DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the
Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan

Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding for the displacement-affected communities in

Nertiti locality, Central Darfur

August 2021

Suggested citation: PBF Sudan, DSWG Sudan, UNHCR, JIPS (2021). *Durable Solutions & Baseline Analysis: Key Obstacles to Durable Solutions and Peacebuilding for the Displacement-Affected Communities in Nertiti locality, Central Darfur.*

With special thanks to Margharita Lundkvist-Houndoumadi (JIPS), Therese Bjorn Mason (consultant to JIPS), Ola Samarah (JIPS) for the analysis and report preparation; Khadra Elmi (UNHCR/ DSWG) for strategic guidance/coordination and the in-depth reviews; Mirjam Kuschnitzki (SUDIA) for the analysis of the area level data and Ghazi Kunna (SUDIA) for the cartography. Profound recognition goes to the communities, who took part in the study and used the findings to identify their priorities, and the Locality and State level authorities for their time, participation, and leadership in the process.

Supported by:

United Nations Peacebuilding

Commissioned and led by:

UNHCR

With technical guidance by the PBF partners and the Durable Solutions Working Group Sudan:

UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency

UNDP Empowered lives. Resilient nations.

unicef

IOM UN MIGRATION

UN-HABITAT

FAO FIAT PANIS

Technical coordination, analysis and reporting:

JIPS informing solutions to internal displacement

Data collection:

IOM UN MIGRATION

UNDP Empowered lives. Resilient nations.

SUDIA

TABLE OF CONTENT

ABBREVIATIONS

DSWG Durable Solutions Working Group

CBM/CBRM Community-based management resolution mechanism/Community-based management

CBO Community-based organisation

GoS Government of Sudan

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IOM International Organisation for Migration

INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation

JIPS Joint IDP Profiling Service

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

SUDIA Sudanese Development Initiative

UN-HABITAT- United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WFP World Food Programme

UNAMID United Nations African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur

UNCT United Nations Country Team

KEY TERMS

Displacement affected communities: refers to displaced persons and the communities affected by their presence, such as host communities, communities in areas of return, or other areas where displaced persons are seeking a durable solution to their displacement.[1]

Displaced persons: refers to internally displaced persons, whether they are physically displaced or have returned to the place they lived prior to their displacement.

Durable solutions: a durable solution is achieved when displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. A durable solution can be achieved through return, local integration and resettlement.[2]

Durable solutions process: a community-based approach to durable solutions planning, based on durable solutions targets identified by displacement-affected communities at a decentralized level, in post-conflict or post-disaster settings.[3]

Durable solutions analysis: the purpose of a durable solutions analysis is to provide an evidence base to inform joint responses to displacement. It entails a systematic and principled process in line with the IASC Framework, including IDPs' perspectives and preferences for future settlement options, demographic profile, and the eight durable solutions criteria. The analysis focuses on the specific realities of the displaced populations, whilst making a comparison to the non-displaced populations and taking into account the broader macro environment.[4]

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: these principles are 30 standards that outline the protections available to internally displaced people (IDPs). They detail the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs: from the beginning of their forced displacement, to IDPs protection and assistance during displacement up to the achievement of durable solutions.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.[5]

IDP returnees/return IDPs: displaced persons that have returned to their place of origin.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs: the framework, endorsed by the IASC Working Committee in 2010, addresses durable solutions following

[1] The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.
[2] Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2010) IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, April 2010.
[3] The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.
[4] Ibid.
[5] UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.

conflict and natural disasters. It describes the key human rights-based principles that should guide the search for durable solutions.

Non-displaced persons: individuals who are not displaced (and may or may not be living in the same areas as displaced persons).

Peacebuilding: involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore a relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.[6]

Protracted displacement: a situation where IDPs and returnees have been displaced for a longer time period (5 years or more) and where they still have assistance needs linked to their displacement, and are not able to enjoy their human rights for reasons caused by their displacement.[7]

Refugees: individuals displaced outside their country of nationality or habitual residence as a consequence of generalized violence, conflict or well-founded fear of persecution.[8]

Resilience: refers to the ability of displacement-affected communities to absorb and recover from shocks (such as earthquakes, droughts, floods or conflicts), while positively adapting and transforming their structures and means of living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty.[9]

Return refugees: persons who have returned to their home country after seeking international assistance abroad. The home country is legally defined as the country of former habitual residence. It is usually their country of citizenship, but it may be that of their parents or grandparents, who fled many years ago, as many crises span several generations.[10]

[6] UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2010) UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation
[7] The Global Roster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (2018) The International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS).

INTRODUCTION

Three decades of war and unrest have dominated the Sudanese political and civil scene, but the ousting of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 has offered a window of opportunity for political transition in Sudan. In 2020, significant political gains were made towards achieving peace in Sudan with the signing of a peace agreement in Juba (South Sudan) between the power-sharing government and five key rebel groups.[11] The current signed peace agreement—a product of a Sudanese-led process—aims to address historically marginalized populations in Sudan's conflict zones. And it addresses root causes of conflict, such as issues of identity, marginalization, the relationship between religion and state, governance, resource-sharing, land issues and social justice

While the political and overall context in Sudan witnessed a historic shift in the last two years, the humanitarian and development aspects have been subject to a continuous and significant decline. Protracted and new displacements continue to be a major issue—as a result of decades of conflict and natural disasters, there are currently approximately 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country and 800,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries.[12] In the context of efforts to build a comprehensive peace and the ongoing UNAMID drawdown, in September 2019 Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok requested that Sudan be declared eligible for the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In his request, the Prime Minister asked that funding be made immediately available in the three priorities areas identified for Darfur; namely rule of law; durable solutions; and peacebuilding at the community level.

Durable solutions have to be an integral part of peacebuilding. Peace in Sudan cannot be divorced from durable solutions and thus must tackle the issue of conflict and protracted displacement in Darfur. 'There is much talk about peace, but you cannot talk about peace in Sudan in isolation from durable solutions for IDPs and the issues of land and compensation. Peace cannot be reached without addressing these issues.'[13] The Juba Peace Agreement regards solutions for IDPs as an important element of building peace and establishes durable solutions as a key priority. The agreement looks to resolve the consequences of conflict, such as the safe and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their original lands, whilst also paying attention to compensation, development and reconstruction. To support this, the peace agreement contains a protocol that deals with refugee and IDP return with specific attention paid to the situation in Darfur.

Just as durable solutions are integral to peacebuilding, lack of peace is often an obstacle to achieving solutions that are durable. Thus, solutions programming needs to identify the specific challenges and address them with suitable measures to mitigate them. The Juba Peace Agreement acknowledges these linkages and looks to addresses the root causes of conflict, such as issues of identity, marginalization, the relationship between religion and state, governance, resource-sharing, land issues and social justice.

IDPs living in protracted displacement can contribute to peacebuilding or be an obstacle. In other words, internally displaced persons are both peace and conflict actors. Displacement is highly political

[11] Despite the non-signature of two of the most important non-state Armed Groups—Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Al-Hilu faction and the Sudan Liberation Movement—Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), negotiations continue amongst the parties to join the final agreement.

[12] OCHA (2021) Humanitarian Needs Overview Sudan, December 2020.

[13] Donor representative quoted in Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

in Darfur and peacebuilding that includes IDPs and displacement affected communities are less likely to fail. Hence, peacebuilding and supporting durable solutions for IDPs must go together.[14]

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) portfolio involves programming in all of Darfur's five states that supports and underpins peace. The programme strategy recognises that durable solutions for IDPs, the rule of law and local conflict resolution are building blocks for peace but also interdependent. To build peace and support durable solutions for IDPs and returnees, PBF programming pays special attention to addressing the root causes of Darfur's conflict, creating a conducive environment for return and integration of IDPs, strengthening local conflict resolution mechanisms, peacebuilding capacities and the rule of law.

At the request of the Government of Sudan, an integrated political and peacebuilding mission, UNITAMS, has been established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2524 (2020). UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT partners are mandated to support Sudan in achieving a successful transition. UNITAMS has four strategic objectives.[15] The peacebuilding objective provides for support to the implementation of the peace process. It will sustain peace through legitimate and functioning State institutions that provide basic security, protection and services to the population with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

A JOINT ANALYSIS AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACH

The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) in Sudan has been a consistent forum championing joint durable solutions analysis to address protracted displacement. Commencing in 2017, the DSWG oversaw two durable solutions pilots respectively in rural Um Dukhun and two IDP camps situated on the outskirts of El Fasher in North Darfur. The working group followed up this work by commissioning a learning review of the pilots with input and feedback provided by all DSWG members.

The resulting 'lite' durable solutions toolkit and recommendations have provided the foundation and starting point for the PBF programme in Darfur.[16] The DSWG continues to play a strategic role by overseeing and coordinating the overall durable solutions work process and deliverables. In equal measures, the consultative process and the evidence produced need to support the wider humanitarian-development-peace work in Sudan.[17]

Darfur's internal displacement dynamics are complex. This demands that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors require a *shared* multi-sectorial analysis of the needs of the displacement-affected communities. Following the collaborative approach piloted in El Fasher, a particular emphasis has been placed on generating shared data and engaging all major stakeholders including IDPs, local and state authorities. Accordingly, the Peacebuilding Fund partners combined all data collection activities using *one* methodology approach and *one* coordinated data collection in eight localities across the five Darfur states—Tawilla, Assalaya, Yassin, Sheiria, Nertiti, Um Dhukun,

[14] Humanitarian Policy Forum, 2020, Policy Brief 77: Achieving Durable Solutions by including displacement-affected communities in peacebuilding.

[15] The four strategic objectives of UNITAMS under SCR 2524 (2020) are: (i) Assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace. (ii) Support peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements. (iii) Assist peacebuilding, civilian protection, and rule of law, in Darfur and the Two Areas. (iv) Support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

[16] Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

[17] Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) is co-chaired by UNHCR, UNDP and DRC. The working group is mandated to inform and advise, develop policy and coordinate work on durable solutions. DSWG is placing a strong focus on data and HLP issues with sub-working groups dedicated to these issues.

Gereida and Jebel Moon—where they are carrying out comprehensive, area-based joint peacebuilding programming.[18]

ACTORS

The DSWG is central to the Durable Solutions Analysis and Baseline process—it not only oversees the durable solutions analysis process and coordinates work streams but also guarantees data has visibility with government authorities as well as the broader humanitarian and development community in Sudan to be used for planning and programming at the locality level and feed into national policy. Support from the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) was requested by the DSWG to develop the methodology approach and indicators for both the survey and area-level analysis as well as to conduct the analysis of the results, all in a consultative manner. Remote support and expertise plus Khartoum deployment of a JIPS technical adviser has given quality assurance and provided technical support to field operations and built capacity for the teams deployed in Darfur.

The PBF projects are implemented by UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, UN-Habitat and FAO. The partners have actively taken part in designing the methodology by offering thematic expertise and on-the-ground knowledge of the Darfur localities to develop the indicators and data collection tools. Partners have also been key to raising awareness at the village and locality level, assisting with the training of enumerator teams and trouble-shooting with challenges at the field level in Darfur.

IOM managed all components and stages of the household survey including pre-fieldwork missions, training of enumerators, and operational management of the field data collection. Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA), an experienced national NGO, has been leading the area-level data collection and analysis. Tasks included development of the qualitative tools, training of interviewers, and identification of respondents in all localities before implementing the key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

PROCESS OVERVIEW

- Methodology approach and objectives shaped with PBF agencies and the DSWG
- Indicators for population and area-level developed and agreed
- Survey tools and qualitative tools developed and reviewed by partners and experts
- Sampling approach designed
- Testing of the survey tool
- Pre-field work missions to inform sampling and sketch target villages
- Training of field teams in all states and pilots
- Data collection: survey and area-level (December 2020 and January 2021)
- Data analysis of survey results and area-level results jointly, including several thematic consultations with PBF agencies, DSWG and experts for validation
- Locality level report with the Durable Solutions Analysis and Baseline finalised
- Community consultations in the Locality with each target group to validate results and prioritise obstacles to solutions
- Next: Workshops at Locality level to review results and develop a community Action Plan

[18] Making use of a single methodology and joint data collection in all eight localities also sought to mainstream indicators and allow for a holistic analysis to avoid overburdening communities.

OBJECTIVES OF DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

The durable solutions and baseline analysis exercises in each of the target localities in Darfur aim to:

- Provide the foundation for an analysis of displaced and non-displaced populations' progress towards durable solutions (incl. IDPs, IDP returnees, return refugees and nomads), as an integral element to the peacebuilding process.
- Inform PBF programming and durable solutions Action Plan development in each Darfur target locality.
- Provide the baseline of the agreed-upon PBF outcome indicators for measuring programme impact at a later stage.
- Inform broader Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP) programming beyond the PBF.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The methodology approach was developed based on consultations with the PBF agencies and the DSWG and was strongly shaped by the learning that emerged from the durable solutions analysis conducted in El Fasher in 2019.[19] JIPS consolidated the combination of methods and made sure that agency programming needs, as well as the durable solutions analysis needs, were met. The indicators,[20] the household survey tool, the key informant interview questions and the joint analysis plan, were reviewed in several rounds by all PBF agencies, relevant technical experts and local partner SUDIA.

TARGET GROUPS & LOCATIONS

The Nertiti household survey targeted eight settlements.[21] The target groups and locations were identified by UNICEF, as the PBF lead agency in Central Darfur in coordination with the authorities at the locality level. The data collection covered four target groups: IDPs that have returned to their village of origin (IDP returnees), IDPs living in camps and villages, non-displaced residents and, lastly, nomads residing in damrahs.

A MIXED METHODS METHODOLOGY

Both primary qualitative and quantitative data inform the analysis of progress towards durable solutions on the locality level presented in this report. The approach consists of both a sample-based household survey and area-level key informant interviews. The survey data has been used to produce socio-economic population profiles for each target group at the locality level to conduct a comparative analysis between the groups.

The area-level data collection included a total of 19 key informant interviews (KIIs) targeting respondents at the state and the locality level: four KIIs took place with representatives of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Production in Zalingei. On the locality level KIIs were conducted with five basic service representatives (education, health, police, judiciary, WES) as well as four KIIs with local government and native administration and 5 community members including nomads, women, IDPs and youth as well as a representative of the Peace Code Organization working in Nertiti locality. The qualitative data collection took place in December 2020. Analysis of the interviews and focus groups discussion focused on the context at the locality level concerning issues such as land and resource management, conflict resolution mechanisms, service provision, rule of law and civic participation.

SAMPLING APPROACH

The sampling followed a stratified multi-stage sampling approach in which villages were the primary sampling unit (PSU) and households were the secondary sampling unit (SSU), while stratification was

[19] UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

[20] The PBF indicators were based on: technical lessons from the interagency durable solutions profiling in El Fasher, the PBF Results Framework plus the Interagency Durable Solutions Indicator Library. https://inform-durablesolutions-idp.org/

[21] Target villages and camps in Nertiti include: Kurifal, Fugo, Guldo villages & camp, Waranga-Debanga, Thur, Mali, Domo, Saganga, Kor Ramla (Damrah).

done by target group. A random sample of households was then selected either based on systematic skips or systematic snowballing. Data collection took place in January 2021.

Looking at the gender distribution of the respondents to the survey; it is observed that 27% were male and 73% were female. By target group the distribution varies: women make up 80% of respondent among non-displaced, 82% of respondents among IDPs, 68% of respondents among IDP returnees, and 54% of respondents among nomads.

TABLE 1: POPULATION BASELINE FOR TARGET LOCATIONS UNDER THE PBF AND SAMPLES (TARGET AND ACHIEVED) BY TARGET GROUP IN NERTITI

Target group	Population baseline[22]	Target sample	Collected sample (individuals)	Collected sample (HHs)
Non-displaced	26,297	406	2,121	426
IDP-returnees	4,200	358	2,119	425
IDPs[23]	11,500	377	1,694	375
Nomads in damrahs	3,213	365	1,045	229

SAMPLING LIMITATIONS & SPECIFICATIONS

Following limitations and specification should be kept in mind when reading the analysis:

- The sampling is designed to produce results representative for each target group in the selected geographic scope within the locality. Analysis at the village/town/camp level is not possible, and therefore no reference to specific settlements or breakdown by villages, towns or camps is done in the report. Generalisation to the whole of Nertiti locality is also not possible without the required weights to adjust to the total population size of each target group in the locality.

- The achieved sample size for nomads was somewhat less than the targeted (229 HHs versus 365 HHs) due to the limited presence of nomads in Nertiti locality during the data collection.[24]

[22] Population baseline estimates for the target locations were provided in August 2020 by UNICEF as the lead PBF agency in Central Darfur.
[23] The sample of IDPs is distributed between Guldo village (N=214 HHs) and Guldo camp (N=161 HHs).
[24] According to UNICEF, this was also connected to demands by local communities to remove new settlers from their lands, which led to the government evacuating settlers to the capitals of South and Central Darfur states in July 2020.

DISPLACEMENT HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

What is the general demographic profile of the target populations (IDPs, IDP returnees, non-displaced and nomads) and what is the displacement history of the IDPs? What will this information help us understand? The basic demographics and the displacement history will be used to understand the key characteristics of the target populations—of both displaced and non-displaced inhabitants. Breaking the population data into smaller sub-populations based on basic demographics such as sex, age, location, capacities, vulnerabilities and displacement characteristics, makes it possible to discern how different sub-groups within each target group are faring in comparison, thereby acknowledging that each target group is not a homogeneous entity.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **IDPs overwhelmingly originate from Nertiti locality (96%),[25] and most have maintained a connection to their place of origin: 30% have been back once, 35% have been back two times and 13% have been back three times during the past 12 months to cultivate land or to check on their land or dwelling.**
- **Most IDP returnees have been in their current location between 5 and 10 years (43%) and 1 to 5 years (42%).**
- **Overall, the population in Nertiti locality is very young. 58% (non-displaced), 56% (IDPs), 55% (returnees) and 60% (nomads) are below the age of 20 years.**
- **There is a significant proportion of female-headed households amongst all groups—IDPs (38%), non-displaced (35%), returnees (30%) and nomads (25%).**
- **Literacy is lower among nomad communities as 59% of men and 21% of women can read and write. Literacy is considerably higher for men across all groups; with literacy rates around 80–85 % for men, and around 50% for females (among sedentary groups).**
- **Approximately one-third of households across target groups have a high age- dependency ratio meaning there is a heavier burden placed on working-age members to provide for dependent members of the household. Also, it is common among all groups to have a household member, who is away mainly due to working elsewhere for more than 6 months per year: among the non-displaced population, IDP returnees and nomads (20%), and among IDPs (15%).**

CENTRAL DARFUR—NERTITI LOCALITY

Nertiti is a town in Central Darfur that is surrounded by the Jebel Marra mountains. It is situated along the main route linking Nyala, Zalengei and El Geneina. Central Darfur State was created in 2012 as part of implementing the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The state is comprised of 9 localities; Nertiti, Um Dukhun, Zalengei, Azoum, Wadi Salih, Mukjar, Bendisi, Rokero and Golo. Nertiti locality is a fertile agricultural area inhabited by sedentary farmers primarily from the Fur tribe but other tribes also live in the towns and surrounding villages including Zaghawa and Berno. Pastoralist nomads live in semi-permanent settlements named damrahs; they are mainly Salamat, Rizeigat, Shatia but also some belonging to the Nawaiba, Jallo, Mahria, Erigat and Awlad Ziad. Livelihoods are mainly

[25] IDPs were captured in Guldo village and Guldo camp.

dependent on crop agriculture, animal resources, trade and mining. Three key migratory routes run through Nertiti locality; all starting from the north, one route ends in Um Dukhun, another goes to Chad while the third route ends in Central Africa.[26]

Conflict in Darfur has often been presented to be between 'Arab' against 'African' tribes, however, it is not necessarily a helpful lens to view the conflict because present-day identities 'operate within a system of perceptions' that are largely ideological distinctions.[27] And such distinctions can move attention away from the political nuances of the conflict. The conflict in Darfur has been characterised by allegiances to and splits from the previous regime in Khartoum, plus a number of splits within the main rebel factions that, in turn, have become smaller splinter groups and party to the conflict. As one recent Darfur conflict analysis states, 'one many occasions 'Arab' groups also fought each other. Indeed, many 'Arab' communities abstained from taking part in the government of Sudan's counterinsurgency against the rebels in which civilians from rbel groups' communities were targeted. [And] this generalisation falls short of explaining why some militias that are associated with the 'Arab' identity are currently in alliance with SLA-AW in Jebel Marra'.[28]

Central Darfur has continued to experience significant armed conflict. The Darfuri rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Army – Abdulwahid (SLM-AW) has a strong presence in the Jebel Marra mountains. The SLA-AW operates in the Jebel Marra area that covers Rokiro, Golo and Nertiti locality and the area is considered a conflict hotspot. Since the breakout of conflict in 2003, the fighting between the central government and the SLA resulted in widespread displacement. In 2016, the area saw intense fighting between the Sudan Armed Forced (SAF) and the SLA-AW, which caused significant displacement of civilians from across the Jebel Marra massif, which straddles North Darfur, Central Darfur and South Darfur states.[29] After the drawdown of UNAMID from other Darfur states in 2018, the Jebel Marra plateau became the focus of UNAMID's mandate, and the remaining mission moved its headquarters from El Fasher (North Darfur) to Zalengei in Central Darfur.

