

DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the
Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan

**Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding
for the displacement-affected communities in**

Tawila locality, North Darfur

August 2021



Suggested citation: PBF Sudan, DSWG Sudan, UNHCR, JIPS (2021). *Durable Solutions & Baseline Analysis: Key Obstacles to Durable Solutions and Peacebuilding for the Displacement-Affected Communities in Tawila Locality, North Darfur.*

With special thanks to Margarita Lundkvist-Houndoumadi (JIPS), Therese Bjorn Mason (consultant to JIPS), Ola Samarah (JIPS) for the analysis and report preparation; Khadra Elmi (UNHCR/ DSWG) for strategic guidance/coordination and the in-depth reviews; Mirjam Kuschnitzki (SUDIA) for the analysis of the area level data and Ghazi Kunna (SUDIA) for the cartography. Profound recognition goes to the communities, who took part in the study and used the findings to identify their priorities, and the Locality and State level authorities for their time, participation, and leadership in the process.

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ABBREVIATIONS

DSWG Durable Solutions Working Group

CBM/CBRM Community-based management resolution mechanism/Community-based management

CBO Community-based organisation

GoS Government of Sudan

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IOM International Organisation for Migration

INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation

JIPS Joint IDP Profiling Service

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

SUDIA Sudanese Development Initiative

UN-HABITAT- United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WFP World Food Programme

UNAMID United Nations African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur

UNCT United Nations Country Team

KEY TERMS

Displacement affected communities: refers to displaced persons and the communities affected by their presence, such as host communities, communities in areas of return, or other areas where displaced persons are seeking a durable solution to their displacement.¹

Displaced persons: refers to internally displaced persons, whether they are physically displaced or have returned to the place they lived prior to their displacement.

Durable solutions: a durable solution is achieved when displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. A durable solution can be achieved through return, local integration and resettlement.²

Durable solutions process: a community-based approach to durable solutions planning, based on durable solutions targets identified by displacement-affected communities at a decentralized level, in post-conflict or post-disaster settings.³

Durable solutions analysis: the purpose of a durable solutions analysis is to provide an evidence base to inform joint responses to displacement. It entails a systematic and principled process in line with the IASC Framework, including IDPs' perspectives and preferences for future settlement options, demographic profile, and the eight durable solutions criteria. The analysis focuses on the specific realities of the displaced populations, whilst making a comparison to the non-displaced populations and taking into account the broader macro environment.⁴

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: these principles are 30 standards that outline the protections available to internally displaced people (IDPs). They detail the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs: from the beginning of their forced displacement, to IDPs protection and assistance during displacement up to the achievement of durable solutions.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.⁵

IDP returnees/return IDPs: displaced persons that have returned to their place of origin.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs: the framework, endorsed by the IASC Working Committee in 2010, addresses durable solutions following

¹ The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.

² Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2010) IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, April 2010.

³ The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.

conflict and natural disasters. It describes the key human rights-based principles that should guide the search for durable solutions.

Non-displaced persons: individuals who are not displaced (and may or may not be living in the same areas as displaced persons).

Peacebuilding: involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore a relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.⁶

Protracted displacement: a situation where IDPs and returnees have been displaced for a longer time period (5 years or more) and where they still have assistance needs linked to their displacement, and are not able to enjoy their human rights for reasons caused by their displacement.⁷

Refugees: individuals displaced outside their country of nationality or habitual residence as a consequence of generalized violence, conflict or well-founded fear of persecution.⁸

Resilience: refers to the ability of displacement-affected communities to absorb and recover from shocks (such as earthquakes, droughts, floods or conflicts), while positively adapting and transforming their structures and means of living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty.⁹

Return refugees: persons who have returned to their home country after seeking international assistance abroad. The home country is legally defined as the country of former habitual residence. It is usually their country of citizenship, but it may be that of their parents or grandparents, who fled many years ago, as many crises span several generations.¹⁰

⁶ UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2010) UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation

⁷ The Global Roster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (2018) The International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS).

INTRODUCTION

Three decades of war and unrest have dominated the Sudanese political and civil scene but the ousting of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 has offered a window of opportunity for a political transition in Sudan. In 2020, significant political gains were made towards achieving peace in Sudan with the signing of a peace agreement in Juba (South Sudan) between the power-sharing government and five key rebel groups.¹¹ The current signed peace agreement—a product of a Sudanese-led process—aims to address historically root causes of conflict and marginalized populations in Sudan’s conflict zones.

While the political and overall context in Sudan witnessed a historic shift in the last two years, the humanitarian and development aspects have been subject to continuous and significant challenges. Protracted and new displacements continue to be a major issue—as a result of decades of conflict and natural disasters, there are currently approximately 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country and 800,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries.¹² In the context of efforts to build a comprehensive peace and the ongoing UNAMID drawdown, in September 2019 Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok requested that Sudan be declared eligible for the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In his request, the Prime Minister asked that funding be made immediately available in the three priorities areas identified for Darfur; namely, the rule of law, durable solutions, and peacebuilding at the community level.

Durable solutions have to be an integral part of peacebuilding. Peace in Sudan cannot be divorced from durable solutions and thus must tackle the issue of conflict and protracted displacement in Darfur. ‘There is much talk about peace, but you cannot talk about peace in Sudan in isolation from durable solutions for IDPs and the issues of land and compensation. Peace cannot be reached without addressing these issues.’¹³ The Juba Peace Agreement regards solutions for IDPs as an important element of building peace and establishes durable solutions as a key priority. The agreement looks to resolve the consequences of conflict, such as the safe and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their original lands, whilst also paying attention to compensation, development and reconstruction. To support this, the peace agreement contains a protocol that deals with refugee and IDP return with specific attention paid to the situation in Darfur.

Just as durable solutions are integral to peacebuilding, lack of peace is often an obstacle to achieving solutions that are durable. Thus, solutions programming needs to identify the specific challenges and address these with suitable measures. The Juba Peace Agreement acknowledges these linkages and looks to address the root causes of conflict, such as issues of identity, marginalization, the relationship between religion and state, governance, resource-sharing, land issues and social justice.

IDPs living in protracted displacement can contribute to peacebuilding or be an obstacle. In other words, internally displaced persons are both peace and conflict actors. Displacement is highly political

¹¹ Despite the non-signature of two of the most important non-state armed groups—Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Al-Hilu faction and the Sudan Liberation Movement—Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), negotiations continue amongst the parties to join the final agreement.

¹² OCHA (2021) Humanitarian Needs Overview Sudan, December 2020.

¹³ Donor representative quoted in Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

in Darfur and peacebuilding that includes IDPs and displacement affected communities are less likely to fail. Hence, peacebuilding and supporting durable solutions for IDPs must go together.¹⁴

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) portfolio involves programming in all of Darfur's five states that supports and underpins peace. The programme strategy recognizes that durable solutions for IDPs, the rule of law and local conflict resolution are building blocks for peace but also interdependent. To build peace and support durable solutions for IDPs and returnees, PBF programming pays special attention to addressing the root causes of Darfur's conflict, thus creating a conducive environment for return and integration of IDPs, strengthening local conflict resolution mechanisms, peacebuilding capacities and the rule of law.

At the request of the Government of Sudan, an integrated political and peacebuilding mission, UNITAMS, has been established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2524 (2020). UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT partners are mandated to support Sudan in achieving a successful transition. UNITAMS has four strategic objectives.¹⁵ The peacebuilding objective provides for support to the implementation of the peace process. It will sustain peace through legitimate and functioning State institutions that provide basic security, protection and services to the population with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

A JOINT ANALYSIS AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACH

The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) in Sudan has been a consistent forum championing joint durable solutions analysis to address protracted displacement. Commencing in 2017, the DSWG oversaw two durable solutions pilots respectively in rural Um Dukhun and two IDP camps situated on the outskirts of El Fasher in North Darfur. The working group followed up this work by commissioning a learning review of the pilots with input and feedback provided by all DSWG members.

