demands that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors require a *shared* multi-sectorial analysis of the needs of the displacement affected communities. Following the collaborative approach piloted in El Fasher, a particular emphasis has been placed on generating shared data and engaging all major stakeholders including IDPs, local and state authorities. Accordingly, the Peacebuilding Fund partners combined all data collection activities using *one* methodology approach and *one* coordinated data collection in eight localities across the five Darfur states—Tawilla, Assalaya, Yassin, Sheiria, Nertiti, Um Dhukun,

[14] Humanitarian Policy Forum, 2020, Policy Brief 77: Achieving Durable Solutions by including displacement-affected communities in peacebuilding.

[15] The four strategic objectives of UNITAMS under SCR 2524 (2020) are: (i) Assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace. (ii) Support peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements. (iii) Assist peacebuilding, civilian protection, and rule of law, in Darfur and the Two Areas. (iv) Support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

[16] Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

[17] The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) is co-chaired by UNHCR, UNDP and DRC. The working group is mandated to inform and advise, develop policy and coordinate work on durable solutions. DSWG is placing a strong focus on data and HLP issues with sub-working groups dedicated to these issues.

Gereida and Jebel Moon[18]—where they are carrying out comprehensive, area-based joint peacebuilding programming.

ACTORS

The DSWG is central to the Durable Solutions Analysis and Baseline process—it not only oversees *the* durable solutions analysis process and coordinates work streams but also guarantees data has visibility with government authorities as well as the broader humanitarian and development community in Sudan. And works to ensure that data and analysis is used for planning and programming at the locality level and feed into national policy. Support from the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) was requested by the DSWG to develop the methodology approach and indicators for both the survey and area-level analysis. JIPS also conducted the analysis of the results, all in a consultative manner. Remote support and expertise plus Khartoum deployment of a JIPS technical adviser has given quality assurance and provided technical support to field operations and built capacity for the teams deployed in Darfur.

The PBF projects are implemented by UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, UN-Habitat and FAO. The partners have actively taken part in designing the methodology by offering thematic expertise and on-the-ground knowledge of the Darfur localities to develop the indicators and data collection tools. Partners have also been key to raising awareness at the village and locality level, assisting with the training of enumerator teams and trouble-shooting with challenges at the field level in Darfur.

IOM managed all components and stages of the household survey including pre-fieldwork missions, training of enumerators, and operational management of the field data collection. Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA), an experienced national NGO, has been leading the qualitative area-level data collection and analysis. Tasks included development of the qualitative tools, training of interviewers, and identification of respondents in all localities before implementing the key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

PROCESS OVERVIEW

- Methodology approach and objectives shaped with PBF agencies and the DSWG.
- Indicators for population and area-level developed and agreed.
- Survey tools and qualitative tools developed and reviewed by partners and experts.
- Sampling approach designed.
- Testing of the survey tool.
- Pre-field work missions to inform sampling and sketch target villages.
- Training of field teams in all states and pilots.
- Data collection: survey and area-level (December 2020 and January 2021).
- Data analysis of survey results and area-level results jointly, including several thematic consultations with PBF agencies, DSWG and experts for validation.
- Locality-level report with the durable solutions analysis and baseline finalised.[19]

[18] Making use of a single methodology and joint data collection in all eight localities also sought to mainstream indicators and allow for a holistic analysis to avoid overburdening communities.

[19] In all other localities, targeted under the PBF for data collection and analysis, community consultations were held to validate results with all target groups and to prioritize the identified obstacles to durable solutions from their perspectives. This was not possible in Gereida, due to the delay in data collection, which was moved from December 2020 to June 2021 because of the security situation.

OBJECTIVES OF DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

The durable solutions and baseline analysis exercises in each of the target localities in Darfur aim to:

- Provide the foundation for analysis of displaced and non-displaced populations' progress towards durable solutions, including IDPs, IDP returnees, return refugees and nomads as an integral element to the peacebuilding process.
- Inform PBF programming and durable solutions Action Plan development in each Darfur target locality.
- Provide the baseline of the agreed-upon PBF outcome indicators for measuring programme impact.
- Inform broader Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP) programming beyond the PBF.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The methodology approach was developed based on consultations with the PBF agencies and the DSWG and was strongly shaped by the learning that emerged from the durable solutions analysis conducted in El Fasher in 2019.[20] JIPS consolidated the combination of methods and made sure that agency programming needs, as well as the durable solutions analysis requirements, were met. The indicators;[21] the household survey tool, the key informant interview questions and the joint analysis plan were reviewed in several rounds by all PBF agencies, relevant technical experts and local partner SUDIA.

TARGET GROUPS & LOCATIONS

The household survey in Gereida targeted 20 settlements.[22] The target locations were identified by UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, UNDP and UN-Habitat in coordination with the authorities at the locality level. The data collection covered four target groups: IDPs in displacement (living in camps and out of camps), IDPs that have returned to their village of origin (IDP returnees), non-displaced residents and, lastly, nomads residing in damrahs.

A MIXED-METHODS METHODOLOGY

Both primary qualitative and quantitative data inform the analysis of progress towards durable solutions on the locality level presented in this report. The approach consists of both a sample-based household survey and area-level key informant interviews. The survey data has been used to produce socio-economic population profiles for each target group at the locality level to conduct a comparative analysis between the groups.

The area-level data collection included a total of 41 respondents who were interviewed during key informant interviews (KIIs) and mini-focus group discussions (FGDs) at the state and the locality level. In Nyala, interviews were conducted with representatives from the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the General Administration of Local Governments, the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources and the Ministry of Infrastructure. At the locality level, the qualitative data collection further included FGDs with community representatives including women, youth, IDPs and farmers along with basic service representatives (education, health, judiciary and WES). Due to the ongoing tensions, key informants from the police force and rural courts were unavailable for interviews. Originally, the research targeted nomads but the team was unable to speak to any nomads in the locality due to limited movement caused by the insecurity. The qualitative data collection took place in December 2020. Analysis of the interviews and focus groups discussion focused on the Gereida context

[20] UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS and World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

[21] The PBF indicators were based on: technical lessons from the interagency durable solutions profiling in El Fasher, the PBF Results Framework plus the Interagency Durable Solutions Indicator Library. https://inform-durablesolutions-idp.org/

[22] Target settlements in Gereida included: Camp – A; Daralsalam – Camp; Abu Lala – camp; Vorica – Camp; Sagour – Camp; Muhajria – Camp; Um Bulula – Camp; Jaijai – Camp; Dikka – Village; Towayel – Village; Dagama – Village; Abu Jabra – Village; Bayata – Village; Jur toobak – Village; Hay Al Saura; Hay Alwadi; Reheed Albirdi; Taiba – Village; Debeekir – Village; Um teraan – Village.

concerning issues such as land and resource management, conflict resolution mechanisms, service provision, the rule of law and civic participation.

SAMPLING APPROACH

The sampling followed a stratified multi-stage sampling approach in which villages were the primary sampling unit (PSU) and households were the secondary sampling unit (SSU), while stratification was done by target group. A random sample of households was then originally planned selected either based on systematic skips or systematic snowballing. However, the planned sampling approach has to be adapted in order to ensure that different tribal affiliations were represented. Thus, 420 households across target locations were added to the originally targeted sample (Table below). Furthermore, while data collection started in December 2021 it was interrupted due to the security situation and finalized during June 2021. All this resulted in a mixed sample design approach; in some cases probability proportional to size (PPS) was applied and in other cases a simple random sampling was done due to lack of sufficient baseline information.

Considering the gender distribution of the respondents in the survey, 28% were male and 72% were female. The distribution varies by target group: among non-displaced and IDPs, 25% were men and 75% women, while among the IDP returnees, 31% were men and 68% women. Of the 50 nomad households interviewed in the damrahs, there were 23 women and 27 men.

The samples of the non-displaced and IDP returnees are distributed between villages and towns: 80% of non-displaced and 50% of returnees reside in towns, while the remaining in villages. Among IDPs, 80% reside in camps while 20% are distributed equally between towns and villages. All 50 nomad households were interviewed in damrahs.

TABLE 1: POPULATION BASELINE FOR TARGET LOCATIONS UNDER THE PBF AND SAMPLES (TARGET AND ACHIEVED) BY TARGET GROUP IN GEREIDA

Target group	Population baseline[23]	Target sample	Collected sample (individuals)	Collected sample (households)
Non-displaced	1,425	391	3,253	**562**
IDP returnees	4,640	412	2,697	**611**
IDPs	20,313	461	3,281	**531**
Nomads in damrahs	500	340	268	**50**

SAMPLING LIMITATIONS & SPECIFICATIONS

Following limitations and specifications should be kept in mind when reading the analysis:

- The sampling is designed to produce results representative for each target group in the selected geographic scope within the locality. Analysis at the village/town/camp level is not possible, and therefore no reference to specific settlements or breakdown by villages, towns or camps is performed in the report. Generalisation to the whole of Gereida locality is also not possible without the required weights to adjust to the total population size of each target group

[23] Population baseline estimates for the target locations were provided in August 2020 by UNICEF as the lead PBF agency in South Darfur.

in the locality. Results are thus representative for each target group within the targeted geographic scope of the PBF.

- The achieved sample size for nomads was only 50 households (out of the planned 340 households), therefore no statistical analysis was feasible. Only selected indicators are presented in the report. Individual level results are presented in percentages while household level results only with the number of households out of the total 50 households. For this reason, all results on nomads should be interpreted with caution.

DISPLACEMENT HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

What is the general demographic profile of the target populations? In Gereida locality, the survey captured the IDP returnees, IDPs, non-displaced residents in addition to a small number of nomads residing in damrahs. The basic demographics and the displacement history will be used to understand the key characteristics of the target populations. Breaking the population data into smaller sub-populations based on basic demographics such as sex, age, location, capacities, vulnerabilities and displacement characteristics, makes it possible to discern how different sub-groups within each population group are faring in comparison, thereby acknowledging that each target group is not a homogeneous entity.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **The population in Gereida locality is very young; non-displaced (61%), IDPs (56%), returnees (60%) and nomads (59%) are below the age of 20 years.**
- **Female-headed households make up a substantial part of the population and the proportion is higher by 10–15 percentage points in comparison to other PBF surveyed localities. IDP (45%), returnee (42%), non-displaced (40%) and 9 out of 50 nomad households are female-headed.**
- **Among the nomad population, literacy rates are significantly lower in comparison to the other Gereida population groups—merely 20% of men and 2% of women can read and write. Literacy rates, in general, are much higher among men than women, as 79–80% of non-displaced, IDP and returnee men are literate compared to 49–50% of women.**
- **The vast majority of IDPs are from Gereida locality (89%) and have been displaced for more than 10 years (73%).**
- **Findings show that merely 37% of IDPs have been back to visit their place of origin at least once during the preceding 12 months.**
- **There has been a steady flow of returnees to Gereida locality; 32% returned more than 10 years ago, 25% between 5 and 10 years, and 27% have been back between 1–4 years, while 17% returned during the last 12 months prior to the survey.**

SOUTH DARFUR—GEREIDA LOCALITY

Gereida is a locality in South Darfur State situated approximately 100 km south of Nyala, the state capital. The state previously encompassed the state of East Darfur, but South Darfur State in its current shape was created in 2012 as part of changes set out in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). South Darfur is made up of 21 localities and shares international borders with the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan.

Gereida locality has three Administrative Units, Gereida, Al Jokhana and Dito. The locality is inhabited by Masalit, Zerghawa and Birgid sedentary farming communities, but also nomad, semi-nomad and some settled 'Arab' tribes of which the Falata is the largest, but Rezeigat and Ma'alia also live in Gereida locality. Livelihoods mainly depend on cultivating groundnuts, sesame—both are important cash crops— but also sorghum, millet, livestock, trade and mining.

Conflict in Darfur has often been presented to be between 'Arab' against 'African' tribes, however, it is not necessarily a helpful lens to view the conflict because present-day identities 'operate within a

system of perceptions' that are largely ideological distinctions.[24] And such distinctions can move attention away from the political nuances of the conflict. The political forces at the centre of power in Khartoum exploited longstanding inter-tribal conflicts and grievances. Since 2003, the conflict in Darfur has been characterised by political allegiances to and splits from the previous regime in Khartoum, plus several breaks within the main rebel factions and so cannot be explained by ethnicity in isolation from the political economy of the conflict. As one recent Darfur conflict analysis states, 'on many occasions, 'Arab' groups also fought each other. Indeed, many 'Arab' communities abstained from taking part in the government of Sudan's counterinsurgency against the rebels in which civilians from rebel groups' communities were targeted. [And] this generalisation falls short of explaining why some militias that are associated with the 'Arab' identity are currently in alliance with SLA-AW in Jebel Marra'.[25]

In the current context of South Darfur, there are a number of different components to the conflict and insecurity in South Darfur State. Conflict drivers include inter-communal conflict and tension and conflict between farmers and herders over land and natural resources. With the onset of the rainy season in June, disputes between farming communities and nomad herders, who are often armed, tend to increase.

The eastern part of Jebel Mara under the control of the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) is located in South Darfur. In 2019, the central government and SLA-AW signed a ceasefire, but the SLA-AW rebel group has still not signed the Juba Peace Agreement and hence a more permanent settlement has not yet been reached. There are still regular classes between SLA-AW forces and the SAF, but also between different factions of the SLA respectively led by Aldouk, Borsa and Hassabo for territorial control, small-scale peace agreements and on how to engage with GoS. This situation has been discouraging the return of IDPs who, originally were displaced from Jebal Marra to Gereida locality.

In Gereida locality, conflict is often along tribal lines between the Masalit and Falata. The area of Sagour is a particular hotspot between the two tribal groupings. Originally, the majority of inhabitants were Masalit but during the 1970s members of the Falata asked permission to settle. The Falata subsequently wanted to belong to the Tulus locality, which is an area that is dominated by the Falata tribe.[26] The previous regime granted permission for Sagour to become part of Tulus locality, which sparked conflict between the Falata and Masalit. To solve this problem, the Sagour area has been governed by the administration in Nyala since 2010 and does not fall within either locality. Hence, while Sagour is located within Gereida locality, and is not part of any of the three Administrative Units.[27]

During the regime change in April 2019, violence erupted as tensions increased between the farming communities, including IDPs and returnees and some 'Arab' communities associated with the previous regime. Since then, several incidents of violence have occurred, which is also linked to the withdrawal of the UN joint mission in Darfur (UNAMID), whose presence acted as a deterrent. The regime change and the subsequent Juba Peace Agreement's emphasis on the voluntary return of IDPs and refugees have also had an impact on the situation in South Darfur. For example, pro-

[24] Prunier, G (2005) Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide.

[25] Danish Refugee Council (2020) Conflict analysis, Central Darfur, Sudan.

[26] For a discussion on the establishment of Dar Falata, see Takana, Y. (2008) The politics of local boundaries and conflict in Sudan: The South Darfur case. Sudan working paper.

[27] South Sudan, Gereida locality, key informant.

revolution sit-ins in Darfur during 2020 did not only show support for the transition to democracy but also called for nomad settlers to be evicted from the land, which has left these communities feeling targeted.

During the end of 2020 and January 2021, Gereida locality and surrounding areas were affected by a tribal conflict between the Falata and Masalit, and the Falata versus Rezeigat. For example, clashes took place between Rezeigat and Falata communities on 18 January 2021, which resulted in 72 killed.[28] Local peace agreements were brokered, however, despite these efforts, conflict accelerated because of weak communication between the tribes and the unresolved question of disputed land ownership. IDPs from the Masalit tribe had attempted to return to their original areas, but as a result of the conflict, returnees faced renewed insecurity coupled with problems accessing water in these return areas.[29] On 1 March 2021, inter-communal violence erupted in Gereida town between Falata and Masalit tribesmen due to conflict over a water source resulting in houses and infrastructure burnt down and large numbers of people being displaced.[30] This has affected both nomads and farmers: among the farming communities, many have missed the period for seeding, which will result in food insecurity for those affected.

BASIC POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLE

According to the latest Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), Gereida locality has a total population of 169,548, with 133,785 IDPs and 5,878 returnees (2021 projections).[31] Thus, the majority of the population is composed of IDPs (79%), while only a small minority have been able to return. The targeted locations in Gereida locality for the survey were identified by UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, UNDP, UN-Habitat and the local authorities based on the programmatic scope of the fund.[32] Therefore, the target group samples captured are not necessarily representative of each target group across the locality. Specifically, 80% of IDPs live in camps, 11% in villages and 9% in towns, while all surveyed nomad households resided in damrahs, which are settlements used by nomads. The vast majority of the surveyed non-displaced lives in towns (80%) and only 20% in villages, whilst returnees are split between towns (50%) and villages (48%).[33]

It is worth noting that classifications are helpful tools, but that it is important to be aware of the conceptual limitations they impose. Nomads and pastoralism are generally viewed in opposition to crop farming and sedentary livelihoods. And further complexity follows from the fact that in Sudan, the words ‘nomad’ and ‘pastoralism’ refer to economic activity as well as a cultural identity, whilst in reality, the two do not always overlap.

Defining nomads against the rural sedentary population can have a number of conceptual consequences; mobility becomes the defining feature of what it means to be nomadic; it creates a contrast between mobility and sedentary so that people can either belong to one classification or the other. Also, by defining nomads based on tribal identity (from the 1970s onwards),[34] ‘the classification

[28] OHCHR (2021) Sudan: Un experts call for enhanced protection of civilians including internally displaced, in Darfur. 1 February, 2021.
[29] Consultation with PBF lead-agency staff (UNICEF) in South Darfur.
30 IOM (2021) DTM Sudan: Conflict in Gereida, South Darfur. 7 March 2021
[31] OCHA (2021) Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview. December 2020. Separate estimates on nomads are not provided.
[32] See the methodology section in the introduction chapter for details on target locations and baseline population figures for the targeted geographic scope.
[33] The remaining IDP returnees are residing in IDP camps.
[34] In Sudan, the 1955–56 census defined nomads (rohal) by their practice of mobile livestock keeping. But in the 1973 and 1983 census, ‘nomads’ were no longer defined by their lifestyle but by administrative categorization that associated them with a northern identity: a

excludes in principle that people can move across the categories: people belonging to a 'nomadic' tribe remain 'nomads' even if they settle. The definition of 'nomads' in relation to both mobility and tribe institutionalizes the confusion between economic practices and cultural identity'.[35] In this study, **the surveyed households residing in damrahs may not all be viewed as nomadic if considered by their actual strategies of production;** better definitions could include agro-pastoralist or semi-nomadic to describe at least parts of the damrah population. Environmental factors and the conflict in Darfur have demanded flexibility and dynamic adaptation from all population groups, and the inflexibility embedded in the classification will not always be adequate if used as an analytical tool for informing livelihoods and economic development interventions.

The findings of the household survey show that the basic demographics are very similar for all the target groups in Gereida. Overall, the population is very young: 56–61% of the population is below the age of 20 years.[36] Among all groups, 23–26% are between 20 and 39 years, and older people (above 40 years) make up between 15–18%.

Approximately, Gereida has a 50/50 gender distribution for all population groups. Compared to other surveyed localities, there is a higher proportion of female-headed households in Gereida locality by 10–15 percentage points. 45% of IDP, 42% of IDP returnee, 40% of non-displaced and nine of the 50 (9/50) surveyed nomad households are headed up by a woman. The size of the households is fairly similar for IDPs, returnees and nomads: 57–64% of households have between 1 and 5 members, 35–38% are composed of 6–9 members, while only a small percentage of households are made up of 10 members or more. In contrast, non-displaced family units are larger: 9% of non-displaced households have 10-plus members, 41% have 6–9 members, while 50% comprise 1–5 household members.