In the last three years, the security situation relatively improved due to a peace agreement between several SLA-AW factions and the government. The improvement in the security situation since 2018 in turn led IDPs to return to Nertiti and other localities in Central Darfur.[30] In 2019, the central government and SLA-AW also signed a ceasefire, but the SLA-AW rebel group has still not signed the Juba Peace Agreement and hence a more permanent settlement has not yet been reached. There is widespread insecurity and regular clashes between SLA-AW forces and the SAF, which are reported to often result in retaliation and civilians suspected of collaborating with either of the forces are targeted. Clashes also continue between two different factions of the SLA-AW respectively led by Mubarak Aldouk and Salih Borsa for territorial control and because of disputes over small-scale peace agreements and on how to engage with GoS.

During the last couple of years, attacks on civilians in Central Darfur have taken place regularly and put to the fore the question of the planned UNAMID withdrawal from the region.[31] The rule of law is weak and the area is characterised by general lawlessness. The SLA-AW engage in cattle rustling

[26] Nertiti, Central Darfur, key informant interview.
[27] Prunier, G. (2005) Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide.
[28] Danish Refugee Council (2020) Conflict analysis, Central Darfur, Sudan.
[29] OCHA reported that access in Central Darfur was very limited at the time with humanitarian actors excluded from verifying displacement figures including in Nertiti, Thur Boori/Wadi Boori. OCHA (2016) Jebel Marra Crisis: Fact Sheet, March 2016.
[30] UNDP (2019) Building peace stone by stone in Golo, Darfur's hitherto inaccessible area.
[31] ARC (2020) Sudan: Country Report, UK: Asylum Research Centre.

mostly targeted the northern Reizegat who frequently retaliate by attacking IDPs and sedentary farming communities.

Since early 2019, there has been an increase in reported GBV targeting women and girls, who are particularly vulnerable as they fetch water and firewood and mostly depend on natural resources for their livelihoods. In June 2020, a sit-in in Nertiti demanded justice and security after recent looting and killings. Reportedly thousands of IDPs from across Darfur travelled to Nertiti to show their support and demand an end to violence and attacks by the militias.[32]

BASIC POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLE

Nertiti locality has a population of 277,000 and hosts a total of 70,752 IDPs.[33] The targeted locations in Nertiti locality for the survey were identified by the PBF lead agency in Central Darfur together with the local authorities based on the programmatic scope of the fund.[34] Therefore, the samples captured by the target groups are not necessarily representative of each target group across the locality. Specifically, *the* vast majority of both returnees and non-displaced locations captured are urban (83% of non-displaced households and 96% of IDP returnee households). The IDPs were captured in the camp and town of Guldo. All surveyed nomad households resided in damrahs—temporary settlements that nomads use. The population estimates for the targeted locations in Nertiti are as follows: 26,297 non-displaced persons, 11,500 IDPs, 4,200 IDP returnees and 3,213 nomads residing in damrahs.[35]

It is worth noting that classifications are helpful tools, but that it is important to be aware of the conceptual limitations they impose. Nomads and pastoralism are generally viewed in opposition to crop farming and sedentary livelihoods, and further complexity follows from the fact that in Sudan the words 'nomad' and 'pastoralism' refer to an economic activity as well as a cultural identity, whilst in reality, the two do not always overlap. Defining nomads against the rural sedentary population can have a number of conceptual consequences; mobility becomes the defining feature of what it means to be nomadic; it creates a contrast between mobility and sedentary so that people can either belong to one classification or the other. Also, by defining nomads based on tribal identity (from the 1970s onwards),[36] 'the classification excludes in principle that people can move across the categories: people belonging to a 'nomadic' tribe remain 'nomads' even if they settle. The definition of 'nomads' in relation to both mobility and tribe institutionalizes the confusion between economic practices and cultural identity.'[37] In this study, the surveyed households residing in damrahs may not all be viewed as nomadic if considered by their actual strategies of production; better definitions could include agro-pastoralist or semi-nomadic to describe the population. Environmental factors and the conflict in Darfur have demanded flexibility and dynamic adaptation from all population groups, and the

[32] Salih, Z. M (2020) Darfur protesters call for action to end attacks on civilians by armed militias, The Guardian, 8 July, 2020.
[33] UN Peacebuilding Fund (2019) project document for Central Darfur.
Estimates for IDP returnees and nomads were not available.
[34] See the methodology section in the introduction chapter for details on target locations and baseline population figures for the targeted geographic scope.
[35] Provided by UNICEF as the lead agency in Central Darfur. The listed figures provided the baseline for the sampling; see methodology for more details.
[36] In Sudan, the 1955–56 census defined nomads (rohal) by their practice of mobile livestock keeping. But in the 1973 and 1983 census, 'nomads' were no longer defined by their lifestyle but by administrative categorisation that associated them with a northern identity: a person owing allegiance to a nomadic sheik. Hence 'nomads were in practice defined on an administrative bases rather than by empirical observation. Krätli et al. (2013) Standing Wealth: Pastoralist Livestock Production and Local Livelihoods in Sudan.
[37] Ibid.

inflexibility embedded in the classification will not always be adequate if used as an analytical tool for informing livelihoods and economic development interventions.

The household survey shows that the demographics characteristics are similar among the target population groups in Nertiti; non-displaced, IDP returnees, IDPs, and nomads living in damrahs. The population in Nertiti locality is overall young—the proportion of persons below the age of 20 years is respectively 58% (non-displaced), 56% (IDPs), 55% (returnees) and 60% amongst nomads. 24–26% in all groups are aged between 20 and 39 years, while older people above the age of 40 years make up a little less than 20% of the population.[38]

When it comes to gender distribution, the proportion of men and women is fairly even. Among the non-displaced population, 47% are men and 53% women and among IDPs, 49% of men and 51% women. Among returnee and nomad communities, there are slightly more men (51%), and 49% women. The number of female-headed households is also quite high in Nertiti—about a third of households are headed up by a woman. The proportion is highest amongst IDP households as 38% of households are female-headed, whilst the proportion is lower amongst non-displaced (35%), returnees (30%) and lowest among nomads (25%).

The size of the households is similar for all of the surveyed groups; a majority (63–68%) of households are made up of 1–5 family members although the proportion is lower among IDP returnees as 54% of households consist of 1–5 members. Among the returnee population, there is a somewhat higher proportion of households with 6–9 members (40%), whilst 30% among non-displaced, 36% among IDPs and 26% among nomads are households with 6–9 family members.[39]

To gain a more complete picture of household vulnerability, the household survey also recorded whether any family members were disabled. Between 2–5% report having a disability that stops them from ‘coping with all the things they need to’. Among IDPs and returnees, more men report having a disability by 1–3 percentage points, whilst among nomads, and equal proportion of men and women have a disability (2%). Among the non-displaced more women (4%) say they are disabled compared to men (3%). As is not unusual, there is a higher proportion of people living with a disability amongst the older generation. Those that report a disability say that it is ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ difficult to cope indicating that their life is impacted significantly.

Literacy rates are used to gauge literacy skills, which span a range of proficiencies. Literacy, the ability to read and write amongst those above 15 years of age, is significantly higher for men. Among all the groups, literacy is considerably higher among men, by 32–38 percentage points. Furthermore, literacy rates are considerably higher for sedentary farming residents compared to the nomadic pastoralist communities, as 80–85% of sedentary farming men are literate compared to 59% among nomadic men. And approximately half of the women in sedentary communities are literate compared to 1/5 among nomadic pastoralists. Interestingly, those between 40–60 years have lower literacy rates than the older generation. For example, for men below 40 years about 70% of all groups are literate and 40% nomad men. For men above 60 years, around 60% are literate and 40% of nomads. In contrast, the generation of men between the age of 40 and 60 years, only 40–45% of men can read and write and it is also lower among nomad men (21%).

[38] Persons above the age of 40 years, make up respectively 17% (non-displaced), 19% (returnees), 17% of IDPs and 15% of nomads.
[39] Only a very small proportion of households have ten and above family members; non-displaced (4%), IDPs (1%), returnees and nomads (6%).

FIGURE 1: LITERACY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 15 YEARS OF AGE AND ABOVE



The age-dependency ratio is used to understand the pressure on the working-age population (15–65 years) to provide for the dependent family members: children 14 years or younger and adult family members above the age of 65 years.[40] The findings show that approximately among one-third households, there is a heavier burden placed on working-age members to provide for the family, meaning that the working age members expected to provide for the household are less than then dependent members.[41] Among nomadic communities in Nertiti, a higher proportion of households are under extra stress as 38% of family units have a dependency ratio greater than 1.

It is common for households to have at least one household member, who is away for more than 6 months per year, primarily for work purposes (and fewer cases for education or other reason). The proportion of households with a member away is 20% among the non-displaced population, the IDP returnees and nomad, while among the IDPs it is somewhat lower (15%). A considerable number of household members, who are working elsewhere are women. Among the non-displaced population, 54% of those who are away because of work are women, and among the IDP returnee population, 37% are women, followed by 32% among the IDPs. In nomad communities, there is a clear majority of men among those working elsewhere (80%).

DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION HISTORY

The surveyed **IDPs** overwhelmingly originate from Nertiti locality (96%), whilst only 4% were displaced from Golo, also situated in Central Darfur. The household survey shows that a majority of IDPs have lived in their current location between 5 and 10 years (43%) and between 1 and 5 years (42%). Only 14 of IDPs have lived more than 10 years in their current location, and none for less than a year. Examining the connection of IDPs to their place of origin, the majority of IDPs make regular trips back to their place of origin.[42] 30% have been back once, 35% have been back two times and 13% have been back three times during the past 12 months to cultivate land or to check on their land or dwelling.

The household survey also looked at the duration of return among the **IDP returnees**. Hardly any IDPs arrived during the last year (5%). Returnees arrived back 5–10 years ago (42%) and only marginally more (47%) between 1 and 4 years previously. Only a very small minority of IDP returnees (7%) relocated back to their place of origin more than 10 years ago.

[40] It is the ratio of those not in the labour force (children below 15 years and adults older than 65 years) in relation to the working-age population (15–64 years); the higher the ratio, the greater the pressure is on the working-age members to provide for the dependent family members.
[41] Among non-displaced residents, the proportion is 35% of households that have more strain placed on the working-age members to support dependent members, while this is 28% among IDPs and 33% among IDP returnees.
[42] Only 4% have never gone back to visit.

The survey also looked at **nomads**' movement patterns. The vast majority of nomad households (66%) had stayed in another settlement in Nertiti before arriving in their current damrah. 14% had arrived from Kebkabiya north of Nertiti and another 5% from Kass situated south of Nertiti.

LIVELIHOODS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES

Access to livelihoods is a key factor for local integration—durable solutions for IDPs and IDP returnees require access to employment and livelihoods akin to that of the non-displaced population; while often livelihoods of all displacement and conflict-affected populations are impacted. Considering in more detail households' sources of income and coping strategies provides a more nuanced picture and a better understanding both of particular vulnerabilities as well as of the livelihood opportunities. Sustainable livelihoods and access to required resources is a key challenge in post-conflict settings and an important element to post-conflict redevelopment.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Among sedentary population groups, the main livelihood for the great majority is crop farming; 81–82% of non-displaced and returnees but to a lesser extent IDPs (70%). Among nomads, 14% rely on crop farming as their main livelihood and 64% on livestock.**
- **A significant proportion among sedentary farming communities (35–40%) states that they have no secondary livelihoods source, but for many collecting and selling wood is an important additional source of income (32–37%).**
- **Overall, the proportion working for profit or pay is much higher among men compared to women across all groups. Only 7–10% among women work for profit or pay. Subsistence farming is much higher among women, as 27–33% of men work in 'own-use' production in comparison to 33–39% of women except for nomads—a higher proportion of men (46%) practise 'own-use' production in comparison to women (33%).**
- **The survey data shows that that among those who work for profit or pay, firewood collecting and grass cutting for selling are the main industries of paid work among the sedentary farming communities—grass cutting is an industry dominated by women.**
- **Many report being under-employed; between 50% and 60% among the sedentary population groups are looking for more work—with no significant difference by sex or age—and amongst nomads, about 30% report that they are looking for additional work.**
- **A large proportion of female youth (15–24years) are outside of the labour force (70–83% across the groups), more than half report studying while the remaining are mainly taking care of their home and family. Among young nomad women outside the labour force the vast majority (82%) report taking care of the home and only 10% to be studying.**
- **A high proportion of male youths are outside of the labour force (78–86%) while this is case for only 40% for nomad male youths. The vast majority of young men outside the labour force report studying.**
- **High proportions of female youths (34–37%) are neither in education, employment nor training especially female youths from nomadic communities.**
- **All respondents identity high food and fuel prices as shocks to their livelihood and 71–79% of sedentary population groups and 59% of nomads say that it was the most significant shock they faced during the last 12 months.**
- **Violence, raiding, looting, robbery or assault was a shock experienced by all groups, but more by IDPs and returnees (44–45%) compared to nomads and non-displaced residents (35–36%).**
- **Higher proportions of IDPs and IDP returnees are food insecure (72%), and did not have enough food the 7 days preceding the survey, compared to the non-displaced (65%) and**

nomad (39%) population. However, practically no households used 'high' coping mechanisms. Food insecurity is found to a higher extent among households that have experienced raids/attacks on property and is very prevalent among households that report not having a secondary source of income but rely exclusively on crop farming.

MAIN LIVELIHOOD SOURCES

Agriculture is central to people's livelihoods. The household survey shows that a majority amongst the sedentary communities rely on crop farming as their source of income. Among the non-displaced and returnee population respectively 82% and 81% rely on crop farming, while this is true for somewhat fewer IDPs (70%). Among nomad communities, the majority rely on livestock (64%), but 14% report relying on crop farming as their main source of livelihood.

A higher proportion of IDPs (19%) rely on a salary or wage compared to IDP returnees (15%) and non-displaced residents (13%). Only a very small percentage rely on aid as their main source of income; 5% of IDPs and only 2% of non-displaced and 1% of returnee households. Among the nomad communities, nobody relies on aid, and they have more diverse income streams. Besides livestock (64%) and crop farming (14%), 7% rely on wages and another 7% on petty trading.

Among nomads, only 28% report having no secondary source of income, while 18% points to crop farming and 17% to livestock rearing as their secondary livelihood. Among the sedentary farming communities, non-displaced (40%), returnees (37%) and IDPs (35%) say that they have no additional second source of income. However, collecting and selling wood is an important secondary source of income for many; non-displaced (32%), IDPs (37%) and returnees (33%). Among the IDP and returnee population, 11% also rely on a wage or salary to top their income, whilst 11% only amongst IDPs say they depend on aid in addition to their main source of income.

FIGURE 2: MAIN SOURCE OF LIVELIHOODS FOR HOUSEHOLDS



Considering differences between male and female-headed households, the findings show that it is mainly female-headed households that rely on aid as their main income source. IDP (8%), non-displaced (4%) and IDP returnee (2%) of female-headed family units depend on aid as their main livelihood source, compared to only 1–3% among male-headed households across the groups. Considerably fewer female-headed households among sedentary groups rely on wages or salaries

(7–8%), compared to male-headed households (17–26%), while a higher proportion of female-headed households rely on crop farming by 3–7 percentage points.[43]

MAIN OCCUPATION: EMPLOYMENT AND 'OWN-USE' FARMING

Overall, the proportion working for profit or pay is much higher among men compared to women across all groups. Only 7–10% among women work for profit or pay, whilst the proportion rises to 30–34% exception for IDP returnee men amongst whom 22% work for profit or pay. Subsistence farming is much higher among women, as 27–33% of men work in 'own-use' production in comparison to 33–39% of women.[44] The exception here is among the nomad population, where a higher proportion of men (46%) practise 'own-use' production in comparison to women (33%).

Looking in more detail at the main occupation by age group, the data shows that among the population aged 25–64 years that work profit/pay the difference between men and women increases. Among women in this age group, a low proportion of non-displaced (13%) and returnee (10%) women work for profit/pay in contrast to 43–44% of non-displaced and returnee men. For IDPs and nomads, this trend is a little less pronounced, as 8–10% of women work for profit or pay in comparison to 29–33% of men from these two population groups.

FIGURE 3: MAIN ACTIVITY OF WORKING-AGE POPULATION (15–64 YEARS) BY SEX



Among those that work for profit or pay, similar proportions among returnees and non-displaced work in crop farming; respectively 11% and 13% for men and for women 15% and 17%. Among the IDP population, this is somewhat lower as 8% of men and women work in crop agriculture for profit or pay. The survey data shows that among those who work for profit or pay, firewood collecting and grass cutting for selling are the main industries of paid work among the sedentary farming communities.[45] Especially for women from sedentary communities, grass cutting is an important industry, as 43% of non-displaced, 36% of IDP and 29% of returnee women working for profit/pay are making their living

[43] Among nomadic pastoralists, there is much less of a difference between male and female-headed households when it comes to salaried or waged labour: 7% of male-headed and 5% of female-headed households.
[44] Subsistence farming and 'own use' production refer to those who do not sell their produce at all.
[45] Firewood collection is important industry for both men and women from sedentary communities. Amongst IDPs, men (29%) and women (28%) who work for profit or pay make a living from collecting firewood. Among displaced, 25% and 11% of respectively men and women also work in firewood collecting and so do 14% of returnee men and 29% of returnee women.

from cutting grass. For all population groups, the private sector is also important; 24% among men from nomadic communities and 33–38% from sedentary communities work in the private sector. Notably, the public sector is a significant employer for men from nomadic communities, as it employs 26% in contrast to 5–9% of men from sedentary communities.

UNDER-EMPLOYMENT

Considering under-employment provides a better grasp of people's employment circumstances. For example, are those who are working searching for more work? Looking for additional work could indicate that people's current work is not providing enough income to support the household. And looking closer at how much people are working can expose whether people are only working part-time or during certain months of the year. Between 50% and 60% among the sedentary population groups are looking for more work—with no significant difference by sex or age. Amongst nomads, about 30% report that they are looking for additional work.