The resulting 'lite' durable solutions toolkit and recommendations have provided the foundation and starting point for the PBF programme in Darfur.¹⁶ The DSWG continues to play a strategic role by overseeing and coordinating the overall durable solutions work process and deliverables. In equal measures, the consultative process and the evidence produced need to support the wider humanitarian-development-peace work in Sudan.¹⁷

Darfur's internal displacement dynamics are complex. This demands that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors require a *shared* multi-sectorial analysis of the needs of the displacement affected communities. Following the collaborative approach piloted in El Fasher, a particular emphasis has been placed on generating shared data and engaging all major stakeholders including IDPs, local and state authorities. Accordingly, the Peacebuilding Fund partners combined all data collection activities using *one* methodology approach and *one* coordinated data collection in eight localities across the five Darfur states—Tawilla, Assalaya, Yassin, Sheiria, Nertiti, Um Dhukun,

¹⁴ Humanitarian Policy Forum, 2020, Policy Brief 77: Achieving Durable Solutions by including displacement-affected communities in peacebuilding.

¹⁵ The four strategic objectives of UNITAMS under SCR 2524 (2020) are: (i) Assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace. (ii) Support peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements. (iii) Assist peacebuilding, civilian protection, and rule of law, in Darfur and the Two Areas. (iv) Support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

¹⁶ Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

¹⁷ The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) is co-chaired by UNHCR, UNDP and DRC. The working group is mandated to inform and advise, develop policy and coordinate work on durable solutions. DSWG is placing a strong focus on data and HLP issues with sub-working groups dedicated to these issues.

Gereida and Jebel Moon—where they are carrying out comprehensive, area-based joint peacebuilding programming.¹⁸

ACTORS

The DSWG is central to the Durable Solutions Analysis and Baseline process—it not only oversees the durable solutions analysis process and coordinates work streams but also guarantees data has visibility with government authorities as well as the broader humanitarian and development community in Sudan. And works to ensure that data and analysis is used for planning and programming at the locality level and feed into national policy. Support from the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) was requested by the DSWG to develop the methodology approach and indicators for both the survey and area-level analysis. JIPS also conducted the analysis of the results, all in a consultative manner. Remote support and expertise plus Khartoum deployment of a JIPS technical adviser has given quality assurance and provided technical support to field operations and built capacity for the teams deployed in Darfur.

The PBF projects are implemented by UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, UN-Habitat and FAO. The partners have actively taken part in designing the methodology by offering thematic expertise and on-the-ground knowledge of the Darfur localities to develop the indicators and data collection tools. Partners have also been key to raising awareness at the village and locality level, assisting with the training of enumerator teams and trouble-shooting with challenges at the field level in Darfur.

IOM managed all components and stages of the household survey including pre-fieldwork missions, training of enumerators, and operational management of the field data collection. Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA), an experienced national NGO, has been leading the qualitative area-level data collection and analysis. Tasks included development of the qualitative tools, training of interviewers, and identification of respondents in all localities before implementing the key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

PROCESS OVERVIEW

- Methodology approach and objectives shaped with PBF agencies and the DSWG.
- Indicators for population and area-level developed and agreed.
- Survey tools and qualitative tools developed and reviewed by partners and experts.
- Sampling approach designed.
- Testing of the survey tool.
- Pre-field work missions to inform sampling and sketch target villages.
- Training of field teams in all states and pilots.
- Data collection: survey and area-level (December 2020 and January 2021).
- Data analysis of survey results and area-level results jointly, including several thematic consultations with PBF agencies, DSWG and experts for validation.
- Locality-level report with the durable solutions analysis and baseline finalised.

¹⁸ Making use of a single methodology and joint data collection in all eight localities also sought to mainstream indicators and allow for a holistic analysis to avoid overburdening communities.

OBJECTIVES OF DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

The durable solutions and baseline analysis exercises in each of the target localities in Darfur aim to:

- Provide the foundation for analysis of displaced and non-displaced populations' progress towards durable solutions, including IDPs, IDP returnees, return refugees and nomads as an integral element to the peacebuilding process.
- Inform PBF programming and durable solutions Action Plan development in each Darfur target locality.
- Provide the baseline of the agreed-upon PBF outcome indicators for measuring programme impact.
- Inform broader Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP) programming beyond the PBF.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The methodology approach was strongly shaped by the learning that emerged from the durable solutions analysis conducted in El Fasher in 2019 as well as the Interagency Durable Solutions Indicator Library and then further developed based on consultations with the PBF agencies and the DSWG. JIPS consolidated the combination of methods and made sure that agency programming needs, as well as the durable solutions analysis needs, were met. The indicators as well as the household survey tool,¹⁹ the key informant interview questions and the joint analysis plan, were reviewed in several rounds by all PBF agencies, relevant technical experts and local partner SUDIA.

TARGET GROUPS & LOCATIONS

The geographical scope of the exercise included 11 villages and five camps. The target groups and locations were identified by UNDP, as the PBF lead agency in Tawilla locality in coordination with the authorities at the locality level.²⁰ Selection of target villages, towns and camps were done based on a conflict sensitive perspective and based on the programmatic scope of the PBF.

The data collection covered four target groups in the locality of Tawilla: IDPs residing in camps, IDPs that have returned to their village of origin, non-displaced residents and, lastly, nomads residing in damrahs. It was decided that the analysis would be at the population level and provided results representative at the target group level and not at the village level/settlement level.

A MIXED METHODS METHODOLOGY

Both primary qualitative and quantitative data inform the analysis of progress towards durable solutions on the locality level presented in this report. The approach consists of both a sample-based household survey and area-level key informant interviews. The survey data has been used to produce socio-economic population profiles for each target group at the locality level to conduct a comparative analysis between the groups.

Key informant interviews were conducted with community representatives, state and locality level authorities including the Native Administration in Tawila and government departments in El Fasher. Separate focus group discussions (FDGs) were organised with communities in Tawila with nomads and women. The qualitative data collection took place in December 2020. Analysis of the interviews and focus groups discussion focused on the context at the locality level concerning issues such as land and resource management, conflict resolution mechanisms, service provision, rule of law and civic participation.

¹⁹The PBF indicators were based on: technical lessons from the interagency durable solutions profiling in El Fasher, the PBF Results Framework plus the Interagency Durable Solutions Indicator Library. <https://inform-durablesolutions-idp.org/>

²⁰ Target camps include Rawanda, Bargo, Argo, Dali, Daba Naira. The target villages included in this survey are: Tawila Town, Tawila Omda, Um Jaras, Dali, Marar, Hashaba, Singdongou, Um Sayala, Debenga, Dobo al-Omda, Kunjara, Tarnei (South), Bobay Sigili.

SAMPLING APPROACH

The sampling followed a stratified multi-stage sampling approach in which villages were the primary sampling unit (PSU) and households were the secondary sampling unit (SSU), while stratification was done by target group. Accordingly, the first sampling stage consisted of selecting a sample of villages with probabilities that were proportional to size; villages with higher numbers of households had a higher probability of being selected for the survey. A random sample of households was then selected based on two approaches: systematic skips or systematic snowballing. This depended on the spatial distribution of the target groups in each village. For example, in all camps and return villages where only IDPs reside, systematic skips were done. In villages with more target groups, systematic snowballing was performed for each target group. Data collection took place in December 2020 and January 2021.

Looking at the gender distribution of the respondents to the survey, it is observed that the non-displaced respondents were distributed between men and women more or less equally, while among camp IDPs and IDP returnees, around one-third of the respondents were men and two-thirds women.

TABLE 1: SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION FOR TAWILA LOCALITY. POPULATION ESTIMATES PROVIDED BY THE PBF AGENCIES²¹

Target group	Population baseline (HHs)	Sample size targeted (HHs)	Sample size (individuals)	Achieved sample size (HHs)
Non-displaced	2,745	378	1,705	321
IDPs in camps	12,063	383	2,500	431
IDP-returnees	3,837	388	2,448	399
Nomads	104	84	/	/

SAMPLING LIMITATIONS & SPECIFICATIONS

Following limitations and specification should be kept in mind, when reading the analysis:

- The sampling is designed to produce results representative for each target group in the locality. Analysis at the village level is not possible and therefore no reference to villages or breakdown by villages is done in the report.
- The locations targeted in Tawila for the survey were not selected randomly across the locality and thus do not necessarily provide representative results of all settlement situations in Tawila. The targeting of location has been based on a conflict sensitive approach and the programmatic scope of the PBF. However, the area-level analysis has looked at locality as a whole and thus counterbalance the survey scope which focused on the displaced target groups.
- Only 40 nomad households were interviewed, which did not allow for a statistical analysis. Therefore, results on nomads are only based the key informant interviews conducted.