The age-dependency ratio is used to understand the pressure on the working-age population (15–65 years) to provide for the dependent family members—children 14 years or younger and adult family members above the age of 65 years.[37] The findings show that between 36–40% of non-displaced, IDP and returnee households have a heavier burden placed on the working-age household members to provide for the family. This that the working-age family members expected to provide for the household are fewer than then the dependent members (below 15 years and older than 65 years). Interestingly, 4–5% of IDP, returnee and non-displaced and 16/50 of nomad households are composed only of dependent members.

To gain a more complete picture of household vulnerability, the household survey also recorded whether any family members were disabled. A higher proportion of IDPs (4.8%) report having a disability that stops them from 'coping with all the things they need to', whereas 2.6–3% of the other population groups live with a disability.

person owing allegiance to a nomadic sheik. Hence, 'nomads' were in practice defined on an administrative basis rather than by empirical observation. Krätli et al. (2013) Standing Wealth: Pastoralist Livestock Production and Local Livelihoods in Sudan.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Specifically, the age distribution broken further down for the children: 0–5 years: 19% non-displaced, 15% IDPs, 18% IDP returnees and 18% nomads. 6–13 years: 26% non-displaced, 23% IDPs, 26% IDP returnees and 26% nomads. 14–18 years: 15% non-displaced, 16% IDPs, 14% IDP returnees and 14% nomads.

[37] It is the ratio of those not in the labour force (children below 15 years and adults older than 65 years) in relation to the working-age population (15-64 years); the higher the ratio, the greater the pressure is on the working-age members to provide for the dependent household members.

FIGURE 1: LITERACY (ABILITY TO READ AND WRITE) AMONG ALL PERSONS 15 YEARS OF AGE AND ABOVE BY SEX (SDG 4.6.1 A)



Literacy rates are used to gauge literacy skills, which span a range of proficiencies. Literacy rates are much lower among the nomad population, as merely 30% of men and 10% of women can read and write. Literacy rates are relatively high among non-displaced, IDP and returnee men, while literacy is significantly lower among women (49–54%). However, the proportion of literate women in Gereida locality is relatively high when comparing against the surveyed population in Jebel Moon in West Darfur, where only a third of women are literate (21–35%).

DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION HISTORY

The profiling household survey looked at the displacement history of IDPs and returnees. 91% are from areas in Gereida locality, while the remaining 9% comes from East Darfur (Yassin and Dimsu). The greater majority (73%) have been displaced for a considerable period and have stayed in their current location for more than 10 years. Another 18% of IDPs has lived in their current settlement between 5 and 10 years, 5% between 1–4 years and 4% less than a year. IDPs' reported time of displacement corresponds to the length of time they have spent in their current location, which indicates that most IDPs have come directly to where they are currently living and have not been forced to move several times.

FIGURE 2: IDPS' LENGTH OF STAY IN THEIR CURRENT SETTLEMENT AND IDP RETURNEES' DURATION OF RETURN



When considering IDPs' connection to their place of origin, the findings show that only 37% have been back to the place they previously live since being displaced. Of those that have travelled back, 78% have been back less than five times during the past 12 months preceding the survey. 18% have made the trip back 5–10 times and 4% have visited on more than 10 occasions. The main reason for

journeying back is to farm the land (72%), whereas respectively 14% go to visit relatives and 8% to check on their land or dwelling.

Considering the IDP returnees in Gereida locality, findings indicate that the area has seen a steady flow of IDP returnees. 32% returned more than 10 years ago, 25% between 5 and 10 years, and 27% have been back between 1–4 years. During the last 12 months prior to the survey, 17% of returnees came back to their locality of origin.

The household survey also considered the nomads' movement patterns. A majority (31/50) reported that they came from a location within Gereida locality, while smaller proportions (9/50) came from Tullus and (6/50) from Yassin.[38] 37 of the 50 nomad households stated that they had followed the designated migration routes, while seven households said that they had to change course because of increased crime and risk to safety. Another seven surveyed nomads pointed to a lack of safety in the area of the livestock route, and two nomad households said they moved beyond the migration route to look for water or grazing.

[38] The remainder of the nomad population reported that they came from Assalaya, Ed Daein and Dimsu.

LIVELIHOODS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES

Access to livelihoods is a key factor for local integration—durable solutions for displaced populations (IDPs, IDP returnees) require access to employment and livelihoods akin to that of the non-displaced population. However, often livelihoods of all displacement and conflict-affected populations are impacted. Considering in more detail households' sources of income and coping strategies provides a more nuanced picture and a better understanding of particular vulnerabilities as well as of the livelihood opportunities. Sustainable livelihoods and access to required resources is a key challenge in post-conflict settings and an important element to post-conflict development.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **A majority of both non-displaced (76%) and returnee (75%) households rely on crop farming as their main source of income, while among IDPs, this proportion (57%) is somewhat less indicating more variation of livelihood means. Among nomads, 13/50 rely on crop farming, while the remaining households mainly depend on livestock.**
- **A considerable proportion of the working-age male population is working for profit or pay, probably selling cash crops: non-displaced (64%), IDP (54%) and IDP returnees (51%). The employment rate for women is somewhat lower among non-displaced (50%) and returnees (38%) and significantly lower among IDPs (23%).**
- **All population groups point to the same obstacles to finding work (or extra work): irregular or lack of work opportunities as well as inadequate or lack of skills. Among women, the skills requested to increase income and employment opportunities include handicraft and food processing skills. While among men, the requested training differs much more: agricultural know-how plus handicrafts, carpentry, masonry, welding and electrical/car mechanical skills were sought after.**
- **The proportion of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET rate) is low for non-displaced and IDP returnee men (10–12%), while somewhat higher for IDP young men (22%). Among young women, more than a third of all groups are neither studying nor working: 34% of non-displaced, 31% of IDP returnees and 47% of IDPs. These young women are mainly taking care of the home and their families.**
- **A majority of households (68–77%) identified high food prices as the most significant shock to their livelihoods during the 12 months preceding the study, while significant proportions point to severe water shortages (10% of non-displaced, 8% of IDPs and 14% of returnees).**
- **Similar proportions across the groups face food insecurity. Non-displaced (31%) and 26% of both IDP and returnee households did not have enough food during the week prior to the survey (Jan. 2021). Food insecurity is higher among returnees residing in villages compared to towns.**

MAIN LIVELIHOOD SOURCES

Agriculture is central to people's livelihoods and in Gereida locality livelihoods mainly depend on cultivating groundnuts and sesame, both are important cash crops, and sorghum and millet. People also rely livestock, trade and mining. The household survey shows that a majority of both non-displaced and displaced communities rely on crop farming as their main source of income. Among non-displaced (76%), IDPs (57%) and IDP returnees (75%), the vast majority report crop farming as their main income source, while 12–17% across the population groups report salaries and wages as

a key income course. Amongst the nomads residing in damrahs, 34/50 rely on livestock while 13/50 of households rely on crop farming as their main livelihood source.

Significant proportions of all population groups report that they have no secondary source of income: 26% of non-displaced, 37–38% of IDPs and IDP returnees. Non-displaced households report crop farming (22%), wages (10%) and livestock (9%) as their secondary source of income. Among IDPs, 16% rely on selling wood, 10% on aid, and 9% on crop farming, as their secondary source of livelihood. IDP returnees rely similarly on selling firewood (15%), crop farming (14%), wages (9%) and livestock (8%) as their secondary source of income.

FIGURE 3: HOUSEHOLDS' PRIMARY SOURCE OF LIVEHOOD



Comparing male and female-headed households, the findings show that female-headed households rely to a greater extent on farming: non-displaced (86%), IDPs (59%) and returnees (81%) compared to male-headed households: non-displaced (70%), IDPs (55%) and returnees (71%). a significant proportion of male-headed households depend mainly on salaries and wages; 16% of non-displaced, 23% of IDPs, and 15% of returnees 15%), while salaries and wages are only indicated as a key income source by 4–9% of female-headed households.

MAIN OCCUPATION: EMPLOYMENT AND 'OWN-USE' AGRICULTURE

Relatively high proportions of the working-age male population are working for profit or pay: the proportion is highest among the non-displaced (64%), while among IDPs (54%) and IDP returnees (51%) the percentage is lower. These are relatively high employment rates compared to many other localities covered by this study.[39] This must be linked to the cultivation of groundnuts and other cash crops, which are key to the livelihoods of hundreds of households in Gereida locality. The employment rate for women is lower among non-displaced (50%) and returnees (38%) and significantly lower among IDPs (23%). Among nomad men, 44% are working for profit or pay and 40% in own-use production. Significantly fewer women from the nomad community are working (20%) and 31% in own-use production.[40]

[39] In contrast, male employment ranges between 19–32% in Jebel Moon in West Darfur, where the majority relies on subsistence farming (50–61%).
[40] The low N of nomads should be considered: the working-age male population is 68 and the female working-age population is 64.

FIGURE 4: EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS BY TARGET GROUP AND SEX



All persons working for profit or pay were also asked in which industry they are work. The men from each of the population groups are engaged in equal proportions in farming and the private sector.[41] Amongst women, the proportion working in crop farming is significantly higher (52% of non-displaced, 50% of IDPs; 35% of returnees), while the rest work mainly in the private sector (14–18% across the groups). Another 16% of returnee women also report working in the 'service sector'. The results also show that 12–15% of the working-age population are away from their home for more than 6 months per year because they work elsewhere.

Employment rates are significantly lower among youth (15–24 years of age). While among the population aged 25–64 years, 70% of men and 54% of women not displaced work for profit or pay, the proportion working for profit/pay among youth is down to 54% of men and 40% of women. Similarly, 69% of IDP men and 30% of women (25–64 years) are working for profit, compared to 36% and 14% of IDP male and female youth. The same trend is among the returnee population, where 59% of men and 43% of women aged 25–64 years are working for profit/pay, in comparison to 39% of male and 32% of female youths.

UNDER-EMPLOYMENT

Considering under-employment provides a better grasp of people's employment circumstances. For example, are those who are working searching for more work? Looking for additional work could indicate that people's current work is not providing enough income to support the household. And looking closer at how much people are working can expose whether people are only working part-time or during certain months of the year. In Gereida locality, approximately half of non-displaced, IDPs and returnees working, both in subsistence farming or working for profit or pay, are looking for additional work with similar proportions among men and women.[42] All population groups point to the

[41] Non-displaced: 34% of the population that are working for profit or pay are engaged in crop farming and 33% in the private sector. IDPs: 34% work in crop farming and 32% in the private sector, while among the IDP returnees, 25% work in crop farming and 28% in the private sector. 10% of returnees are also engaged in livestock husbandry.

[42] 53% of non-displaced men and 60% women; 50% of IDP men and 52% of women; and respectively 49% and 56% of returnee men women.

same obstacles to finding work (or extra work): irregular or lack of work opportunities as well as inadequate or lack of skills.

Among women, the skills reported for increasing employment opportunities include handicraft and food processing skills. While among men, the requested skills vary much more. Agricultural know-how skills are indicated as key to better and more employment by the biggest proportion (20–33%), and handicrafts (13–18%), carpentry, masonry, welding as well as electrical and car mechanic skills (5–12%) are also requested.

The household survey found that a high proportion of households own a mobile phone. Between 54–56% of men in the displaced and non-displaced groups own a mobile phone. Among women, one-third of all groups have a phone. A recent ILO report on East Darfur points out that mobile phones could make it easier for businesses and cooperatives to reach markets at the regional, state and potentially at national level. Also, the Bank of Khartoum has launched a mobile money service (MBok) that has the potential to provide access to banking services despite the absence of financial services providers. With regards to developing skills, repairing mobile phones could become a useful skill for young people in the target communities.[43]

Using a different lens to view under-employment takes into account how much people are working. The majority of Gereida residents who work in 'own-use' production only work between 5–8 months per year, while the remaining work only up to 4 months per year, and hence subsistence farming is a very seasonal occupation. 75% of non-displaced, 60% IDPs as well as 72% of IDP returnees engaged in subsistence farming work only 5–8 months. Most of the remaining persons work less than 4 months per year. Working for profit or pay include occupations that are more distributed along a continuum stretching from seasonal (5–8 months) to full-time (9–12 months). Between 64–71% work between 5–8 months, while about one-fifth in all groups report working 9–12 months. Smaller proportions of non-displaced (7%), IDPs (18%) and returnees (11%) work less than 4 months.

OUTSIDE THE LABOUR FORCE

The population referred to as 'outside of the labour force' are persons, who are of working-age (15–64 years) but economically inactive. In Gereida locality, the results show that 24% of non-displaced working-age men and 35% of women are not working. For the returnee population, the proportions are somewhat similar (29% among men and 42% among women). Among IDP the population, the proportion of working-age men and women out of the labour force is higher: 38% of men and 67% of women. This group is neither working for profit or pay nor involved in 'own-use' production and instead report taking care of their family and house or studying as their main occupation.

When disaggregating this data further by age, figures show that more than double as many are out of the labour force among the youth (15–24 years) compared to the rest of the working-age population.[44] Particularly among the IDP youth, the proportion not working is very high: 60% of young men and 80% of young women. In comparison, 21% of men and 57% of women aged 25–64 years are inactive.

[43] ILO (2021) PROSPECTS Sudan Baseline Survey. Draft report (March 2021).

[44] 36% of male and 49% female non-displaced youth are inactive compared to 15% of men and 25% of women between the age of 25 and 64 years. Among the IDP returnees, respectively 48% and 51% of male and female youths are not working in contrast to 17% of men and 36% of women among 25–64-year-olds. For the IDPs population, the proportion of inactive male youth is 60%, and the percentage for female youth reaches 80%, while 21% of men and 57% of women aged 25–65 years are not working.

FIGURE 5: WORKING-AGE POPULATION: YOUTH (15–24 YEARS) AND BETWEEN 25–64 YEARS, WHO ARE OUTSIDE THE LABOUR FORCE (I.E. NOT WORKING FOR PROFIT/PAY AND NOT ENGAGED IN OWN-USE PRODUCTION)



The proportion of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET rate) is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator.[45] It shows the number of young persons as a percentage of the total youth population, who are neither in education, employment or training and hence conveys information about the labour market situation for young people. In the targeted areas of Gereida, the NEET rate is low for non-displaced men and IDP returnees (10–12%), while somewhat higher for IDP male youth (22%). Among young women, more than a third of all groups is neither studying nor working: non-displaced (34%), IDP returnees (31%) and 47% of IDPs. These young women are mainly taking care of the home and the families.[46]

FIGURE 6: PROPORTION OF YOUTH (15–24 YEARS) NOT IN WORK, EDUCATION OR TRAINING (NEET)[47]



[45] SDG indicator 8.6.1
[46] As a comparison, the NEET rate in Nertiti locality for young men is: non-displaced (7%), IDPs (10%), IDP returnees (9%), nomads (2%). For female youths rates are higher: non-displaced and IDPs (34%), IDP returnees (37%), nomads (62%). And in Um Dukhun, NEET rates are the following for male youth: IDP returnees (34%), return refugees (28%), nomads (22%), while for female youths, the NEET rate is between 62–65% for all groups.
[47] It should be noted that the N for non-displaced and IDP returnees is low.

SHOCKS TO LIVELIHOODS AND COPING MECHANISMS

During the last couple of years, Sudan has seen soaring price rises for fuel and staple foods such as sorghum, millet and wheat. The household survey also looked at what respondents thought to be the most severe shocks to their livelihoods. Rocketing food prices impacted *all* households across the surveyed population groups (99%), while high fuel prices also affected the vast majority (98–99%). COVID-19 restrictions also impacted a majority across the population groups in Gereida locality (60–66%). Loss of income or employment was also a significant livelihoods shock to more than half of households across all groups (69–75%). Violence and attacks were reported to be a shock to approximately one-third across the groups: 27% of non-displaced, 35% of IDPs and 33% of returnees.

'Drought, irregular rainfall or prolonged dry spells' presented a shock to livelihoods for 43–44% of non-displaced and returnees, and 38% of IDPs. A substantial proportion of non-displaced (71%), returnees (69%) and somewhat fewer IDPs (59%) was impacted by crop disease. Livestock loss was reported by about half of non-displaced (49%) and returnees (55%), while this was a problem for fewer IDPs (42%). 'Too much rain or floods' have been an issue for approximately a quarter (24%) of the non-displaced, but affected less IDPs (15%) and returnees (13%).

When asked to identify the most significant shock during the last 12 months, 68–77% across the groups single out high food prices, while significant proportions point to severe water shortages as their greatest shock: non-displaced (10%), IDPs (8%) and (14%) returnees. Among the surveyed nomads residing in the damrahs, almost all reported having experienced livestock loss during the 12 months preceding the survey. However, the shocks reported to be the most severe were the high food prices (23/50), raiding and violence (14/50) and the loss of livestock (8/50).

The household survey also asked households how they dealt with the most significant livelihood shocks and households surveyed were asked if and how they had responded. Selecting from a broad range of coping mechanisms, a picture emerges of how households have coped. Grouping responses into 'negative' or non-reversible versus 'positive' or sustainable coping strategies is a good predictor of future vulnerability. In other words, to what extent a household is resilient when facing potential future shocks. For example, 'non-sustainable' or more extreme coping mechanisms include selling productive assets, which suggest serious long-term consequences. Such strategies are less reversible and thus represent a more severe form of coping. Sustainable strategies include selling more produce, which does not need to have longer-term negative impacts.[48] Just above half of the households from all population groups used sustainable mechanisms to address the most significant shock: 52% of non-displaced and returnees as well as 54% of IDPs. These households mainly relied on 'selling more of their produce' and to a lesser extent 'worked more'. Similar proportions across the groups relied on negative coping strategies: 39% of non-displaced, 35% of IDPs and 40% of returnees. These households sold animals, spent savings and to a lesser extent reduced consumption. The remaining households reported that they did not or could not do anything in response to the shock (which also represents a negative coping strategy).

[48] The categorization is based on the responses provided to the question 'what do you do when faced with X shock to your livelihood? Modest coping strategies are easily reversible or strategies that do not jeopardize longer-term prospects, while more extreme coping mechanisms have longer-term consequences. Categories for coping were reviewed by UNDP Sudan colleagues. Based on feedback, the coping mechanisms were grouped according to severity into non-sustainable/irreversible and sustainable/reversible. For example, 'sold farm area', 'reduced food consumption', 'selling animals' were categorized as 'non-sustainable', whilst 'selling more crops', 'starting a new business', 'received help from an NGO' were grouped as less severe/reversible coping mechanisms.

FOOD SECURITY

Households were asked if there had been times when they did not have enough food or money to buy food during the past 7 days. Findings show that similar proportions across the groups faced food insecurity: 31% of non-displaced, 26% of IDPs and 26% of returnee households did not have enough food during the week prior to the survey (June 2021). Among the IDP returnees, who are captured both in towns and villages, the results show that food insecurity is higher in the villages—34% of returnee households residing in villages report not being able to access enough food the week before the survey, whereas this is the case for 18% of the returnee households living in towns. Among the 50 nomad households interviewed, five reported not having had enough food or money to buy food the week preceding the survey.

The reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) is an indicator of household food security. The rCSI assesses how people cope when they do not have enough to eat or any money to buy food. The proxy tool takes into account how often particular strategies are used and the severity of the strategies employed categorizing the way households are coping with the lack of food into low, medium and high strategies, with the latter being the most severe.[49] Among the households that reported not having enough food the previous week, the majority in all surveyed groups used sustainable coping mechanisms—very few households used severe non-sustainable coping strategies (2–6%). It should be kept in mind that the inter-communal violence that erupted in Gereida town (March 2021)[50] between Falata and Masalit tribesmen will very likely have a major impact on farmers, as many have missed the period for seeding, which will result in food insecurity for those affected.[51]

[49] The reduced CSI has been developed to compare food security across different contexts. It is a sub-set of the context-specific CSI but food security is calculated using a specific set of behaviours with a universal set of severity weightings for each behaviour. Thus, the reduced CSI uses a standard set of five individual coping behaviours that can assess food security of households in any context: eating less-preferred foods, borrowing food/money from friends and relatives, limiting portions at mealtimes, limiting adult food intake, and reducing the number of meals per day. Maxwell, D. and Caldwell, R. (2008) The Coping Strategies Index. Field Methods Manual (March, 2008).
[50] IOM (2021) DTM Sudan: Conflict in Gereida, South Darfur. 7 March 2021
[51] Consultation with UNICEF, August 2021.

HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY: ACCESS AND TENURE

The enjoyment of housing, land and property rights is key to achieving durable solutions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs regards effective mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP) as crucial criteria to determine if IDPs have reached a durable solution. This is because housing, land and property underpin people's livelihoods and standard of living.

This chapter explores IDPs' and returnees' access to land.[52] Have they managed to regain their land and rebuild their livelihoods? What are the specific obstacles to this? Drawing on the data of the non-displaced population as a benchmark, the analysis looks to explore and explain obstacles faced by IDPs and returnees.

From a peacebuilding perspective, violations of IDPs' housing, land and property (HLP) rights are a major obstacle to durable solutions for IDPs but are also integral to reaching peace, because land is a primary cause *and* ongoing driver of conflict between communities. The Juba Peace Agreement recognizes the importance of land—land is a resource for the good of all people of Sudan. The agreement specifies that individuals and communities have the right to restitution of lands lost as a result of the conflict in Darfur, and where a return of the land is not possible, IDPs are entitled to compensation. As part of the peace agreement, several structures and institutions have been established with particular mandates relating to land issues.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **A very high proportion of returnees (93%) report having access to agricultural land, while this is the case for 76% of IDPs. Only 24% of IDPs have regained access to the land they farmed before being displaced, whereas 71% of returnees have managed to access the same land.**
- **Both owning and renting agricultural land are common forms of tenure. Among the non-displaced population, a majority own their agricultural land (46%) but a significant proportion also rent (36%), while returnees predominantly rent (46%) and only a third say they own the land they cultivate.**
- **The circumstances are different for the IDP population (80% in camps and 20% living outside of camps), as 54% rent and only 16% report owning the agricultural land they are currently accessing.**
- **Among the households that report owning the land they cultivate, a majority of the non-displaced population (49%) claim customary rights, while about a third of IDPs and returnees do so (37–38%). Among the returnees and IDPs, 39–41% state they have 'no legal title' to their agricultural land, while this is also the case for a quarter of non-displaced residents (26%).**
- **IDPs (8%), returnees (10%) and non-displaced (15%) that report owning land, say that they hold a land registration certificate as proof.**
- **IDP and returnee female-headed households in Gereida locality have less access to agricultural land by 20–25 percentage points compared to households headed up by a man.**
- **A majority of nomad households have access to grazing land (41/50), but one in five say that they face issues in regards to accessing grazing land (10/50). 19/50 of nomad households also have access to farmland.**

[52] Access refers to obtaining or using land. Access to land is governed through land tenure systems, which is a 'relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups with respect to land.' A land tenure system determines who can use what land, for how long and under what terms. FAO (2002) Land Tenure Studies (4). Gender and access to land.

- **80% of returnees have regained access to the same residential land, among whom 56% say they own their plot. In contrast, 65% of non-displaced households own their residential land but only 13 of the 50 surveyed damrah residents own their housing plot. By far the largest proportion of nomads (30/50) say they are living on government-owned land for free.**

ACCESS TO LAND & TENURE TYPE

In Gereida locality, access to land is central to the livelihoods of the majority of people, as their livelihoods chiefly depend on this natural resource.[53] Very high proportions of non-displaced (92%) and returnees (93%) report having access to agricultural land, whilst fewer IDPs (76%) have access to farmland by about 16% percentage points. A majority must walk more than 30 min to reach their farmland; a higher proportion of IDPs (92%) need to walk more than half an hour to reach their fields compared to non-displaced residents (85%) and returnees (76%). Among nomads, the results show that 13 out of the 50 interviewed households had access to agricultural land. From the household survey results, it is not clear whether these damrah households are cultivating crops on grazing land or whether they farm a different plot of land.[54]

Looking in more detail at the households' tenure of agricultural land, the household survey findings show that a majority of non-displaced residents own their agricultural land (46%), but that renting land is also very common among the non-displaced population (36%). IDP returnees in Gereida locality predominantly rent land (46%), while 37% say that they own their farmland. The situation is different for the IDPs; only 16% own the agricultural land they are currently farming, while a clear majority (54%) rent. According to a Native Administration key informant, different rules apply depending on where IDPs originate. IDPs that have been displaced from within the locality already own land and can usually continue to access their land to some degree, whereas IDPs that originate from outside the locality, are not able to own land in Gereida but can rent agricultural land whilst displaced.[55]

FIGURE 7: TENURE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND BY POPULATION GROUP



[53] Access is here understood as 'using' land for agriculture regardless of the tenure rights, which are discussed subsequently.

[54] Nomad households were not asked about access to agricultural land, however, 13 out of 50 nomad households reported that crop farming is their main source of income and hence must have access to land. The data does not indicate whether the nomad households are cultivating grazing land or have a separate plot for farming.

[55] Depending on distances and the security situation, IDPs from outside Gereida locality are sometimes able to access their land in a different locality. South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with Native Administration members.

In the context of South Darfur, what does it involve to borrow or rent land for cultivation? For many return IDPs or refugees that no longer have access to land in their place of origin, renting land is the next best option.[56] Rent can be paid in currency, part of the harvest yield or in services. According to area-level data, the payment for renting farmland is referred to as *Oshoor* and payment is reported to be 10% of the harvested crops.[57]

With regards to regaining access to the same land, only 24% of IDPs in Gereida locality have been able to access the same land they farmed before being displaced, while 71% of returnees have access to the same land. Analysis shows that a higher proportion of returnees that have been back for longer have been successful in regaining access to their former land.[58] Among the returnees that are accessing their former land, 49% reportedly own the land and 39% rent. The inability to regaining access to land are mainly due to unlawful occupation and disputed ownership.[59] Of the group of IDPs, who are no longer accessing the same land, the majority (71%) report that they have lost their rights to the land.

Considering grazing land, a majority of nomads (41/50) say they have access to grazing land. 17 of the 50 damrah households report that the grazing land they access is communal, while another 15 households say that their herds graze on land owned by the government and is free to use. 10 out of the 50 surveyed households say that they face issues in regards to their grazing land, which are mainly linked to disputed ownership and land boundary conflicts.

THE DARFURI HAKURA LAND TENURE SYSTEM

Darfur is governed by plural legal land tenure systems. Since the start of the joint authority Anglo-Egyptian rule of Sudan, modern statutory laws have existed alongside traditional customary laws. In practical terms, this legal pluralism means that there are 'overlapping institutions for accessing land'.[60] The customary 'Hakura' system is the traditional way to manage land in Darfur. Ownership of land does not correspond to the Western legal concept. Following the customary system, rights are not exclusive and land is 'owned' or belong to a community. Land in Darfur is split into tribal homelands, which is named a Dar. Generally, the homeland belongs to a major tribe, which gave this tribe monopoly over land but crucially also leadership, political representation and power.[61] A tribal sheikh from the dominant homeland tribe can assign a piece of land to a group of people, family or person. Permission is granted for a time period and in case the land allocated is not being used, then the sheikh may reallocate it to another person or group.[62] Crucially, not all groups have a Dar—tribes can be categorized as land-holding and non-landing tribes. A sheikh belonging to a tribe that does not have a homeland is known as 'sheikh of the people' and have no authority over land.[63] A recent UN-Habitat report assesses that the customary Hakura system is still the predominant way to manage

[56] Consultation with UN thematic experts.
[57] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with youth.
[58] It is not clear whether returnees over time have been able to regain access or whether it was simply easier to re-access their land if they were away for a shorter period of time.
[59] Please see the next chapter concerning safety, security and conflict for data and analysis of the reasons why IDP and returnees are unable to access their previous land.
[60] Satti, H., Sulieman, H., Young, H., Radday, A. (2020) Natural Resources Management: Local Perspectives from North and Central Darfur.
[61] Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.
[62] UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.
[63] East Darfur, Native Administration key informant

land in Darfur and that registered land ownership cover less than 1% of agricultural land in Darfur with very few registered parcels of land in rural locales.[64]

The findings from the household survey are in line with the UN report; few of the surveyed households indicate that they hold a land registration certificate. Respectively 8% of IDPs, 10% of returnees and 15% of non-displaced residents possess a land registration certificate to prove ownership of their agricultural land. A majority claim customary rights; 37–38% of IDPs and returnees and 49% of non-displaced residents claim customary rights to their agricultural land. 39–41% of returnees and IDPs plus 26% of non-displaced state they currently have 'no evidence or proof of land ownership'. According to thematic experts, this refers to a situation when a sheikh allows for people to use a piece of land but the land is not regarded as owned by the land users.[65]

The Hakura system itself represents an obstacle to accessing land for some population groups. Interviews with community members and key informants in Gereida show that women face inequalities when it comes to land ownership. Agricultural land belongs to the male members of the family; women can cultivate land belonging to a husband or other male family members, but cannot themselves own land because of local customs and traditions.[66] However, women can own residential land in their own right according to area-level information.[67]

Household survey results show that non-displaced female-headed households have the same level of access to agricultural land compared to households headed up by a man.[68] These figures may not present a true picture of land ownership by women, as information was captured at the household level. It is plausible that the female head of the household would not herself own the land, but that a son or other male relative from the household does. However, the household survey data shows that IDP female-headed households have less access to agricultural land by 15 percentage points. Among IDP returnees, the difference is much smaller as female-headed households are accessing land by seven percentage points less.[69]

There are no formal barriers for youth when it comes to owning land, however, youth rarely own land. The land belongs to the family and most will not acquire land until they get married or they inherit land. With regards to residential land, most youths do not have the financial means to buy. Reportedly, youths from Masalit and other communities were classified as rebel movement supporters by the previous regime and barred from owning 'Degree 4 Land'.[70]

Gereida locality area-level respondents agree that nomads have very little access to agricultural land because agricultural land is tribal land, which cannot be sold to another tribe.[71] This exclusion of nomads is also an outcome of how the traditional customary Hakura system manages access to land. According to Hakura, nomads do not have access to land because land rights are linked to agricultural

[64] UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.
[65] IOM key informant.
[66] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with farmers, women, youth, and representatives from the Native Administration and Ministry of Infrastructure & Physical Planning (Nyala).
[67] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with women.
[68] While 68% of female-headed households access land, that is the case for 83% of the male-headed households among IDPs.
[69] Among IDP returnees, 89% of female-headed households have access to land, while this is the case for 96% of the male-headed households.
[70] South Darfur, Gereida locality, youth community representative. Degree 4 Land refers to land under the authority of the local government. This land category mostly includes smaller settlements and rural markets.
[71] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGDs respectively with farmers and women. Note, that the team collecting qualitative area-level data was unable to speak to nomad representatives in Gereida due to the ongoing insecurity.

use of land. According to this traditional land management system, communal ownership of land is not attainable for nomadic communities. Instead, pastoralists have transient rights including access to water for animals and humans plus access to grazing land and livestock routes.[72] Hence, sheikhs from pastoralist communities, Sheikhs of People (*Sheikh Anfar*) that do not have a homeland—a Dar—do not have land to offer members of their tribe, whereas Sheikhs of sedentary communities *(Sheikh Al-Ard)* can assign or lease land.[73]

The area-level data also indicates that among the other population groups in Gereida locality, there is a widespread perception that nomads have no need for land or interest in owning land. And therefore, access to land is not an issue for them.[74] However, many nomads who used to be mobile and depended on livestock production settled during the Darfur conflict partly due to insecurity and partly due to environmental pressures.[75] In the event nomads want to purchase land that is not designated as tribal land, personal documentation (birth certificate or national ID) is required which reportedly many nomads do not possess, plus the process is lengthy.[76] Nomads are able to borrow land for farming, but usually, land is only granted for one season and the ability to borrow land depends on the individual's relations with the landowners or Sheik of land.[77]

Land rights in Darfur are widely regarded as a central feature and one of the root causes of the conflict.[78] Some Darfur experts argue that the inability of the indigenous Hakura system to allow for full participation by nomadic pastoralists aggravated divisions between sedentary farmers and nomads and thus was a major factor in the development of the conflict. This is because a Dar—a homeland—is traditionally linked to political participation and comes with formal leadership positions in local and regional state institutions and have excluded nomadic pastoralists and smaller tribes.[79]

THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT—STIPULATED CHANGE

The Juba Peace Agreement sets out some changes to the hierarchy of the statutory and customary land tenure systems. The government of Jafar Numeiri enacted the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, which brought all land not formally registered into government ownership. In practice, the Act asserted government ownership over lands that were already claimed under the customary land tenure Hakura system and administered by the Native Administration. The Juba Peace Agreement signed in 2020 explicitly recognizes traditional ownership of tribal lands (referred to as Hawakeer), historic rights to lands plus customary livestock routes and opportunities to access water.[80] Moreover, customary law takes precedence if there is a conflict between Sudanese statutory law and customary law relating to land. Subsequently, laws should be amended to include land rights 'according to the norms, traditions,

[72] Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.
[73] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181
[74] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGDs respectively with farmers, youth and women.
[75] Young, H. and Ismail, M. (2019) Complexity, continuity and change: livelihood resilience in the Darfur region of Sudan in Disasters, 2019, Vol. 43 (S3): p. 318−344.
[76] Note that this information was not provided by members of the nomad communities, but by youth community representative.
[77] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with Native Administration representatives.
[78] Flint, J., and de Waal, A., Darfur. A New History of a Long War; Sulliman, O. The Darfur Conflict: Geography or Institutions?
[79] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181
[80] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.1

and inherited practices of land tenure in Darfur'.[81] It is unclear whether these changes to land tenure in the peace agreement represent a view as to whether formal land registration in Darfur is the right tool for reducing conflict over land or not. But certainly, some Darfur scholars hold the view that it is the inherent flexibility and ambiguity of customary tenure that allows for the 'elasticity required in the tenure system to accommodate livestock migrations and pursue options in drought years'.[82]

DEMARCATION AND REGISTRATION CERTIFICATES FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND

24% of non-displaced residents in Gereida locality report that their land is demarcated. Among the returnee and IDP population, the proportion is lower: respectively 16% of IDPs and 14% of returnees say that their agricultural land is demarcated.[83] Getting land demarcated is the first step to obtaining an official land registration certificate, which involves both the Native Administration and the Land Use Office.

The logic behind wanting to demarcate and legally register land is to establish clarity on boundaries and ownership, and in turn, reduce conflict over land.[84] How come that only a small percentage of people possess a legal certificate documenting ownership of their land? One explanation is that it is a complicated, lengthy process that only grants ownership for a relatively short period (6–7 years).[85] The issue of costs was also highlighted by thematic experts, who say that IDPs and returnees complain that the cost of the official GPS demarcation is high, which is necessary to obtain an official land registration certificate—it costs 200 SDG per feddan.[86] The process of obtaining a land registration certificate is not only costly and lengthy but also complicated because it involves dealing with both the Native Administration, who oversees the customary tenure system and the formal legal judiciary in charge of the formal registration of land.

Some Darfur commentators suggest a different explanation as to why few have demarcated land or a land registration certificate to prove ownership. They reason that demarcation has been 'actively resisted' by the population that claim customary ownership of land. The rejection, it is argued, had to do with limited trust in the government and the government institutions that were involved in demarcation and land registration.[87] Furthermore, thematic experts point out that the process involved in the official land registration of farmland is open to manipulation. The process involves the Native Administration signing and endorsing a written form. The land claim is broadcast on local radio, and if no one disputes the claim it will be officially registered using GPS mapping to demarcate. People can register land, but it is very hard to verify that it is, in fact, their land. Therefore, they argue, the process itself needs to be strengthened or changed.

[81] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.5

[82] Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur *tribe* in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.

[83] Land demarcation is based on the household survey questions: 'Is this farming land demarcated and officially registered?' In Arabic the question reads as: (هل تم مسح وتسجيل هذه الأرض الزراعية؟

[84] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

[85] Consultation with a thematic expert from UN-Habitat, February 2021.

[86] Consultation with UN thematic experts, March, 2021.

[87] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013), Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

HOUSING AND RESIDENTIAL LAND

According to the household survey findings, a majority of returnees (80%) have regained access to the same residential land. The 20% of returnees, who are not accessing the same residential plot, cite unlawful land occupation and disputed ownership as the two main obstacles for regaining access.

Around half of the surveyed Gereida returnees (56%) report owning their residential plot, while the proportion is bigger among the non-displaced (65%). Only 1% of non-displaced report issues or conflict linked to the residential land where they are currently living, while this is the case for 6% of returnees and 10% of IDPs. For all, disputed ownership is the main issue. The majority of IDPs (77%) report residing in camps, while 15% report residing on either government land, communal land or on land provided by relatives. Only a small proportion (6%) report owning their residential plot.

Less than 2% reported renting their residential land, but significant proportions say that they live on land provided by the government for free (14% of non-displaced, 7% of IDPs and 17% of returnees). Among the nomads, 13 of the 50 surveyed households say they own their housing plot, 6/50 report that their residential land is provided for free by either relatives or friends. The largest proportion (30/50) of damrah households report that they are living on government-owned land.

SAFETY, SECURITY, CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW

Perceptions of safety and security are key criteria for durable solutions. The analysis aims to understand if IDPs and returnees experience a higher degree of security incidents in comparison to the non-displaced population. What type of insecurity and conflict do residents face in Gereida locality?