All population groups point to the same obstacle to finding work (or more work); irregular or lack of work opportunities in addition to inadequate or lack of skills. Survey respondents also flag a lack of information about the local labour market. Among the sedentary communities in Nertiti, several skills are highlighted and requested by male household members including carpentry (10–15%), masonry (16–21%), welding (10–13%), handicrafts (9–10%), and lastly agricultural skills (25–37%). Women from sedentary communities are looking for a shorter range of skills namely handicraft (54–58%) and agricultural skills (30–33%). For nomads, livestock extension skills including breading are regarded as important as 63% of men and 53% of women are looking for such skills. Women from nomad communities also request knowledge and competencies in handicraft production. There is also no availability of micro-credit schemes providing small-scale loans to help individuals become self-employed or grow a business.[46]

The household survey found that a high proportion of households own a mobile phone. Mobile phone ownership is higher amongst men (ranging from 28% to 50% among the different groups), whereas among women only 8–20% among the different groups own a mobile phone. Mobile phone ownership is overall lower among the IDP population with 8% of IDP women and 28% of IDP men report owning a mobile. 38–40% of non-displaced and returnee men have a mobile phone, but the population group with the highest proportion of mobile phone ownership is the nomads. 50% of men from nomadic communities own a mobile phone. A recent ILO report on East Darfur point out that mobile phone could make it easier for businesses and cooperatives to reach markets at the regional, state and potentially at the national level. Also, the Bank of Khartoum has launched a mobile money service (MBok) that has the potential to provide access to banking services despite the absence of financial services providers. With regards to developing skills, repairing mobile phones could become a useful skill for young people in the target communities.[47]

Using a different lens to view under-employment takes into account how much people are working. 'Own use production' is more seasonal, as very few work 9–12 months (1–7%), apart from those making a living from livestock; 65% of nomads that rear animals for their own use work 9–12 months per year. Among the population who are engaged in 'own use' production, 62–65% of non-displaced

[46] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, key informant interview.
[47] ILO (2021) PROSPECTS Sudan Baseline Survey. Draft report. March 2021

and returnees and 53% of IDPs work 5–8 months. Among those working in subsistence agriculture, a considerable proportion of IDPs (46%) only work up to 4 months per year; this is the case for about one-third of non-displaced (34%) and returnees (29%) but only for 15% of nomads.

Among Nertiti locality residents who work for profit or pay, a substantial proportion work for 9–12 months of the year: non-displaced and IDP residents (38%), returnees (46%) and the vast majority of nomads (79%). However, work is only mainly seasonal amongst the sedentary communities that work for profit or pay, as 49–53% work 5–8 months per year.

OUTSIDE THE LABOUR FORCE

The population referred to as 'outside of the labour force' are persons, who are of working-age (15–64 years) but economically inactive. More than half of women (54–58%) in all population groups are outside the labour force, meaning they do not work in 'own use' production nor for profit or pay.
When disaggregating this data further by age, figures show that a large proportion of female youths (15–24 years) across the groups (70–83%) are not working. For women belonging to the age group 25–64 years, 40–42% of women from sedentary communities are outside the labour force, whilst this proportion rises among women nomads in that age group (51%). Amongst the group of young women outside the labour force, 34–42% report taking care of their home and family as their main occupation, while most of the remaining (50–59%) report studying. Among young nomad women outside the labour force the vast majority (82%) report taking care of the home and only 10% to be studying.

40–45% of men from sedentary farming communities are 'inactive' compared to 22% among nomads. The proportion of the working-age population (15–64 years) that are inactive is very high in comparison to the findings from East Darfur localities—here only 20–22% of men and 29–33% of women were neither working for pay or profit nor engaged in 'own-use' production. Again, when breaking down these findings by age group, it is clear that youths aged 15–24 years account for the high numbers outside the work force—between 78% and 86% of male youths are not working with the except for nomads among whom only 40% are out of the labour force. Findings show that the vast majority of these young men outside the labour force are studying (87–93%)

FIGURE 4: YOUTH (15–24 YEARS) NOT WORKING AND NOT IN EDUCATION - SDG 8.6.1



The proportion of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET rate) is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator.[48] It shows the number of young persons as a percentage of the

[48] SDG indicator 8.6.1

total youth population, who are not in education, employment or training and hence conveys information on the labour market situation for the population of young people. In Nertiti locality, there are significantly more women in this category, especially among the nomad communities. 34–37% of non-displaced, IDPs and returnee female youths are not in education, employment or training, but this figure rises radically to 62% among female youths from nomadic communities. The NEET rate is 7–9% for male youths belonging to sedentary communities and only 2% for nomad male youths, which can be explained by the high numbers of male youth that report that they are in education thus counterbalancing the very higher numbers of male youth being outside the labour force. A recent study from November 2019 found that youths are vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups and that unemployment and poverty are the main drivers for youth to join conflicts.[49] The same study found that women also join armed groups in Darfur although mainly providing support in terms of cooking, nursing and intelligence gathering.[50]

SHOCKS TO LIVELIHOODS AND COPING MECHANISMS

During the last couple of years, Sudan has seen soaring price rises for fuel and staple foods such as sorghum, millet and wheat. The household survey also looked at what respondents thought to be the most severe shocks to their livelihoods. All respondents across the surveyed population groups identify high food and fuel prices as shocks to their livelihood hence rocketing prices impacted everyone in Nertiti. When asked what was the most significant shock to their livelihood during the last 12 months, a vast majority across all groups single out high food prices; 71–79% among the sedentary farming communities and 59% of nomads. 17% of nomads specify that livestock was the most significant shock to their livelihood that they faced. A somewhat higher proportion of IDPs (17%) stated that high fuel prices were the most significant shock in contrast to 10–13% among the other surveyed groups.

Findings show that shocks related to COVID-19 restrictions and 'loss of employment or severely reduced income' had a significant impact on all Nertiti locality residents. 71–77% of all groups said COVID-19 restricts and 72–89% that 'loss of employment or severely reduced income' was a shock to their livelihood. Violence, raiding, looting, robbery or assault was also specified as a shock by all groups, but IDPs and returnees (44–45%) were impacted more than nomads and non-displaced residents (35–36%). Some livelihood shocks were experienced more among nomad and sedentary farming communities, as would be expected due to their economic practices. About half of the sedentary farming groups (46–53%) points to crop disease or pests as a livelihood shock and 57–63% say that 'too much rain or floods' was a shock compared to 40% of nomads.[51] Similarly, a majority of nomadic pastoralists say that livestock loss was a livelihood shock in comparison to a quarter of the population groups that are sedentary farmers. Shortages of drinking water also impacted nomads more (27%) in comparison to 17–18% of the sedentary farmers, but a lower proportion of nomads (7%) reported drought, irregular rainfall or prolonged dry spells to be a problem that impacted their livelihood in comparison to the farming communities (16–18%).

How did the surveyed households deal with the shocks to their livelihoods? The households surveyed were asked if and how they had responded to livelihood shocks. Selecting from a broad range of coping mechanisms, a picture emerges of how households have coped. Grouping responses into 'negative' or non-reversible versus 'positive' or sustainable coping strategies is a good predictor of

[49] UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Only 26% of nomads specify that crop disease or pests were a shock to their livelihood.

future vulnerability. In other words, to what extent a household is resilient when facing potential future shocks. For example, 'non-sustainable' or more extreme coping mechanisms (selling productive assets) suggest serious long-term consequences. Such strategies are less reversible and thus represent a more severe form of coping.[52] Many nomads rely on selling livestock, hence for this population group selling productive assets was not included in the 'non-sustainable' category of responses. The majority have used sustainable mechanisms to address the most significant shock to their livelihood they faced (60–64%).

FOOD SECURITY

Households were asked if there had been times when they did not have enough food or money to buy food during the past 7 days. Findings show that somewhat more IDPs and IDP returnees (72%) did not have enough food the previous week compared to the non-displaced population (65%). However, the data also indicate that a considerably smaller proportion of nomad households (39%) did not have enough food.

The reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) is an indicator of household food security. The rCSI assesses how people cope when they do not have enough to eat or any money to buy food. The proxy tool takes into account how often particular strategies are used and the severity of the strategies employed, by categorizing the way households are coping into low, medium and high coping strategies with the latter being the most severe.[53] Among the households that report not having enough food the previous week, the majority in all surveyed groups used low or medium coping mechanisms—practically none of the households used 'high' coping mechanisms (less than 1%).

FIGURE 5: HOUSEHOLDS NOT HAVING ENOUGH FOOD OR MONEY TO BUY FOOD, DURING THE 7 DAYS PRECEDING THE SURVEY (JAN. 2021)



Looking at the food insecure households (i.e. those that did not have enough food or money to buy food), the data shows that many more amongst them report having experienced raids/robberies/

[52] The categorization is based on the responses provided to the question 'what do you do when faced with X shock to your livelihood? Modest coping strategies are easily reversible or strategies that do not jeopardize longer-term prospects, while more extreme coping mechanisms have longer-term consequences. Categories for coping were reviewed by UNDP Sudan colleagues. Based on feedback, the coping mechanisms were grouped according to severity into non-sustainable/irreversible and sustainable/reversible. For example, 'sold farm area', 'reduced food consumption', 'selling animals' were categorized as 'non-sustainable', whilst 'selling more crops', 'starting a new business', 'received help from an NGO' were grouped as less severe/reversible coping mechanisms.

[53] The reduced CSI has been developed to compare food security across different contexts. It is a sub-set of the context-specific CSI but food security is calculated using a specific set of behaviours with a universal set of severity weightings for each behaviour. Thus, the reduced CSI uses a standard set of five individual coping behaviours that can assess food security of households in any context: eating less-preferred foods, borrowing food/money from friends and relatives, limiting portions at mealtimes, limiting adult food intake, and reducing the number of meals per day. Maxwell, D. and Caldwell, R. (2008) The Coping Strategies Index. Field Methods Manual (March, 2008).

attacks.[54] The data also show that among IDP returnees and IDPs a bigger proportion of food insecure households are relying mainly on crop farming (selling of goods) compared to the equivalent proportion among households that did not report having food insecurity.[55]

FOCUS ON FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS

Female-headed households make up a considerable proportion of households, IDPs (38%), non-displaced (35%), returnees (30%) and nomads (25%), and it is therefore important to understand if and to what extent these households may be more vulnerable. Among female-headed households, the data does not show a difference in regards to the age-dependency ratio meaning there is no additional pressure on working-age members of female-headed family units. Among nomad communities, a higher proportion of female-headed household (38%) do report not having enough food or money to buy food in the 7 days preceding the survey in comparison to male-headed households (27%) by 11 percentage points. Using coping mechanisms to withstand livelihood shocks as a proxy for vulnerability, the data also does not suggest any significant differences between male and female-headed households. This is in contrast to other localities in North and East Darfur, where the analysis did identify female-headed households to have a tendency to be more vulnerable.

[54] Specifically, among non-displaced 42% of the food insecure had experienced raids, robberies or attacks compared to only 25% among those that were not food insecure. Among IDPs and IDP returnees, the difference is 52% versus 26%, whilst it is 50% versus 29% for nomads.

[55] IDPs: 73% of the food insecure rely on crop farming compared to 60% among the food secure. IDP returnees: 84% of the food insecure returnees rely on crop farming compared to 74% among the food secure, who to a higher degree rely on wages (24%).

HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY: ACCESS & TENURE

The enjoyment of housing, land and property rights is key to achieving durable solutions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs regards effective accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP) as crucial criteria to determine if IDPs have reached a durable solution. This is because housing, land and property underpin people's livelihoods and standard of living.

This chapter explores IDPs' and returnees' access to land.[56] Have they managed to regain their land and rebuild their livelihoods? What are the specific obstacles to this? Drawing on the data of the non-displaced population as a benchmark, the analysis looks to explore and explain obstacles faced by IDPs and returnees.

From a peacebuilding perspective, violations of IDPs' housing, land and property (HLP) rights are a major obstacle to durable solutions for IDPs but are also integral to reaching peace, because land is a primary cause *and* ongoing driver of conflict between communities. The Juba Peace Agreement recognises the importance of land—land is a resource for the good of all people of Sudan. The agreement specifies that Individuals and communities have the right to restitution of lands lost as a result of the conflict in Darfur and where a return of the land is not possible, IDPs are entitled to compensation. As part of the peace agreement, several structures and institutions have been established with particular mandates relating to land issues.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **High proportions of the sedentary farming population have access to land (83–88%), while among nomads in damrahs the proportion is estimated to be 33%. Ownership of land is the dominant form of tenure among the non-displaced (48%) and returnee (56%) population, but only 7% of IDPs own the land they cultivate. The same trend is reflected in regained access to land; 90% of returnees sampled have managed to access the same agricultural land, while only 6% of IDPs have done so.**
- **Significant proportions of the sedentary population rent; IDPs (43%), non-displaced (28%) and returnees (11%). Borrowing agricultural land for no fee is also very common, as a majority of IDPs (46%) access agricultural land this way, and so do 23% of non-displaced and 32% of returnee households.**
- **A majority of nomad households have access to grazing land (64%), the same proportion that relies on livestock as their main source of income.**
- **Among the households that report owning agricultural land, the majority claim customary rights to the land whilst only 1–4% have a land registration certificate.**
- **Only very few households (4–6%) report that their farmland is demarcated, but higher proportions hold an area registration for their residential plot—16% of non-displaced and 18% of returnee households. However, 25% of nomads and more than half of non-displaced (53%) and returnees (54%) claim customary rights to their housing plot.**

[56] Access refers to obtaining or using land. Access to land is governed through land tenure systems, which is a 'relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups with respect to land.' A land tenure system determines who can use what land, for how long and under what terms. FAO (2002) Land Tenure Studies (4). Gender and access to land.

ACCESS TO LAND & TENURE TYPE

Access to land is central to the livelihoods of many people in Nertiti locality, as livelihoods among the sedentary population overwhelmingly depend on crop agriculture. 81–82% of non-displaced residents and returnees and 70% of IDPs depend on crop farming as their primary source of livelihoods. Predictably, a smaller proportion of nomads (14%) rely on crop farming as their primary source of livelihood. High proportions among the non-displaced (87%) and returnee population (88%) have access to farming land—the proportion among the IDPs is somewhat lower (83%)[57] Among nomad households in damrahs, the data shows that 33% have access to agricultural land.[58] Amongst all the sedentary population groups, the vast majority has to walk more than 30 min from their dwelling to their agricultural land. Non-displaced (89%), IDPs (94%) and returnees (81%) have 30 min or more walking distance to reach their fields. Access to agricultural land follows a traditional setup, where dwellings are clustered in villages and fields positioned some distance away.[59]

Looking in more detail at households' tenure of agricultural land, findings show that owning is the principal form of tenure, but that renting or borrowing land for free is also common. 48% of non-displaced residents and 56% of returnees report owning the land they cultivate. Tenure among IDPs is very different—merely 7% say they own the agricultural land they farm. Amongst the IDP population, 43% rent land and 46% report borrowing land for free. In contrast, 28% of non-displaced residents rent land 23% borrow land, whilst only 11% of returnees say they rent agricultural land but 32% borrow for free the land they cultivate. In the context of Central Darfur, what does it involve to borrow or rent land for cultivation? For many IDPs that no longer have access to land in their place of origin, renting land is the next best option.[60] Rent can be paid in currency, part of the harvest yield or in services. On some occasions, farmers are able to negotiate more favourable rent terms when bargaining as a group[61] but generally renting land is not an option among the poorer households.[62]

FIGURE 6: TENURE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND AMONG HOUSEHOLDS WITH ACCESS TO LAND



With regards to regaining access to the same land, 79% of returnees report that they can access the same agricultural land as before being displaced. For the IDP population, only 5% say they are accessing the same land they cultivated before their displacement, which supports the previous

[57] Note, this figure is missing for the nomad household population surveyed.
[58] This data is based on the number of nomad households that report crop farming as either their main or secondary source of livelihoods.
[59] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156–181
[60] Consultation with UN thematic experts.
[61] Consultation with UN thematic experts.
[62] Consultation with UN thematic experts.

household survey data that specifies that only 7% own the land they are cultivating. Among the majority of IDP households that are unable to access the same land, 31% report still holding a legal title or rights to the land they farmed before their displacement. Area-level data are in line with the household survey findings; key informants say that IDPs may have land in their original villages, but that 'they do not have access to this land, because it is inhabited by other people, who are not the original people'.[63] Interestingly, only nomad respondents state that IDP returnees have a good chance of accessing the land they own in the original villages.[64]

Considering grazing land, a majority of nomadic pastoralist generally report having access to grazing land. 64% of surveyed nomads report having access to grazing land, whilst 11% of returnees and non-displaced residents and 4% of IDPs have access to grazing land. The proportion of nomads that have access to grazing land may seem somewhat low but corresponds to the 64% of nomads that report their main livelihood to be dependent livestock. Most report having to walk more than 30 minutes from their dwelling to the grazing land. Among the nomads that have access to grazing land, 63% say that the land is government-owned and 34% report accessing designated communal grazing land. According to several area-level respondents, pastoralist nomads do not generally own land as their traditional way of life means they move with their livestock.[65] However, a key informant from the Native Administration states that some pastoralists are semi-nomadic and do own land.[66]

THE DARFURI HAKURA LAND TENURE SYSTEM

Darfur is governed by plural legal land tenure systems. Since the start of the joint authority Anglo-Egyptian rule of Sudan, modern statutory laws have existed alongside traditional customary laws. In practical terms, this legal pluralism means that there are 'overlapping institutions for accessing land'.[67] The customary 'Hakura' system is the traditional way to manage land in Darfur. Ownership of land does not correspond to the Western legal concept. Following the customary system, rights are not exclusive and land is 'owned' or belong to a community. Land in Darfur is split into tribal homelands, which is named a Dar. Generally, the homeland belongs to a major tribe, which gave this tribe monopoly over land but crucially also leadership and political representation and power.[68] A tribal sheikh from the dominant homeland tribe can assign a piece of land (Hakura) to a group of people, family or person. Permission is granted for a time period and in case the land allocated is not being used, then the sheikh may reallocate it to another person or group.[69] Crucially, not all groups have a Dar—tribes can be categorized as land-holding and non-landing tribes. Sheikhs not belonging to a tribe that do not have a homeland are knows as 'sheikh of the people' and has no authority over land.[70] A recent UN-Habitat report assesses that the customary 'Hakura' system is still the predominant way to manage land in Darfur and that registered land ownership cover less than 1% of the land in Darfur with very few registered parcels of land in rural locales.[71] The survey results in Nertiti locality are in line with this description—the data shows that merely 1–4% hold a land registration certificate and a great majority of people state that their rights to land derive from

[63] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—key informants (local government representative, Native Administration, local NGO).
[64] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—nomad community representative.
[65] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—local government and NGO representatives.
[66] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—Native Administration representative.
[67] Satti, H., Sulieman, H., Young, H., Radday, A. (2020) Natural Resources Management: Local Perspectives from North and Central Darfur.
[68] Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.
[69] UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.
[70] East Darfur, key informant—Native Administration
[71] UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.

customary law. IDPs (95%), returnees (70%) and non—displaced population (68%) claim customary rights to their agricultural land. A significant proportion among the non-displaced (29%) and returnee (22%) population state that they have no evidence or proof of their land ownership. According to thematic experts, this refers to a situation when a sheikh allows for people to use a piece of land but does not allocate the land as owned by the land user.[72]

The 'Hakura' system itself represents an obstacle to accessing land for some groups. Key informant interviews (KIIs) with Central Darfur respondents flag that women face inequalities when it comes to land ownership. According to tribal customs and traditions, women are not able to own land in their own right but can cultivate land.[73] The household survey found that male and female-headed households across all the sedentary groups own land to a similar degree.[74] Similar proportions also rent land or use land provided for free by relatives or friends.

Pastoralist nomads is also a group that traditionally did not have access to land as an outcome of how the customary 'Hakura' system manages access to land. According to 'Hakura' nomads do not have access to land due to their movement because traditional land rights are linked to agricultural use of land. Communal ownership of land was traditionally not attainable for nomadic communities. Instead, pastoralist had transient rights including access to water for animals and humans plus access to grazing land and livestock routes.[75] Hence, sheikhs from pastoralist communities that do not have a homeland—a Dar—would not have land to offer members of their tribe, whereas leaders of sedentary communities traditionally could assign or lease land.