²¹ IOM, the organisation responsible for administering the survey, reported that nomads were not found in Tawila locality during the data collection, due to the migration season and social tensions that took place at that time.

DISPLACEMENT HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES

What is the general demographic profile of the target populations (IDPs, IDP returnees and non-displaced) and what will this help us understand? The basic demographics, the conflict and displacement history will be used to understand the key characteristics of the target populations and provide context to the analysis. The basic demographics and the displacement history will be used to understand the key characteristics of the target populations. Breaking the population data into smaller sub-populations based on basic demographics such as sex, age, location, capacities, vulnerabilities and displacement characteristics, makes it possible to discern how different sub-groups within each target group are faring in comparison, thereby acknowledging that each target group is not a homogeneous entity.

KEY FINDINGS:

- Overall, the target population is young—half are below 20 years of age.
- Women represent a majority, specifically among IDP returnees and IDPs in camps, and high numbers of female-headed households. One quarter of non-displaced family units are female-headed households climbing to 35% among IDP returnees and camp IDPs.
- 81% of camp IDPs were displaced from areas within Tawila locality and a majority have been displaced for a prolonged time period (43% between 5-10 years and 40% for more than 10 years), meaning that many children and youth have spent most of their lives in displacement.
- A majority of IDP returnees (46%) have been living in their village of origin between 1–5 years, whilst one-third have been back in their home village between 5–10 years.
- Amongst all three population groups, men have higher literacy rates (by almost 30 points). Comparing across groups, returnee IDPs have the highest literacy for both men and women.

TAWILA

Tawila Town is situated in North Darfur approximately 35–50 km from the state capital El Fasher. Tawila is nestled in a valley and its farmland is a throughfare for nomadic pastoralists, who move their livestock north and south in search of pasture. It is traversed by a wadi that expands during the rainy season between the months of June and October. Temperatures easily surpass 40 degrees in the previous months.

Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, Tawila was a prosperous town inhabited by about 40,000 inhabitants mostly from the Fur tribe. The town had many brick buildings (warehouses and residential buildings) and a bustling market. People in the locality cultivated tombac, an expensive type of chewing tobacco, plus vegetables and cereals such as sorghum. Especially, the prized tombac cash crop was an important source of income.

Tawila has been a hotspot in the conflict in Darfur since the fighting began in 2003. The town was attacked and looted in 2004; the assault left it almost entirely destroyed and inhabitants fled to camps east of El Fasher or El Fasher city itself. Although the town itself was deserted, camps began to spring

up with many thousands of internally displaced people from Tawila locality and other areas of conflict. The main tribes in the camps are Fur, Zaghawa and Tunjur.²²

Three camps sprung up near to Tawila town including Argo and Dali plus the largest Rwanda camp next to which the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) set up base. First, those who had fled stayed in tents from sticks and plastic sheeting scattered across the open, but the dispersed tents were transformed into more permanent camp with more IDP inhabitants and huts made from straw and mud plus whatever else was to hand. The camps have expanded and contracted in response to let-ups in the fighting and influxes of displaced people in the wake of violent flare-ups. Significant waves of displaced people include 55,000 arriving in 2012 followed by another 36,000 2016.

Tawila locality is still a site of high numbers of IDPs and returnees, who have returned to their areas of origin. Although Tawila is located close to El Fasher, movement outside of Tawila town was often complicated because of the insecure environment demanding long detours. The drive between El Fasher and Tawila town could at times take up many hours (3–7 hours).

During the last 10 years, the main causes of displacement have been the Darfur war and continued attacks by nomads on farmer villages. During the war, many nomads, mainly camel-herders from Rezeigat tribe, fought on the side of the Government, which supplied them with many of the weapons they possess to this day. Sometimes, they were also provided with four-wheel drive cars that were also used to attack farmers mainly belonging to the Fur, Tunjur, Zaghawa, Konjara, Hawara, Keneen, Burti, Mosabat, Bargo tribes and to destroy their crops and fighting the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA) rebel groups.²³ After the Darfur war ended, nomads continued to attack villages including returnee village causing displacement.²⁴ 'Several intercommunal conflicts persist. In North Darfur, the dispute between the Northern Rezeigat herders and returnee farmers, mostly Tunjur and Fur, over access to farmlands in Kutum, Shangil Tobaya, Tawilla, Kabkabiya and Saraf Umra.'²⁵

OCHA designates inter-communal conflicts as the main drivers as one of the main drivers of protection needs in 2019. Tensions were caused by land occupation and conflict between herders and farmers during the harvest season. 'Such localized armed violence takes place most frequently between sedentary-farming and nomadic-pastoral communities, as well as between nomadic communities, over access to, use of, and management of resources, particularly land for farming and grazing and water sources.'²⁶

The area has seen significantly improved access and mobility in recent years and better connectivity with El Fasher has meant that more humanitarian organisations have set up a more permanent presence in Tawila. The area has witnesses intermittent violence while renewed insecurity, followed by displacement, has taken place during recent months.

²² Inter-agency Assessment Report (2019) Tawilla IDP Camps, Tawilla Locality, North Darfur State, 11 June 2019.

²³ UN Security Council (2016) Special Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 26 February 2015, p. 5/19 para. 16

²⁴ Number of animals increased significantly during the last years so more grazing land is required by nomads. The nomads' motivation to attack, according to IDPs in Tawilla, is to displace them to towns and cities so they can use their land for grazing land.

²⁵ UN Security Council (2019) Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 30 May 2019.

²⁶ OCHA (2021) Humanitarian Needs Overview Sudan, December 2020.

BASIC DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE POPULATION SAMPLES

The survey results show that key basic demographic characteristics are similar for all three target groups. Overall, the population is very young across all three groups. Approximately, half are below 20 years of age.²⁷ This is in line with the 2019 profiling findings from the nearby El Fasher IDP camps, where only 25% of IDPs and 27% of non-displaced El Fasher residents were older than 30 years.²⁸ Across all groups, 25% are aged between 20–39 years, whilst just short of a quarter of the population are 40 years or older.²⁹ There is a majority of women, especially among returnee and camp IDP populations. Women make up 56% of the non-displaced in contrast to 61% of camp IDPs and 69% of returnees. Notably, female-headed households make up a significant proportion of the population. One in four households among the non-displaced are female-headed households, and this number rises to 35% among returnees and camp IDPs.

Household sizes are similar for camp IDPs and returnees. Around 90% of households from each group are equally divided between families of 2–5 members and families with 6–9 members. A larger proportion of smaller households are found among the non-displaced population—53% are family units of 2–5 members and 5% are single-member households. Notably, the proportion of households with 10 plus members is 12% among returnees compared to 7% for the other two populations. To obtain a more complete picture, households were asked if any members had been away for more than 6 months for work, education or other purposes. 18% of non-displaced Tawila households report a family member to be elsewhere in contrast to 14% for IDPs residing in camps and 13% for returnees.


Among humanitarian and development actors, there is a need for data on disability to dig below the surface when assessing vulnerability and needs. In Tawila locality, 5% of non-displaced persons, and 6% of camp IDPs and IDP returnees report having a disability that prevents them from ‘coping with all the things they need to’. Literacy rates are a proxy for literacy skills, which span a range of proficiencies. Literacy, as measured by the ability to read and write amongst everyone above 15 years of age, is higher for men by almost 30 percentage points. IDP returnees have the best literacy rates for both sexes—respectively 92% and 74% of IDP returnee men and women are literate. When viewing literacy across different age groups, the literacy rate remains essentially the same for camp IDPs and IDP returnees. Amongst the non-displaced population, literacy is higher amongst older age groups (6 percentage points).