Lack of security has the ability to erode the overall confidence in peacebuilding processes and, therefore, restoring the rule of law is imperative. Peacebuilding is ultimately concerned with transforming post-conflict societies so that political and social disputes and conflicts are managed and resolved through non-violent means. In other words, the rule of law is a framework for the peaceful management of conflict and fair administration of justice through institutions, mechanisms and procedures.[88] Ensuring the rule of law relies on the capacity of the police and formal courts, but how effective are the police and courts in Gereida locality? The role of civil society in conflict resolution and peacebuilding is also important in Darfur, and therefore local conflict resolution mechanisms are reviewed and their perceived effectiveness assessed. Key informants also provide insight into the limitations of local conflict resolution mechanisms, but also how local mechanisms can be strengthened and local peacebuilding capacities supported.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **IDPs stand out as the population group in Gereida locality that feel most insecure as 14% report feeling 'very unsafe' during the day and 44% at night. A higher proportion of IDPs living in camps (57%) feel unsafe and very unsafe compared to IDPs residing outside of camps (24%).**
- **Perceptions of safety is highest among the non-displaced population; both during the day (77%) and at night (49%). In comparison, 62% of returnees report feeling safe during daylight hours, while this proportion drops considerably when it comes to perceptions of safety at night (36%). Returnees living in villages (24%) feel unsafe by 10 percentage points more in comparison to returnees residing in towns (15%).**
- **Robbery and damage to property and livestock are the most common security incidents faced by all population groups. A majority of nomads (40/50) report having been robbed during the last 12 months before the survey, whereas a third of IDPs, non-displaced and returnees reported this crime (33–36%). Half of the non-displaced residents (54%) and returnees (50%) report damage to property, assets or livestock but this type of security incident was reported by almost all surveyed nomads (47/50).**
- **Significant proportions of the population chose not to report a security incident: 64% of IDPs and 52–55% of all other population groups. Only 25% and below reported incidents to the police and Native Administration across all population groups, however, IDPs have particularly low reporting rates as only 10% of IDPs seek assistance from the Native Administration and 16% report to the police.**

[88] Kritz, N. J. (2007) The Rule of Law in Conflict Management in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.) (2007) Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World.

- **Satisfaction with how an issue was resolved by the police and Native Administration was very low. Returnees (19%), non-displaced (13%) and respectively 10% and 9% of IDPs and nomads assessed the issue or problem reported to be 'effectively resolved and just'.**
- **Conflict drivers in Gereida locality are chiefly linked to land. Unlawful occupation of land is a key issue that occurs along tribal lines with a huge potential to spark large-scale tribal conflict. Only 31% of surveyed IDPs and 76% of returnees are accessing the same agricultural land they cultivated before being displaced. Among those who do not have access to the same land they farmed prior to their displacement, 40% of returnees and 49% of IDPs indicate that this land is unlawfully occupied by others.**
- **A number of scenarios involving disputed land ownership including conflict between farmers over the boundaries of their farms, and Sheiks of land allowing others to cultivate IDPs' previous land are critical sources of conflict, while conflict linked to migratory routes is also a key conflict driver that spark clashes between farmers and nomads every season.**
- **Conflict over water is reportedly not a key conflict driver in Gereida locality according to area-level interviews. Household survey findings show that 85% of IDPs, 65% of non-displaced and 53% of returnees but few nomads have access to a Water Committee (4/50).**
- **The area-level data indicate that the Formal Joint Committee is the most important conflict resolution mechanism. The Native Administration and the local government are described as key stakeholders in regards to security and local conflict resolution mechanisms.**

PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY INCIDENTS

The households survey asked how safe respondents and their household members feel when walking in their neighbourhood or area during the day and during nighttime on a scale from 'very safe', 'safe', 'unsafe' and 'very unsafe'. The proportion of households that report that they feel 'very safe' during the day is highest among the non-displaced population (77%), followed by returnees (62%). Only 46% of IDPs judge it to be 'very safe' and a sizeable proportion (14%) say that they feel 'very unsafe' during daylight hours.

FIGURE 8: PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY WHEN WALKING IN ONE'S NEIGHBOURHOOD DURING DAY AND NIGHT - SDG INDICATOR 16.1.4



When it comes to perceptions of safety during the night, a large proportion of IDPs (44%) report feel 'unsafe' at night, while fewer returnees (18%) and non-displaced residents (9%) also deem that they are 'unsafe' at night. Again, a higher proportion of the non-displaced population (49%) feel 'very safe' during nighttime compared to the returnees (36%) and IDPs (13%). IDPs in Gereida locality stand out

as the group that feel most insecure as 14% and 44% say they feel 'very unsafe' (risk to life) respectively during the day and night.

Exploring in more detail whether the respondent's sex and type of settlement have a bearing on perceptions of safety, the findings show that the sex of the respondent plays no role in the responses concerning safety, but where respondents live does have an impact. A higher proportion of IDPs living in camps say they feel 'unsafe' and 'very unsafe' (57%) compared to IDPs residing outside of camps (24%). Returnees living in villages (24%) feel 'unsafe' by 10 percentage points when comparing to returnees in towns (15%). Among non-displaced residents, the trend is different; more households that live in villages (65%) report feeling safe contrasted with households living in towns (45%).

To identify the kinds of threats and confrontations that communities in Gereida locality face, respondents were asked about incidents that they had experienced during the 12 months prior to the survey. Verbal and physical threats (with knife, gun or other weapon) is experienced by somewhat higher proportions of IDPs (29%) and nomads (32%),[89] compared to non-displaced residents and returnees of whom 18–19% experienced verbal threats and 21–24% were victims of physical threats. The findings on verbal and physical threats among IDPs align with more IDPs feeling unsafe.

FIGURE 9: HOUSEHOLDS WITH MEMBERS THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED SECURITY INCIDENTS (PHYSICAL THREATS, ROBBERY, DAMAGE OF PROPERTY) IN THE 12 MONTHS PRECEDING THE SURVEY



Robbery is common and a third of IDPs, non-displaced and returnees report having been robbed (33-36%), while this proportion is dramatically higher among the nomads (40/50).[90] And almost all surveyed nomad households—47 out of a total of 50 households—report damage to property, assets or livestock. Half of the returnees (50%) and non-displaced residents (54%) also report criminal damage to their property, assets or livestock, while 38% of IDPs experienced this type of security incident in the 12 months preceding the survey. The lesser proportion of IDPs can be explained by the fact that fewer own land or livestock.

[89] 16 households out of a total of 50 reported verbal and physical threats, which is presented as a percentage to ease comparison to other population groups.

[90] The household survey sample of nomads is small (50 households), but findings can still provide valuable insight and identify patterns, especially when proportions are very high. For example, 47 out of 50 nomad households report damage to property or livestock.

PREVALENCE OF CONFLICTS LINKED TO LAND

Conflict in Gereida locality is predominantly linked to land, but tension and conflict are at times also caused by looting and theft of animals.[91] Area-level respondents regard water to be sufficient for people and animals and seldom be a source of tension and conflict. They point out that Gereida locality is situated upon the Bagarra underground water basin and boreholes provide access to this water source.[92] However, it should be kept in mind that the area-level qualitative data collection captured people's perceptions around conflict and water, and PBF staff have during 2020 recorded a significant number of conflicts over access to water between nomadic tribes and sedentary communities.[93]

In Gereida locality, there are several key conflict drivers related to land. One type of conflict occurs on a seasonal basis between pastoralists and farmers when either herders' animals enter farm areas and destroy crops or farmers expand their farms and cultivate inside migration routes. Unlawful occupation of land is another chief conflict driver with conflicts between IDPs and returnees and 'newcomers', who are unlawfully occupying their land. A third chief source of conflict in Gereida locality is disputed land ownership between individuals; either between farmers over the boundaries of their farms or between IDPs and Sheiks of land, who have allowed others to settle and cultivate in the IDPs' absence.

Area-level respondents also refer to a number of other causes of conflicts linked to land, which are deemed less common or less powerful in terms of igniting and driving conflict.

- Boundary conflicts also take place between Sheiks of land and localities, when locality borders run through land belonging to a tribe that perceives that their land provides benefits to a different locality, which is dominated by another tribe. For instance, a market located on tribal land can bring in revenue in terms of taxation to the locality.[94] This type of conflict is reportedly taking place in the following areas: Morgana area (Gereida and Al Sunta locality), Abou Lala and Manungry areas (Gereida and Tulus locality), plus in locations that intersect Gereida and Yassin locality and Gereida and Buram locality.[95]
- Conflict between family members over the inheritance of agricultural land but this also happens in relation to residential land in towns and cities.[96]
- Disputes over the payment for renting land sometimes takes place between Sheiks of land or landowners and the tenants. [97] Or when agricultural land tenants are evicted by the landowners, which is a legal process.[98]

When considering in more detail **unlawful occupation** of land in Gereida locality, it is important to emphasize that this kind of conflict is taking place along tribal lines and in particular areas. Hot spots include Sagour where members of the Falata tribe are residing on land described by some area-level

[91] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with members of the Native Administration
[92] South Darfur, Gereida locality, local government official.
[93] Consultation with PBF South Darfur programme staff, July 2021.
[94] South Darfur, Gereida locality, farmer community representatives and mini-FGDs conducted with respectively IDPs, women and youth.
[95] The localities that surround Gereida locality are dominated by other tribes and not the Masalit. These localities are reported to be dominated by the following tribes: Buram locality (Habaniya), Yassin locality (Birgid), Tulus locality (Falata), Al Sunta locality (Habaniya), Bileil locality (Dajo).
[96] South Darfur, Gereida locality, local government official.
[97] People that own agricultural land according to customary rights are able to lease the land or parts of the land to others to cultivate.
[98] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FDGs with respectively with Native Administration members, farmers, IDPs, women and youth. And key informant interview with local government office in Nyala (state-level key informant).

respondents as originally belonging to the Masalit community, who have been displaced. The Abdoose, Eadan and Hashaba areas are also described as 'trouble spots', where clashes over occupied land have taken place and so are the locales of Abou Lala, Abou Dukma and Abou Jabra in the Dito Administrative Unit. This type of land disputes that are drawn along tribal lines are described as the most critical problem to solve by peaceful means in Gereida locality, as it may otherwise lead to large-scale tribal conflict.[99]

Findings from the household survey underline that land illegally occupied is a key issue for IDPs. Only 31% of surveyed IDPs are accessing the same agricultural land they cultivated before being displaced, while 76% of returnees have done so, which still leaves 24% of IDP returnees, who have not managed to regain access to the land they previously farmed. Of those who do not have access to the same land they farmed before their displacement, significant proportions—40% of returnees and 49% of IDPs—point to 'land unlawfully occupied' as the reason.

Disputed ownership as a key source of conflict in Gereida locality is also supported by the household survey data. Disputed land ownership can refer to several scenarios but area-level data indicates that this mainly involves disputes between farmers over the boundaries of their farms or between IDPs and Sheiks of land, who have allocated the land to new land users. Of the 76% of IDPs that report having access to agricultural land, 34% of camp IDPs reported having issues related to this land and indicated that disputed ownership is the main issue. Disputed ownership of land is also the principal problem for returnees; a quarter of returnees (24%) report issues with their agricultural land, and specifically 9% indicate disputed ownership. Conflict over ownership of land is also reported by non-displaced residents; one in five non-displaced (19%) face issues related to their farmland, and specifically 4% report disputes over land ownership. Disputes related to boundaries of farmland is an issue: 5% of non-displaced say they face problems linked to the boundaries of their agricultural land. Among returnees, 7% indicate boundary conflicts.

In Gereida locality, community representatives and key informants also identify conflict linked to migratory routes as a key conflict driver.[100] This type of dispute is described as 'responded to with violence on many occasions', which has a wider impact on the locality as insecurity often limits access to other natural resources and services.[101] Conflict linked to pastoralists' grazing routes is also seasonal. In Darfur, pastoralist tribes move their livestock from north to the south in the course of the dry season and head back north during the rainy season.[102] The pastoralists use traditional livestock corridors (masarat) and have customary rights to graze their animals on rain-fed farmland (talique) after the harvest.[103] Although the Hakura system gives farmers customary land rights, these rights are not exclusive and pastoralists have temporary rights to graze their herds on what is left of the harvested crops. Normally, a talique date for when pastoralists can graze their animals is agreed upon between farmers and pastoralists with the help of the local authorities or the Native Administration to avoid crop losses and conflict.[104] Disputes and conflict happen when talique agreements are violated

[99] South Darfur, Gereida locality, local government official.
[100] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FDGs with respectively farmers, IDPs, women and youth.
[101] South Darfur, Gereida locality, representatives from the Native Administration, local government and Ministry of Infrastructure & Physical Planning (Nyala).
[102] UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.
[103] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181
[104] The talique date is referred to as a customary institution that has 'evolved through local practices of local communities, their leadership, and formal government structures. Osman, A.M.K., Young, H. Houser, R.F., and Coates, J. C. (2013)) Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur.

by either side. Violations of these agreements are often caused by a poor rainy season, which press pastoralists to move their herds much earlier in search of pasture and water. This, in turn, causes damage to crops before the harvest and farmers are known to deny pastoralists passage or block passage by expanding their farms into these livestock migratory routes.[105] In Gereida locality, farmers reported that the climate is changing and now the rainy season starts in July rather than in May when the rains used to come. The knock-on effect is that the crops are not ready to be harvested by the end of November, which causes major problems with the nomads, who expect to be moving their animals onto the harvested fields at this time.[106]

A considerable proportion of Gereida locality's farming communities point to 'grazing routes not being followed' as a source of conflict in the household survey. Findings show that of the non-displaced (19%) that face issues with their farmland, 47% point to grazing routes and rules not adhered to. This is also the case for IDPs and returnees; of the 34% of IDPs and 24% of returnees that report issues with the agricultural land they are currently assessing, respectively 30% and 21% indicate that designated livestock routes are not being followed by pastoralists. One in five of surveyed nomads (10/50) also report conflict related to grazing land.

REPORTING SAFETY INSTANCES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

The household survey sought to understand how residents report incidents and to whom they turn for resolving disputes and effective remedies. Households that experienced a security incident during the 12 months preceding the survey were asked recall the most serious incident and indicate whether they sought help. The household survey shows that more than half of all population groups (52–55%) did not report security incidents, although this trend is more pronounced among IDPs as 64% did not report an incident.

Equal proportions of nomads reached out to the Native Administration (19%) and the police (19%) for help,[107] while a slightly higher proportion of returnees turns to the police (25%) and the Native Administration for help (21%). A majority of non-displaced residents seek assistance from the police (23%), while only 11% report to the Native Administration. Similarly, only 10% of IDPs approach the Native Administration for help, while 16% report to the police.

[105] Young, H. et al. (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management.
[106] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with IDPs.
[107] The household survey asked respondents if they reported incidents to an Omda, Sultan, Malik, Nazir or Sheikh.

FIGURE 10: HOUSEHOLDS THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED AT LEAST ONE SECURITY INCIDENT DURING THE 12 MONTHS PRECEDING THE SURVEY DETAILING WHETHER THEY HAVE REPORTED AND TO WHOM



Overall, satisfaction with the way an issue was resolved was very low. More returnees (19%) thought that the issue was 'effectively solved and just', while merely 13% of non-displaced, 10% of IDPs and 9% of nomads assessed the security incident that they had experienced had been dealt with effectively and a just solution had been reached.

The fact that 16–25% of the population reports to the police coupled with the low satisfaction rates is likely to be linked to the police's limited capacity. Gereida locality has a total of six police points; three are located in the Gereida Administrative Unit and one police point in both Al Jokhana and Dito town. The police work in tandem with five rural courts in the locality. Unfortunately, representatives from the Gereida locality police force were not available for interview during the period of data collection because of the ongoing conflict in the locality. However, it is worth noting that area-level data from the seven other localities for the PFB programme have consistently flagged challenges concerning the police and courts that in tandem work to uphold the rule of law. It is reasonable to assume that Gereida locality, at least in part, is also impacted by the same issues. Challenges include that the police force is tasked with covering a large geographic area with not enough vehicles and shortages of fuel, and a lack of trained staff, which impact their ability to respond to incidents. Often particular areas and villages do not have access to police services due to long distances.

The rural courts are tasked with resolving simple problems and disputes in the locality,[108] while referring more complicated cases to a formal court, which sometimes is located outside the locality. According to area-level findings from the seven other PBF targeted localities in Darfur, a rural court is made up of members from the Native Administration. The rural courts face many of the same problems as the police; there is a lack of vehicles and fuel to reach remote areas plus often no meeting or office space for the members to carry out their business.[109] In general, analysis across the seven PBF programme localities consistently shows that the limited capacity of the police and courts in these post-conflict areas results in failure to bring perpetrators to justice, which in turn impacts peacebuilding efforts as upholding the rule of law is key to building peace.

[108] Rural courts serve as the entry point to the judicial system as these customary courts form part of the formal judiciary structure in Sudan as stipulated by the 2004 Town and Rural Courts Acts. Rural court judges are tasked with promoting dialogue and mediation as avenues to justice and reconciliation. Tubiana, J., Tanner, V. and Abdul-Jalil, M. (2012) Traditional authorities' peacemaking in Darfur. Peaceworks No. 83.

[109] Please see PBF's durable solutions analysis and baseline reports for Tawila, Assalaya, Yassin, Sheiria, Um Dukhun, Nertiti and Jebel Moon localities.

LOCAL COMMUNITY RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

In Gereida locality, there are several conflict resolution mechanisms alternative to police involvement. The principal committee is named the Formal Joint Committee, but the area is also served by local water committees that manage competing demands and conflict linked to water.[110] Traditional resolution mechanisms include the Judiya, the Native Administration and rural courts.

According to area-level data, competition over water is not regarded as a conflict driver in Gereida locality. Water committees, however, are reported to manage water usage and solve small-scale disputes over water.[111] Significant proportions of the Gereida farming communities have access to a water or WES committee. Household survey findings show that 85% of IDPs, 65% of non-displaced and 53% of returnees report that they have a water committee in their area. In contrast, few nomads appear to be served by a water committee (4/50).[112] Water committees have been set up in many areas and trained by INGOs (ZOA, CARE and ARC). When it comes to the levels of satisfaction, non-displaced (39%), IDPs (43%) and 56% of returnees assess that their committee was able to 'effectively solve a problem and provide a just solution'.

Local mediators are part of the Judiya traditional mediation mechanism at the community level that resolves conflicts between community members. Judiya is a grassroots system of mediation that centres on reconciliation and repairing of social relationships and tackle low-level crime that does not need to be dealt with by the courts. The Judiya arbitrators are named Ajaweed and are respected community members, who have knowledge of customary law and inter-tribal history. They are not neutral mediators, rather their role is to exert pressure on a party to accept a settlement.[113] The area-level respondents refer to the Judyia, Native Administration and rural courts as avenues for resolving conflict. With regards to unlawfully occupied land, parties can address the conflict in the following ways:[114]

- Start a dialogue with the Sheikh of the land and the 'newcomers' using the land.
- Take the case before the rural court or civic court (formal).
- Approach members of the Judyia (Ajaweed) to act as mediators.

Compromises with the 'newcomers' may include:

- Share the land with the 'newcomers' or new land users or share the harvested crop.
- Rent the land to the new users or permit them to use the land for a specific period, after which they have to return it to the original owners.
- Make an exchange with the new settlers; allow them to farm parts of the land in exchange for protection. The return areas tend to be insecure and the new settlers are often armed and can provide some level of protection.

Area-level informants highlight the Formal Joint Committee as the most important conflict resolution mechanism in Gereida locality. Its main function is to prevent conflict and clashes between nomads

[110] According to area-level data, youth-led initiatives exist in Gereida locality including the Resistance Committee and the Service and Change Committee that were set up during the uprising against the former regime. None of the area-level respondents or key informants made reference to either, which suggest that their role in conflict resolution is very limited.
[111] South Darfur, Gereida locality, representative from the local Water Corporation.
[112] It is concerning that the nomad population do not seem to be served by this local conflict resolution mechanism, however, it is important bear in mind that the nomad survey sample was very small (50 households).
[113] Young, H. et al (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Boston: Feinstein International Center.
[114] Area-level informants provided information as to how IDPs and returnees could try to address the issue of unlawfully occupied land. Note that the qualitative data did not provide information as to how effective or successful the suggested solutions are.

and farmers. The committee checks that farmers are not expanding their farms into designated livestock routes and that pastoralists move their animals using these demarcated animal routes. This committee is mandated to manage livestock routes and adherence to the talique but is often referred to as the Harvest Protection Committee in other Darfur localities. Typically, there is a second committee that has a wider conflict resolution mandate (either called the Peace and Reconciliation Committee or Peaceful Coexistence Committee), which appears to not exist in Gereida locality.