Many Darfur experts argue that the inability of the indigenous 'Hakura' system to allow for full participation by nomadic pastoralists aggravated divisions between sedentary farmers and nomads and thus was a major factor in the development of the conflict. This is because a Dar—a homeland—is traditionally linked to political participation and comes with formal leadership positions in local and regional state institutions and have excluded nomadic pastoralists and smaller tribes. The area-level analysis in Nertiti includes many statements by key informants that refer to nomads, who settled on the land of IDPs after they were displaced.[76] And that the land now settled by people belonging to pastoralist nomadic tribes was 'historically owned based on the norms and traditions of Darfur […].[77]

THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT—STIPULATED CHANGE

The Juba Peace Agreement sets out some changes to the hierarchy of the statutory and customary land tenure systems. The government of Jafar Numeiri enacted the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, which brought all land not formally registered into government ownership. In practice, the Act asserted government ownership over lands that were already claimed under the customary land tenure 'Hakura' system and administered by the Native Administration. The Juba Peace Agreement signed in 2020 explicitly recognises traditional ownership of tribal lands (referred to as Hawakeer), historic rights to lands plus customary livestock routes and opportunities to access water.[78] Moreover,

[72] IOM key informant.
[73] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—youth leader and local government, nomad, Native Administration representatives.
[74] Among the non-displaced population, 48% of both male and female-headed households own land, while more female-headed household own land among the returnee population; 60% versus 54% of family units headed by a man. Among IDPs, a somewhat smaller proportion of female-headed households own land (5%) by 4 percentage points.
[75] Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.
[76] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—Native Administration, local NGO representatives.
[77] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—Land use Office key informant.
[78] Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020),, chapter 7.1

customary law takes precedence in the event that there is a conflict between Sudanese statutory law and customary law relating to land. Subsequently, laws should be amended to include land rights 'according to the norms, traditions, and inherited practices of land tenure in Darfur'.[79] It is unclear whether these changes to land tenure in the peace agreement represent a view as to whether formal land registration in Darfur is the right tool for reducing conflict over land or not. But certainly, some Darfur scholars hold the view that it is the inherent flexibility and ambiguity of customary tenure that allows for the 'elasticity required in the tenure system to accommodate livestock migrations and pursue options in drought years'.[80]

DEMARCATION AND REGISTRATION CERTIFICATES FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND

Very low proportions of the surveyed households reported that their farmland is demarcated. Only 4–6% of non-displaced, IDPs and returnees have demarcated land. The proportion of respondents that say their land is demarcated is only a little higher than the percentages that say they hold a land registration certificate (1–4%) to prove ownership of their agricultural land. The slight discrepancy may be explained by the fact that obtaining a registration certificate involves many steps, but the first stage requires the Native Administration to survey and demarcate the land.

The commonly held logic behind wanting to demarcate and legally register land is to establish clarity on boundaries and ownership, and in turn, reduce conflict over land.[81] How come only a small percentage of people possess a legal certificate documenting ownership of their land? One explanation is that it is a complicated, lengthy and costly process that only grants ownership for a relatively short time period (6–7 years).[82] A key informant from Nertiti locality flags the issue of the high fees involved in the process of registering land ownership as an obstacle.[83] The issue of costs was also highlighted by thematic experts, who say that IDPs and returnees complain that the cost of the official GPS demarcation is high; it costs 200 SDG per feddan.[84] The process of obtaining a land registration certificate is not only costly and lengthy but also involves dealing with both the Native Administration, who oversees the customary tenure system and the formal legal judiciary in charge of formal registration of land.

Some Darfur commentators suggest a different explanation; that demarcation has been 'actively resisted' by the population that claim customary ownership of land. The rejection, it is argued, had to do with limited trust in the government and the government institutions that were involved in demarcation and land registration.[85] Furthermore, thematic experts point out that the process involved in the official land registration of farmland is open to manipulation. The process involves the Native Administration signing and endorsing a written form. The land claim is broadcast on local radio, if no one disputes the claim it will be officially registered using GPS mapping to demarcate. People can register land, but it is very hard to verify that it is, in fact, their land. Are the Omdas, the original tribal

[79] Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020),, chapter 7.5
[80] Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.
[81] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156–181
[82] Consultation with thematic expert from UN-Habitat, February 2021.
[83] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—Land Use Office key informant.
[84] Consultation with UN thematic experts, March 2021.
[85] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156–181

leaders of the land in question or more recent arrivals? Therefore, the process itself needs to be strengthened or changed.

HOUSING AND RESIDENTIAL LAND

When asked about the tenure of residential land, returnees (74%) and non-displaced residents (65%) mainly reported that they own their housing plot. 28% of nomads say they own their residential plot but hardly any among IDPs have ownership (1%). The vast majority of IDPs (90%) say they live in an IDP camp, whilst a small proportion report living on a plot provided for free by relatives or friends (7%). This is also the case for a considerable proportion of non-displaced residents and returnees, as 25% of non-displaced and 20% of returnee households have their residential dwelling on a parcel of land belonging to friends or relatives. One-third of the nomad households (35%) have their dwelling on government-owned land free of charge, whilst another 35% are living on communal grazing land. A small proportion rent their residential plot; non-displaced households (8%), returnees (4%) and IDPs (1%).

How do the households that report owning their residential plot—non-displaced (65%), returnees (74%) and nomads (27%)—claim ownership of their residential plot? A majority of nomad households (65%) report not being able to prove ownership, and so do 25% of non-displaced and 20% of returnee households. More than half of non-displaced (53%) and returnees (54%) claim customary rights to their residential land and 25% of nomad households. Some refer to a decision by the local administration as proof of ownership; 10% of nomads, 7% of returnees and 5% of non-displaced. And lastly, 16% of non-displaced households and 18% of returnees state they hold a registered area registration proving ownership of their residential plot of land. According to thematic experts, the land registration process for residential land is easier, because it is easier to be awarded relatively small plots of land for housing, which can explain the higher proportion of households holding official documentation. [86]

The vast majority (92%) of returnees have regained the same residential plot. And among that have not regained access to the same plot, more than half say they faced no issues linked to re-accessing their residential land. Area-level data flag the same obstacles for IDPs accessing residential land as the obstacles highlighted for not being able to access their previous agricultural land. Obstacles centre around ‘unlawful’ occupation, non-adherence to grazing routes and rules plus land boundary disputes.

[86] Consultation with UN thematic experts, March 2021.

SAFETY, SECURITY, CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW

Perceptions of safety and security are key criteria for durable solutions. The analysis aims to understand if IDPs and returnees experience a higher degree of security incidents in comparison to the non-displaced population. What type of insecurity and conflict do residents face?

Lack of security has the ability to erode the overall confidence in peacebuilding processes and therefore restoring the rule of law is imperative. Peacebuilding is ultimately concerned with transforming post-conflict societies so that political, social disputes and conflict are managed and resolved through non-violent means. The rule of law is a framework for the peaceful management of conflict and fair administration of justice through institutions, mechanisms and procedures.[87] Ensuring the rule of law relies on the capacity of the police and formal courts, but how effective are the police and courts in Nertiti locality? The role of civil society in conflict resolution and peacebuilding is also important in Darfur and therefore local conflict resolution mechanisms are reviewed and their perceived effectiveness assessed. Key informants also provide insight into the limitations of local conflict resolution mechanisms, but also how local mechanisms can be strengthened and local peacebuilding capacities supported.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **A majority of all population groups feel safe during the day, but the proportions of Nertiti residents that report feeling safe drops during nighttime especially among IDPs (14%) and no-displaced (19%); a significant difference is found between IDPs in the camp and the town, as the former feel safer. Nomads in damrahs report the highest degrees of safety during day and night.**
- **Verbal and physical threats, robbery and damage to property (such as crops and livestock) have all been experienced by significant proportions of all population groups.**
- **Robbery is the type of security incidents experienced by the highest proportion of all groups; 53–69% have experienced at least one robbery during the last 12 months. Among nomads, damage to livestock is also high (63%), whereas physical and verbal threats are experienced more by the IDP and IDP returnee population (53–57%).**
- **Conflict is predominantly linked to land in Nertiti locality and is linked to boundary conflicts, livestock grazing routes and unlawful occupation of land. Unlawful occupation of land is a problem faced by many IDPs—the vast majority have not been able to re-access their previous agricultural land (94%) and of those 61% report issues mainly related to unlawful occupation (71%). The area-level findings also indicate that this is a major problem especially in western and northern parts of Nertiti locality.**
- **Among Nertiti residents, there is a tendency towards not reporting security incidents. Only 22–25% report to the Native Administration, whilst a higher proportion of nomads (38%) report incidents to the police in contrast to the non-displaced (20%), IDP (14%) and returnee (11%) residents. Satisfaction with how the issue was resolved was low, as nomads (15%), non-displaced (18%), non-displaced (16%) and 23% of IDPs were satisfied and reported the issue resolved.**

[87] Kritz, N. J. (2007) The Rule of Law in Conflict Management in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.) (2007) Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World.

- **The police, Rural Court and Prosecution Office in Nertiti locality lack staff, funding and vehicles to respond to security incidents and the continued presence of armed militia groups presents a significant challenge to the rule of law.**
- **The Peaceful Coexistence and Reconciliation Committee is considered the most effective local conflict resolution mechanism, but the Native Administration is also highlighted as key to providing justice and mediation in situations of dispute and conflict.**
- **Water Committees are common among IDP communities (74%), but among the non-displaced (44%) and especially nomads (73%), returnees (63%) report not having a Water Committee to manage access to water and mediate in disputes. Satisfaction with how the Water Committee resolved an issue was particularly low among nomads (16%).**

PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY INCIDENTS

Respondents were asked how safe they and their household members feel when walking in their neighbourhood or area during the day and during night-time on a scale from 'very safe', 'safe', 'unsafe' and 'very unsafe'. Among IDP (61%) and IDP returnee (64%) households 'feel very safe' during the day; that proportion is higher among non-displaced (69%) while among nomads residing in damrahs the proportion is the highest (83%). Most of the remaining households indicated that they feel 'somewhat safe', while smaller proportions report feeling 'unsafe' or 'very unsafe': 4% among nomads, 5% among non-displaced, and higher among IDP returnees (7%) and IDPs (11%). Perceptions of safety drop among all population groups when asked about feeling safe when walking at night. Feelings of safety especially drop among the IDPs where merely 14% of IDPs report feeling 'very safe'; a significant difference is found between IDPs in the camp and the town, as the former feel safer. Specifically, 61% of IDPs in towns feel 'unsafe'/'very unsafe' while that is the case for only 33% of IDPs in the camp. Looking at the proportions reporting 'unsafe'/'very unsafe' when walking in the night, IDPs (49%) and non-displaced (41%) are the most unsafe, followed by IDP returnees (33%), while nomads (14%) have a significantly lower proportions reporting feeling unsafe.

FIGURE 7: HOUSEHOLDS BY DEGREE OF SAFETY WHEN WALKING AROUND IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD/AREA IN THE NIGHT – SDG INDICATOR 16.1.4



Do women feel less safe than men? Reports point to a high level of gender-based violence (GBV) in Nertiti blamed on militias still operating in the locality. While the information on perceptions of safety was collected at the household level,[88] the analysis has checked the responses provided by the sex of the respondent. Interestingly, among IDP returnees and nomads, the proportion reporting feeling unsafe/very unsafe during night is higher for male respondents (IDP returnees 41% and nomads 22%) compared to female respondent (IDP returnees 29% and nomads 7%). Among the other groups, the responses between male and female respondents were very similar.

To identify the kinds of threats and confrontation that communities in Nertiti locality face, respondents were asked about incidents that they had experienced during the 12 months prior to the survey. The household survey data shows that the incidents inquired about—robbery, damage to property and verbal and physical threats—were all quite common with some variation between the different population groups. For instance, 33% of the non-displaced and 37% of the IDP population report property and livestock damage. This is the lowest reported percentage of damage to property by any of the population groups surveyed, but this incident is experienced by a third of non-displaced and IDP residents. Similarly, the nomads represent the lowest proportion experiencing verbal and physical threats, yet it is still respectively 18% and 20% of surveyed nomads, which demonstrate that these types of security incidents are common.

FIGURE 8: HOUSEHOLDS THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED THE BELOW SECURITY INCIDENTS AT LEAST ONCE IN THE 12 MONTHS PRECEEDING THE SURVEY



Robbery is the most frequent type of security incident for all groups; non-displaced (53%), IDPs (64%), returnees (59%) and nomads (59%) report having experienced at least one robbery during the last year before the survey. And significant numbers of IDPs (11%), returnees (13%) and nomads (15%) say that robbery happens ‘always’ indicating that robberies take place very frequently. Apart from robbery, a high proportion of nomads also register damage to property or livestock. 63% of nomads have experienced this type of incident, and of those 15% state that damaged inflicted on property or livestock happens ‘always’. High proportions among the non-displaced, IDP and returnee residents also experience verbal and physical threats. 47% of non-displaced residents experience both verbal and physical threats, whilst this is higher among the IDP and returnee population (53–57%). Notably, the vast majority of all population groups characterise all security incidents as either taking place ‘sometimes’ or ‘rarely’.

[88] For example, the respondent was asked ‘How safe do you or anyone in your household feel walking alone in your area/ neighbourhood during the day/night?’

The data analysis sought to discern any differences in terms of safety and types of settlement. Among the non-displaced and returnees, the majority reside in towns, and thus the results are indicative of urban settings. Targeted IDPs were distributed between an urban settlement and the neighbouring camp and here the results show that IDPs living in the town reported fewer security incidents than IDPs residing in the camp, but the data indicate that IDPs living in the camp feel safer. Around 50% living in town versus 30% in camp report that they never experienced any type of threat, while a somewhat bigger proportion of IDPs residing in the camp say that they 'very often' or 'often' experience threats especially robbery. However, 61% of IDPs in towns measured against 33% of IDPs living in camps say they feel 'very unsafe' or 'unsafe' when walking at night and the data shows the same tendency during daylight hours.

PREVALENCE OF CONFLICTS LINKED TO LAND

Conflict drivers in Nertiti locality are predominantly related to land. Land conflict centres around boundary conflicts, livestock grazing routes and unlawful occupation of land. Disputes and conflict linked to access to water are much less of an issue and so are intra-family disputes, while conflict arising from animal theft is reported to be on the rise during the 6 months prior to the survey.[89]

In Nertiti locality, 5% in all groups report that they face issues linked to the farming land that they are now accessing. IDPs are additionally asked about the land in their place of origin and the extent to which there are issues linked to that. According to the household survey, 94% of the IDP households are not accessing the land they farmed before their displacement; among them, one-third still have access rights (and it is thus assumed that they could re-access if relevant). 61% of the households not accessing the land in place of origin report that there are issues linked to re-accessing the land, and these are mainly caused by the land being 'unlawfully occupied' (71%).

IDP returnees are asked if they have managed to re-access their land upon return. Only 10% of returnees have been unable to access the land they farmed prior to their displacement. Among this 10% of returnees, the majority report issues linked to the land being 'unlawfully occupied' by others, while one-third still has access rights and are thus likely to not be accessing by choice.

The area-level study provides context to the household survey findings. This type of conflict is described to happen along tribal lines. Violent land acquisitions and unlawful occupation of land by animal herders or people from nomadic tribes were flagged as a key problem by many respondents and add that this land was acquired 'by force' with support from the government during the previous regime.[90] Other key informants state that some nomads came to the area from outside Sudan (Chad and Niger) and exploited the land, while others simply state that nomads settled on the land belonging to others after the original owners had fled due to the conflict commencing in 2003.[91] Thematic experts confirm that this type of land dispute is common in Nertiti locality, and that areas in the northern and western part of the locality are particular hotspots.[92] The conflict has also affected nomad communities access to land, which perhaps is somewhat obscured by the focus on agricultural land. A nomad

[89] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—youth community representative, police and local government informants.
[90] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—NGO, youth, female and Native Administration representatives.
[91] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—NGO and two Native Administration representatives.
[92] Consultation with UN thematic experts.

respondent stated that nomads have also been displaced as a result of the conflict—nomads residing in damrahs in the area of Khor Ramla were displaced to more remote areas during the conflict.[93]

Both area-level data and household survey findings identify conflict linked to livestock migratory routes and boundary disputes as lesser problems. Among the group of IDPs unable to access the same land they farmed before displacement, and who specify conflict (61% of those not accessing their pre-displacement land) linked to their inability to do so, 12% point to grazing routes not followed and 11% to boundary conflicts as reasons. Conflicts between farmers over farm boundaries result from farmers expanding the cultivated land pushing into areas of the neighbouring farms. This kind of conflict cyclical and is reported to happen every year during the rainy seasons when farmers begin planting crops.

Conflict linked to pastoralists' grazing routes is also seasonal. In Darfur, pastoralist tribes move their livestock from north to the south in the course of the dry season and head back north during the rainy season dry season[94] The pastoralists use traditional livestock corridors (masarat) and have customary rights to graze their animals on rainfed farmland (talique) after the harvest.[95] Although the 'Hakura' system gives farmers customary rights to land, these rights are not exclusive and pastoralists have temporary rights to graze their herds on what is left of the harvested crops. Normally, a talique date for when pastoralists can graze their animals is agreed between farmers and pastoralists with the help of the local authorities or the Native Administration to avoid crop losses and conflict.[96] Disputes and conflict happen when talique agreements are violated by either side. Violations of these agreements are often caused by a poor rainy season, which press pastoralists to move their herds much earlier in search of pasture and water. This, in turn, causes damage to crops before the harvest and farmers are known to deny pastoralists passage or block passage by expanding their farms into these livestock migratory routes.[97] Based on area-level data, conflicts related to grazing routes appear to be less common, and furthermore, only 5% of surveyed nomads report issues over grazing land. Also, when surveyed nomads were asked whether they followed designed livestock movement routes, 83% confirmed that they did. The main reasons given for not following livestock corridors was to look for grazing and water (47%), while insecurity, risks to safety and crime (32%) were also reasons as to why nomads had changed course and not followed defined livestock routes. Area-level data does highlight a couple of hot spots where confrontations take place because of blocked animal corridors. A respondent from a nomad community states that the area of Khor Ramla is a particular area, where more than 30 disputes and conflict have taken place due to the closure of livestock routes.[98] The conflict that do happen in relation to animal grazing routes and adherence to the talique date could be better facilitated in order to cause less friction according another respondent. As it is a recurring problem that follows the migration season the problem is also a lack of preparation and intervention 'from the local government before the nomads move or the start of the rainy season begins'.[99]

[93] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, nomad community representative.
[94] UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.
[95] Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156–181
[96] The talique date is referred to as a customary institution that has 'evolved through local practices of local communities, their leadership, and formal government structures. Osman, A.M.K., Young, H. Houser, R.F., and Coates, J. C. (2013)) Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur.
[97] Satti, H., Sulieman, H., Young, H., Radday, A. (2020) Natural Resources Management: Local Perspectives from North and Central Darfur
[98] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, Nomad community representative.
[99] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, representative of local NGO.

REPORTING SAFETY INSTANCES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

The household survey sought to understand how residents report incidents and to who they turn to for solving disputes and effective remedies. Households that experienced a security incident during the 12 months preceding the survey, were asked to think about the most serious incident and indicate whether they sought help. The findings show a tendency towards not reporting security issues—especially among the sedentary population groups. Returnees (61%), IDPs (56%) and non-displaced (55%) and nomad (37%) residents did not report security incidents or threats during the 12 months preceding the survey. 22–25% among all surveyed population groups reported incidents to the Native Administration. Apart from nomad community members, somewhat lower proportions choose to report security incidents to the police. Non-displaced (20%), IDPs (14%), returnees (11%) report to the police in contrast to 38% of nomad residents in Nertiti locality.