²⁷ The survey found that 49% of non-displaced, 57% of camp IDPs and 56% of returnees are below the age of 20 years.

²⁸ UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

²⁹ 23% of the non-displaced population and 18% of camp IDPs and returnees are 40 years of age and above.

FIGURE 1: LITERACY RATES FOR ALL ABOVE 15 YEARS, BY SEX – SDG 4.6.1 (A)



When exploring the background of the IDPs residing in the Tawila camps,³⁰ the survey results show that the vast majority of IDPs are from within the Tawila locality. More than 80% of IDPs in camps originate from the immediate region. Considering how long IDPs have resided in their current settlement, 43% have stayed in their camp between 5–10 years, whilst more than 40% have lived in their present camp for more than 10 years. Hence, many IDPs have been displaced for a prolonged period, and under this scenario many children and youths have experienced displacement for a large part of their lives.

When considering the IDPs that have returned to their place of origin and how long they have been back in their villages, the survey results show that a majority (46%) have been back between 1–5 years. 36% of IDP returnees have been back for a period of 5–10 years, whilst only 10% returned to their village more than 10 years ago.

³⁰ Five camps in Tawilia locality were included in the household survey including Rwanda, Bargo, Argo, Dali, Daba and Naira IDP camps.

LIVELIHOODS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES

Access to livelihoods is a key factor for local integration—durable solutions for IDPs and IDP returnees require access to employment and livelihoods akin to that of the non-displaced population; while often livelihoods of all displacement and conflict affected populations are impacted. Considering in more detail households' sources of income and coping strategies provides a more nuanced picture and a better understanding both of particular vulnerabilities as well as of the livelihood opportunities. Sustainable livelihoods and access to required resources is a key challenge in post-conflict settings and an important element to post-conflict redevelopment.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Agriculture is the main livelihood for the great majority in all groups: 84% of IDP returnee households, 69% of IDPs in camps and 73% of non-displaced.**
- **There is a considerable number of youths (15–24 years) who are not working and not in education or training.** That is especially the case for young women: 37% young women in camps and 27% among young returnee women.
- **There is a significant proportion of households (10–15%) in all groups that have zero members of working-age (15–64 years).** These households have no persons of working-age to provide for the household.
- **Amongst all three groups, only a minority of the working-age population is working during the whole year; and high proportions of individuals working for profit/pay or engaged in subsistence farming are looking for additional work.**
- **The great majority in all groups rate high food prices as the most significant livelihoods shock during the year preceding the survey, while all groups additionally report shocks linked to crop diseases, Covid-19 restrictions plus loss of employment or income.** However, camp IDPs and IDP returnees are more impacted by water shortages, security incidents, loss of livestock and droughts.
- **A focus on female-headed households show that they are a more vulnerable part of the population.** Amongst all three groups, a larger proportion of female-headed households reported challenges ensuring enough food for the family. Vulnerability is more pronounced among female-headed households living in the camps—they resort to negative coping strategies to a higher degree plus have a higher age-dependency ratio signifying a heavier burden placed on the providing members.

MAIN SOURCE OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME/SUBSISTENCE

Tawila locality is a rural area in North Darfur State, and people's livelihoods are principally dependent on agriculture. The survey findings confirm this picture—73% of non-displaced and 69% of camp IDP households primarily rely on farming, whilst the dependency on agriculture is even higher among IDP returnees (82%). Merely, 16% of IDP households residing in camps and non-displaced households rely primarily on salaried or wage employment. Households' reliance on a salary income drops to 10% among Tawila IDP returnees.

For a quarter of the population agriculture is the only source of livelihood.³¹ This is true for all the three population groups—camp IDPs (22%), IDP returnees (26%) and non-displaced households (27%). When surveying additional sources of livelihoods, results confirm just how strongly households rely on agriculture. 24% of non-displaced Tawila residents, 20% of IDPs and 21% of IDP returnees rely on agriculture as their primary *and* secondary source of livelihood.³²

The reliance on agriculture is also reflected in the main occupation that is reported for the working-age members of the households (15-64 years). Here a majority across all the three groups are engaged in 'own-use' farming as their main occupation, meaning they do not sell the crop but instead consume their produce.³³ Also among persons engaged in work for profit or pay, crop farming is the reported 'work industry' for a significant proportion (see employment results below for more details).

Looking closer for any disparities between male and female-headed households, less of the non-displaced households headed by women (66%) rely on agriculture as their main source of income by 10 percentage points; whereas amongst camp IDPs and returnees the difference between male and female-headed households is smaller or none. Overall, very few households amongst all groups principally depend on aid (in total 1–3%). Most of these aid recipients are found among the female-headed households of the non-displaced (9%) and in the IDP camps (6%) compared to the only 0–1% of male-headed households in all the groups.

The age-dependency ratio is used to understand the pressure on the working-age population to provide for the dependent members.³⁴ The results show that there is a larger proportion of camp IDP households (48%) and returnee households (45%), where there is a heavier burden placed on working-age members to provide for the family. The equivalent proportion amongst the non-displaced population is somewhat lower (39%).³⁵ The age-dependency ratio can also pinpoint particular vulnerabilities. In Tawila locality, the survey results show that a considerable proportion of the population— 5% of non-displaced, 11% of camp IDP and 10% of returnee households are composed of *only* dependent members. In other words, these households are entirely made up of person below 15 and above 65 years without any household members of working-age (15–64 years) to support them.

MAIN OCCUPATION: EMPLOYMENT & OWN-USE FARMING

About one-third of the working-age male population in all three groups works for profit or pay (either as an employee or business owner). Among women, the employment rate falls to one-fourth among non-displaced and one-fifth among IDPs in camps and returnees.³⁶ Working for profit or pay does not necessitate that the work is not farming related. 32% of the non-displaced, followed by 25% of IDP returnees and lastly 17% of camp IDPs are working for profit or pay in the cash crop farming sector. The fact that fewer IDPs work in crop farming is in line with IDPs residing in camps, and hence have

³¹ The only source of livelihoods means that no secondary income source was indicated by the survey respondents.

³² The survey looked to understand diversification of livelihoods; households were asked for their two main sources of livelihoods.

³³ This trend is particular pronounced among the non-displaced population (41% of women and 50% of men are subsistence farmers).


³⁴ It is the ratio of those not in the labour force (children below 15 years and adults older than 65 years) in relation to the working-age population (15–64 years); the higher the ratio, the greater the pressure is on the working-age members to provide for the dependent family members.

³⁵ Percentages refer to the proportion of households that have an age-dependency ratio above 1, which indicate a higher burden on the working-age family members to support dependent members of the household. The national dependency ratio in Sudan is 0.8, however, this is expected to be lower in Darfur.

³⁶ It is worth highlighting that the survey did not capture the second main occupation of the working-age population; it is likely that those, who are working for pay also have access to land and are also engaging in 'on-the-side' subsistence farming.

less access to arable land. A significant proportion of the population working for profit/pay is engaged in the private sector—28% of returnees, 21% of IDPs and 17% the non-displaced working population. About one in ten across the groups is engaged in the public sector, while another tenth of the non-displaced and camp IDP working population is making a living from collecting firewood.

FIGURE 2: MAIN ACTIVITY OF WORKING-AGE PERSONS (15–64 YEARS) BY SEX




Looking at under-employment can provide a more nuanced and better understanding of the employment circumstances. For instance, are those who are already working looking for additional work? Searching for other work could potentially indicate that although they are working, the work is not providing enough income to support the household. Overall, across all population groups approximately half or more than half of men and women want additional work.

All three groups list the same obstacles and challenges linked to finding additional work. All three groups point to a ‘lack of or irregular work opportunities’ as an obstacle, as well as ‘lack of skills or inadequate skills’. The two sets of skills and knowledge chiefly requested by the respondents to improve their chances of employment are competences related to handicrafts and agriculture (e.g. how to better irrigate fields, use fertilizers etc.). Reportedly, there is also no access to micro-credit schemes providing small-scale loans to help individuals become self-employed or grow a business.³⁷

A different perspective on under-employment focuses attention on how *much* people are working. When asking the persons that work for profit or pay how many months they worked during the 12 past months preceding the survey, a majority across all groups report having worked between 5–8 months (67% of non-displaced and returnees, and 48% of camp IDPs). The proportion working closer to full time (working 12 months of the year) is larger among camp IDPs (38%) and somewhat smaller among return IDPs (26%) and non-displaced (20%). This can be explained by the fact that a higher proportion of IDPs are dependent on employment than on land for their livelihoods.