The Formal Joint Committee is made up of all relevant stakeholders including farmers, nomads, the police, IDPs, Native Administration, local government, Ministry of Agriculture & Natural Resources and the Forestry Administration.[115] Members of the committee make regular trips to guarantee that livestock routes and rules are adhered to by both farmers and pastoralists. The committee is regarded as the most successful conflict resolution mechanism in Gereida because it has the best resources (security, finance to pay for trips to sites of conflict etc.), which is provided by the local government. And because it includes all the relevant population groups to resolve conflict related to land in the locality.[116]

Notably, area-level respondents attribute a lot of importance to the local government's role in conflict resolution. The Native Administration takes the lead in rural courts, the Judiya and the Formal Joint Committee dealing with land and other resources and conflict, but the local government is described as a very important stakeholder in relation to conflict and land. In the words of a member of the Native Administration, 'the local government is one of the most relevant stakeholders in resolving land-related issues in this locality'. The role of the local government in Gereida locality includes setting up and supporting reconciliation conferences, keep order and security, and support landowners to register their land. In addition, it should adopt measures to prevent conflict around land and other natural resources including encouraging the establishment of local committees to manage competing demands.[117]

Native Administration representatives report that half of the conflicts resolved during the last 6 months were successfully mediated by committees, whilst the other half of conflicts and disputes incidents were settled by a rural court.[118] A key informant deems that conflict resolution mechanisms that are based on local norms, customs and traditions as most successful. This is because such forums usually find a solution that is accepted by both parties, which makes the arrangement durable, whereas formal courts are least successful 'because one side will gain and the other loose, and consequently the results achieved may not last'.[119]

The household survey results suggest that there is room for improvement with regard to how local conflict resolution mechanisms perform. As discussed above, 52–64% of surveyed Gereida residents did not report a security incident that they had experienced during the 12 months preceding the survey. Also, satisfaction with how an issue was resolved was low; only 9% of nomads, 10% of IDPs, 13% of non-displaced and 19% of returnees reported that the problem was 'effectively solved and just'.

[115] South Darfur, Gereida locality, Native Administration representatives and mini-FGD respectively with farmers, IDPs, women, youth.

[116] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGDs respectively with youth, farmers, IDPs and women.

[117] South Darfur, Gereida locality, local government official and mini-FDG respectively with Native Administration members, IDPs, farmers, women, representatives from the Ministry of Infrastructure & Physical Planning (Nyala).

[118] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with Native Administration representatives.

[119] South Darfur, Nyala, key informant from the Local Government Office.

STRENGTHENING CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING MECHANISMS

The area-level analysis explored challenges and elements that would strengthen the effectiveness of existing conflict resolution mechanisms. Overall insecurity is regarded as a hindrance to the Native Administration, committees, Rural Courts and Judiya to mediate in conflicts and impose their authority. Therefore, in the short- and medium-term there needs to be a focus on building the capacity of the local government including the police and judiciary plus the Native Administration, Rural Courts and community-level mechanisms to effectively address issues around land and natural resources. Concrete suggestion for short-term action involves setting joint committees at the level of the Administrative Units in addition to the Formal Join Committee that already exists at the locality level.

In the long term, there is a need for modernizing crop farming and animal husbandry by adopting new technologies. For example, farming can make a shift from horizontal to vertical expansion, while animal husbandry needs to focus on producing quality meat and dairy rather than concentrate on increasing the number of animals as grazing land is limited. In addition, there is a need for supporting nomad settlements, changing and expanding the education system, develop markets, infrastructure and set up water harvesting projects.[120]

Supporting and implementing the suggested actions to reach sustainable solutions requires capacity building and funding plus the support of the government at all levels (central, regional and local) and collaboration with INGOs, civil society organizations and the private sector.[121] Importantly, key informants and community representatives also emphasize the role of the communities. Advocacy and awareness-raising are needed to engage the community, for instance through radio programmes. The Native Administration and the local government have important roles to play and likewise, do the communities. Communities have to respect regulations and arrangements vis-à-vis land use and be part of joint committees to solve emerging conflicts. Farmers need to harvest their crops in time and allow nomads to feed their animals on the crop remains, while nomads have to wait to move their herds until after the harvest. And both communities have to let the Native Administration intervene and adhere to decisions and avoid resorting to violence.[122]

THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT AND CONFLICT OVER LAND

The Juba Peace Agreement attempts to address housing, land and property (HLP) that have significant implications for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding interventions. Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property is central to achieving durable solutions for IDPs as set out by the IASC Framework. Securing HLP rights is also critical for reaching durable solutions as it tackles one of the root causes of the conflict. The Juba Peace Agreement agrees with the IASC criteria and stipulates that 'all victims of Darfur have a right to seek restoration of property or compensation for their lost or seized property resulting from the conflict in Darfur'.[123] The right to restoration or compensation is essential for transitional justice. This right to restitution is not only awarded to individuals but also to communities that have a collective right to pursue restitution for communal property, villages, farms and traditional land. Where IDPs cannot return, they are entitled

[120] South Darfur, Gereida locality, local government and Native Administration representatives.
[121] South Darfur, Gereida locality, local government official and mini-FDGs with respectively farmers, IDPs, women and youth.
[122] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD respectively with farmers, women and IDPs. And key informant interviews with representatives from the Native Administration and Ministry of Agriculture & Animal Resources (Nyala).
[123] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.3.

to compensation for their loss resulting from forced displacement.[124] This right is extended to displaced persons regardless of whether they choose to return to their places of origin or not. [125] Thematic experts warn that the lack of mechanisms to implement restitution and compensation will be an obstacle to durable solutions and peacebuilding efforts.[126] In Gereida locality, area-level community representatives state that there are currently no compensation or restitution mechanisms in place.[127] Respondents emphasize that IDPs and returnees need legal support and the active involvement of the Native Administration to deal with the unlawful occupation of land,[128] while the local government also has a role to play when it comes to the legal process of registering land.[129] Only three villages out of 23 return villages have land demarcated for returnees: Abdoose, Abou Lala and El Dukhma.[130] 12 villages currently have IDP returnees and another eight villages are expecting returning IDPs.[131]

The peace agreement provides for the review and possible revocation of registered land that was expropriated or forcibly taken after June 1989.[132] Potentially, this is a powerful tool to deal with land that is unlawfully occupied even when the resent settlers hold land registration certificates to prove ownership. However, there is little mention in the agreement of the rights of the 'secondary occupants' or settlers unlawfully occupying land apart from chapter two, which specifies that basic services should be provided in areas of resettlement for those who inhabited the lands of others illegally.[133] Secondary occupation of land originally belonging to the people displaced by the conflict has been a critical barrier preventing durable solutions. But Sudan HLP experts warn that the JPA's aim of addressing long-standing disputes may contribute to the resurgence of violence in Darfur.

Specifically, the lack of clarity on how the JPA will consider the rights of secondary occupants, who will become displaced if a returns process is implemented, is a 'divisive factor' and constitute a severe risk of triggering further conflict.[134] Furthermore, the insecurity coupled with drought and environmental degradation have resulted in many nomadic pastoralist groups adopting a semi-sedentary or sedentary way of life, which requires land for housing and farming. Likewise, the HLP rights of these Darfuri communities also need to be included in the durable solutions process.[135]

The agreement sets out several institutions and their mandates that will govern conflict over land and aid peaceful co-existence between communities. The Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission has a mandate to hear and mediate in property restitution claims for individuals, who lost their land because of the conflict in Darfur. It is also tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed

[124] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.3.2.
[125] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.8.2
[126] NRC (2021), Housing, Land and Property Rights (HL) in the Juba Peace Agreement. Darfur Track briefing note.
[127] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGDs respectively with farmers, women and IDPs.
[128] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGDs respectively with farmers, IDPs, women, Native Administration representatives, and Ministry of Infrastructure & Physical Planning (Nyala).
[129] South Darfur, Gereida locality, local government official and mini-FGD with Ministry of Infrastructure & Physical Planning (Nyala).
[130] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with Native Administration representatives.
[131] Villages in Gereida locality expecting IDPs to return include Abu Lala, El Dukhma, Abou Sfareak, El Sfia, Dar El Salam, Tmaseeh, Jokhanaya and Um Blola. Villages to where returnees are living include Um Rakoba, Ed Eltegle, Abdoose, Am Assle, Trtora, Hboba, Eadan, Hashba, Donki Abyad, El Sagor, Um Krfa, and Gigi village.
[132] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan, chapter 7.8.1.
[133] This task is allocated to the Reconstruction and Development Commission. Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan, chapter 2.18.
[134] UN Sudan HLP Sub-sector (2021) UN Sudan Briefing note: HLP in the Republic of Sudan. (24 June, 2021).
[135] Ibid.

land.[136] The National Lands Commission has also been established and is tasked with working in tandem with the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, whilst the Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee Commission will be overseeing voluntary return and resettlement.[137] The Commission for the Development of the Nomads is mandated with improving the nomadic pastoralist sector plus regulate relations between farmers and nomadic pastoralists.[138]

The household survey and area-level analysis focused on conflict drivers, capacities for peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level. At the time of data collection, none of the institutions and mechanisms stipulated in the JPA was up and running and it is not clear how these will interact with or support efforts at the locality level. The implementation of the JPA has suffered delays and at the same time, the existing structures in Darfur are not capable of addressing land appropriation, restitution or compensation. As an example, the body entrusted to deal with land arbitration, the Land Commission, has not yet been granted legal authority and has 'struggled to address the scale and complexity of HLP issues' according to experts.[139]

[136] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.9.1 and chapter 7.10.11.
[137] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.8.
[138] Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.7.1.
[139] UN Sudan HLP Sub-sector (2021) UN Sudan Briefing note: HLP in the Republic of Sudan. (24 June, 2021).

ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING: AVAILABILITY AND ACCESS TO SERVICES

To assess adequate standard of living, this analysis draws on indicators such as availability and access to education, health, water and sanitation. For displaced persons to enjoy an adequate standard of living is important for durable solutions.[140] The analysis draws on the household survey and area-level data focusing on the access to services among the displaced populations (IDPs and IDP returnees) and non-displaced neighbours. By benchmarking against the non-displaced population's level of access to services, the analysis can shed light on possible challenges and vulnerabilities linked to IDPs' and returnees' displacement as well as identify broader area-level development challenges, which affect service delivery to all population groups.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **School attendance is highest among the non-displaced with 62% of boys and 57% of girls attending primary school. Among IDPs and IDP returnees, somewhat fewer children attend: 53–54% of the boys as well as 54–60% of the girls. Among the interviewed nomad households, merely three boys from a total of 39 boys from surveyed households, and none of the 31 girls of primary school age attended school.**
- **Access to health services is a challenge for all surveyed population groups. The poor provision of healthcare is reflected in the relatively low proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel across the groups: 13–14% of the births among the non-displaced and IDP population and 10% of births among IDP returnees. A vast majority across all groups face challenges when attempting to access healthcare (89–94%). Costs, quality of services and distance to services are key barriers.**
- **Access to improved drinking water varies between the surveyed groups: 24% of non-displaced, 27% of IDP returnees, 44% IDPs and 8/50 nomad households have access to improved water sources.**
- **Access to improved sanitation also varies: non-displaced (11%), IDP returnees (7%) while among IDPs (23%) almost a quarter has access. This is likely due to IDPs residing in camps, where at least some sanitation is provided. Among nomads, no one reported access to improved sanitation, while the vast majority indicated that they practice 'open defecation'.**
- **Very similar proportions ranging from 22–23% amongst the non-displaced, IDP returnees and IDPs report not having any personal documentation, while the rest of the surveyed persons mainly have national ID cards: non-displaced (76%), IDP returnees (75%) and IDPs (71%). Among the nomads surveyed in the damrahs, more than half (60%) did not have any documentation, while 39% held national ID cards. The area-level information suggests that administrative processes linked to land registration do require personal documentation.**

[140] Typically, a durable solutions analysis will benchmark against the non-displaced population's level of access to services, and thus shed light on possible challenges and vulnerabilities linked to IDPs' and returnees' displacement as well as identify broader area-level development challenges, which affect service delivery to all population groups.

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

The survey findings show that more than half of the boys and the girls aged 6–13 attend formal primary school in Gereida locality. School attendance is highest among the non-displaced with 62% of the boys and 57% of the girls attending primary school. Among IDPs and IDP returnees somewhat fewer attend; 53–54% of the boys as well as 54–60% of the girls. Interestingly, the typical trends of lower attendance rates among girls are not observed. A Gereida locality key informant also stresses that there is 'full awareness of the importance of education for girls in the area', and also points out that provision of education in the IDP camps is good.[141] Among the interviewed nomad households, merely 3 boys from a total of 39 boys from surveyed households, and none of the 31 girls of primary school age attended school.

Looking at education for children aged 6–18 years shows similar trends as primary school attendance with boys and girls attending school at very similar rates. Informal religious school, Khalwa, is only attended by very small proportions (1–7%) across all population groups. Formal school attendance is higher among non-displaced and IDPs (65–67% boys, 61–64% girls) and lower among IDP returnees (59% boys and 55% girls). As the primary school data indicates, school attendance in the damrah settlements is very low with only 9/56 boys and 1/52 girls aged 6–18 years are enrolled in formal schools.

FIGURE 11: SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AMONG CHILDREN BETWEEN 6 AND 18 YEARS OF AGE, BY SEX, ACROSS THE TARGET GROUPS



Households with children not attending school were asked about the reasons. Financial constraints are the reason for many children dropping out of school (40% of non-displaced, 34% of IDP returnee and 63% of IDP school-aged children). When it comes to financial obstacles, it is worth pointing out that primary education is in theory free of charge, but in reality, fees are often charged for attending school. Fees are said to cover the cost of running the school plus act as incentives for volunteer teaching assistants.[142] Distance to schools or poor quality and capacity of schools is indicated as the

[141] South Darfur, Gereida locality, education official.

[142] UNICEF Sudan Education Team insights. UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

key barrier by 10% of non-displaced children and 16% IDP returnees. Lastly, work (within or outside the home) is indicated as a reason why 10% non-displaced children, as well as 7–8% of IDP and returnee children, are not attending school. Among nomads, the main reasons listed for not attending school mainly include 'education not a priority' (29%), 'lack of information around enrolment' (15%) and 'distance to school' (15%).

Gereida locality is served by 43 primary schools and 8 secondary schools. Before 2003, primary schools were located in or near villages across the countryside, however, as a result of the war and resulting insecurity all schools were relocated to the three Administrative Unit centres. As a result, IDP returnees and especially nomads have less access to education. In the case of the nomad population, there are no primary or secondary schools specifically serving the damrah population or in the vicinity.

The low school attendance among the damrah children is also partly due to limited awareness of the importance of education among the nomad population.[143] Schools were destroyed during the war, for instance in the villages of Donki Abyad and Al Sagor, however, before the conflict, many villages did not have a primary school, including Um Rakoba and Abdoose. Plan to set up schools in return villages have been drawn up if certain conditions are met and also to build guest houses for students. Conditions include numbers of returnees plus availability of water.[144]

A number of factors come into play when assessing the quality of education. A key challenge is a lack of trained teachers: Gereida locality has a total of 383 teachers of whom 208 are trained. Teachers teach a total of 12,604 pupils, which translates into an average student-teacher ratio of 33 pupils per teacher, or 60 pupils for each trained teacher. The ratio is better for the 8 secondary schools, as there are 80 secondary school teachers (60 trained) instructing a total of 1,980 students (1:25). Reportedly, most schools in Gereida locality have access to clean water, but none have electricity and few are equipped with latrines, which means students defecate in open areas. When it comes to teaching equipment and furniture, 60% of schools are said to have blackboards and 30% of students have a seat and desk.[145]

This lack of access to sanitation, furniture, basic teaching equipment and qualified staff are stressed as the main challenges for the provision of education. In addition, destroyed or school buildings in severe disrepair plus a lack of vehicles for reaching potential schools in remote villages are also regarded as obstacles to children's education in Gereida locality. Currently, a temporary solution has been to raise funds for education from the communities, individuals plus national and international NGOs to run schools, but local Gereida education official says that durable measures need to be taken by the federal, state and local government to build capacity and support education.[146] A new additional challenge has come in the form of an intermediate level of education recently introduced in Sudan.[147] Implementing this educational reform at the locality level is difficult because it requires adopting a new curriculum and separate school buildings.[148]

[143] South Darfur, Gereida locality, education official.
[144] Plans exist to build schools in the following villages, Um Rakoba, Abdoose, Donki Abyad (Gereida Administrative Unit), Byata, Jor Tobak (Jokhana Administrative Unit), Rehad Elberdi and Abu Jabrah (Dito Administrative Unit). Ibid.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.
[147] According to UNICEF, this refers to the introduction of three school phases instead of two introduced without investment in teacher training, separate schools or changes in curriculum.
[148] Ibid.

ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES

The household survey results show that access to health services is a challenge for all surveyed groups. A majority in all groups has attempted to access health services in the past 6 months: 72% non-displaced, 78% IDPs, 66% of IDP returnees. Of those households that sought medical assistance, the vast majority reported that they faced challenges accessing healthcare (89% to 94%).

All groups specified that the barriers to accessing healthcare include the high cost of services or medicine, the low quality or capacity of services at the health facility or pharmacy, and long distances to reach health services. The challenges cited match the most reported barriers to healthcare in the 2020 multi-sector needs assessment that covers all Sudan's states.[149] The target groups in Gereida locality prioritise these barriers differently: among the non-displaced households, costs are the most cited barrier (73%), followed by quality/capacity (14%) and distance (12%). Among IDP returnees, the cost of healthcare is also the barrier most referred to (58%), followed by a significant proportion indicating distance as an issue (28%), and lastly quality and or capacity of service provision (13%). Among IDPs, costs were also highlighted as the main barrier by more than half (54%), while quality/capacity (41%) was highlighted by a very significant proportion but distance (4%) was only flagged by a small minority.

Looking at the surveyed nomads, proportionately fewer households compared to the other target groups tried to access health care (27/50). Most of them (25/27) had challenges in doing so: costs and distance were mentioned by equal proportions as the key barriers to accessing healthcare (11/25 in both cases).

The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator (SDG 3.1.2) and is often used as a proxy for measuring access to healthcare. The majority of births are attended by a relative, friend or traditional birth attendant. The proportion of births attended by skilled personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) is low: 13–14% of the births among the non-displaced and IDP population, and 10% of births among IDP returnees.[150]

FIGURE 12: PROPORTION OF BIRTHS ATTENDED BY SKILLED PERSONNEL (SDG 3.1.2)



[149] The Sudan 2020 Multi-sector Needs Assessment show that the two most common barriers to accessing healthcare are 'lack of medicines at the health facility' followed by 'cost of services and/or medicine too high/cannot afford to pay'. REACH (2021) Sudan: 2020 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (March, 2021).