Satisfaction with the way an issue was resolved by the police or the Native Administration was overall low among those who did report an incident, although the proportion of those satisfied with the outcome was higher among IDPs by 5–8 percentage points. 23% of IDPs said 'the issue had been resolved and they were satisfied' in contrast to non-displaced (16%), returnees (18%) and nomads (15%).

This trend towards not reporting crime and security incidents to the police could be linked to the capacity of the police and the courts to respond to incidents. The peaceful sit-in demonstration in Nertiti in July 2020 was partly in response to violence against civilians and a perceived lack of security and justice.[100] During the four weeks prior to the demonstration, the Darfur Bar Association had registered 48 cases of violence aimed at civilians in Nertiti locality.[101] Villages in Jebel Marra do not have access to police as they are under the control of armed rebel groups, which also operate outside of their strongholds.

In Nertiti locality, there is a police centre in Nertiti town and five police points located in towns; Fodko and Gildo, Saga Dirr in Sector North and Garni in the northern part of Nertiti. Some villages do not have access to the police due to long distances, but plans are underway to provide additional police stations in Toor and the villages of Katroom, Baldong and Galol.[102] The police centre in Nertiti town is staffed by 50 police offers, whilst each police point employs 5–6 police officers, but no female staff members. Some but not all the police staff have received training by the Sudan Police Force, UNDP or NGOs.[103] In theory, women have equal access to the police but are reported not to seek help from police forces because local traditions and customs prohibit women from doing so. Nomad pastoralist reportedly seldom report incidents to the police, but the household survey findings suggest that the nomad population actually is the group that seek help from the police the most.

In regards to capacity, the police representative interviewed lists a number of challenges and does not consider the funding and support to the police enough for the police force to carry out their tasks.[104] The police are tasked with protecting civilians, contribute to resolving conflicts and work closely together with the Native Administration and rural court. However, the police force in Nertiti locality lack trained staff, appropriate offices, equipment and vehicles.

[100] M. (2020) Abuses in Sudan's Darfur spur mass protest and calls for Bashir's conviction, Middle East Eye, 7 July, 2020.
[101] Salih, Z. M (2020) Darfur protesters call for action to end attacks on civilians by armed militia, The Guardian, 8 July, 2020.
[102] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, police official.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.

The police force works both with the Rural Court and the Prosecution Office in Nertiti town. Rural courts serve as the entry point to the judicial system as these customary courts form part of the formal judiciary structure in Sudan as stipulated by the 2004 Town and Rural Courts Acts. Rural Court judges are tasked with promoting dialogue and mediation as avenues to justice and reconciliation.[105] Larger and more complex problems are referred to the court in the state capital. In November 2018, UNAMID handed over the Rural Court to the Sudanese judiciary.[106] According to area-level data, the Prosecution Office is missing a prosecutor and therefore not operating and members of the Rural Court is still due to receive training. Like the police force, the challenges for the Rural Court are considered to be the ongoing insecurity in the locality—often involving the SLA-AW, SLA splinter groups and other militias—plus lack of funding, trained and qualified staff, and vehicles to reach areas where disputes are taking place. Key informants report that none of the conflicts identified by the community in the last six months have been resolved by the Rural Court.[107] In terms of access, there is reportedly poor access for women to rural courts. Because of local traditions, women are prohibited from accessing rural courts, while youths and nomads are considered to have access equal to other community members, and nomad leaders are reported to be members of the rural court.[108]

There are a number of dispute resolution mechanisms alternatives in Nertiti locality. Several committees exist at the local level; some with wider mandates such as the Peaceful Coexistence and Reconciliation Committee and others that manage competing demands and conflict linked to specific natural resources including the Harvest Protection Committee and Water Committee.[109] Other grassroots level mechanisms include the Native Administration and Judiya. Local mediators are part of the Judiya traditional mediation mechanism at the community level that resolves conflicts between community members. Judiya is a grassroots system of mediation that centres on reconciliation and repairing of social relationships and tackle low-level crime that do not need to be dealt with by the courts. The Judiya arbitrators are named ajaweed and are respected community members, who have knowledge of customary law and inter-tribal history. They are not neutral mediators, rather their role is to exert pressure on a party to accept the settlement.[110] In Nertiti locality, parties can also seek informal arbitration from the Native Administration in case of a dispute.

RATING LOCAL COMMUNITY RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

How do the local communities regard these conflict resolution mechanisms? Water Committees operate at the local level and focus on maintaining water points and manage access to water including mediating if disputes and conflict around water usage arise. According to the household survey, many residents report that they do *not* have a Water Committee in their community although markedly more IDPs say they have a Water Committee (74%). Non-displaced (44%) and returnees (63%) and 73% of nomads say they do *not* have such an institution managing competing water needs. Among the communities where a Water Committee does exist, IDPs (45%), non-displaced (36%), returnees (42%) say that the committee 'effectively solved the problem and a just solution was provided', but

[105] Tubiana, J., Tanner, V. and Abdul-Jalil, M. (2012) Traditional authorities' peacemaking in Darfur. Peaceworks
[106] UNAMID (2018) UNAMID hands over Nertiti rural court to the Sudanese Judiciary, 5 December, 2018.
[107] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, Native Administration key informant.
[108] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, police official.
[109] A Native Administration representative also mentions community conflict resolution committees and agricultural committees. Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, Native Administration key informant.
[110] Young, H. et al. (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management.

this proportion drops to only 16% among nomads. Key informants do not report on the number of water committees operating in the locality, but feedback points to their role being 'weak'.[111]

The area-level data points to the Peaceful Coexistence Committee as the most successful because 'it is composed of members from all communities' and is, therefore, best placed to resolve disputes and conflict.[112] Key informants also highlight that committees that are set up by the community are most successful as opposed to any initiatives created by the government.[113] The Harvest Protection Committee receives mixed reviews; some respondents describe it as the most successful mechanisms in resolving conflict at the locality level, whilst others state that it is not effective.[114] The Native Administration is flagged as a key institution to 'resolve all issues around land and water', but although it is described as effective other respondents believe the Native Administration 'need to be empowered.[115] The main challenges and limitations facing community-based mechanisms identified by key respondents include the overall insecurity in the area, the absence of justice, insufficient capacity and a need for training plus a general lack of funds even to just pay for transportation to travel to where a particular dispute is taking place.[116]

When it comes to disputed ownership of land and unlawful occupation of land, key informants in Nertiti locality say that returnees and IDPs cannot deal with these challenges on their own and require assistance. There is no land demarcated for returning IDPs and because most of the land is occupied by others it is not possible to return under these conditions.[117]

STRENGTHENING CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING MECHANISMS

The area-level analysis explored challenges and elements that would strengthen the effectiveness of existing conflict resolution mechanisms. The issues flagged by respondents can shed some light on why small proportions of the population turn to committees and conflict resolution mechanisms for help when faced with a security incident or crime.

Insecurity is a key theme; the overarching insecurity and the proliferation of weapons are seen as main obstacles and many respondents emphasise that security, the protection of civilians and addressing root causes of the conflict between farmers and nomads is the role of the Government. In other words, local community conflict mechanisms can form a part but cannot be expected to solve disputes and conflict that are not confined to the local level. Hence, local-level conflict resolution mechanisms need to be joined up with solutions at the state and even country-level. The proliferation of weapons in Central Darfur has been identified to hinder the Native Administration's ability to assert their authority within their areas, while respondents in a study in neighbouring Golo locality raised the issue of politization of the Native Administration by the previous regime, which affected their legitimacy and thus their ability to mediate in disputes and conflict.[118]

[111] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—youth leader. This informant believes that the Water Committees are ineffective partly because their members have not received any training.
[112] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, local NGO representative.
[113] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, local government and nomad community representatives.
[114] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, key informants, female community representative and Native Administration representative.
[115] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, youth and female community representatives.
[116] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, woman community representative and Native Administration representative.
[117] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—Native Administration key informant.
[118] Danish Refugee Council (2020) Conflict analysis, Central Darfur, Sudan.

Other main challenges and limitations flagged by key informants for community-based mechanisms to be effective include strengthening the Native Administration. This includes empowering the Native Administration through laws and support by the Government, but also financial and logistic support to help them fulfil their mandate.[119] In coordination with the Native Administration, the Government should prioritise laws around land ownership and work to demarcate land plus move animal routes further away from the farmland. Other respondents place more emphasis on the community itself and want to see the Native Administration and community leaders mobilise the communities to prepare them for taking part in peace processes.[120] A number of respondents also believe that sustainable solutions will need to involve the provision of basic services serving communities including the rehabilitation of health centres, schools and water points.[121]

THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT AND CONFLICT OVER LAND

Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property is central to achieving durable solutions for IDPs as set out by the IASC Framework. The Juba Peace Agreement agrees with the IASC criteria and stipulates that 'all victims of Darfur have a right to seek restoration of property or compensation for their lost or seized property resulting from the conflict in Darfur'.[122] This right to restitution is not only awarded to individuals but also to communities that have a collective right to pursue restitution for communal property, villages, farms and traditional land. Where it is not possible for IDPs to return, they are entitled to compensation for their loss resulting from forced displacement.[123] This right is extended to displaced persons regardless of whether they choose to return to their places of origin or not.[124] Thematic experts warn that the lack of mechanisms to implement restitution and compensation will be an obstacle to durable solutions and peacebuilding efforts.[125]

Interestingly, the peace agreement provides for the review and possible revocation of registration of land that was expropriated or forcibly taken after June 1989.[126] Potentially, this is a powerful tool to deal with land that is unlawfully occupied even when the resent settlers hold land registration certificates to prove ownership. There is little mention in the agreement of the rights of the 'secondary' or settlers unlawfully occupying land apart from chapter two, which specifies that basic services should be provided in areas of resettlement for those who inhabited the lands of others illegally.[127]

The agreement sets out several institutions and their mandates that will govern conflict over land and aid peaceful co-existence between communities. The 'Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission' has a mandate to hear and mediate in property restitution claims for individuals, who lost their land because of the conflict in Darfur. It is also tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed land. [128] The National Lands Commission has also been established and is tasked with working in

[119] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—police representative and Native Administration key informant.
[120] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, nomad and women community representatives.
[121] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, women community representative and local government key informant.
[122] Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.3.
[123] Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.3.2.
[124] Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.8.2
[125] NRC (2021), Housing, Land and Property Rights (HL) in the Juba Peace Agreement. Darfur Track briefing note.
[126] Juba Peace Agreement, chapter 7.8.1.
[127] This task is allocated to the Reconstruction and Development Commission. Juba Peace Agreement, chapter 2.18).
[128] Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.9.1 and chapter 7.10.11.

tandem with the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, whilst the Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee Commission has been set up to oversee voluntary return and resettlement.[129] The Commission for the Development of the Nomads is mandated with improving the nomadic pastoralist sector plus regulate relations between farmers and nomadic pastoralists.[130]

The household survey and area-level analysis focused on conflict drivers, capacities for peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level. At the time of data collection, none of the institutions and mechanisms stipulated in the Juba Peace Agreement were up and running and it is not clear how these will interact with or support efforts at the locality level.

[129] Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.8.
[130] Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.7.1.

CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

Social cohesion is a multi-faceted concept, however, this chapter focuses on specific aspects including participation and inclusion as well as inter-group contacts and perceptions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs specify that displaced persons should be able to exercise the right to participate in public affairs on an equal footing with the non-displaced population without discrimination due to their displacement. People's civic participation—engagement in public affairs, as well as how groups accept and engage with each other, can offer insights into social cohesion within and between communities. In turn, social cohesion has a bearing on integration and thus are important for durable solutions and peacebuilding. Greater cohesion may facilitate more consensus-oriented or inclusive governance, as well as create resilience to escalating conflict at the individual level.[131]

KEY FINDINGS:

- **33% of surveyed IDP returnees live in villages together with non-displaced residents, hence 2 out 3 returnee households live as separate communities in the targeted areas of Nertiti.**
- **Inter-group perceptions are overall very positive among non-displaced, IDP returnees and IDPs but attitudes towards the nomad community are very different. 50–60% of non-displaced residents do not welcome nomads to settle in their village, do not believe they should participate in decision-making, have equal access to education nor welcome nomads into their family through marriage.**
- **Community-based conflict resolutions mechanism are viewed as inclusive, as youths, IDPs and nomads are represented, however, inclusion does not extend to women who seem to not be represented in local conflict resolution mechanisms nor service committees.**
- **About half of nomads, returnees and non-displaced residents take part in meetings concerning community affairs, but fewer IDPs appear to be taking part in such meetings (34%). Attendance to reconciliation meetings drops among all groups apart from nomads of whom 51% have taken part in a reconciliation meeting during the 6 months preceding the survey.**
- **The Native Administration is the main communication channel between the community and the government. In order for community members and civil society groups to collaborate directly with the local government and foster greater accountability, training is needed to improve awareness and capacity.**

INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

The survey set out to understand how the different target groups perceive each other. As a starting point, displaced households were asked if they live together with non-displaced families in the same village or location. 33% of IDP returnees live together with non-displaced households, while this is twice as prevalent among the IDP population as 60% of the surveyed IDPs resided in a town with non-displaced residents. Of those IDPs and returnees that have non-displaced neighbours, both population groups feel accepted and welcome. Between 95–98% of returnees and IDPs say that they

[131] For more on social cohesion analysis, see: UNDP (2020) Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications.

have non-displaced friends, feel welcome and invited to participate in joint activities with neighbours. The majority of IDPs and returnees report positive perceptions towards all other Nertiti population groups, but IDPs (20%) and returnees (13%) do not think that all groups should have equal access to education and health services, although which population group they refer to is not specified.

Non-displaced residents' attitudes towards both IDPs and IDP returnees are also very positive—less than 5% believe that they should not be able to participate in community activities on an equal footing. However, attitudes vis-à-vis the nomad population are dramatically different, as a significant proportion of non-displaced report that they do not welcome nomads settling in their village (60%), do not believe they should participate in decision-making (67%), have equal access to services (33%) or welcome nomads into their family through marriage (64%).

PARTICIPATION, PEACEBUILDING AND COORDINATION AT COMMUNITY-LEVEL

Community-based mechanisms are generally viewed as inclusive, as youths, IDPs and nomads are represented in the Peaceful Coexistence Committee and the Harvest Protection Committee. Women, however, do not seem to be represented in any of the local conflict resolution mechanisms or committees dealing with access to services. A woman community representative states: 'there is no interaction between women and the local authorities, and event with the NGOs there is no coordination. Women in this locality are marginalised'.[132] The area-level analysis sought to find out whether any civil society groups are advocating for women to participate in reconciliation and Darfur peace processes. Committees led by youth are described as more inclusive of women than other committees and that attitudes towards women are slowly changing. The Freedom and Change Forces Committee is said to advocate for women to participate in peace processes in Darfur, while other youth-led bodies include the Freedom and Change Committee and Services and Resistance Committee. However, none of these was mentioned by female respondents interviewed. Women make up half of the population in Nertiti locality and are important peace and conflict actors. A recent Darfur study by UNDP found that women play a significant role in conflict including instigating men to use violence—often singing traditional Hakamat songs to spur on the men to fight, they prevent pastoralists from accessing water, but also partake directly in conflict by providing cooking, nursing and intelligence to combatants.[133]

The household survey examines participation in public meetings and reconciliation meetings. Findings indicate that the nomad population (51%) has the highest proportion of residents that have taken part in a meeting on communal matters during the last 6 months. A little less than half of returnee (48%) and non-displaced residents (45%) have taken part in meetings, while a smaller percentage of IDPs (34%) are taking part in community affairs. Participation among nomads is similarly high in reconciliation meetings among nomads (51%), but the proportion of other residents attending such peacebuilding and reconciliation meetings drops—45% of returnees, 37% of non-displaced and 29% of IDP residents say that they have taken place in a reconciliation meeting in the last 6 months. The reasons for not attending are similar for all groups (40–50%) and primarily included 'not being aware of such an event or meeting', whilst a higher proportion (40%) of IDPs said that they were not invited. Some IDPs (13%) and IDP returnees (4%) report that they are not able to participate in decision-making, which is concerning as the ability to actively take part in decision-making in meetings is imperative vis-à-vis building community cohesion. Similarly, 98% of the non-displaced respondents think that IDP returnees should have the opportunity to participate in decision-making, but in regards

[132] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, woman community representative.
[133] UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur.

to camp IDPs, the proportion of non-displaced thinking that they should be able to partake in decision-making drops somewhat to 90%. When it comes to perspectives on nomads, the picture changes significantly are only 29% agree with nomads participating in local decision making.

FIGURE 9: PERCEPTIONS OF PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING

	Non-displaced are asked to rate their agreement with below statements:			IDPs are asked to rate their agreement with below statement:	IDP-returnees are asked to rate their agreement with below statement:
	"IDP-returnees...	"Camp IDPs...	"Nomads...		
	...should have the opportunity to become leaders or participate in decision-making within the village"			"You are able to participate in decision-making in the village, or can lead on some issues such as service provision and conflict	
Strongly disagree	0%	2%	28%	1%	0%
Disagree	2%	8%	39%	13%	4%
Neutral	0%	0%	2%	1%	0%
Agree	45%	39%	11%	30%	37%
Strongly agree	53%	51%	18%	55%	60%

As discussed above, findings show that significant proportions of Nertiti residents own a mobile phone, especially among the men.[134] In regards to peacebuilding, mobile phones may present an opportunity to share information or messaging relevant to peacebuilding. The Tadoud programme, for instance, equipped community leaders with mobile phones, credit and facilitated contact between leaders so that in times of crisis they were able to communicate and resolve issues even when in two different locations. With the current fuel shortages, communication by phone might be easier to facilitate than face to face meetings.

The area-level analysis explored collaboration and interaction between community members, the local government and local authorities. Respondents state the Native Administration is the main channel between the community and any government departments. Respondents indicate that there is good coordination and interaction between the local government, the Native Administration and community members,[135] but that logistics and lack of finances are the main obstacles to providing services. Some suggest that there is a gap in relations between government institutions and the community potentially suggesting that the Native Administration is unable to be the bridge between the two.[136]

Most respondents say that if there any grievances in the village, turning to the Native Administration or other local leaders for help would be a potential mechanism to make the local government aware, however, for residents to approach different service committees (Water or Education Committees) would be a better avenue.[137] Respondents flagged that in order to encourage community members and civil society organisations to work collaborate with the local government and foster greater accountability, training would be needed. Both awareness-raising among the community and training

[134] Among the non-displaced and returnee male population 38–40% own a mobile, while 50% of nomads have a mobile. A lower proportion of IDPs have access to a mobile phone (28%), and lower proportions of women across all groups report owning a mobile phone (8–20%).
[135] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, community representative and Health official.
[136] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, Land Use Office official.
[137] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, Education and Health officials.

to improve the capacity of community members and civil society is required if they are to hold the local government to account vis-à-vis provision of services etc.[138]

[138] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, nomad community representative, Native Administration, Land Use Office and Education officials.

ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING: AVAILABILITY AND ACCESS TO SERVICES

To assess adequate of living, this analysis draws on indicators such as availability and access to education, health, water, and sanitation. For displaced persons to enjoy an adequate standard of living is important for durable solution. By benchmarking against the non-displaced population's level of access to services, the analysis can shed light on possible challenges and vulnerabilities linked to IDPs' and returnees' displacement as well as identify broader area-level development challenges, which affect service delivery to all population groups.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Primary school attendance (net) is highest among non-displaced children (66% among boys and girls), while only one-third among IDP children of primary age attend primary school. Among IDP returnees, there is a greater difference between the sexes with 44% of girls in primary school and only 29% of boys. Similar numbers are seen among the damrah children (42% of boys and 25% girls—the lowest across all groups). Reasons for not attending include mainly costs, but also long distances to school and education not regarded as a priority.**
- **Access to health service is a challenge for all population groups in Nertiti locality. A large majority of all groups faced challenges when accessing healthcare (86–92%), although a somewhat smaller proportion among IDPs (80%). The main obstacle flagged by respondents is the cost of service or medicine, followed by lack or poor quality of services, while long distances to reach health centres is a key barrier for the nomad population (31%).**
- **Overall provision of healthcare is poor in Nertiti locality with few health centres in operation, while those that are lack skilled staff and medicines. Access to healthcare is also low among nomads, but there is some healthcare provision in areas near damrahs and along animal migration routes. The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is very low, but especially among the returnee (6%) and non-displaced (8%) population. Long distances combined with an insecure environment is reported to impacts access to healthcare, especially for women.**
- **Access to improved drinking water is far better for IDPs (61%), while non-displaced (33%), returnees (18%) and merely 7% of nomad households rely on improved drinking water sources. Most depend on unimproved water sources including surface water, unprotected wells and springs. Access to improved sanitation is similarly low with only access for 3–12%, while the vast majority defecate in the open.**
- **A great majority of IDPs (79%) and returnees (75%) do not have any personal documentation. The area-level information suggests that administrative processes linked to land registration do require personal documentation. In contrast, 30% of nomads and 51% of non-displaced residents report not holding personal documentation.**

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Overall, access to school for children between 6 and 18 years of age is highest among the non-displaced population (73% of boys and 72% of girls). IDPs have a lower enrolment rate (47% of the boys and 54% of the girls), while enrolment among IDP returnees is even lower (with 36% of the boys and 41% of the girls). Interestingly, in none of the aforementioned groups, does the data point to lower enrolment among girls compared to boys. The one exception is the children in the damrahs, where significantly less girls attend school (25%). The area-level data is in line with the household survey findings, as the official figures show that the student body is made up of 46% boys and 54% girls. Girls' access to education has reportedly steadily increased and is now higher than among male students. Area-level findings suggest that some school-aged children and youths have had to leave school due to Sudan's economic crisis.

This trend of girls attending school to either the same or a higher degree compared to boys (with the exception of the nomads), is reversed when looking at attendance of informal school (Kwalva). Boys attend informal school (instead of formal) at a significantly higher rate than girls; the exception here again being children in damrahs where boys and girls attend to a very similar extent. Adding the proportions who attend formal and informal school, and looking at the remaining proportion out of any school, the data point to more girls being completely out of education.

FIGURE 10: FORMAL AND INFORMAL SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AMONG CHILDREN 6–18 YEARS—FOR THE YEAR 2019–2020



Zooming in on access to primary education among the children aged 6–13 years of age (net attendance); the above trends remain similar: non-displaced children have the highest rates (66% among boys and girls), more or less half as many among IDPs attend primary school (namely one-third of boys and girls). Among IDP returnees, there is a greater difference between the sexes with 44% of girls in primary school and only 29% of boys. Very similar numbers are seen among the damrah children (42% of boys and 25% girls—the lowest across all groups). According to key informants, both IDPs and nomads have good access to education, while IDP communities are reported to have the worst access to education, but this picture is at odds with the findings of the household survey.

FIGURE 11: NET PRIMARY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE (6–13 YEARS OLD)



The reported reasons for not attending are rather similar across the groups: a significant proportion (between one-third and half of households) reports that the children are 'too young to attend' (however the age group in question is the school-age group of 6–13 years). The next most important reason is the lack of financial resources amongst all groups besides the nomads, who instead highlight reasons linked to education not being a priority, long distances to school and lack of information on how to enrol. Primary education is in theory free of charge, but in reality, fees are often charged for attending school. Fees are said to cover the cost of running of the school plus act as incentives for volunteer teaching assistants.[139] Among IDP returnees, reasons also include long distances to school and closure of schools due to conflict.[140]

In Nertiti locality, there are a total of 45 primary schools; 34 mixed schools plus 6 boys' and 5 girls' schools. According to the Education Officer in Nertiti, several villages do not have access to primary education because of long distances to the nearest school.[141] Many factors that come into play when assessing the quality of education. One of the main reported challenges is a lack of trained teachers, however, official data indicate that there is a total of 503 teachers, of whom 89% are trained. The teacher-student ratio is also relatively good (1:38), although it is said that the ratio varies significantly between schools. Overall, there is a lack of resources and equipment in schools including an absence or shortage of chairs and desks. There is also a lack of school buildings and in some places, classes are conducted in open spaces or under trees to shade the students. Apart from a lack of classrooms, offices and furniture, many schools also struggle to provide accommodation for teachers that are not from the local area.

Most schools are reported to have a fence, but many are made from local materials that have to be renewed on a regular basis. Most schools are without water and sanitation, which means students have to defecate in the open and drink from open hafirs. A lack of separate sanitation facilities for boys and girls is regarded as a disincentive for girls to attend school. Books, pens, pencils have to be purchased by the students' families.

When it comes to secondary school attendance, the rates are much lower: among the non-displaced 28% boys and 19% girls (14–18 years) attend secondary school; among the IDPs population, one out of five (boys and girls) attend secondary school, while among IDP returnees the rates are lower as 14% boys and 13% girls are enrolled in secondary school. Among the nomad population, no one attends secondary school. Area-level information shows that there are 10 secondary schools in Nertiti

[139] UNICEF Sudan Education Team insights. UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.
[140] 'Fear of COVID' was also included in the potential answers but was not mentioned to a significant degree by any group.
[141] Kaila village (Gildo Administrative Unit), Domo village (Sector North), Hai Elomda and Hai Garsilla (Nertiti Administrative Unit).

locality. Half are located in Nertiti town, while another is located in Saga close to the border with North Darfur and a further two secondary schools in both Toor and Gildo.

ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES

The findings show that access to health services is a challenge for all surveyed groups. A large majority among IDPs (83%), returnees (83%), returnees (77%) and nomads (80%) attempted to access health services in the past 6 months, among whom a great majority faced challenges accessing healthcare. 92% of non-displaced, 89% of nomads and 86% of returnees faced challenges when accessing healthcare, and a somewhat smaller proportion of IDPs (80%). All groups specified the barriers to accessing healthcare to include the cost of services or medicine too high, low quality or availability of services at the health facility or pharmacy and long distances to reach health services. The challenges cited match the most reported barriers to healthcare in the 2020 multi-sector needs assessment that covers all Sudan's states.[142] When asked to identity the most significant obstacle to accessing healthcare, a majority of nomads, returnee and non-displaced residents point to cost (44–54%). For IDPs, availability and quality of services is the most important obstacle (51%), whereas for the other population groups it is the second most important barrier to accessing healthcare (nomads (16%) and returnees and non-displaced population (37%). Distance to health facilities is an issue for 15% of returnees, while this represents a barrier to about one-third of the nomad population (31%).[143]

The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator (SDG 3.1.2) and is often used as a proxy for measuring access to healthcare. The vast majority of births are attended by a relative, friend or traditional birth attendant.[144] The proportion of births attended by skilled personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) is overall low. It is highest among the IDP population (20%) but this figure drops to 13% among nomads and even further among the non-displaced and returnee population—among whom respectively 8% and 6% of births are attended by skilled health personnel.[145] IDPs that give birth assisted by skilled personnel mostly resided in towns, while fewer mothers giving birth in camps or informal settlements were attended to by skilled health practitioners.[146]

According to the area-level analysis, there is a general lack of healthcare, which impacts residents' ability to access healthcare. Returnees and non-displaced residents, however, are deemed to have less access to health services because of distances to health services combined with the insecure environment. Healthcare informants point out that these factors especially impact women's access to health services and pregnant women in particular, which is reflected in the household survey results. Nertiti locality has 22 health centres spread across its Administrative Units and the health representative interviewed in Nertiti flag that the residents in the villages of Kuwilla, Domo, Dibling and Engra face particular long distances to reach health centres.[147] In April 2020, Unicef in collaboration with the Ministry of Health (MoH) conducted a comprehensive survey on health services

[142] The Sudan 2020 Multi-sector Needs Assessment show that the two most common barriers to accessing healthcare is 'lack of medicines at the health facility' followed by 'cost of services and/or medicine too high/cannot afford to pay'. REACH (2021) Sudan: 2020 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (March, 2021).

[143] Distance is identified as an obstacle to healthcare by 8% of non-displaced residents and 1% of IDPs.

[144] Note that the total number of births captured by the survey was low; non-displaced (91 births), IDPs (59 births), returnee (66 births) and nomads (52 births).

[145] In comparison to the three localities in East Darfur, the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is low—for Yassin, Sheiria and Assalaya, the proportion was 20%.

[146] 10 of 27 of IDP mothers giving birth in town areas were assisted by skilled personnel in contrast to merely 3 of 22 births taking place in camps or informal settlements.

[147] Villagers residing in Kuwilla village located in the eastern part of Nertiti locality have to travel 8 hours to reach the nearest health centre, while distances from Dibling and Engra involve 3–4 hours journey time.

in Nertiti locality. The healthcare survey results have not yet been shared, and hence the key informant was unable to share plans for making health services more accessible to Nertiti locality residents.

The household survey shows that nomad point to distance to health centres as a key obstacle to accessing healthcare. The area-level analysis does flag that nomads face obstacles as a result of distances to health centres, however, in Nertiti locality health facilities have been specifically constructed to serve the nomad communities. A healthcare facility in Daba Nayra (West Gildo) serves the nomad residents, while others are located close to migratory routes—Tour and Eraideeba (south Nertiti), Jebel Ahmar and Khor Ramla (west Nertiti), Umharaz and Dabanga and Garni (north-west Nertiti), and Saga Dir (north Nertiti). In addition, vaccine campaigns reach the nomad communities along the migratory routes and in the damrahs. Reportedly, some nomads have also been trained in first aid and kitted out with a supply of basic medicines.

Apart from a lack of health centres, but many of the health centres are reportedly not in operation. According to key informants, only 8 health centres are in operation and able to treat patients and many lack medicines. Furthermore, 3 of the health facilities only treat patients with private health insurance.[148] According to the MoH, there are 6 doctors, 15 medical assistants and 35 nurses treating approximately 800 patients in Nertiti locality each week. MoH officials point to a number of challenges including inadequate budgets and a lack of trained healthcare personnel and vehicles. According to key informants, these challenges have to be addressed jointly by the government and NGOs. When it comes to rating healthcare services, about one-third say they are satisfied with services, whilst 48% of IDPs report that they are content with the provision of healthcare. Non-displaced (35%), returnees (38%) and a smaller proportion among the nomad communities (28%) are satisfied with the healthcare services on offer.[149]

ACCESS TO WATER AND SANITATION

The household survey measured access to improved sanitation and improved drinking water sources. Access to improved drinking water is far better for the IDP population.[150] 61% of IDPs report having access to improved drinking water sources in comparison to the non-displaced (33%), returnee (18%). In stark contrast, merely 7% of nomad households. The area-level analysis also points to IDPs enjoying good access to water mainly from hand pumps and mini water yards.

FIGURE 12: HOUSEHOLDS BY ACCESS TO IMPROVED SOURCES OF WATER

[148] Health facilities in operation include: Nertiti hospital, Health Centre 8 in Nertiti town, Gildo, Kori Fal and Kutti health centres plus three Health Insurance Centres located in Tour, Nertiti and Gildo.
[149] The ratings of healthcare services seem high in the context of low service provision, however, high numbers of respondents do report obstacles to accessing services.
[150] Improved water sources include piped water, boreholes, tube wells, protection dug wells, protected springs, rainwater plus packaged or delivered water.

The remaining households rely on unimproved drinking water sources. Among the nomad population, 45% rely on surface water, and respectively 17% and 31% get water from unprotected dug wells and springs. Significant proportions of non-displaced and returnee communities rely on unprotected water sources; non-displaced (26%) and a high proportion of returnees (44%) depend on surface water as a water source; 15–17% get their water from unprotected springs, while non-displaced (17%) and returnees (21%) rely on unprotected dug wells for water. Also, about one in ten of returnee (9%) and non-displaced (11%) households rely on water trucking for water. Area-level findings indicate that water is available in Nertiti town, but that access to water is more limited in villages. Many villagers have long distances to travel to reach water sources and water is harder to find during the dry season. Insecurity is also said to have a bearing on access to water especially in return areas, where returnees struggle to access water sources as fetching water often involves travelling long distances.[151] Access to water sources is reportedly particularly limited in 20 villages in the areas of Baldong and Katroom, from where villagers have to travel all the way to Nertiti Town or Tour where the nearest water sources are situated.[152] The villages of Arkis, Eraideeba and Dilaiba are also reported to be far from water sources. Plans are being developed to set Water, Environment and Sanitation (WES) committees in several places including Khor Ramla and Gildo. The plan is for WES committees to manage access and maintenance of mini water yards, will also be tasked with raising awareness around hygiene and partake in health and hygiene campaigns.[153]

Judging whether their households have adequate water to meet their needs varies. Among the sedentary population groups, 74–79% are satisfied with the amount of water available in contrast to 59% of nomads, who deem the amount of water sufficient. Similarly, only half of the nomad households (52%) say they are satisfied with the amount of water for their livestock, while among the sedentary groups the satisfaction ranges between 72-78%, among the households that have livestock (50-57% of households have livestock). In general, water is reported to be scarce according to informants and seen to be insufficient to cover the consumption by livestock and people, which leads to tensions between pastoralists and farmers. Access to water is particularly acute for both animals and people during the dry season.[154] A WASH representative says that there is a need for funding, but also that there is a lack of awareness among communities of how to better preserve and enhance water sources. To improve access to water for all Nertiti water users, communities themselves need to work together with the government and NGOs that specialize in WASH and Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). Increasing water availability through groundwater recharging and water harvesting can help reduce competition between different water users. And conflict resolution and managing competing water needs is an important role for catchment area Water or WES committees.

[151] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, community representative—youth.
[152] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, WASH representative.
[153] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, WASH representative.
[154] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, women, Native Administration, local government, and WASH representative.

FIGURE 13: ACCESS TO IMPROVED SOURCES OF SANITATION



The household survey also assessed access to improved sanitation. All population groups in Nertiti locality have extremely low access to improved sanitation—only between 3–12% while the vast majority defecate in the open.[155] Especially nomads have little access to improved sanitation (3%) in damrahs. The practice of open defecation is a major problem as water and sanitation-related diseases are one of the leading causes of death for children under five caused by diarrhoea. It is also a cause of acute malnutrition associated with repeated diarrhoea or worm infections, which is why WES committees are also tasked with hygiene and sanitation promotion. The low access to improved sanitation is reflected in equally low levels of satisfaction with sanitation services as only 3–12% are satisfied according to the household survey.[156]

ACCESS TO PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION

The survey asked all persons if they possess any official documentation. The proportion that has personal documentation varies widely between the different population groups. 30% of nomads and half of the non-displaced population (51%) report not having any type of personal documentation, whereas 79% of IDPs and 75% of returnees have no personal documentation. This is in contrast to East Darfur, where household survey findings showed that only between 20–27% of residents in all groups did not possess any form of personal identification.

A majority of the surveyed nomadic pastoralists possessed a national ID. The fact that a relatively high proportion of nomads taking part in the survey hold a national ID is likely the result of recent efforts by the Ministry of Interior. Three years ago, the ministry started an initiative to provide nomads with national ID cards. Most of those with personal documentation hold a national ID card, while birth certificates are held by a smaller proportion (6–24%).

Registering births is important for ensuring the fulfilment of human rights and an SDG indicator (16.9) because it is regarded as the starting point for the recognition and protection of every person's right to identity and existence. The findings show that very few children under 5 have a birth certificate. Again, the highest proportion is seen among nomads (14%), followed by non-displaced residents (11%), while only 7% of IDP and 5% of returnee children under 5 possess a birth certificate.

[155] Improved sanitation facility includes pit latrines with slab (shared or not), ventilated pit latrine or flush latrine.
[156] The slightly higher proportion of IDPs satisfied with sanitation services are due to a number of IDP households residing in towns, where sanitation is better.

FIGURE 14: PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION HELD



The area-level information suggests that documentation is not necessary for accessing education and health services, but that administrative processes linked to land registration do require personal documentation. Before the Ministry of Interior national ID card initiative, many nomadic pastoralists did not possess personal documentation, which made it harder for nomads to own residential land.

Respondents with no documentation point to one key reason for not having documentation. Most highlight the lack of administrative services in their area as an obstacle. Non-displaced (75%), IDPs (90%), returnees and nomads (82%) report there to be 'no office to obtain documentation in the area'. Smaller proportions cite lack of knowledge on how to obtain such documents as key reason. Looking at satisfaction with official government services (courts, government offices issuing official documents etc.), extremely low proportions among IDPs and returnees (7%) say they are satisfied. In other words, 93% of the IDP and returnee population in Nertiti locality are dissatisfied with these government services. Significant proportions of on-displaced and nomad Nertiti residents are also not giving government services a positive review, as respectively 82% and 76% are dissatisfied but it is considerably higher than among IDP and returnee communities.

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

Displaced persons have a right to make informed and voluntary decisions regarding what durable solution is right for them. Understanding preferences and the perspectives behind the intentions for the future will help relevant actors to support IDPs returnees and IDPs to realise their preferred durable solutions. Displaced households—whether in displacement or in the return location—determine whether return, settling elsewhere, local integration or a mix of options is the preferred option. This study employs a wide lens and examines the preferences for the future not only amongst IDPs but also amongst IDP returnees, whose return might not have proved durable, as well as amongst non-displaced households and nomads, to also understand the general mobility in the area.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **39% of IDPs prefer to leave their current location, whilst only small proportions of non-displaced, returnees and nomads want to relocate elsewhere. Half of the IDPs have concrete plans to move within the 12 months following the survey.**
- **Key 'push' for wanting to leave among IDPs include access to their home, whereas 14% point to concerns around security in their current location. Security is also a key 'pull' factor as more than half (63%) of those wanting to stay cite security. For those wanting to stay, access to home is also a prime concern (11%).**
- **Obstacles to leaving as reported by IDPs include lack of security (35%), lack of funds or productive assets to re-establish their livelihood in a different location (28%), while 32% point to dangers posed by explosive remnants of war in their area of origin as a key obstacle to return.**
- **The area-level analysis also emphasises that security is a key factor that influences IDPs' decision to return. Although land ownership and access to basic services are important, the security situation is of paramount concern and is a precondition for return.**
- **Exploring driving factors behind intentions, show that the female-headed households, food insecure households as well as households reporting conflicts linked to current agricultural land have a higher likelihood to prefer leaving. Furthermore, bigger proportions of IDPs residing in towns or peri-urban areas (compared to those in camps) and those that primarily rely on crop farming (instead of wages/salaries and other sources) intend to leave.**

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

What preferences for the future do IDPs and other population groups have? Findings show 39% of IDPs consider leaving their current location, while a small proportion among non-displaced (8%), returnees (6%) and nomads (4%) are considering relocating elsewhere.

Households' intentions paint a picture of how people view their future, therefore, households were asked in more detail if they have concrete plans to move. Approximately half of IDPs (17%) intending to leave had plans to do so within the 12 months following the survey, which indicate more concrete plans. Almost all IDPs (99%) wishing to leave wanted to return to their place of origin.

The 'pull' factors—the reasons for wanting to stay—that households themselves highlight centre around safety and being in their home area. 48% of IDPs intending to leave, report the key reason for leaving is a lack of access to their home, whilst 14% cite lack of security in the area they are currently living in Nertiti locality. Asking IDPs why they would prefer to stay in their current location, a majority (63%) say that safety in their current area is the main reason. 11% report access to home indicating that they currently live relatively close to their place of origin. When households are asked about the main obstacle to moving, three key issues are flagged by similar proportions of IDP respondents. Among IDPs wanting to move, 35% cite a lack of security, 28% say that they lack funds or productive assets to re-establishing their business or livelihood, whilst 32% point to the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) as the main obstacle to pursue moving. ERW is reported to be especially acute in the area of Jebel Marra where a lot of armed hostilities have occurred involving the Sudan Armed Forces. In response to the ERW contamination in areas of Jebel Marra, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is especially focusing on this area but some areas have been inaccessible as they are SLA/AW strongholds.