³⁷ Tawila, North Darfur, key informant interviews.

FIGURE 3: MONTHS WORKED PER YEAR AMONG PERSONS WORKING FOR PROFIT/PAY




Own-use farming is reported as the main occupation of about one-third of the male working-age persons in all three groups. Among women, the proportion varies slightly more, with 25% of non-displaced women, and around one-fifth of camp IDP and returnee women. Own-use farming is seen to a larger extent among persons aged 25–64 years compared to the youth between 15–24 year, although the non-displaced youth appear to be somewhat more engaged in own-use farming compared to the other groups. Farming being a seasonal occupation, the majority of these persons report being engaged between 5–8 months per year.

Compared to the non-displaced population, there is a higher proportion among IDP returnees and camp IDPs that are outside the labour force (by more than 10 percentage points),³⁸ with a noteworthy high proportion of women IDP returnees (48%) that also fall into this category. What do we know about this segment of the working-age population that is not working or engaged in subsistence farming? The majority are youth, as we see the ‘out of labour force’ proportion drastically increase amongst the 15–24-year-olds; close to half amongst non-displaced youth, more than half amongst youth in the IDP camps and two-thirds among returnee youth. The majority of them report to be studying, which is especially true for the male youth in comparison to female youth.

It is important to highlight the proportions of the youth who are not working nor in education. That is especially the case for young women: 37% young women in camps and 27% among young returnee women. These young people could be at risk of remaining outside the labour market, since they are not receiving training or education, nor working in subsistence farming or gaining practical work experience. Poverty coupled with lack of economic opportunities in Darfur make youth (especially young men) vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups.

³⁸ The population referred to as ‘outside of the labour force’ are persons, who are between the ages of 15–64 and ‘economically inactive’, meaning they are neither working or actively looking for work. This category often includes students, non-waged household work, sick and disabled persons unable to work.

FIGURE 4: PROPORTION OF YOUTH (15–24 YEARS) NOT IN WORK, EDUCATION OR TRAINING (NEET) - SDG 8.6.1



SHOCKS TO LIVELIHOODS AND COPING MECHANISMS

The profiling also takes into account what respondents considered to be the most severe shocks to their livelihoods. Over the past few years, Sudan has seen continuous price hikes for staple foods and fuel. Across all three groups (98%), high food prices were seen to be the most significant challenge. Among the non-displaced population almost all households indicate that high prices for food and fuel is the most significant shock (71% and 14% respectively). In contrast, IDP returnees and camp IDPs point to a broader list of significant livelihood shocks. 55% and 57% of IDPs and returnees specify high food prices as the most severe, 18% and 16% higher cost of fuel, whereas 8% of both populations list violence, raiding, looting or assault as the most critical shock. And lastly, 6% of IDPs and 8% of returnees say that crop diseases caused the worst shock to their livelihood.

All groups faced challenges in some areas, however, there are areas where it is possible to discern clear differences. When asked to indicate which shocks the household had experienced during the past year, large majorities across all three groups report rising food prices (98%) and high fuel prices (97–99%), crop diseases (88–92%), loss of employment or income (68–72%) and COVID-19 restrictions (80–91%). Clearly defined differences can be observed when it comes to water shortages, security incidents, livestock and droughts. Both camp IDPs and returnees are more impacted by these challenges. For example, 40% and 36% of respectively returnees and camp IDPs were impacted by severe water shortages in contrast to 14% of non-displaced residents. A similar picture emerges with regards to violence, raiding, robbery and assault as 36% and 30% of returnees and IDPs experienced these challenges juxtaposed with only 14% of the non-displaced population.


How are households dealing with the shocks to their livelihoods? The households surveyed were asked if and how they had responded to livelihood shocks. Selecting from a broad range of coping mechanisms, a picture emerges of how households have coped. Grouping responses into ‘negative’ or non-reversible versus ‘positive’ or sustainable coping strategies is a good predictor of future vulnerability.³⁹ In other words, to what extent a household is resilient when facing potential future shocks. For example, ‘negative’ or more extreme behaviours (selling productive assets) suggest serious long-term consequences. Such strategies are less reversible and therefore represent a more

³⁹ The categorization is based on the responses provided to the question ‘what do you do when faced with X shock to your livelihood? Modest coping strategies are easily reversible or strategies that do not jeopardize longer-term prospects, while more extreme coping mechanisms have longer-term consequences. Categories for coping were reviewed by UNDP Sudan colleagues. Based on feedback, the coping mechanisms were grouped according to severity into non-sustainable/irreversible and sustainable/reversible. For example, ‘sold farm area’, ‘reduced food consumption’, ‘selling animals’ were categorized as ‘non-sustainable’, whilst ‘selling more crops’, ‘starting a new business’, ‘received help from an NGO’ were grouped as less severe/reversible coping mechanisms.

severe form of coping, whereas selling more crops, starting a new business or receiving help from an INGO/NGO are classed as modest or ‘positive’ coping strategies.⁴⁰

The findings show that similar proportions (58–63%) across the three groups deployed ‘positive’ coping mechanisms, while the ‘negative’ mechanisms are seen to a slightly higher degree amongst displaced households (26% IDP returnees and 23% camp IDPs) compared to 19% amongst the non-displaced population.

FIGURE 5: MECHANISMS USED FOR COPING WITH A RECENT LIVELIHOOD SHOCK



In order to specifically understand households’ food security, households are asked whether there was one or more times during the last 7 days when they did not have enough food or money to buy food. In Tawila locality, more than half said that they did not have enough food; 52% of non-displaced households, rising to 66% of returnees and 68% of camp IDPs. The reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) is an indicator of household food security. The rCSI assesses how people cope when they do not have enough to eat or any money to buy food. The proxy tool takes into account how often particular strategies are used and the severity of the strategies employed categorising the way households are coping with the lack of food into low, medium and high strategies, with the latter being the most severe.⁴¹ Looking at how many households have had to resort to high coping strategies, 18% of returnees and 10% of IDPs fall into this category that face severe difficulty coping with insufficient food, whilst this is the case for a very low number of non-displaced households (4%).⁴²

⁴⁰ The category here of ‘positive’ is relative, and mainly refers to ‘reversible’ strategies that have no longer term negative impact as e.g. selling of assets, obtaining loans or decreasing food portions, have.

⁴¹ The reduced CSI has been developed to compare food security across different contexts. It is a sub-set of the context-specific CSI but food security is calculated using a specific set of behaviours with a universal set of severity weightings for each behaviour. Thus, the reduced CSI uses a standard set of five individual coping behaviours that can assess food security of households in any context: eating less-preferred foods, borrowing food/money from friends and relatives, limiting portions at mealtimes, limiting adult food intake, and reducing the number of meals per day. Maxwell, D. and Caldwell, R. (2008) The Coping Strategies Index. Field Methods Manual (March, 2008).

⁴² It should be noted that seasonality will also impact scores. Higher scores are more common in months where food is not readily available.

FOCUS ON FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS

With female-headed households making up a substantial proportion of the population, it is important to try to understand if and to what extent they may be more vulnerable.⁴³ When using the rCSI tool, the data shows that a larger proportion of households headed up by women did not have enough food. 73% female-headed versus 63% of male-headed family units among the non-displaced population did not have enough food during the preceding week. For camp IDPs, there is a difference of respectively 7 and 9 percentage points among camp IDPs and returnees. Hence, female-headed households show a tendency to being more food insecure.

Using female-headed households' use of coping mechanisms as a proxy for vulnerability, female-headed households among the non-displaced and returnees do not appear to be applying negative mechanisms to a degree very different to those headed up by men. However, when it comes to camp IDPs, female-headed households are applying negative coping strategies to a higher degree. 47% either apply negative coping mechanism or are simply unable to respond to external shocks. This is the case for a smaller proportion among the male-headed IDP family units (36%).