[150] Among the surveyed nomads, only 13 births were reported during the year preceding the survey, and none of these were attended by skilled personnel.

There is a severe lack of health services in Gereida locality. According to area-level data, only five health centres are active of a total of 21 health facilities (77% inactive). The 5 health centres in operation are staffed by one doctor, 16 nurses and 6 health assistants, who are tasked with providing healthcare to all Gereida locality inhabitants. The healthcare teams treat approximately 280 patients each week. None of the health centres has clean water, electricity or sanitation. The shortage of healthcare provision affects *all* Gereida locality residents, although IDPs residing in camps reportedly have healthcare facilities located. This data matches the household survey findings that show that only 4% of IDPs pointing to distance to services as a problem, however, results also show that IDPs face other barriers to medical assistance including costs (54%) and quality/capacity of the available healthcare (41%).

ACCESS TO WATER AND SANITATION

The household survey measured access to improved sanitation and improved drinking water sources. Access to improved drinking water differs between the surveyed groups. Respectively 24% of non-displaced and 27% of IDP returnees have access to improved water sources, while among the IDPs 44% have access to improved water sources. According to area-level information, IDPs living in camps have relatively good access to water, as INGOs provide water services. Among the nomads surveyed (50 households), only 8 households reported access to improved water sources. The remaining households rely on unimproved water sources,[151] with large proportions among all groups accessing water through tanker trucks.

According to key informants, Gereida locality is situated upon an underground water basin, which means that water is not a natural resource in short supply. The main water sources include boreholes, deep wells, hand pumps and seasonal rivers.[152] However, many water points have been destroyed in return areas including Abdoose and Abyad Gereida, and inhabitants rely on water transported from Gereida town as the survey results on water trucking validate.

In some areas, the lack of security restricts movement to and from water points, which especially affects women and children who are responsible for collecting water. Insecurity is reported to make it difficult to rehabilitate destroyed water points in some areas including Eadan, Hashaba and Umblola. Other factors affecting access to water include the high costs of spare parts and fuel required for the water pumps. The water tariffs are low and so is the government budgets for maintaining the water points, both contributing factors as to why water points are not rehabilitated and maintained. Besides, there is a lack of vehicles needed to reach the water points, and any maintenance work stops during the wet season when the rains restrict movement.[153] Key informants suggest that some challenges could be addressed by providing security to access and rehabilitate damaged water points. And by increasing the water tariffs enough revenue could be raised to cover running and maintenance costs. In addition, running costs could be lowered by using solar power rather than diesel to power the water pumps.[154]

[151] Unimproved drinking water sources include unprotected dug well, unprotected spring, cart with small tank/drum, tanker truck, and surface water (river, dam, lake, pond, stream, canal, irrigation channels), bottled water.
[152] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with Native Administration representatives.
[153] South Darfur, Gereida locality, local government official.
[154] South Darfur, Gereida locality, representative from the local water corporation.

According to area-level data, there are three water points in Jokhana Administrative Unit that supply 12 villages[155], while another three water points serve the villages of Um Tearan and Mowaro located in Dito Administrative Unit. Reportedly, there are two water points in Gereida Administrative Unit, but the nearby villagers were displaced to Gereida town during the war. The villages of Kfala, Harazan and Edaiza in Jokhana Adminstrative Unit are reported to lack access to water, and the residents of Tyba and Um Kshawaia (Dito Administrative Unit) likewise struggle to access water.

FIGURE 13: ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER BY TYPE ACROSS THE TARGET GROUPS (FOR RESULTS ON IMPROVED DRINKING WATER SOURCES SEE NARRATIVE)



Satisfaction with the amount of water available to households is quite similar across the groups. Non-displaced (45%) and IDPs (47%) are the most satisfied, while satisfaction drops somewhat among IDP returnees (39%). Among nomads, the results show that more than half (29/50) are satisfied with the sufficiency of the drinking water. Having enough water for livestock is also key, not only for nomads of whom all report owning livestock but also for Gereida's other population groups as 85% of non-displaced, 72% of IDPs, 87% of IDP returnees own livestock. Findings on satisfaction with the sufficiency of water for the livestock is somewhat lower compared to the results on drinking water: non-displaced (38%), IDPs (37%) and IDP returnees (32%) say that they are satisfied with the amount of water available for their animals. Among the nomads, the group that relies on livestock the most, satisfaction is higher, as half of the surveyed households say that they had sufficient water for their herds.[156]

The household survey also considered access to improved sanitation.[157] Access to improved sanitation is low across all groups: non-displaced (11%), IDP returnees (7%) while among IDPs (23%) almost a quarter has access. This is likely due to IDPs residing in camps, where at least some sanitation is provided. Among nomads, no one reported access to improved sanitation, while the vast majority indicated that they practice 'open defecation' in the bush. This practice of open defecation is a major problem as water and sanitation-related diseases are leading causes of death for children under 5 years caused by diarrhoea. It is also a cause of acute malnutrition associated with repeated diarrhoea or worm infections, and hence poses a major risk to public health. Open defecation is also a practice among many IDP returnees (40%), while less among non-displaced (15%), and IDPs (7%).

[155] These are: Mowala, Um Keshik, Dukomi, Um Shraina, Amoud El Shab, El Sgour, Rwaina, Um Jumaina, Jodol Gmari, Haraza, Um Khebasha and Hashba

[156] The very small sample size of 50 households needs to be kept in mind.

[157] Improved sanitation facility includes pit latrine with slab (shared or not), ventilated pit latrine, flush latrine.

Area-level data points several challenges concerning sanitation. A general lack of community awareness of the dangers that the practice of open defecation poses, absence of improved sanitation facilities, but also a shortage of qualified health personnel. Sanitation committees have been established in Donki Abyad and El Sagour, which forms part of the Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) programme. As part of programme activities, the committees carry out local environmental and sanitation campaigns and also raise awareness through home visits. The Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) committees that have been set up with support from ZOA, CARE and ARC have also received training on sanitation and community mobilization sponsored by UNICEF.[158]

FIGURE 14: ACCESS TO SANITATION BY POPULATION GROUP (RESULTS ON ACCESS TO IMPROVED SANITATION TO BE FOUND IN THE NARRATIVE)



ACCESS TO PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION

The survey household asked all persons if they possess any official documentation. Very similar proportions ranging from 22–23% amongst the non-displaced, IDP returnees and IDPs report not having any personal documentation, while the rest of the surveyed persons mainly have national ID cards: non-displaced (76%), IDP returnees (75%) and IDPs (71%). Among the nomads surveyed in the damrahs, more than half (60%) did not have any documentation, while 39% held national ID cards.

Birth certificates are only held by a small number of persons (ranging from 11%–15%). An indicator often tracked is the proportion of children under 5 years who have a birth certificate (SDG indicator 16.9.) This is because registering births is important for ensuring the fulfilment of human rights and are thus regarded as the starting point for the recognition and protection of every person's right to identity and existence. The results show that these proportions are somewhat lower (7–12%) than the access to birth certificates in the whole population. Among the surveyed nomads, only one out of a total of 40 children under the age of 5 years had a birth certificate.

Those that possess no personal documentation were asked if they had previously had such documentation. Only small proportions reported having lost their documentation: 7% of non-displaced persons and respectively 15% and 12% of IDPs and IDP returnees. The majority amongst this group

[158] The UNICEF sponsored training is a package that includes trainings on financial management, community mobilization, engineering and technology and sanitation. The various trainings have respectively been conducted by Ministry of Finance & Workforce, Ministry of Social Affairs, the Water Corporation and the Ministry of Health. South Darfur, Gereida locality, local MoH official.

has not been able to obtain new documentation because there is 'no office to obtain such documents in the area' or 'the process takes time'.

The area-level information suggests that documentation is not necessary for accessing education and health services, but that administrative processes linked to land registration do require personal documentation. Before the Ministry of Interior national ID card initiative, many nomadic pastoralists did not possess personal documentation, which made it harder for nomads to own residential land.

FIGURE 15: ACCESS TO DOCUMENTATION BY POPULATION GROUP[159]



[159] The low sample size of nomads needs to be taken into account – especially the indicator on Children under 5 years of age with birth certificate, as the total N of children under 5 is 40.

CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

Social cohesion is a multi-faceted concept, however, this chapter focuses on specific aspects including participation and inclusion as well as inter-group contacts and perceptions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs specify that displaced persons should be able to exercise the right to participate in public affairs on an equal footing with the non-displaced population without discrimination due to their displacement. People's civic participation—engagement in public affairs, as well as how groups accept and engage with each other—can offer insights into social cohesion within and between communities. In turn, social cohesion has a bearing on integration and thus is important for durable solutions and peacebuilding. Greater cohesion may facilitate more consensus-oriented or inclusive governance and create resilience to escalating conflict at the individual level.[160]

KEY FINDINGS:

- **23% of returnees report living with non-displaced households in their current village or area compared to 77% of IDPs. Co-existence and interaction appear to take place to a lesser degree in areas where returnees are living as they appear to be living mainly with other returnees.**
- **The non-displaced population are very welcoming of returnees and think they should be able to partake in decision-making and take on leadership positions on an equal footing (95%), while less IDPs (57%) feel able to participation in local decision making.**
- **40% of surveyed non-displaced households live together with or next to nomads. Overall, non-displaced a less accepting of nomads: 76% agree that nomads should have equal access to services, for example. And fewer (61%) believe that nomads should participate in decision-making and should have the opportunity to lead on issues that concerns the local communities.**
- **None of the community-based mechanisms in Gereida locality are inclusive of women, and Gereida locality has no organisations that advocate for women to be part of the peace process. The youth are involved in youth-led committees and initiatives but are deemed too inexperienced to be part in committees concerned with managing access to natural resources and conflict resolution.**
- **Around half of all population groups take part in reconciliation and public meetings. Less female-headed households participate, especially among IDPs where only 36% of the female-headed households participated in a reconciliation meeting compared to 51% of the male-headed households.**

INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS[161]

The survey sets out to understand how the different target groups perceive each other. As a starting point, IDPs and return IDP households were asked if they live together with non-displaced families in the same village or location. 77% of IDPs say they live side-by-side with non-displaced households,

[160] For more on social cohesion analysis, see: UNDP (2020) Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications.

[161] The module of the questionnaire focusing on intergroup perceptions only captured the attitudes between displaced and non-displaced groups. The module was not designed to capture the attitudes of the displaced/returnees vis-à-vis the nomads. Also, because relatively few non-displaced residents report living in the vicinity of IDPs, an analysis of the views of non-displaced regarding IDPs was not feasible for Gereida locality.

which indicates that the camps/informal settlements in which they reside are in close vicinity to town or villages. Considerably fewer returnees (23%) report living close to non-displaced. The household survey findings indicate that a higher degree of interaction and co-existence takes place in the areas where IDPs reside. IDP returnees tend to be living in separate returnee villages in more homogenous communities—a factor when trying to understand the social cohesion in these communities at the micro-level.

Non-displaced households captured by the survey in Gereida locality were similarly asked about their neighbours.[162] Without exception, the non-displaced population is very welcoming and accepting of the IDP returnee population. Between 95–99% say that returnees are welcome to settle, participate in local activities, and should have equal access to basic services. The same high percentages of non-displaced residents have returnee friends in their village, welcome returnee neighbours into their family through marriage and think that they should have the opportunity to become leaders and participate in decision-making regarding local matters. There is a marked difference in responses when non-displaced residents are asked the same set of questions about nomad neighbours. Around three-quarters of non-displaced residents have nomad friends in the area they live (72%), welcome nomads to participate in local activities (76%) and agree that nomad neighbours should have equal access to basic services such as education and clean water (74%). Slightly fewer welcome nomads to settle in their village or town (69%), while notably fewer welcome nomads to marry into their family and think they should take on leadership positions and be part of making decisions about local issues (61%).

The sample is not large enough to gauge the nomads' perceptions vis-à-vis decision-making and the ability to take on leadership positions, however, key informants indicate that the nomad communities have separate leadership structures and nomads and their interests are represented in the main joint decision-making forum, the Formal Joint Committee.

Overall, IDP returnees feel very much accepted and welcome by the non-displaced community (84–90%), both when it comes to their participation in joint activities, marriage, local decision-making, and access to services. Comparatively to the returnees, IDPs feel somewhat less welcome to participate in joint activities with non-displaced neighbours, have non-displaced friends (74-82%), while only 57% think they are able to participate in local decision-making.

PARTICIPATION, PEACEBUILDING AND COORDINATION AT COMMUNITY-LEVEL

Area-level respondents describe conflict resolution mechanisms as inclusive of nomads and returnees but not in regards to women and youth. IDPs are reported to be included whenever issues concern them, and when it comes to managing demands for water, IDPs tend to have their own committees in the camps. Nomads are said to always be included in these forums because they are represented on the Formal Joint Committee and always stakeholders in the issues discussed.[163] Besides a number of youth-led committees and initiatives, youths are not included in any committee or traditional conflict resolution mechanisms on the grounds of being too inexperienced.[164] Youth are taking the lead on several initiatives including support for Gereida locality's rural hospital (Stand up

[162] 49% of non-displaced said that returnees live in their village or town, while only 11% said they live close to IDPs in camps. Only 11% of non-displaced residents that report IDPs to be living in their village or town, which makes it too small a sample for exploring the non-displaced population's perceptions of IDPs.
[163] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGDs respectively with farmers, women, and IDPs.
[164] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGDs with youth.

for the hospital), provide fuel to the Dito water point and help build a school in Sudoor El Khail (Jokhana Administrative Unit). Interviewed youths complain of a lack of engagement and cooperation from the Native Administration on these youth-led projects.[165]

The area-level analysis sought to find out if women are included in local committees and whether any civil society groups are advocating for women to participate in reconciliation and Darfur peace processes. Respondents stated that women were generally not included conflict resolution mechanisms or committees because of local customs and practices. For instance, when referring to the Formal Joint Committee respondents explain that members are required to travel to settle disputes, which would be inappropriate for women.[166] In Gereida, respondents were also unaware of any civil society organizations advocating for women's participation in Darfur peace processes and representatives from the local government and Native Administration also say that there are no local governance forums that advocate for policy change, social accountability and inclusion of women and youth in leadership positions.[167]

Women make up half of the population in Gereida locality and are important peace and conflict actors. A recent Darfur study by UNDP found that women play a significant role in conflicts including instigating men to use violence—singing traditional Hakamat songs to spur on the men to fight, preventing pastoralists from accessing water, but also partake directly in conflict by providing cooking, nursing and intelligence to combatants.[168]

The household survey also considered participation in reconciliation and public meetings. Results show that significant proportions across all population groups have taken part in such meetings. Somewhat fewer IDP households (45%) have participated in a reconciliation meeting during the six months preceding the survey compared to 50% of non-displaced, 56% of returnees and 34/50 of damrah households. Slightly higher proportions across all groups have attended a public meeting on community matters by 2–6 percentage points. Respectively, 54% (non-displaced), 51% (IDPs), 59% (returnees) and 35/50 nomad households took part in a public meeting. Across all groups, the reasons given for not attending were primarily 'not invited', 'not aware of such a meeting' as well as 'not sure why'.

Looking at participation among male and female-headed households, the results show that female-headed households attend meetings to a lesser extent. Especially when looking at IDPs as 51% of male-headed households have attended at least one reconciliation meeting the year preceding the survey, while that is only the case for 36% of the female-headed households. As this information was captured at the household level, it is possible that a male member of the household participated in meeting(s) rather than the woman, who is the head of the household. Among non-displaced and returnee households, the difference is smaller and ranges between 4–5 percentage points. When contextualizing the survey results with the area-level data, it appears that women are less included in conflict resolution and peace processes although not entirely left out.

[165] Ibid.
[166] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGDs respectively with farmers, IDPs, women and youth.
[167] South Darfur, Gereida locality, local government official and mini-FGD with Native Administration representatives.
[168] UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur

FIGURE 16: PARTICIPATION OF MALE AND FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS IN RECONCILIATION MEETINGS



As discussed in a previous chapter, findings show that significant proportions of Gereida residents own a mobile phone, especially among men. Mobile phones may present an opportunity to share information or send messages relevant to peacebuilding. The Tadoud programme, for instance, equipped community leaders with mobile phones, credit and facilitated contact between leaders so that, in times of crisis, they were able to communicate and resolve issues even when in two different locations.[169] With the current fuel shortages, communication by phone might help facilitate discussion if and when face to face meetings are not possible.

Collaboration and interaction between community members, the local government authorities and the Native Administration was also explored by the area-level analysis. Respondents state that there is good coordination between the local government, the Native Administration and community members and highlight where partnerships between the three are formed. For instance, community members together with the Native Administration and local government have set up a partnership to mobilize resources for education. Stakeholders including teachers come together in a committee to organize support and resources from the community for education.[170] However, interactions and opportunities for civil society and community members to work with the local government and have an influence on decisions is relatively limited and restricted to basic services as in the case of education.[171] To improve engagement and opportunities for participation, respondents say that financial support, capacity-building and awareness-raising are key in order for community members, civil society and individual community members to be able to advocate and represent the communities plus encourage greater accountability from the government.[172]

Respondents state that the Native Administration is the main communication channel between the community and the local government in case of any grievances in the community. Native Administration representatives were aware of policy guidelines developed by the Ministry of Local Governance for effective engagement of the traditional authorities in the formal local governance structures but said the guidelines had not been implemented and exist only on paper.[173]

[169] Consultation with former UNAMID staff member based in East Darfur also highlighted that the peacekeeping force facilitated many meetings between tribal leaders by providing transportation, and also provided phone credit to facilitate communication.
[170] South Darfur, Gereida locality, education representatives.
[171] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD respectively with farmers, IDPs, women, youth and representatives from the Ministry of Infrastructure & Physical Planning (Nyala).
[172] Ibid.
[173] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with Native Administration representatives.

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

Displaced persons have a right to make informed and voluntary decisions regarding what durable solution is right for them. Understanding preferences and the perspectives behind the intentions for the future will help relevant actors to support the preferred durable solutions. Displaced households—whether in displacement or their return location—determine whether return and re-integration in their place of origin, settling elsewhere, locally integrating in the place of displacement or a mix of options is the preferred solution. This study employs a wide lens and examines the preferences for the future not only amongst IDPs but also amongst IDP returnees, whose return might not have proved durable, and also considers the non-displaced to also understand the general mobility in the area.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **The vast majority among IDP returnees (89%) intent to stay. This strongly indicates a preference for continuing to reintegrate in their places of origin to where more than half (57%) have returned more than 5 years ago.**
- **Among IDPs, three-quarters (74%) intend to stay in their current location, while the remaining intend to leave. However, only less than half of those intending to leave (46%) have concrete plans to move within the following 12 months. The majority (80%) of the IDPs who prefer to leave, would like to return to their place of origin, which is primarily within Gereida locality.**
- **Drawing upon key informant interviews, the central factors that influence returns of IDPs include the overarching security situation and the ability to regain or negotiate access to land in the place of origin. The survey results also point to obstacles linked to lack of funds and means of transportation. Furthermore, IDP households residing in camps are more likely to want to return, as well as households headed by a woman and households that experience conflicts linked to the land, which they currently farm.**
- **More than half of surveyed nomad households (29/50) do not intend to leave their current location, and 13 of the 50 households report crop farming as their main source of livelihood. Both survey findings suggest that a significant part of the damrah residents are agro-pastoralists and reside in these settlements on a full-time or semi-permanent basis.**

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

What preferences for the future do the displaced populations (IDPs, IDP returnees) have? Findings show the vast majority among **IDP returnees** (89%) intent to stay. This strongly indicates a preference for continuing to reintegrate in their places of origin to where more than half (57%) have returned more than 5 years ago.[174] The pull factors—the reasons for wanting to stay—that households themselves highlight mainly centre around wanting to be near family and home (64%), while safety (14%) and employment opportunities (14%) in the return area are also mentioned.