The area-level analysis explored, through key informant interviews, factors that influence IDPs' decision to return in each locality. Respondents highlight that security is a precondition for IDPs to return, and when asked to identify the most important factor influencing IDPs' return, all respondents say that security affects the decision to return the most. Availability and access to services are seen to play a key role in IDPs' decision to return 'because they can lay the foundation for settlement', but respondents emphasise that the overall security situation needs to be addressed before IDPs can return.[157] All interviewed respondents also state that land ownership strongly impacts IDPs' decision to return, but that this involves addressing the issue of 'new settlers' that are now using the land. 'Without resolving the disputes over land ownership in this locality, it is difficult for the IDPs to decide to return to their original villages.'[158] Some respondents think beyond security and collection of illegal weapons and state that return cannot happen without reconciliation and peace. A youth leader simply states, 'without peace they [IDPs] cannot return'.[159]

EXPLORING DRIVING FACTORS FURTHER

What else does the survey data tell us about intentions for the future? What characterises the households that prefer to stay and those that want to leave? The analysis tried to understand what drives IDPs' preferences and explored potential predictors for IDPs wanting to leave and identified factors related to household structure and land conflict.[160] Following characteristics influence IDP's decision to leave:

- Firstly, among IDP households, female-headed family units prefer to leave to a higher degree than male-headed households. 48% of female-headed households prefer to leave versus 33% of households headed up by a man.

[157] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, local NGO representative.

[158] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, Native Administration key informant.

[159] Central Darfur, Nertiti locality, local NGO representative.

[160] A regression analysis was done to check whether any of the indicator (dummy) variables affect the intensions to leave. The result of the analysis suggests that if the household is headed by a woman, the household has experiences conflicts linked to their current agricultural land and if the household is food insecure, it is more likely that the household wants to leave. All estimated effects were all statistically significant.

- Secondly, if a household reports **conflict or issues related to their current farming land**, a larger proportion wants to leave. Amongst IDPs who report conflict concerning their land, 65% prefer to leave as opposed to 41% of IDP households that do not report conflict in relation to their current agricultural land.

- Thirdly, there is also a link between IDPs' **type of settlement** and the intention to leave. IDPs residing in towns or peri-urban areas are more likely to want to leave—48% of IDPs living in towns or informal settlement on edge of towns wants to leave compared to 27% of IDPs residing in camps.

- When it comes to livelihoods, a bigger proportion of **IDPs who rely on crop farming** as their main source of livelihood prefer to leave (53%) compared to IDP households that primarily rely on salaries or wages (4%).

- Lastly, households that experience **food insecurity** want to leave to a higher degree than households that do not. 45% of food insecure IDP households versus 22% of food secure IDP households prefer to leave.

- Among those IDP and non-displaced residents that experience **robbery or damage to assets,** there is not a stronger tendency to leave compared to those that do not experience these types of security incidents.

CONCLUSIONS: PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND PEACEBUILDING

NERTITI, CENTRAL DARFUR: HOW WAS PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTIONS ANALYSED?

Durable solutions for IDPs living in displacement is part of building peace in Darfur. At the same time, peace is also central to achieving solutions for the displaced population that are durable—the two aspects are intrinsically linked. It is impossible to envisage stability and security in the long-term without sustainable return of those who fled the conflict.

This study paid attention to a number of areas crucial to peace and durable solutions for IDPs and IDP returnees. Importantly, the analysis included the views and concerns of Nertiti nomad communities, whose perspectives need to be mainstreamed into conflict analysis and any peacebuilding approach informing future activities—whether with a humanitarian, development or durable solution focus.

As per the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, 'a durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement'. It is of central importance to focus on the non-discriminatory and voluntary nature of solutions, and to measure local integration— whether in the place where people have found refuge or upon return—as a *process* towards overcoming vulnerabilities linked to their displacement. In other words, durable solutions are not defined or achieved merely by the geographic features of the solutions outlined in the IASC Framework—to return, stay or settle elsewhere. What is key is the principles of non-discrimination and the voluntary nature of reaching long-term solutions.

The approach designed for this study is to measure progress towards durable solutions by conducting a **comparative analysis of the socio-economic situation of the displaced populations against the non-displaced**, across the key criteria outlined in the IASC Framework. By identifying the key differences in the situations of displaced and non-displaced, the analysis has pointed to areas where IDPs and IDP returnees are worse off and can be assumed to still face displacement-linked vulnerabilities. In this way, the analysis pinpoints the key obstacles to reaching solutions.

To strengthen the understanding of the locality and peacebuilding capacities, the methodology approach combines the population analysis (based on household survey results) with the area-level analysis of the locality that looks at conflict dynamics, local conflict resolution mechanisms, the capacity of the police and courts to uphold the rule of law, land and resource management structures, availability and capacity of services etc. Lastly, it is critical to also understand the preferences and plans for the future that displaced populations have and the factors that drive their intentions.

The guiding questions for the analysis have been:

- To what extent are the displaced populations, who have returned and those who are still in displacement, progressing towards durable solutions? And what are the key obstacles and opportunities in this process?
- What are their own preferences for the future and what is driving these intentions?
- How are these integration processes of displaced groups interlinked with the broader peacebuilding process at the locality level?

The above questions were addressed by analysing the following:

- What is the **rule of law** situation in the locality? Do people feel safe and are they able to access the police and courts?
- What land **governance structures and dispute resolution mechanisms** are in place? How are conflicts and disputes solved within the community?
- What is the **housing, land and property** situation in the place of displacement and return for both displaced and non-displaced households including nomads?
- How is the **standard of living** for the different populations in terms of access to basic services and livelihoods?
- How **socially cohesive** are the communities, to what extent are different groups participating in decision-making, and how active and equipped are civil society organisations?

PEACEBUILDING CONSIDERATIONS

Rule of law, conflict and local conflict resolutions mechanisms: Central Darfur has continued to experience significant levels of armed conflict—especially the localities of Nertiti, Golo and Rokiro, which are key strongholds of the SLA-AW. Clashes between the SLA-AW and SAF or involving SLA-AW and splinter groups have created an overall insecure environment that affects civilian life in many aspects. Key informants highlight that access to education and healthcare is impacted because accessing services involves travelling through insecure areas, and so are livelihoods and daily tasks like fetching water and firewood that similarly necessitate moving beyond village or town areas. Members of the SLA-AW are involved in cattle-rustling, which often involves violence and frequently lead to retaliatory attacks on IDPs and sedentary farming community.

The area is characterised by general lawlessness, which is reflected in the survey results on security incidents. All types of security incidents, robbery, damage to property and physical as well as verbal threats, are common and experienced by all population groups. Robbery is the most frequent crime for all population groups, as non-displaced (53%), IDPs (64%), returnees (59%) and nomads (59%) report having experienced at least one robbery during the last year before the survey. 63% of nomads have experienced damage to property or livestock during the last 12 months and indicate that such incidents occur frequently. Area-level information suggests that members of the SLA-AW are often involved in cattle-rustling. Cattle theft incidents often turn violent and can lead to retaliatory attacks on IDPs and sedentary farming communities. Apart from robbery, high proportions of non-displaced, IDPs and returnee Nertiti residents say they face physical and verbal threats (47–57%). Amidst these high levels of crime experienced by all population groups, only a minority turns to the police for help. Among returnees (11%), IDPs (14%) and non-displaced (20%) report to the police, whilst one-third of the surveyed nomads report to the police (38%).

Conflict in Nertiti is predominantly linked to land and involves boundary conflicts, livestock migratory routes, but violent acquisition and unlawful occupation of land is a major issue for IDPs. 5% of all population groups report conflict linked to the farmland they are currently accessing, but of the 94% of IDPs that are not accessing the land they cultivated before being displaced, 61% point to conflict issues as the reason, which are predominantly due to ‘unlawful occupation’ (71%). When it comes to local conflict resolution mechanisms as an alternative to report incidents to the police, only about a quarter among all population groups report security incidents to the Native Administration or a committee (22–25%). And similar to police involvement, satisfaction with how an issue was resolved

was low—23% of IDPs said 'the issue had been resolved and they were satisfied' along with non-displaced (16%), returnees (18%) and nomads (15%). Conflict involving access to water is perceived as less of a conflict trigger in comparison to conflict over land, however, if disputes or conflict were to occur a majority of Nertiti communities do not have a Water Committee dedicated to managing the competing needs of water users. Non-displaced households (44%), returnees (63%) and nomads (73%) say they do not have Water Committee to manage access and mediate in disputes over water, and among communities that do have such a committee, respondents report low satisfaction with how issues are resolved especially among nomad communities (16%).

Livelihoods and competition over natural resources: The household survey shows that some nomad households residing in damrahs rely on crop farming (14%) and 33% have access to agricultural land, as some households rely on crop farming as a secondary source of livelihood.[161] In addition, 11% of returnees and non-displaced report having access to grazing land. Hence, the data indicates that households are adopting a mix of livelihood strategies, and the diversification makes the households both more productive but also more resilient to livelihood shocks.[162] The household survey captured that conflict over land involves boundary conflicts between farmers and also expansion into livestock migratory routes. Darfur studies have documented degradation of natural resources, which in turn led to an expansion of the land cultivated, which involved clearing forested areas that were sources of livestock fodder.[163] Changing cultivation patterns, from leaving agricultural land fallow to continuous cultivation reduced the fertility, means farmers require more land, which in turn, is intensifying competition for land plus leading to further degradation of agricultural land.[164] In general, conflict and blocking of livestock migratory routes have meant that many pastoralists no longer practise long-distance mobility. This often means that nomad communities choose to stay in areas they consider safe and practice short or medium distance mobility.[165] For the livestock to range over less land also asserts additional pressure on land. Community sessions could offer a forum to explore these dynamics in more detail.

Local conflict resolutions mechanisms: In terms of local conflict resolution mechanisms and the Native Administration's and committees' capacity to mediate effectively in disputes and conflict, these results are worrisome. The prevalence of small arms not only leads to an increase in criminal activity but also constitutes a key challenge because it makes it difficult for the Native Administration to assert its authority.[166] Key informants emphasize that committees and the Native Administration needs to be supported and empowered to be effective at mediating conflict. Especially, the issue of unlawful occupation appears to present a particular challenge as land was offered to the 'new settlers' by the previous regime. The Native Administration and committees have never previously been tasked with resolving issues of this magnitude and political significance but rather focused on boundary disputes between farmers and conflicts related to migratory routes.

Women: Local conflict resolution mechanisms and committees do not appear to include women representatives, and women key informants describe women as marginalized with no interaction between women and the local authorities or NGOs. Women account for half of the population in Nertiti

[161] This data is based on the number of nomad households that report crop farming as either their main or secondary source of livelihoods.
[162] Fitzpatrick, & Young (2016) Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur.
[163] Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.
[164] Osman, A.M.K., Young, H. Houser, R.F., and Coates, J. C. (2013)) Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur.
[165] Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.
[166] Danish Refugee Council (2020) Conflict analysis, Central Darfur, Sudan.

locality and are important conflict actors in their communities. Although seldom directly involved in fighting, women partake by blocking pastoralists from accessing water or instigating men to use violence in Hakamat songs. Hence, peacebuilding efforts will need to involve women's active participation. [167]

The Juba Peace Agreement specifically recognises the Native Administration in relation to administering land, which may help strengthen this institution when it comes to land management and arbitration in disputes. The agreement also stipulates the setting up of the Commission for the Development of the Nomads with a mandate to improve the nomadic pastoralist sector plus manage relations between farmers and nomadic pastoralists plus the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, which is tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed land. The establishment of such commissions could help mitigate conflict over land and grazing in Darfur and potentially be a key tool in peacebuilding.

Youth: In Nertiti locality, 34–37% of non-displaced, IDPs and returnee female youths are not in education, employment or training but this figure is drastically higher among nomads (62%). These young people are engaged in domestic chores but are at risk of remaining outside the labour market, since they are not receiving training or education, nor working in subsistence farming or gaining practical work experience. A recent UNDP study on Darfur flags that both male and female youths join armed groups mainly driven by unemployment and poverty, and hence the NEET rate is cause for concern.

Peaceful co-existence and social cohesion: the household survey findings point to positive attitudes towards IDPs and returnees but much lower acceptance of nomads in regards to equal access to services as well as partaking in decision-making. 60% of non-displaced households do not welcome nomads settling in their village, 67% do not think nomads should participate in decision-making, while 33% believe they should not have equal access to services. Group acceptance is very different in comparison to acceptance of the nomad communities in the three localities in East Darfur, in Yassin, Assalaya and Sheirin localities, where 91% say that nomads are welcome to access services, to settle in their village (71%) and to take part in local activities (85%). How the different population groups accept and engage with each other in Nertiti is an impediment to durable solutions and peacebuilding, but can be actively addressed by setting up forums, like committees with representatives from all population groups, that specifically aims to facilitate inclusive governance and make joint decisions by consensus.

Nomads: There is provision of services that target nomad communities living in damrahs within Nertiti locality, but nomads still have particularly low access to education and improved water and sanitation. Access to education among children 6–13 years of age is the lowest across all groups—42% of boys and 25% of girls. Access to improved water and sanitation is low for all population groups, but nomads have the lowest access as merely 3% of the damrah households say they have access to improved sanitation and 7% to improved water sources. Long-term processes of economic and political marginalization of Darfur by the central government in Sudan is well documented, and how this led to resentment and encouraged many to join the armed resistance, which in turn, led to war in 2003. The marginalization resulted in inequality and underdevelopment in the shape of poor education, healthcare, transport, and other services affecting *all* communities in Darfur, but not to the same

[167] UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur

extent.[168] That Darfuri pastoralist nomad communities were sidelined to an even greater extent through active and passive neglect of pastoralist groups, is perhaps less known as it took place within the wider marginalization of Darfur and other peripheral regions.[169] The neglect of nomad pastoralists' rights to veterinary services, healthcare and education affected their relationship with sedentary communities and was a factor in the conflict. In the light of this history of marginalization, providing services to all Darfuri communities on an equitable basis will be an important factor for social cohesion between communities.

TO WHAT EXTENT ARE IDPs LOCALLY INTEGRATING?

Localized displacement: Displacement in Nertiti is localized, as the majority of IDPs (96%) in Nertiti are displaced from within the locality. Despite not being significantly far away from their village of origin, 95% of IDP households report not having retained access to the same land they farmed before displacement. And among this majority, 61% point to conflict linked land as the reason for not accessing the land, which is predominantly due to 'unlawful occupation (71%). IDPs do make regular trips back to their place of origin, as only 4% have never gone back to visit during the past 12 months to check on their land or dwelling. The fact that IDPs are still living in protracted displacement and cannot access their land in place of origin is both an obstacle to durable solutions, and also to peacebuilding as disputes over land is often cited as unresolved conflict, discrimination and injustice.

Land tenure insecurity: In Nertiti locality, the principal form of tenure is ownership, but renting or borrowing land at no cost is also common. Non-displaced (48%) own land, 28% rent and 23% borrow land for free, whilst merely 7% of IDPs own the land they cultivate. Amongst the IDP population, 43% is renting and 46% is borrowing land, hence, there is a significant difference when benchmarking against the non-displaced population and is a barrier for IDPs to progress towards durable solutions. It is unclear to which extent renting or borrowing land at no cost is less secure, and to what extent paying rent affects the income of the household, which should be explored further in the community engagement workshops.

Conflict and insecurity: Feeling unsafe during daylight hours is highest among IDPs (11%), and the proportion among IDPs that feel unsafe during the night is also the highest—41% feel unsafe whilst 8% feel very unsafe. Insecurity affects all population groups in Nertiti locality but robbery is reported by a higher proportion of IDPs (64%) by 5–9 percentage points and likewise is physical threats (57%). Security is both a 'push' and a 'pull' factor—among the 39% of IDPs that prefer to leave, 14% cite concerns around security where they are currently living. And among IDPs that want to stay, more than half (63%) point to security as the reason for staying. Thus, safety and security remain a key obstacle to their progress towards a solution, whether durable solutions take the form of local integration or return. Reporting security incidents to the Native Administration or the police is equally low among IDPs and other population groups. A little more than half do not report security incidents (56%), while only 14% report to the police. It is a challenge for the police and courts in Nertiti to uphold the rule of law in Netiti locality; partly due to the continued conflict and fighting between the SLA and government forces plus intra-group fighting between factions of the SLA and partly because of the limited capacity of the police force. 25% of IDPs report security incidents to the Native Administration

[168] Young, H. and Osman, A. K. (2006) Challenges to peace and recovery in Darfur. A situation analysis of the ongoing conflict and its continuing impact on livelihoods.

[169] For an in-depth study of marginalization of Darfuri pastoralist communities, see Young et al., 2009. The study specifically focuses on the Northern Rizaygat but many observations relate to other pastoralist communities as well. Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.

and IDPs' satisfaction with how an issue was resolved by the Native Administration is higher by 5–8 percentage points. Although a quarter of IDPs turn to Native Administration in case of security incidents and disputes, this institution may have a limited capacity to mediate in conflicts concerning the unlawful occupation of land.

Socio-economic situation of IDPs: When comparing the situation of IDPs with that of non-displaced households in terms of accessing services and access to employment, IDPs are better off when it comes to improved water sources and births attended by skilled health personnel. They are otherwise on par with the non-displaced population except for education, as only 33% of girls and 34% of boys are in education in comparison to 66% of the non-displaced population. In other words, being displaced appears not to worsen the adequate standard of living apart from IDP children's access to education.

Limited prospects for youth: NEET rates are similar for non-displaced and IDPs with particularly high rates among female youth (34%). This can place them at risk of not finding a way to integrate and establish livelihoods in their current location, while they also do not practise agricultural skills that would allow them to make a living from farming. Limited livelihood options for IDP female youths will increasingly be a key obstacle for them to find a durable solution whether they return or stay in their current location.

Household food security: The vast majority of Nertiti residents have experienced serious livelihood shocks the year preceding the data collection, including high food prices, COVID-19 restrictions and loss of employment or severely reduced income. Among IDPs, a higher proportion report (72%) not having enough food during the week preceding the survey when benchmarked against the non-displaced population (65%) but do not resort to high coping mechanisms to a greater extent.

Local participation and reconciliation mechanism: Overall, non-displaced communities welcome IDPs and IDPs report feeling accepted and welcome. A large proportion of IDPs say that they can participate in decision-making (86%), but only a small proportion reports having taken part in a reconciliation meeting in the last 6 months (29%), which is the lowest percentage among all the surveyed groups. Conflict resolution mechanisms are said to be inclusive of IDPs, but only 34% of IDPs report taking part in community meetings—again the lowest proportion among all groups. In comparison to other population groups, a bigger proportion of IDPs report having a Water Committee to manage access to water and mediate if disputes occur (74%).

IDPS' OWN PREFERENCES

The majority of IDPs (61%) prefer to stay in their current location, while 39% of IDPs prefer leaving their current location. What characterizes the households that want to leave their current location? A significant proportion of the families that prefer to leave are female-headed households as 48% of female-headed households prefer to leave compared against 33% of households that are headed by a man. More IDPs that are residing in urban or peri-urban areas want to leave (48%) in contrast to IDPs that live in camps (27%), and so do those IDPs that report conflict or issues linked to their current farmland—65% as opposed to 41% of IDP households that are not experiencing conflict over the land they cultivate. And lastly, half of the IDPs who rely on crop farming as their main livelihood (53%) prefer to leave in comparison to merely 4% of IDPs that chiefly depend on a wage or salary. The obstacles to leaving that IDPs themselves identify include lack of security (35%), the presence of

explosive remnants of war (ERW) and simply a lack of funds or productive assets to reestablish their business or livelihood.

TO WHICH EXTENT ARE IDP RETURNEES RE-INTEGRATING?