Lastly, considering the age-dependency ratio for female-headed household provides another lens to gauge vulnerability. For female-headed households residing in the camps, there is a larger proportion of households that have a high age-dependency ration and thus more strain on the providing members of the family.⁴⁴ This trend does not extend to the returnees or non-displaced, as for among these population groups there is either no difference or the data indicates the opposite trend.

⁴³ One in four of non-displaced households are female-headed, whilst this is the case for 35% of returnees and camp IDP households.

⁴⁴ The difference is 10 percentage points (55% of female-headed compared to 44% of male-headed households).

HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY: ACCESS AND TENURE

The enjoyment of housing, land and property rights is key to achieving durable solutions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs regards effective accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP) as crucial criteria to determine if IDPs have reached a durable solution. This is because housing, land and property underpin people's livelihoods and standard of living.

This chapter explores IDPs and returnees' access to land.⁴⁵ Have they managed to regain their land and rebuild their livelihoods? What are the specific obstacles to this? Drawing on the data of the non-displaced population as a benchmark, the analysis looks to explore and explain obstacles faced by camp IDPs and returnees.

From a peacebuilding perspective, violations of IDPs' housing, land and property (HLP) rights are a major obstacle to durable solutions for IDPs but are also integral to reaching peace, because land is a primary driver cause *and* ongoing driver of conflict between communities. The Juba Peace Agreement recognises the importance of land—land is a resource for the good of all people of Sudan. The agreement specifies that Individuals and communities have the right to restitution of lands lost as a result of the conflict in Darfur and where return of the land is not possible, IDPs are entitled to compensation. As part of the peace agreement a number of structures and institutions have been established with particular mandates relating to land issues.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Only 14% of IDPs in the camps own the land they cultivate. 84% rent land in sharp contrast to non-displaced and returnees, who report owning agricultural land to much higher degrees (70% in both groups).**
- **A vast majority of all groups claim customary rights to agricultural land, whilst only a small minority of non-displaced and returnees hold land registration certificates.**
- **77% of IDP returnee households and only 12% of camp IDP households still have access to their agricultural land in their place of origin.**
- **Among camp IDPs, who do not have rights to their agricultural land in the place of origin, less than half report still having access and a majority (67%) report having challenges in re-accessing. The issues reported are linked to land being unlawfully occupied and grazing routes not being followed.**

ACCESS TO LAND AND TENURE SECURITY


Land in Tawila locality is central to people's livelihoods as discussed, as livelihood sources overwhelmingly depend on agriculture (see previous chapter). For people in this rural area, land is by proxy a livelihoods source. High proportions of all three groups report having access to land. 93% of IDP returnees state they have access to land and 90% of non-displaced households. IDPs residing

⁴⁵ Access refers to obtaining or using land. Access to land is governed through land tenure systems, which is 'relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups with respect to land.' A land tenure system determines who can use what land, for how long and under what terms. FAO (2002) Land Tenure Studies (4). Gender and access to land.

in camps report less access to land (70%) by 20 percentage points. IDPs are accessing agricultural land situated outside of the camp. This follows a traditional setup, where dwellings are clustered in villages and fields positioned some distance away.⁴⁶ Amongst all three groups, the vast majority have to walk more than 30 min by foot to reach their agricultural plot.⁴⁷

When considering households' land tenure of arable land, around 70% of both non-displaced residents and IDP returnees say they own the land. This is in sharp contrast to camp IDPs of which merely 14% say they own the land they cultivate. Amongst IDPs living in camps, renting agricultural land is the most prevalent form of tenure (84%). Thus, the findings on land tenure show a marked difference between non-displaced residents and returnees contrasted with camp IDPs when it comes to ownership of arable land.

FIGURE 6: AGRICULTURAL LAND TENURE



Looking closer at particular forms of land ownership, the profiling results show that the customary tenure system is widely adopted in Tawila by all groups. A vast majority claim customary rights to agricultural land, whilst only a very small minority (6%) among the non-displaced population and returnees hold a formal land registration certificate.⁴⁸ This picture is somewhat different for residential land—a relatively higher proportion of non-displaced residents and IDP returnees report having registration certificates for their housing plots. Amongst non-displaced residents, 91% own their housing plot of which 30% hold a registration certificate proving ownership. 79% of IDP returnees own their residential plot of land, whilst 9% carry this official ownership document.

DARFURI LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

Darfur is governed by plural legal land tenure systems. Since the start of the joint authority Anglo-Egyptian rule of Sudan, modern statutory laws have existed alongside traditional customary laws. In

⁴⁶ Abdul-Jalil, Musa and Unruh, Jon. (2013), p.5). Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

⁴⁷ More than 30 min by foot from dwelling to agricultural plot is reported by 92% of non-displaced, 98% of camp IDP and 91% of IDP returnee households.

⁴⁸ According to the survey results, 16% and 19% of respectively the non-displaced and returnees say that their land is demarcated, whilst a much smaller proportion hold a land registration certificate (5%). The survey question refers to demarcation as land surveyed and officially registered. It is unclear whether this matter was misunderstood in some way, as the issuing of a land registration certificate requires the land to be surveyed and officially registered.

practical terms, this legal pluralism means that there are ‘overlapping institutions for accessing land’.⁴⁹ The customary ‘Hakura’ system is the traditional way to manage land in Darfur. Ownership of land does not correspond to the Western legal concept. Following the customary system, rights are not exclusive and land is ‘owned’ or belong to a community. Land in Darfur is split into tribal homelands, which is named a Dar. Generally, the homeland belongs to a major tribe, which gave this tribe monopoly over land but crucially also leadership and political representation and power.⁵⁰ A tribal sheik belonging to the dominant tribe with a tribal homeland can assign a piece of land (hakura) to a group of people, family or person. Permission is granted for a time period and in case the land allocated is not being used, then the sheik may reallocate it to another person or group.⁵¹ Crucially, not all groups have a Dar—tribes can be categorized as land-holding and non-landing tribes. Sheiks not belonging to a tribe that do not have a homeland are known as ‘sheik of the people’ and has no authority over land.⁵² A recent UN Habitat report assesses that registered land ownership cover less than 1% of the land in Darfur with very few registered parcels of land in rural locales.⁵³ The Tawila profiling results are in line with this portrayal—showing that a great majority of people state their land rights derive from customary law.⁵⁴

Examining obstacles to accessing land for IDPs, returnees and other groups, the Hakura customary land management system itself represents an obstacle for accessing land for some groups. Key informant interviews (KIIs) with Tawila respondents flag that women face inequalities when it comes to land ownership, because customary law does not grant women land rights.⁵⁵ The study found that female-headed households appear to own and rent land to the same degree as the male headed households. These figures may not present a true picture of landownership by women, as information was captured at the household level. Therefore, it is possible that any other male member of the households owns the land. Among non-displaced, the proportion of male and female-headed households owning and renting land is more or less the same. Among camp IDPs female-headed households own land to a slightly higher degree (by 5 percentage points), while among IDP returnee female-headed household own land to a slightly lower degree (by 6 percentage points).

Pastoralist nomads is also a group that is identified to have little access to land, as an outcome of how the customary Hakura system manages access to land.⁵⁶ Nomads do not have access to land due to their movement because traditional land rights are linked to agricultural use of land. Communal ownership of land was traditionally not attainable for nomadic communities. Instead, pastoralist had transient rights including access to water for animals and humans plus access to grazing land and livestock routes.⁵⁷ Hence, sheiks from pastoralist communities that do not have a homeland—a Dar—would not have land to offer members of their tribe, whereas leaders of sedentary communities

⁴⁹ Satti, H., Sulieman, H., Young, H., Radday, A. (2020) *Natural Resources Management: Local Perspectives from North and Central Darfur*.

⁵⁰ Unruh, J. (2016) *Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict*.

⁵¹ UN-Habitat (2020) *Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations*.

⁵² East Darfur, key informant—Native Administration

⁵³ UN-Habitat (2020) *Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations*.