Among **IDPs**, 74% intend to stay in their current location, while the remaining 26% intend to leave. However, only less than half (46%) of those intending to leave have concrete plans to move within

[174] 17% returned less than a year ago, 27% returned between 1 and 5 years ago, 25% between 5–10 years ago, while 32% returned more than 10 years previously.

the following 12 months. Of the 26% of IDPs that want to leave, the majority (80%) would like to return to their place of origin, which is primarily within the Gereida locality,[175] while a smaller proportion (13%) intend to resettle in a different locality in Darfur. The results show that a greater proportion of IDPs residing in camps intends to leave (29%) compared to the proportion among the IDPs residing in villages and towns (14%). The main reasons for preferring to leave (push factors) are mainly centred around economic opportunities (49%) and a wish to return to their place of origin or other family reasons (27%). The most important obstacles to leaving includes: lack of security (38%), or funds (24%) and no means of transportation (18%). IDPs' reported reasons for intending to stay in the place they are currently living (pull reasons) include primarily considerations around better safety in their current location (indicated by 32% of the households intending to stay), while family reasons (24%) and access to services (16%) are also specified as the chief reason by smaller proportions.

Area-level informants in Gereida point to the provision of security and access to land as the main factors influencing IDPs' decision to return.[176] Lack of security is currently the main reason why IDPs are not returning as 'most IDP return areas are insecure and weapons are still in the hands of citizens, particularly those who still occupy the IDPs' lands. So security is the top priority for every person who wants to return home'.[177] The main hindrance to return is the tribal conflicts over land and the 'newcomers', who occupy the land of IDPs, and who are often armed according to respondents.[178] As an example, respondents mentioned the conflict between the Falata tribe in the Sagour area and North Gereida Wadi.[179] A key informant added that nomads cross the lands seasonally, 'destroying farms and crops, resulting in conflicts and therefore IDPs prefer to stay in camps rather than return home'.[180]

Access to land is also a decisive factor affecting the decision to return, according to all key informants.[181] Only after access to land has been secured, is the provision of other basic services (most importantly water but also health and education) key to enable sustainable returns of IDPs.[182] Key informants emphasized that security is a precondition for the provision of all basic services.[183] According to the latest HNO figures (2020), IDPs make up a very large proportion of the population in Gereida locality (79%) while returnees only 3%. It is evident that while the majority remain in displacement, only few households have been able to return and re-establish their livelihoods in their places of origin.

Notably, 29 out of 50 interviewed nomadic households responded that they were not planning to leave their current location, which contradicts the assumption that nomad pastoralists reside only temporarily in the damrahs. In addition, 13 of the 50 nomad households in the targeted Gereida damrahs reported crop farming as their main livelihood source. Both findings suggest that a significant proportion of the damrah households are either sedentary or semi-nomadic. Similarly, the proportion intending to stay was 96% of surveyed nomads in Nertiti locality, while in Um Dukhun the proportion was 76% and in Jebel Moon 84%. Thus, there is a trend across a number of the PBF surveyed

[175] 89% of the IDPs are from within Gereida locality.
[176] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGDs respectively with farmers, IDPs, women and youth.
[177] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with farmers.
[178] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGDs respectively with IDPs, youth, Native Administration members, and Local Government Office representatives.
[179] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with women and interview with a local government official.
[180] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with Native Administration representatives.
[181] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD respectively with farmers, youth, IDPs, women, and Native Administration representatives.
[182] South Darfur, Gereida locality, local government official.
[183] South Darfur, Gereida locality, mini-FGD with IDPs.

localities of nomads that have shifted their economic practice from exclusively relying on nomadic livestock production.

The non-displaced households were also asked about their intentions for the future. A minority (9%) preferred to leave their current location. These households' main reason for preferring to leave was a lack of employment opportunities and limited access to basic services.

EXPLORING DRIVING FACTORS FOR IDPs FURTHER

What characterises the IDP households that prefer to stay and those that want to leave?[184] A further analysis considered different factors that might influence IDPs' intentions (in addition to the push and pull factors indicated by respondents).

- **Somewhat more female-headed IDP households intend to stay in their current location.** Among IDP female-headed households, fewer intend to leave (21%) compared to the proportion among male-headed households (30%).
- **IDPs who report conflict linked to the land they currently farm are more likely to leave.** Around one-third of IDP households (34%) report having conflicts linked to the farmland, they are currently accessing. When looking closer at this group, the data shows that a greater proportion (39%) intend to leave compared to those households that have not reported conflict in relation to their land (23%).
- **IDPs in camps are more likely to leave compared to those out of camp (whether in villages or towns).** The surveyed IDPs are distributed between camps, towns and villages. The results show that a greater proportion among those residing in camps (29%) intend to leave compared to the proportion that lives in villages or towns (14%). Most of these IDPs report that they intend to return to their place or village of origin somewhere else within Gereida locality.
- **Food insecurity is not a factor**. Overall, the proportions of IDPs reporting that they intend to leave is the same amongst those who are food insecure and those who are food secure.
- **Security incidents (robbery and damage to property) seem to partly influence preferences.** The experience of security incidents in the shape of property damage (e.g. crop damage) seems not to be a factor influencing the intention to leave or stay. However, when looking at households who have experienced robbery, the data shows that a higher proportion intends to leave compared to the proportion that has not been victims of robbery (32% vs. 22%).

In summary, drawing upon the key informant interviews and the survey results, the key factors that influence IDP returns include the overarching security situation and the ability to regain or negotiate access to land in their place of origin. The survey results also point to obstacles linked to a lack of funds and transportation. Furthermore, IDP households residing in camps are more likely to want to return, as well as households headed by a woman and households that experience conflicts linked to the land that they cultivate.

[184] The limited sample sizes of the IDP, non-displaced and nomad proportions intending to leave does not allow for further analysis of their intentions. Thus, the discussion only focuses on IDPs.

CONCLUSIONS: PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND PEACEBUILDING

GEREIDA LOCALITY, SOUTH DARFUR: HOW WAS PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTIONS AND PEACEBUILDING ANALYSED?

Durable solutions for IDPs living in displacement is part of building peace in Darfur. At the same time, peace is also central to achieving solutions for the displaced population that are durable—the two aspects are intrinsically linked. It is impossible to envisage stability and security in the long-term without sustainable return of those who fled the conflict.

This study paid attention to a number of areas crucial to peace and durable solutions for IDPs and IDP returnees. Importantly, the analysis included the views and concerns of Gereida nomadic communities, whose perspectives need to be mainstreamed into conflict analysis and any peacebuilding approach informing future activities—whether with a humanitarian, development or durable solution focus.

As per the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, 'a durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement'. It is of central importance to focus on the non-discriminatory and voluntary nature of solutions, and to measure local integration—whether in the place where people have found themselves after being uprooted or where they have returned to—as a process to overcoming vulnerabilities linked to their displacement. In other words, durable solutions are not defined or achieved by merely the geographic features of the solutions outlined in the IASC Framework—to return, stay or settle elsewhere. What is key is the principles of non-discrimination and the voluntary nature of reaching long-term solutions.

The approach designed for this study is to measure progress towards durable solutions by way of conducting a comparative analysis of the socio-economic situation of the displaced populations against the non-displaced, across the key criteria outlined in the IASC Framework. The survey in Gereida locality captured IDPs, IDP returnees and non-displaced.[185] By identifying the key differences in the situations of displaced and non-displaced, the analysis has pointed to areas where IDPs and returnees are worse off and can be assumed to still face displacement-linked vulnerabilities. In this way, the analysis pinpoints the key obstacles to reaching solutions.

To strengthen the understanding of the locality and peacebuilding capacities, the methodology approach combines the population analysis (based on household survey results) with the area-level analysis that looks at conflict dynamics, local conflict resolution mechanisms, the capacity of the police and courts to uphold the rule of law, land and resource management structures, availability and capacity of services etc. Lastly, it is critical to also understand the preferences and plans for the future that displaced populations have and the factors that drive their intentions.

[185] Nomad households residing in damrahs were also targeted; however only 50 households were interviewed and thus the results could not be statistically analyzed. Only selected results are included – at household level the results are presented with the N while at the individual level, due to a higher sample size, percentages are indicated. The sample sizes for all target groups can be found in the methodology chapter.

The guiding questions for the analysis have been:

- To what extent are the displaced populations who have returned and those who are still displaced progressing towards durable solutions, and what are the key obstacles and opportunities in this process?
- What are their own preferences for the future and what is driving these intentions?
- How are these integration processes of displaced groups interlinked with the broader peacebuilding process at the locality level?

The above questions were addressed by analysing the following:

- What is the **rule of law** situation in the locality? Do people feel safe and are they able to access the police and courts?
- What land **governance structures and dispute resolution mechanisms** are in place? How are conflicts and disputes solved within the community?
- What is the **housing, land and property** situation in the place of displacement and return for both displaced and non-displaced households including nomads?
- How is the **standard of living** for the different populations in terms of access to basic services and livelihoods?
- How **socially cohesive** are the communities, to what extent are different groups participating in decision-making, and how active and equipped are civil society organisations?

PEACEBUILDING CONSIDERATIONS

Durable solutions programming focuses on needs of the displaced populations, however, successful peacebuilding efforts necessitates that the nomad population is not overlooked. In fact, development programmes specifically need to target nomad communities, whose neglect and marginalization are part of the spectrum of root causes of the conflict.

Rule of law and insecurity: Significant proportions of all population groups are victims of robbery and damage to property or livestock. 33–36% of IDPs, non-displaced and returnees have been robbed during the last 12 months preceding the survey, and half of returnee and non-displaced residents report damage to property, assets or livestock. Fewer IDPs report damage to property, but out of all population groups IDPs feel the most insecure—15% during daylight and 50% at night feel 'very unsafe'. Very high proportions of the surveyed damrah residents have been robbed (40/50 households) and report damage to property, assets or livestock (47/50). Thus, all population groups are subjected to substantial levels of insecurity and crime.

Despite the high levels of crime, the survey findings show that more than half do not report security incidents; 52–55% of non-displaced, returnees and nomads plus 64% of IDPs chose not to report.[186] Only a quarter or less of all Gereida locality residents report security incidents to the police although the IDP population stands out as merely 16% reported to the police. In addition, satisfaction with how an issue was resolved by the police was very low, as between 9–19% said the issue was 'effectively resolved and just'. Upholding the rule of law relies partly on the capacity of the police force in Gereida

[186] The survey questions as to why respondents did not report to security were damaged in the KOBO tool and hence the team is unable to include reasons in the report.

locality and rural courts, but is also partly upheld by the Native Administration, committees and Judiya. The survey results point to a lack of faith in the police and courts by the community. Due to the recent insecurity in Gereida locality, it was not possible to collect information from police and court representatives to understand in detail the challenges they face, but data collection in the other localities where PBF programmes are implementing consistently flag a lack of resources, staff and funding.

Conflict and local conflict resolutions mechanisms: In Gereida locality, conflict is predominantly linked to land, but it is important to distinguish between key conflict scenarios. Unlawful occupation of land is a key conflict driver, which takes place along tribal lines (e.g. Falata and Masalit) and is described to have the potential to lead to large-scale conflict. The occupation of land by 'newcomers' is a key issue for IDPs—76% of surveyed IDPs and 29% of returnees have not been able to regain access to the land they previously cultivated, of whom respectively 49% and 40% say that their land is unlawfully occupied. Another key conflict driver is between farmers and herders; disputes and conflicts between individuals or small groups. This type of conflict is seasonal when either herders' animals damage crops or farmers expand their farms into traditional migration routes. Conflicts between individuals also take place between farmers over farmland boundaries, and between IDPs and Sheiks of land, who have allowed others to settle and cultivate the land.

When it comes to local conflict resolution mechanisms as an alternative to reporting incidents to the police, similarly low proportions report security incidents to the Native Administration or the conflict resolution committees that are headed by the Native Administration. Returnees (21%), nomads (19%) and respectively 11% and 10% of non-displaced and IDPs turn to the Native Administration for help. Satisfaction with how a conflict or issue was resolved was also low among Gereida locality residents, according to the survey findings. Only returnees (19%), non-displaced (13%) and respectively 10% and 9% of IDPs and nomads assessed the issue or problem reported to be 'effectively resolved and just'.

The Formal Joint Committee is seen as the most important conflict resolution mechanism by community members because all parties are represented and it is based on local norms, customs and traditions. However, the overall insecurity is a hindrance to the committee and Native Administration to mediate and impose their authority. Area-level informants highlight the necessity of building the capacity of the police, judiciary, Native Administration, rural courts, and committees to address conflict over land, plus setting up joint committees in each Administrative Unit. Community representatives also highlight the role of the communities in peacebuilding, and suggest advocacy and awareness-raising are needed; reminding farmers and nomads of the talique rules and to adhere to the Native Administration's decisions.

The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA): The peace agreement brokered in November 2020 specifically recognizes the Native Administration in relation to administering land, which may help strengthen this institution when it comes to land management and arbitration in disputes. The agreement also stipulates the establishment of the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, which is tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed land. The establishment of such commissions could help mitigate conflict over land and grazing in Darfur and potentially be a key tool in peacebuilding. The JPA presents an opportunity to address one of the root causes of the Darfur conflict, but experts warn that it may also contribute to a resurgence of violence. The right to restitution is not only awarded to individuals but also to communities that have a collective right to pursue restitution for communal property, villages, farms and traditional land. A particularly divisive factor is in regards to the land

rights of secondary occupants or 'newcomers', who will be displaced as a result of land restitution. In addition, nomad groups that have adopted an agro-pastoralist or fully sedentary way of life also require land for housing and farming but their requirements are currently not addressed in the agreement.

Water: Gereida locality is situated upon a deep underground water basin, yet many residents (42–49%) rely on the delivery of water by tanker trucks. Reportedly, many water points were destroyed during the conflict while others have fallen into disrepair and both insecurity, lack of funds and fuel to power the pumps mean that many pumps are out of service. 45–47% of IDPs and non-displaced plus 29/50 nomad households are satisfied with the supply of drinking water. Somewhat fewer returnees (39%) are satisfied with the amount of drinking water, which may reflect fewer operational water points in the return areas. Satisfaction with water available for livestock is lower across all groups (32–38%).

According to area-level informants, access to water is not regarded as a source of conflict, although the recent clashes between Falata and Masalit tribes were triggered over conflict over a water source. It is difficult to discern to what extent access to water was the root cause, or rather the spark that ignited the outbreak of violence as relations are tense between the two groups over land issues. In other contexts in Darfur and Sudan, water or WES committees have proven that they can play a key role in preventing and resolving conflict and even improve social cohesion when adhering to conflict-sensitive principles and following the participatory Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) approach.[187] Household survey findings show that 65% of non-displaced and 53% of returnees have access to a water committee, and even more IDPs (85%) as most camps have such committees. With regards to managing competing demands for water, non-displaced (39%), IDPs (43%) and 56% of returnees assess that their committee was able to 'effectively solve a problem and provide a just solution'. Notably, only four of the 50 nomad surveyed households had access to a water committee. Although the analysis only includes a small sample of nomad households, the findings do indicate that few nomads are served by a water committee. Thus, there is future potential for inclusion of all population groups with a view to better management of water—a natural resource that has the potential to escalate into tribal conflict 'as different user groups often represent ethnic groups who already have a history of violent conflict and mistrust'.[188]

Women and youth: Local conflict resolution mechanisms and committees do not to include women representatives. Survey results show that female-headed households, especially among IDPs, are less active in meetings on local affairs and reconciliation (51% of male-headed households attended reconciliation meetings, which is only the case for 36% of the female-headed households). Women account for half of the population in Gereida locality and are important conflict actors in their communities and have influence on peace outcomes. Hence, peacebuilding efforts will need to involve women's active participation.[189]

The majority of Gereida locality's population is young (56–61% below 20 years), but young people are also not included in conflict resolution mechanisms as they are considered not to have enough experience to act as mediators and adjudicators. In Gereida locality, youth-led committees and initiatives do exist, including the Resistance Committee and Service and Change Committee, which

[187] Corbijn, C. and Elamen, M.H.M. (2021) Technical paper on Integrated Water Resource Management and Peace in Sudan.
[188] Ibid.
[189] UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur

were set up during the uprising, but none appear to play a role in conflict resolution.[190] The proportion of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET) is relatively low in Gereida locality; 10–12% of non-displaced and returnee men, although somewhat higher for IDP young men (22%). 47% of IDP female youths (15–24 years) and 31–34% of female non-displaced and returnee youth are neither studying or working, but instead take care of their family and home. Although the NEET rate in Gereida locality is low in comparison to other PBF surveyed localities, there is still a risk that the young people that are not receiving training, education or gaining practical work experience will remain outside the labour market. In regard to peacebuilding, unemployment and poverty were found to be the main drivers for youths to join armed groups in Darfur according to a 2019 UNDP study.[191]

Peaceful co-existence and social cohesion: Non-displaced residents are very accepting and welcoming of returnees. 95% think they should be able to take on leadership positions and participate in decision-making on equal terms. A significant proportion of non-displaced households surveyed (three-quarters) have nomad friends, welcome nomads to partake in local activities and think they should have equal access to basic services. Significantly fewer (61%), however, think nomads should participate in decision-making. Similarly, the greater majority of IDPs (more than three quarters) feel overall welcome and accepted in the communities, but only 57% believe they are able to take part in local decision-making. The ability to actively take part in decision-making is imperative vis-à-vis building community cohesion and a cornerstone of peaceful coexistence.

Access to services is a challenge faced by all population groups, and therefore a development challenge. However, the survey findings show that the damrah population is particularly disadvantaged in regard to access to services. Respectively 11% and 3% of nomad boys and girls attend primary school, eight of 50 households have access to improved sources of drinking water, while none reported access to improved sanitation. 27/50 households tried to access healthcare during the previous six months prior to the survey, and the majority of them (25/27) faced obstacles relating to distance and costs.

The long-term processes of economic and political marginalization of Darfur by the central government in Sudan is well documented, and how this led to resentment and encouraged many to join the armed resistance, which in turn, led to war in 2003. The marginalization resulted in inequality and underdevelopment in the shape of poor education, healthcare, transport, and other services affecting *all* communities in Darfur, but not to the same extent.[192] That Darfuri pastoralist nomad communities were side-lined to an even greater extent through active and passive neglect of pastoralist groups, is perhaps a less known fact as it took place within the wider marginalization of Darfur and other peripheral regions.[193] The neglect of nomad pastoralists' rights to veterinary services, healthcare and education affected their relationship with sedentary communities and was a factor in

[190] Resistance Committees are informal neighbourhood grassroots committees that organized civil disobedience campaigns against the Bashir government in 2013 and played a key role in Sudan's revolution. The Bashir-era Popular Committees were dissolved by the Sudan Transitional Government and their mandate and assets have been transferred to local Change and Service Committees. Former members of the Popular Committees and supporters and associates of the former Bashir regime are barred from joining the new committees. Gizouli, M. (2020) Mobilization and resistance in Sudan's uprising: From neighbourhood committees to zanig queens. Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper.