It is important to state that IDP returnees have not achieved a durable solution merely based on their physical return. Their progress towards a durable solution in their place of origin needs to be assessed, as is done with the IDPs in displacement**.**

Regained access to land & livelihoods: IDP returnees have managed to a high degree (79%) to regain or retain access to the same agricultural land they cultivated before displacement. A higher proportion among the returnee households report owning the land they cultivate (56%), compared to the non-displaced residents. Only 11% of returnees rent agricultural land in contrast to 28% of the non-displaced residents, while a further 23% borrow land at no cost. Hence, they have re-established their most important livelihood source upon return and are actually doing better than their non-displaced neighbours in terms of ownership of agricultural land. This is also reflected by the fact that the vast majority (94%) of IDP returnees report that they prefer to stay in their current location.

So, even though they have returned and have access to land, they have *not* overcome vulnerabilities linked to their displacement and key obstacles to achieving solutions persist. What are these main obstacles?

- **Safety and security:** IDP returnees report higher rates of security incidents including threats, robbery and damage to property and assets compared to the non-displaced population in Nertiti. 54% versus 47% of non-displaced residents experienced threats, while 42% of IDP returnees in contrast to 33% of the non-displaced residents reported damage to property and assets during the 12 months preceding the study. Safety and security affect all population groups in Nertiti locality, but impact IDP returnees to a higher degree and remain a key obstacle to re-integration.

- **Food security and coping:** IDP returnees are more vulnerable as a higher proportion are food insecure—72% of returnee households did not have enough food in the 7 days prior to the survey, but hardly none resort to 'high' coping strategies (1%). Not having enough food is likely linked to the insecurity and damage inflicted on property and assets (including crops), as well as the general shocks to livelihoods endured by all households such as high food and fuel prices plus the impact of COVID-19 restrictions.

- **Access to services:** Access to improved water sources and sanitation is particularly low for the IDP returnees, as 18% versus 33% of non-displaced residents have access to clean water. Provision of sanitation is poor for all and therefore a development challenge, but only 9% of returnees have access to improved sanitation. Access to education is an area where provision is considerably worse for IDP returnees—only 29% of boys and 44% of girls from returnee households attend school in comparison to 66% of both boys and girls from non-displaced families. Access to education is particularly low for IDP returnees and linked to their previously displacement.

- **Prospects of youth:** 9% of male youth from returnee communities are neither working, in training or enrolled in education. This is only marginally higher than among the non-displaced population,

which has a NEET ratio of 7% among male youths. 37% of returnee female youths are not working nor engaged in own use farming, while also not in education or training. Although this is only marginally higher than for the non-displaced population (34%), it is of concern because it poses a risk to the prospect of these youths to continue to reintegrate, if they have no skills.

- **Local participation and reconciliation mechanisms:** Inter-group perceptions are positive between non-displaced and returnees, although it is important to point out that only 33% of IDP returnees live in villages together with non-displaced residents. About half of IDP returnees (48%) take part in community meetings and a similar proportion (45%) have taken part in a reconciliation meeting in the last 6 months. Both types of meetings have been attended by a slightly higher percentage of returnees compared to non-displaced residents. Satisfaction with how local conflict resolution mechanisms address issues is low among returnees. Local conflict resolution mechanisms' ability to mediate in disputes need to be strengthened as pointed out by key informants, but also need to be joined up to higher levels of reconciliation and peacebuilding. In other words, there is a limit to the effectiveness of local conflict resolution mechanisms when it comes to addressing the overall security situation.

DATA TO INFORM GOVERNMENT-LED AND COMMUNITY DRIVEN PLANNING

The analysis points to specific displacement linked obstacles that IDPs face in Nertiti and upon return to their village of origin; these are linked primarily to the security situation and land tenure. The analysis also points to general development linked obstacles that all population groups in Nertiti locality are facing, such as the poor availability and capacity of basic services as well as employment prospects for youth. When diving into these obstacles to solutions, it is important to take into account, on the one hand, the capacities, skills and vulnerabilities of the populations, which vary not only by displacement status but also by age and sex. And on the other hand, the governance structures in Nertiti, the existing community-based organizations and the wider peacebuilding process.

IDPs uprooted by conflict and displacement affected communities are not merely people in need of assistance, but dynamic actors who must not be left on the sidelines. Community driven planning with displacement affected communities at the centre is key to finding solutions to displacement. This durable solutions analysis is an important step to inform priorities centred on evidence-based analysis that builds on representative samples of the displacement affected population as well as key informant interviews with key stakeholders in Nertiti. However, inclusion must go beyond ensuring that the realities of the displacement affected communities are analysed. Therefore, key results from this analysis were presented to communities (May 2021) in order to validate and prioritize the most significant obstacles to solutions as seen from their perspective. The prioritized obstacles and the community's vision will form the point of departure for the drafting of the durable solutions Action Plan for Nertiti locality. This will happen during a joint workshop with the relevant stakeholders from locality and state level authorities as well as the humanitarian and development community. The Action Plans will serve as a roadmap to link the results on barriers to solutions, and inform concrete programming activities that can support communities in overcoming those same barriers.

ANNEX 1: DURABLE SOLUTIONS INDICATORS OVERVIEW

DURABLE SOLUTIONS CRITERIA	KEY INDICATORS	Non-displaced	IDPs	IDP returnees	Nomads
Long-term safety and security	HHs having experienced physical threats in the past 12 months	47%	57%	54%	20%
	HHs having experienced robbery in the past 12 months	54%	64%	59%	59%
	HHs having experienced damage of property/assets (incl crops) in the past 12 months	33%	37%	42%	63%
	HHs having experienced security incident(s) who reported to police	20%	14%	11%	38%
	HHs having experienced security incident(s) who reported to Native Administration	24%	25%	23%	22%
	HHs having experienced security incident(s) who did NOT report at all	55%	56%	61%	37%
	HHs having reported incident and reporting that issue was fairly resolved	16%	23%	18%	15%
	Reported feeling of being safe/very safe when walking in the night- SDG indicator 16.1.4	59%	51%	66%	85%
Adequate standart of living / access to basic services (health, education, water, sanitation, documentation)	HHs facing challenges when needing to access health services in the past 6 months	92%	80%	86%	89%
	Births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) - SDG 3.1.2	8%	22%	6%	13%
	Access to improved drinking water sources	33%	61%	18%	7%
	Percpetion of drinking water being sufficient for the HH, the past summer	74%	77%	79%	59%
	Access to improved sanitation facilities	12%	7%	9%	3%
	Primary school attendance amongt boys - 6-13 years old	66%	34%	29%	42%
	Primary school attendance amongt girls 6-13 years old	66%	33%	44%	25%
	Men above 15 years of age who are litterate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	85%	80%	82%	59%
	Women above 15 years of age who are litterate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	51%	48%	48%	21%
	Men who own/qccess a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	38%	28%	40%	50%
	Women who own/access a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	18%	8%	14%	20%
Access to employment and livelihoods	HHs having NOT had enough food or money to buy food the week preceding the survey	65%	72%	72%	39%
	HHs applying 'high coping' strategies based on the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI)	1%	1%	1%	1%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) working for profit or pay	30%	34%	22%	32%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) working for profit or pay	10%	8%	7%	9%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use production	27%	27%	33%	46%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use production	33%	38%	39%	33%
	Male youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	7%	10%	9%	2%
	Female youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	34%	34%	37%	62%
	HHs relying on crop farming as their main livelihoods source (whether for own use or selling)	82%	70%	81%	14%
	HHs with access to agricultural land in current location	87%	83%	88%	33%
	HHs with ownership/secure rights over agricultural land - SDG 5.a.1	48%	7%	56%	*
	HHs with ownership certificates amongst those who report owning land	2%	4%	1%	*
Access to documentation	Persons with birth certificate	17%	6%	8%	24%
	Persons with national ID	45%	19%	23%	68%
	Children under 5 years of age with a birth certificate - SDG 16.9.1	11%	7%	5%	14%
Access to effective mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP)	Displaced HHs that access the same agricultural land as before displacement	n/a	5%	79%	n/a
	Displaced HHs that still have rights over the land in place of origin (out of those who do NOT access th	n/a	31%	36%	n/a
	Displaced HHs that have regained access to the same residential plot, as before displacement	n/a	n/a	92%	n/a
Civic participation in local community	HHs attended local reconciliation initiatives the past 6 months	37%	29%	45%	51%
	HHs reporting presence of water commitees	56%	74%	37%	28%
	Displaced HHs reporting they can participate in local decision making (linked to SDG 16.7.2)	n/a	86%	97%	n/a
	Non-displaced HHs reporting that IDP returnees should be able to participate in local decision making	98%	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Non-displaced HHs reporting that IDPs in camps should be able to participate in local decision making	90%	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Non-displaced HHs reporting that nomads should be able to participate in local decision making	30%	n/a	n/a	n/a

*not available information; **too few observations

ANNEX 2: DETAILED OVERVIEW OF SERVICES

Primary education in Nertiti locality – capacities per school

Village	School name	Teacher		Ratio	Student number		Fence	Seating (seating for x % of students)	Latrines
		Trained	Untrained		male	female			
Gildo Administrative Unit									
Bori	Bori Mixed School	1	1	84	74	94	Local materials	0%	0
Fata Bario	Fata Bario Mixed School	3	0	42	61	66	Local materials	0%	0
Fulli	Fulli Mixed school	6	4	62	308	313	Local materials	0%	0
Gildo	Gildo School for Girls	8	0	66	0	529	Brick wall	45%	4
Gildo	Gild School for boys	7	0	64	447	0	Brick wall	40%	6
Kibili	Kibili mixed school	2	5	59	205	207	Local materials	0%	0
Koronga	Moro Mixed School	1	4	69	122	224	Local materials	0%	0
Krifal	Krifal Mixed School	2	4	31	100	88	Local materials	0%	0
Kuronga	Kuronga Mixed School	3	4	53	215	155	Local materials	0%	2
Kutti	Kutti Mixed school	12	0	105	622	638	Local materials	0%	0
Nertiti Administrative Unit									
Bakht Elrida	Bakht Elrida Mixed school for nomads	1	0	48	28	20	Local material	0%	0
Bala	Bala School for boys	20	0	14	273	0	30% Bricks+ local materials	10%	4
Baraka	Baraka Mixed school nomads	1	1	27	29	24	Local material	0%	0
Birio	Birio Mixed school	5	3	88	344	360	Local material	0%	0

Dilaiba	Eldilaiba Sharg Mixed school for nomads	1	0	43	23	20	Local material	0%	0
Dubbanga	Dubbanga Mixed School	5	3	30	120	117	Local materials	20%	3
Elhujaj	Elhujaj Mixed school for nomads	1	0	26	11	15	Local material	0%	0
Elmamoora	Elmamoora Mixed school for nomads	1	0	30	21	9	Local material	0%	0
Elnour Ban	Elnour ban Mixed school for nomads	1	0	114	45	69	Local material	0%	0
Gorni	Gorni Mixed	4	4	93	309	434	Local material	40%	4
Ingira	Ingira Mixed School	2	2	20	42	36	Local materials	0%	0
Jebel Wala	Jebel Wala Mixed	1	0	43	25	18	Local material	0%	0
Khor Ramla	Khor Ramla Mixed school for nomads	5	0	18	50	38	Without fence	0%	3
Kodi Mara	Kodi Mara Mixed School	2	3	73	145	220	Local materials	0%	2
Mabrooka	Mabrooka Mixed school for nomads	1	1	39	41	36	Local material	0%	0
Mali	Mali Mixed School	3	4	40	117	165	Local material	0%	0
Nerttiti	Elzahra for Girls	34	0	25	0	847	Brick wall	75%	6
Nerttiti	Um Elgura Mixed School	29	0	27	354	425	Brick wall	50%	6
Nerttiti	Elsafa Mixed school	38	0	19	320	414	Brick wall	0%	8
Nerttiti	Eljanobia School for boys	31	0	20	614	0	40% Bricks + local materials	50%	9
Nerttiti	Elgharbia Mixed School	32	0	30	466	493	Brick wall	75%	9
Nerttiti	Elkhansa School for girls	24	0	40	0	964	Brick wall	60%	8
Nerttiti	Ali Dinar Mixed School	18	0	47	392	451	50% Bricks + local materials	50%	8

Nerttiti	Elnaziheen Shamal for girls	24	0	25	0	608	Brick wall	60%	6
Nerttiti	Elshamalia School for boys	26	0	37	966	0	Local materials	30%	6
Nerttiti	Khor ramla shamal mixed school	6	2	5	25	18	Brick wall	30%	9
Nerttiti	Elquraania Mixed	35	0	39	659	709	40 % Bricks + local material	85%	8
Rukko	Rukko Mixed School	1	0	134	42	92	Without fence	0%	0
Saga Dirr	Saga Dirr Mixed School	3	7	66	331	329	Local materials	0%	4
Saga Nagaa	Saga Nagaa Mixed	4	4	35	136	146	Local material	0%	0
Sham Elnaseem	Sham Elnaseem Mixed for nomads	1	1	27	30	24	Local material	0%	0
Toor Administrative Unit									
Toor	Toor school for girls	11	0	11	43	0	Brick wall	80%	6
Toor	Toor Basic School for boys	13	0	13	29	383	Brick wall	75%	6
Toor	Martajalo Mixed School	5	0	5	58	131	Local materials	0%	0

Health services in Nertiti locality – capacities per health center

Village	Active	Construction	Electricity	Clean Water	Latrines
					
Nertiti Administrative Unit					
Nertiti, Center 8	Active	6 rooms	Solar	Not provided	4
Nertiti, Center7	Active	Local materials	No	Not provided	2
Nertiti, NCS Center	Active	5 rooms	Solar	Hand pumps	2
Dabbanga	Active	4 rooms	No	Not provided	2
Eraideeba	Not working	4 rooms	No	Not provided	1
Fogo Dikko	Not Working	3 rooms	No	Not provided	2
Galoal	Not Working	3 rooms	No	Not provided	2
Gorni	Active	8 rooms	No	Not provided	6

Khor Ramla	Active	3 rooms	No	Not provided	2
Saga Dirr	Active	8 rooms	Solar	Mini water Yard	4
Saga Nagaa	Active	2 rooms	No	Not provided	1
Mali	Active	4 rooms	Solar	Not Provided	2
Nertiti Rural Hospital	Active	Rural hospital with many rooms	Solar + Generator	Mini Water Yard + Taps	8
Nertiti, Northern camp	Active	6 rooms	No	Not provided	2
Nertiti, Southern camp	Active	6 rooms	No	Not provided	4
Satareena	Active	6 rooms	Solar (stolen months ago)	Not provided	4
Gildo Administrative Unit					
Gildo	Active	12 rooms	Solar	Mini Water Yard	6
Gildo (Health Insurance)	Active	5 rooms	Solar	Not provided	3
Kutti	Active	5 rooms	No	Not provided	4
Krifal	Active	7 rooms	Solar	Not provided	4
Toor Administrative Unit					
Toor	Active	6 rooms	No	Not provided	2

ANNEX 3: MAPS OF SERVICES[170]







[170] Created by SUDIA based on the locality level service mapping conducted on the basis of key informant interviews with relevant service providers- see Annex 2.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156–181

ARC (2020) Sudan: Country Report, UK: Asylum Research Centre.

Amin, M. (2020) Abuses in Sudan's Darfur spur mass protest and calls for Bashir's conviction, Middle East Eye, 7 July, 2020. Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/darfur-sudan-nertiti-sit-in-civil-struggle

Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2010) IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, April 2010. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c5149312.html

Danish Refugee Council (2020) Conflict analysis, Central Darfur, Sudan. Khartoum: DRC. Available at:https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DRC%202020%20Conflict%20Analysis_Central%20Darfur%2C%20Sudan.pdf

Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (2020) International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS). March 2020. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020. doi:10.2785/18809 Available at: https://www.jips.org/uploads/2021/01/EGRIS-IRIS-IntRecommendationsIDPstatistics-EN.pdf

FAO (2002) Land Tenure Studies (4). Gender and access to land. Rome: FAO
Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/Y4308E/y4308e00.htm#Contents

Fitzpatrick, & Young (2016) Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. Boston: Feinstein International Center. Available at: https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/RisksandReturns_draft_v-2.pdf

Salih, Z. M (2020) Darfur protesters call for action to end attacks on civilians by armed militias, The Guardian, 8 July, 2020. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jul/08/darfur-protesters-call-for-action-to-end-attacks-on-civilians-by-armed-militias

The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017. available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/durable_solutions_in_practice_-_handbook_sept_2017.pdf

Humanitarian Policy Forum (2020) Policy Brief 77: Achieving Durable Solutions by including displacement-affected communities in peacebuilding.

ILO (2021) PROSPECTS Sudan Baseline Survey. Draft report. March 2021

Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit. Khartoum: UNCT. https://bit.ly/3nGcJH3

Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020). Available at: https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/Juba%20Agreement%20for%20Peace%20in%20Sudan%20-%20Official%20ENGLISH.PDF

Krätli et al. (2013) Standing Wealth: Pastoralist Livestock Production and Local Livelihoods in Sudan. Khartoum: UNEP

Kritz, N. J. (2007) The Rule of Law in Conflict Management in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.) (2007) Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Maxwell, D. and Caldwell, R. (2008) The Coping Strategies Index. Field Methods Manual (March, 2008). Atlanta: CARE USA

NRC (2021), Housing, Land and Property Rights (HL) in the Juba Peace Agreement. Darfur Track briefing note.

OCHA (2021) Humanitarian Needs Overview Sudan, December 2020.

OCHA (2016) Jebel Marra Crisis: Fact Sheet, March 2016. Khartoum: OCHA

Osman, A.M.K., Young, H. Houser, R.F., and Coates, J. C. (2013)) Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur. Oxfam America 1–43.

Prunier, G. (2005) Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide. London: Hurst & Co.

REACH (2021) Sudan: 2020 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (March, 2021). Khartoum: REACH

Salih, Z. M (2020) Darfur protesters call for action to end attacks on civilians by armed militias, The Guardian, 8 July, 2020. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jul/08/darfur-protesters-call-for-action-to-end-attacks-on-civilians-by-armed-militias

Satti, H., Sulieman, H., Young, H., Radday, A. (2020) Natural Resources Management: Local Perspectives from North and Central Darfur, Boston: Feinstein International Center

Tubiana, J., Tanner, V. and Abdul-Jalil, M. (2012) Traditional authorities' peacemaking in Darfur. Peaceworks No. 83. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace

UNAMID (2018) UNAMID hands over Nertiti rural court to the Sudanese Judiciary, 5 December, 2018. https://unamid.unmissions.org/unamid-hands-over-nertiti-rural-court-sudanese-judiciary

Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge Press

UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan. Khartoum: UNCT. Availabel at: https://www.jips.org/jips-publication/profiling-report-sudan-2019/

UNDP (2019) Building peace stone by stone in Golo, Darfur's hitherto inaccessible area, Khartoum: UNDP Sudan.

UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur. Khartoum: UNDP (Research commissioned by the Darfur Community, Peace and Stabilization Fund and carried out by Transition International in collaboration with SUDIA).

UNDP (2020) Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications. New York: UNDP. Available at: https://www.undp.org/publications/strengthening-social-cohesion-conceptual-framing-and-programming-implications

UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations. Khartoum: UN-Habitat. Available at:

https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2020/08/darfur_land_administration_report_final_30.07.2020.pdf

UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3c3da07f7.html

UN Peacebuilding Fund (2019) project document for Central Darfur.

UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2010) UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation. Available at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf

Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur. Boston: Feinstein International Center. Available at: https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/livelihoods-power-and-choice-2/

Young, H. et al. (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Boston: Feinstein International Center. Available at: https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taadoud-ii-improving-natural-resource-management/

Young, H. and Osman, A. K. (2006) Challenges to peace and recovery in Darfur. A situation analysis of the ongoing conflict and its continuing impact on livelihoods. Boston: Feinstein International Center.