⁵⁴ In urban cities like El Fasher, it is common for residents (non-displaced) to hold a registered area certificate (between 94–97% of peri-urban and city centre residents). UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). *Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan*.

⁵⁵ According to statutory law, women can own land, however, in rural areas customary land rights do allow women access to land. UN-Habitat (2020) *Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations*.

⁵⁶ Tawila, North Darfur, community representative (youth).

⁵⁷ Unruh, J. (2016) *Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict*.

traditionally could assign or lease land. In fact, many Darfur experts argue that the inability of the indigenous Hakura system to allow for full participation by nomadic pastoralists aggravated divisions between sedentary farmers and nomads and thus was a major factor in the development of the conflict. This is because a Dar—a homeland—is traditionally linked to political participation and comes with formal leadership positions in local and regional state institutions and have excluded nomadic pastoralists and smaller tribes. The customary system also partially excludes those not native to a Dar. Therefore, outsiders like IDPs that have settled away from their place of origin have limited access to land and often rent agricultural land.

The commonly held logic behind wanting to demarcate and legally register land is to establish clarity on boundaries and ownership, and in turn reduce conflict over land.⁵⁸ Then, how come such a small percentage of people possess a legal certificate documenting ownership of their land? One explanation is that it is a complicated, lengthy and costly process that only grants ownership for a relatively short time period (6–7 years). The process of obtaining a land registration certificate is long and complex, and involves dealing with both the Native Administration, who oversees the customary tenure system, and the formal legal judiciary in charge of formal registration of land. The process of converting customary rights to land into registered rights can take years.⁵⁹ The Tawila area-level analysis indicates that many do not have great awareness of existing legal frameworks in regard to land management and are only familiar dealing with representatives from the Native Administration (omdas, sheiks and shartais). Some Darfur commentators suggest a different explanation; that demarcation has been ‘actively resisted’ by the population that claim customary ownership of land. If farmers registered their land it would amount to an acknowledgment that all unoccupied land belonging to the Dar is the property of the Government of Sudan as set out in the 1970 Unregistered Land Act.⁶⁰ The rejection, it is argued, also has to do with limited trust in the government and the government institutions that are involved in demarcation and land registration.⁶¹ Furthermore, thematic experts point out that the process involved in official land registration of farmland is open to manipulation. The process involves the Native Administration to sign and endorse a written form. The claim to land is broadcast on local radio, if no one disputes the claim it will be officially registered using GPS mapping to demarcate. People can register land, but it is very hard to verify that it is, in fact, their land. Are the Omdas, the original tribal leaders of the land in question or more recent arrivals? Therefore, the process itself needs to be strengthened or changed. In addition, IDPs and returnees also complain that the cost of the official GPS demarcation is high. Demarcation costs 200 SDG per feddan.⁶²

The Juba Peace Agreement sets out some changes to the hierarchy of the statutory and customary land tenure systems. The government of Jafar Numeiri enacted the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, which brought all land not formally registered into government ownership. In practice the Act asserted government ownership over lands that were already claimed under the customary land tenure Hakura system and administered by the Native Administration. The Juba Peace Agreement signed in 2020 explicitly recognises traditional ownership of tribal lands (referred to as Hawakeer), historic rights to

⁵⁸ Abdul-Jalil, Musa and Unruh, Jon. (2013), p.5). Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In *War and Society* Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

⁵⁹ Consultation from thematic expert from UN Habitat, February 2021.

⁶⁰ Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 *Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict*.

⁶¹ Abdul-Jalil, Musa and Unruh, Jon. (2013), p.5). Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In *War and Society* Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

⁶² Consultation with UN thematic experts, March 2021.

lands plus customary livestock routes and opportunities to access water.⁶³ Moreover, customary law takes precedence in the event that there is a conflict between Sudanese statutory law and customary law relating to land. Subsequently, laws should be amended to include land rights 'according to the norms, traditions, and inherited practices of land tenure in Darfur'.⁶⁴ It is unclear whether these changes to land tenure in the peace agreement represent a view as to whether formal land registration in Darfur is the right tool for reducing conflict over land or not. But certainly, some Darfur scholars hold the view that it is the inherent flexibility and ambiguity of customary tenure that allows for the 'elasticity required in the tenure system to accommodate livestock migrations and pursue options in drought years'.⁶⁵

RECLAIMING/RETAINING ACCESS TO LAND

77% of IDP returnees say they have access to the same land they used to cultivate before their displacement. For the camp IDP population, only 12% access the land they previously used. Furthermore, 68% of the households in camps reported that they had not visited their place of origin since their displacement, while the remaining who had journeyed back to visit their village of origin at least once, typically did so due to farming and to check on their property.

Of those that are not currently accessing their land, 67% of IDPs say that they face problems when trying to gain entry to the land. In contrast, only 37% of returnees have issues with regards to re-accessing land in their place of origin. The key obstacles linked to regaining access are reported to be unlawful occupation and issues around grazing routes not being followed. The majority of IDPs who are reporting problems regaining access to their previous agricultural land are from Tawila locality. When asked about ownership, 38% report to still have legal rights to their agricultural land.

TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF IDP HOUSEHOLDS' ACCESS TO THE LAND THEY FARMED BEFORE DISPLACEMENT

	IDPs in camps (N=431)	IDP returnees (N=399)
Accessing the same land as prior to displacement	12%	7%
	IDPs in camps NOT accessing same land (N=248)	IDP returnees NOT accessing same land (N=64)
Still having same rights to the land from prior to displacement	45%	31%
Having issues re-accessing land	67%	37%

⁶³Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.1

⁶⁴Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.5

⁶⁵Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.

SAFETY, SECURITY, CONFLICT AND RULE OF LAW

Perceptions of safety and security are key criteria for durable solutions. The analysis aims to understand if IDPs and returnees experience a higher degree of safety and security incidents in comparison to the non-displaced population. What type of insecurity and conflict do residents face?

Lack of security has the ability to erode the overall confidence in peacebuilding processes and therefore restoring the rule of law is imperative. Peacebuilding is ultimately concerned with transforming post-conflict societies so that political, social disputes and conflict are managed and resolved through non-violent means. The rule of law is a framework for the peaceful management of conflict and fair administration of justice through institutions, mechanisms and procedures.⁶⁶ Ensuring the rule of law relies on the capacity of the police and formal courts, but how effective are the police and courts in Tawila locality? The role of civil society in conflict resolution and peacebuilding is also important in Darfur and therefore local conflict resolution mechanisms are reviewed and their perceived effectiveness assessed. Key informants also provide insight into the limitations of local conflict resolution mechanisms, but also how local mechanisms can be strengthened and local peacebuilding capacities supported.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **Overall, IDPs in camps and return IDPs report significantly higher insecurity: a bit more than half of camp IDPs and returnees say they feel safe when walking at night, while that is the case for 84% of the non-displaced residents. Similarly, considerably more IDPs and IDP returnees have experienced threats and security incidents when comparing to the non-displaced population.**
- **50% of IDP returnees report incidents where damage was caused to property, assets or livestock (including crop damage). That is the case for one in four of non-displaced and one-third of camp IDPs.**
- **There is stronger tendency among camp IDPs and IDP returnees to report security incidents (to police and local committees), compared to non-displaced; while at the same time they indicate being less satisfied with the way the matter was resolved compared to non-displaced residents, who have reported incidents.**
- **All three groups point to two main conflict triggers—non-displaced (65%), returnees (58%) and camp IDPs (52%) say that pastoralists not following grazing routes and rules is a chief cause of conflict. Conflict over boundaries of land is also highlighted as a main source of conflict (reported by 16%–14% in the three groups).**
- **Resolving of conflict over land boundaries by the police was given a low satisfaction rating by respondents, whilst the effectiveness of committees to settle grazing conflicts between farmers and pastoralists were rated as average to low satisfaction.**
- **Based on key informant interviews, there appears to be a general move towards better coordination and consultation between local authorities, government representatives,**

⁶⁶ Kritz, N. J. (2007) *The Rule of Law in Conflict Management* in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.) (2007) *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*.

services and community representatives, since the transitional Government in Khartoum took office.