[191] UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur.

[192] Young, H. and Osman, A. K. (2006) Challenges to peace and recovery in Darfur. A situation analysis of the ongoing conflict and its continuing impact on livelihoods.

[193] See for an in-depth study of marginalization of Darfuri pastoralist communities. The study specifically focuses on the Northern Rizaygat but many observations relate to other pastoralist communities as well. Young, H. et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.

the conflict. In the light of this history of marginalization, providing services to all Darfuri communities on an equitable basis will be an important factor for social cohesion between communities.

TO WHAT EXTENT ARE IDPs LOCALLY INTEGRATING?

Localized displacement: Displacement in Gereida is localized, as the majority of IDPs (89%) are displaced from within the locality. Despite not being significantly far away from their village of origin, 69% of IDP households report not having retained access to the same land as they farmed before displacement. However, it is still a significant proportion (24%) who are still accessing the same land despite displacement. This is the proportion of households who are also making regular trips to their place of origin mainly in order to farm the land and check on their property.[194] Looking at the IDPs who are not accessing their land from before displacement, almost half (49%) indicate that their land is 'unlawfully occupied' while the remaining refer to 'disputed ownership' and 'boundary conflicts'. Not being able to access land in the place of origin, is both an obstacle to durable solutions, and also to peacebuilding as disputes over land is often cited as unresolved conflict, discrimination and injustice.

Land tenure insecurity: In Gereida locality, there are two principal forms of tenure: ownership and rent. Among non-displaced, half (50%) own their agricultural land, while a significant proportion (37%) rents. Among IDPs, only 22% own their farming land,[195] while a large majority (71%) is renting.[196] Some of the IDPs are renting the land in their place or origin, while some are also found to own farmland in their current place of displacement; so even though it is more common to rent among returnees and even more so among IDPs, compared to non-displaced, renting as a tenure arrangement is not uncommon across all groups. Typically, the rent submitted amounts to one-tenth of the harvested crops. It is, however unclear, how these rental conditions might differ between groups and the extent to which paying rent affects the income of the household. Further exploration is needed to better understand to what extent renting is or is not a secure form of tenure across groups and thus could form part of a durable solution.

Conflict and insecurity: Feeling unsafe during daylight hours is highest among IDPs (15% vs. 2% among non-displaced) and the proportion among IDPs that feel unsafe during the night is very high—50% feel unsafe compared to 10% of non-displaced Gereida residents. Lack of safety is mainly reported by IDPs residing in camps.[197] Insecurity affects all population groups in Gereida locality and IDPs are reporting robbery and threats to a very similar extent as IDP returnees and only somewhat higher than non-displaced. Damage to property is actually reported least among IDPs (38% compared to 54% among non-displaced). Security is mainly a 'pull' factor: among the 26% of IDPs that prefer to leave, more than one-third report that lack of security is the main obstacle to returning. Thus, safety and security remain a key obstacle to their progress towards a solution, whether durable solutions take the form of local integration or return. Reporting security incidents to the Native Administration or the police is somewhat lower among IDPs. The majority (64%) do not report security incidents at all, while 10% report to the Native Administration and 16% to the police.

[194] 37% report having been back to their place of origin at least once in the 12 months preceding the survey.
[195] Among the households owning their agricultural land: 86% refer to land in the place of origin which they still farm, while the remaining 14% own land in their current place of displacement.
[196] 29% of the households renting their agricultural land are doing so in their place of origin.
[197] IDPs in camps feel to a greater extent very unsafe/unsafe (57%) compared to those outside of camps (24%).

Socio-economic situation of IDPs: When comparing the situation of IDPs with that of non-displaced households in terms of accessing services, IDPs are somewhat better off when it comes to improved water sources and improved sanitation, while access to education and health is very similar (see Annex 1 for all detailed results). Generally, access to health and education seems to be similar across the locality and any obstacles are thus less linked to displacement vulnerabilities and rather development-linked challenges. However, access to employment is lower among IDPs compared to non-displaced (38% of working-age IDPs work for profit or pay compared to 57% of non-displaced residents), indicating that economic integration is not yet on par with the non-displaced population. The vast majority of Gereida residents have experienced serious livelihood shocks during the year preceding the data collection including high food prices, COVID-19 restrictions and loss of employment or reduced income. Nevertheless, among IDPs, a somewhat lower proportion (26%) reports not having enough food during the week preceding the survey when benchmarked against the non-displaced population (31%).

Limited prospects for youth: NEET rates are higher among IDPs, as 22% of the male youth (15–24 years) and 47% of the female youth are neither working nor studying. The equivalent rates for non-displaced are: 10% of male youth and 34% of female youth. This can place them at risk of not finding a way to integrate and establish livelihoods in their current location. Limited livelihood options for IDP female youths will increasingly be a key obstacle for them to find a durable solution whether they return or stay in their current location.

Local participation and reconciliation mechanism: Overall, non-displaced communities are welcoming of IDPs and IDPs report feeling accepted (however, to a somewhat lesser extent than the return IDPs do). More than half of IDPs (57%) say that they can participate in decision-making, while a similar proportion (51%) report having taken part in a public meeting in the last six months, which is somewhat lower compared to the other surveyed groups and indicates that a considerable proportion of IDPs is not engaged in local decision-making, which is key for community cohesion and progress towards local integration. Participation is even lower when it comes to female-headed households, where 36% has attended a reconciliation meeting compared to 51% of the male-headed households. In comparison to other population groups, a bigger proportion of IDPs report having a water committee to manage access to water and mediate if disputes occur (85% compared to 65% of non-displaced).

IDPs' OWN PREFERENCES

Overall, the reported intentions show that the great majority (74%) intent to integrate locally, while one fourth (26%) intends to leave and primarily return to their place of origin within Gereida locality. When looking at the IDP in camps, the results show that a greater proportion wants to leave (29%) compared to the proportion among the IDPs residing in villages and towns (14%). The main reasons for preferring to stay in the current location include safety, family reasons and access to services. According to the latest HNO figures (2020), IDPs make up a very large proportion of the population in Gereida locality (79%), while returnees only 3%. The area-level information, based on key informant interviews and focus groups, highlights that the key factors influencing returns of IDPs include the overarching security situation and the ability to regain or negotiate access to land in place of origin, which so far has only been achievable for a small minority.

TO WHICH EXTENT ARE IDP RETURNEES RE-INTEGRATING?

It is important to state that IDP returnees have not achieved a durable solution merely based on their physical return. Their progress towards a durable solution in their place of origin needs to be assessed, as is done with the IDPs in displacement**.**

Regained access to land & livelihoods: IDP returnees have managed to a high degree (71%) to regain or retain access to the same agricultural land they cultivated before displacement. A somewhat larger proportion of IDP returnees are renting (49%), while fewer households own agricultural land (39%). Renting is a widespread tenure arrangement also among non-displaced; where half (50%) own their agricultural land and 37% rent. While it is not clear what the renting conditions are among returnees, and the extent to which these households also were renting prior to displacement, it can be concluded that a large proportion of returnees have established their most important livelihood source upon return. As indicated in the above section, it should be kept in mind, that only a minority of displaced households have been able to return to their villages of origin in Gereida locality. The survey data shows that most households returned more than 5 years ago. Specifically, 25% returned between 5 and 10 years ago, while 32% more than 5 years ago.

So, even though they have returned and have access to land, they have *not* overcome vulnerabilities linked to their displacement and key obstacles to achieving solutions persist. What are these main obstacles?

- **Safety and security:** IDP returnees report security incidents, including threats, robberies and damage to property, to a very similar extent as the non-displaced. 24% versus 21% of non-displaced residents experienced threats, 36% of IDP returnees in contrast to 33% of the non-displaced residents reported robberies, and lastly, 50% of returnees versus 54% of non-displaced residents reported damage to property and assets during the 12 months preceding the study. Safety and security affect all population groups in Gereida locality and thus remains a key obstacle to re-integration.

- **Access to services and food:** Access to improved water sources and sanitation as well as health is similarly low for the IDP returnees and the non-displaced. 27% of returnees and 24% of non-displaced have access to improved drinking water, 7% of returnees and 11% of non-displaced have access to improved sanitation, while access to skilled personnel during birth is respectively 10% and 13% for returnees non-displaced. Similarly, access to primary education is very similar between the two groups (and generally somewhat higher than in other localities): 54% of returnee primary school-aged boys versus 57% of non-displaced boys, and 53% of returnee girls compared to 62% of non-displaced girls. Lastly, food insecurity does affect both groups very similarly: 26% of IDP returnees did not have enough food in the 7 days prior to the survey, compared to 31% of non-displaced. In sum, access to services and food appears to be an area-level challenge with water, sanitation and health standing out as particularly low for all.

- **Prospects of youth**: 12% of male youth from returnee communities are neither working, in training or enrolled in education. This is only marginally lower than among the non-displaced population, which has a NEET ratio of 10% among male youths. 34% of returnee female youths are not working nor engaged in own-use farming, while also not in education or training. Although this is only marginally higher than for the non-displaced population (31%), it is of concern for all girls in both groups as it poses a risk to the prospect of the youth to continue to reintegrate, if they have no skills.

- **Local participation and reconciliation mechanisms:** Inter-group perceptions are positive between non-displaced and returnees. More than half of IDP returnees (59%) take part in community meetings and a similar proportion (56%) have taken part in a reconciliation meeting in the last six months. Both types of meetings have been attended by an only marginally lower percentage of non-displaced residents. Satisfaction with how local conflict resolution mechanisms address issues is similarly low among returnees and non-displaced. Lastly, the vast majority of IDP returnees feel welcome and included (90%) as well as able to take part in local decision-making (84%), indicating no great obstacles with regards to the social reintegration of returnees into their local communities.

DATA TO INFORM GOVERNMENT-LED AND COMMUNITY-DRIVEN PLANNING

The analysis points to specific displacement-linked obstacles that IDPs face in Gereida and upon return to their village of origin; these are linked primarily to the security situation and land tenure. The analysis also points to general development-linked obstacles that all population groups in Gereida locality are facing, such as the poor availability and capacity of basic services as well as employment prospects for youth. When diving into these obstacles to durable solutions, it is important to take into account, on the one hand, the capacities, skills and vulnerabilities of the populations – which vary not only by displacement status but also by age and sex. And on the other hand, the governance structure in Gereida, the existing community-based organizations and the wider peacebuilding process.

IDPs uprooted by conflict and displacement affected communities are not merely people in need of assistance, but dynamic actors who must not be left on the sidelines. Community-driven planning with displacement affected communities at the centre is key to finding solutions to displacement. This durable solutions analysis is an important step to inform priorities based on evidence-based analysis that builds on representative samples of the displacement affected population as well as key informant interviews with central stakeholders in Gereida. However, inclusion must go beyond ensuring that the realities of the communities are analysed. It is important that the engagement with communities continues, so as to work jointly on validating the results and translating these into recommendations and suggested actions.[198]

[198] In all other localities targeted, under the PBF for a durable solution and baseline analysis, the results were taken back to the different target groups, presented, validated and prioritized in order to inform the subsequent steps leading to community Action Plans for durable solutions. In Gereida, due to the delayed data collection caused by the insecurity, these final steps of the process have not yet taken place at the time of the report publication.

ANNEX 1: DURABLE SOLUTIONS INDICATOR OVERVIEW

DURABLE SOLUTIONS CRITERIA	KEY INDICATORS	Non-displaced	IDPs	IDP returnees
Long-term safety and security	HHs having experienced physical threats in the past 12 months	21%	29%	24%
	HHs having experienced robbery in the past 12 months	33%	36%	36%
	HHs having experienced damage of property/assets (incl crops) in the past 12 months	54%	38%	50%
	HHs having experienced security incident(s) who reported to police	23%	16%	19%
	HHs having experienced security incident(s) who reported to Native Administration	11%	10%	19%
	HHs having experienced security incident(s) who did NOT report at all	55%	64%	53%
	HHs having reported incident and reporting that issue was fairly resolved	13%	10%	19%
	Reported feeling of being safe/very safe when walking in the night- SDG indicator 16.1.4	89%	44%	77%
Adequate standart of living / access to basic services (health, education, water, sanitation, documentation)	HHs facing challenges when needing to access health services in the past 6 months	93%	89%	94%
	Births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) - SDG 3.1.2	13%	14%	10%
	Access to improved drinking water sources	24%	44%	27%
	Percpetion of drinking water being sufficient for the HH, the past summer	45%	47%	39%
	Access to improved sanitation facilities	11%	23%	7%
	Primary school attendance amongt boys - 6-13 years old	57%	60%	54%
	Primary school attendance amongt girls 6-13 years old	62%	54%	53%
	Men above 15 years of age who are litterate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	80%	79%	79%
	Women above 15 years of age who are litterate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	54%	53%	49%
	Men who own/qccess a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	56%	55%	54%
	Women who own/access a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	32%	31%	32%
Access to employment and livelihoods	HHs having NOT had enough food or money to buy food the week preceding the survey	31%	26%	26%
	HHs applying 'high coping' strategies based on the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI) - amongst the	2%	3%	6%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) working for profit or pay	64%	54%	51%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) working for profit or pay	50%	23%	38%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use production	13%	7%	20%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use production	15%	10%	20%
	Male youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	10%	22%	12%
	Female youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	34%	47%	31%
	HHs relying on crop farming as their main livelihoods source (whether for own use or selling)	76%	57%	75%
	HHs with access to agricultural land in current location	92%	76%	93%
	HHs with ownership/secure rights over agricultural land - SDG 5.a.1	50%	22%	39%
	HHs with ownership certificates amongst those who report owning land	15%	8%	10%
Access to documentation	Persons with birth certificate	15%	14%	11%
	Persons with national ID	76%	71%	75%
	Children under 5 years of age with a birth certificate - SDG 16.9.1	12%	12%	7%
Access to effective mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP)	Displaced HHs that access the same agricultural land as before displacement	n/a	24%	71%
	Displaced HHs that still have rights over the land in place of origin (out of those who do NOT access th	n/a	29%	23%
	Displaced HHs that have regained access to the same residential plot, as before displacement	n/a	n/a	80%
Civic participation in local community	Male headed HHs attended local reconciliation initiatives the past 6 months	42%	51%	50%
	Female headed HHs attended local reconciliation initiatives the past 6 months	37%	36%	46%
	HHs reporting presence of water commitees	65%	85%	53%
	Displaced HHs reporting they can participate in local decision making (linked to SDG 16.7.2)	n/a	57%	84%
	Non-displaced HHs reporting that nomads should be able to participate in local decision making	61%	n/a	n/a

ANNEX 2: DETAILED OVERVIEW OF SERVICES[199]

Primary education in Gereida locality

Village	School name	Teacher		Ratio	Student number		Fence	Seating seating for x % of students	Latrines
		Trained	Untrained		Male	Female			
									
Gereida Administrative Unit									
Gereida town	Al Faroug for boys	5	6	24	259	0	Local Materials	n/a	Traditional latrines
Gereida town	Al Garbia for Girls	4	6	38	0	379	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Al Huda for Girls	5	4	52	0	468	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Al Janobya for Girls	5	7	29	0	347	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Al Khansa for Girls	3	7	34	0	343	Fixed Materials	n/a	Traditional latrines
Gereida town	Al Manar for boys	4	5	61	552	0	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Al Manar forGirls	4	6	49	0	492	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Al Manhal for Girls	5	5	22	0	223	Local Materials	n/a	Traditional latrines
Gereida town	Al Mearaj for boys & Girls	5	6	53	308	277	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Al Misbah for boys	6	6	49	591	0	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Al Mojamah for boys	4	7	38	419	0	Fixed Materials	n/a	Traditional latrines
Gereida town	Al Namozajya for boys	6	9	19	292	0	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines

[199] Villages marked with a * are not included in the maps.

Gereida town	Al Salam for boys	4	5	42	375	0	Local Materials	n/a	Traditional latrines
Gereida town	Al Salam for Girls	4	5	40	0	357	Local Materials	n/a	Traditional latrines
Gereida town	Al Shamalya for Girls	4	6	26	0	258	Fixed Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Al Shargia for boys	5	5	21	210	0	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Al Shrkhya for boys & Girls	4	6	35	183	167	Local Materials	n/a	Traditional latrines
Gereida town	Al Tarbya for boys	6	5	43	473	0	Local Materials	n/a	Traditional latrines
Gereida town	Al Tarbya for Girls	4	7	41	0	453	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Al Wefag for boys	3	6	27	245	0	Fixed Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Babanosa for boys	6	5	38	420	0	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Babanosa for Girls	3	7	39	0	387	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Ibn Sinah for boys	3	6	49	439	0	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Ibn Sinah for Girls	3	6	41	0	372	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Gereida town	Um Alkhora for boys & Girls	5	7	46	258	295	Local Materials	n/a	Traditional latrines
Al Jokhana Administrative Unit									
El Jokhana	Al Salam for Girls	2	8	47	0	470	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
El Jokhana	Al Shargia for boys & Girls	2	7	32	151	135	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
El Jokhana	El Jokhana for boys	5	6	32	357	0	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
El Jokhana	El Jokhana for Girls	5	7	40	0	0	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines

El Jokhana	El Trkosha	3	8	21	235	0	Local Materials	n/a	Improved latrines
Dito Administrative Unit									
Dito	Al Mowaro for boys & Girls	5	2	13	45	49	No Fence	50%	Improved latrines
Dito	Dito for boys	4	6	18	179	0	No Fence	50%	Improved latrines
Dito	Dito forGirls	3	6	24	0	215	No Fence	50%	Improved latrines
Dito	Tyba for boys & Girls	5	3	13	61	43	No Fence	50%	Improved latrines
Dito	Um Taran for boys & Girls	4	4	23	102	79	No Fence	50%	Improved latrines
Dito	Al Mowaro for boys & Girls	5	2	13	45	49	No Fence	50%	Improved latrines
Dito	Dito for boys	4	6	18	179	0	No Fence	50%	Improved latrines

Health services in Gereida locality

Village	Active	Condition	Electricity	Clean Water	Latrines	Comment
						
Gereida Administrative Unit						
Graida	Active	New Building	yes	Yes	yes	62 medical staff and 75 midwifes
Um Blola	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Um Blola	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Abyad	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Dar Elsalam	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Towyel	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City

Jokhanaya	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Graida	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Eadan	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Hashaba	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Abdoose	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Sadoon	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Moved to Tulus locality
Al Jokhana Administrative Unit						
Sagor	Active	Local Materials	No	Yes	yes	
Mograna	Active	Local Materials	No	Yes	yes	
Gagy	Active	Old Building	No	Yes	yes	
Mowila	Active	Old Building	No	Yes	yes	
Dito Administrative Unit						
Um Teeran	Active	New Building	No	Yes	Yes	Working now from inside Gereida City
Sanam Elnaga	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Abou Jabra	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Mwaro	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City
Abou Lala	Not active	Destroyed	No	No	No	Working now from inside Gereida City

ANNEX 3: MAPS OF SERVICES[200]







[200] All maps are produced by SUDIA based on the service mapping in Annex 2.

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