DISPUTES AND CONFLICT

The profiling survey draws attention to two main conflict drivers. A majority among camp IDPs, returnees and non-displaced communities report disputes linked to pastoralist grazing routes and secondly conflict in relation to boundaries of land as the main causes of conflict.

A high proportion of all three groups specify conflict with pastoralists connected to agricultural land and animal routes as chief conflict trigger. 65% of non-displaced and respectively 58% and 52% of returnees and IDPs say that grazing routes and rules not followed by pastoralists is a main cause of conflict. Conflict over boundaries of land is also flagged as a main conflict spark, but by a smaller proportion—16% of IDPs and 14% of non-displaced and IDP returnees in Tawila locality.

In interviews with key informants on whether issues around land, water or other issues are causing conflict, all respondents say that more than half of conflicts are related to land.⁶⁷ Conflicts between farmers over farm boundaries and land appropriated and occupied unlawfully by others unlawfully by others involving pastoralists and farmers are emphasised. Conflicts due to a lack of registration and official demarcation of land is also flagged, however, respondents indicate that such disputes are often between original land owners and tenant farmers.⁶⁸ Key informants from the pastoralist community, on the other hand, regard demarcation and land registration as more fundamental to resolving all conflicts relating to land.⁶⁹

The referred to farmland boundary conflicts result from farmers expanding the cultivated land pushing into areas of the neighbouring farms. This kind of conflict is reported to happen every year during the rainy seasons when farmers begin planting crops.⁷⁰ Conflict linked to pastoralists' grazing routes are also seasonal. Darfur pastoralist tribes move their livestock from north to the south in the course of the dry season and head back north during the rainy season.⁷¹ The pastoralists use traditional livestock corridors (masarat) and have customary rights to graze their animals on rain-fed farm land (talique) after the harvest.⁷² Although the Hakura system gives farmers customary rights to land, these rights are not exclusive and pastoralists have temporary rights to graze their herds on what is left of the harvested crops. A talique date for when pastoralists can graze their animals is normally agreed between farmers and pastoralists with the help of local authorities to avoid crop losses and conflict.⁷³ Disputes and conflict happen when talique agreements are violated by either side. Violations of these agreements are often caused by a poor rainy season, which press pastoralists to move their herds

⁶⁷ Other sources of conflict include intra-family disputes and theft.

⁶⁸ Tawila, North Darfur, Omda of Tawila.

⁶⁹ It is worth noting that pastoralists key informants only referred to boundary conflicts between farmers resulting from changing the boundaries of their farms at the beginning of the planting season. And did not mention or discuss other conflicts types of conflict between communities.

⁷⁰ Tawila, North Darfur, focus group discussions (FDGs) with respectively women and IDPs.

⁷¹ UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations. Khartoum: UN-Habitat.

⁷² Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

⁷³ The talique date is referred to as a customary institution that has 'evolved through local practices of local communities, their leadership, and formal government structures. Osman, A.M.K., Young, H. Houser, R.F., and Coates, J. C. (2013) Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur. Oxfam America 1–43.

much earlier in search for pasture and water. This, in turn, causes damage to crops before the harvest and farmers are known to deny pastoralists passage.⁷⁴


The unlawful occupation of land is described as between farmers or IDPs and pastoralists. The Kolgay mountains (Galab) area along with parts around Nabagaye Ateem are frequently referred to as where nomads who have settled are ‘have taken the land by force’ and preventing the displaced from returning.⁷⁵

SECURITY INCIDENTS AND PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY

In Tawila locality, a high proportion of all three groups report feeling safe whilst walking around during the daytime (90% and above). Those who state ‘feeling very safe’ during daylight hours account for 63% and 67% IDP returnees and camp IDPs, whilst this rises to 78% among the non-displaced inhabitant. Perceptions of safety remains high amongst the non-displaced population (84%) when asked about feeling safe walking at night,⁷⁶ but drops significantly among camp IDPs and returnees as about 40% say they feel ‘very unsafe’.

To identify the types of confrontations and threats that communities face in Tawila, respondents were asked about incidents that they had experienced in the 12 months prior to the survey. Findings show that 11–16% of IDPs and returnees experience verbal and physical threats as well as robbery ‘very often’ in contrast to only 2–5% of the non-displaced population. Overall, IDPs living in camps and IDP returnees have experienced one or more security incidents during the last year.⁷⁷ Robbery is the most frequently reported incident for all the communities, whilst one-third of IDP and returnee households say they have been threatened. This number is high when weighed against only 11–12% of the non-displaced households that have experienced physical and verbal threats. Amongst the IDP returnees, approximately 50% report incidents where damage was caused to property, assets or livestock. In comparison, this type of incident is reported less by camp IDP and non-displaced households.

FIGURE 7: HOUSEHOLDS THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED AT LEAST ONE SECURITY INCIDENT IN THE 12 MONTHS PRECEDING THE SURVEY



⁷⁴ Satti, H., Sulieman, H., Young, H., Radday, A. (2020) Natural Resources Management: Local Perspectives from North and Central Darfur.

⁷⁵ Tawila, North Darfur, community representative (youth, women, IDPs, farmers).


⁷⁶ Respectively 41% and 43% of non-displaced Tawila residents report feeling ‘very safe’ and ‘somewhat safe’ when walking during the night.

⁷⁷ Respondents were asked about security and safety incidents in the 12 months preceding the survey.

REPORTING SAFETY INSTANCES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

Survey results show a stronger tendency among non-displaced to not report incidents (53%) compared to camp IDPs (37%) and IDP returnees (29%). The majority of those who did report an incident, across all three groups, do so to the village committee (Omdas, Sultan, Malik, Nazir, Sheikhs). Across all three communities, only 17–22% of those that experienced a crime reported the incident to the police. This propensity not to report to the police may be linked to access—Tawila locality only has two police stations to serve a large geographical area.⁷⁸ Reportedly, nomads very seldom report incidents to the police as the stations are located far from pastoralists’ usual routes and sites of temporary dwelling. In theory, women have access to the police, but local customs prohibit women from travelling to police stations.⁷⁹ For the police to actively respond to incidents is a challenge with a limited number of officers and lack of vehicles and fuel.⁸⁰

FIGURE 8: HOUSEHOLDS WHERE AT LEAST ONE MEMBER HAS EXPERIENCED AT LEAST ONCE A SECURITY INCIDENT THE 12 MONTHS PRECEDING THE SURVEY BY TYPE OF INCIDENT



Interestingly, the satisfaction with the way an issue was addressed among those who did report an incident differs: there is a larger proportion of non-displaced residents who indicate they found the solutions fair (25%), whereas less camp IDPs (15%) and IDP returnees (15%) found the resolution fair.

Looking in more details at reporting, both camp IDPs and IDP returnees are more likely to turn to local committees for help as an alternative to police involvement than non-displaced residents. Respondents rating how well land boundary conflicts reported to the police had been resolved reported low satisfaction. This may to some extent explain why some population groups look to other conflict resolution mechanisms.

There are a number of community dispute resolution mechanisms alternative to police involvement. Rural courts exist and are linked to the Native Administration often with the Omda presiding as the judge. Various committees exist at the local level, some with wider mandates such as the Peace

⁷⁸ A third police station is under construction in Kunjara.

⁷⁹ Tawila, North Darfur, police officer.

⁸⁰ Tawila police station has a mixed force of 40 police officers and soldiers, whilst the smaller station is staffed by 10. Some, but not all, of the soldiers and officers have received training from either UNDP, UNAMID, the Sudanese Police Force or NGOs with a relevant mandate.

Committee and the Youth and Resistance Committee. Other grassroots level mechanisms manage competing demands and conflict linked to specific areas; these include the Water/WASH Committee and Crop Protection Committee.

How are these local conflict resolution mechanisms regarded by the communities? The area-level analysis points to the Peace Committee as the most frequently mentioned institution. The Peace Committees are made up of members of the Native Administration and is also referred to as 'Ajaweed'. The Water/Wash Committee and Harvest Protection Committee were also highlighted as key to managing conflict. The Harvest Protection Committee is headed up by the Executive Director representing local government and is the chief forum that brings all community groups together including nomads. IDPs have similar committee set ups for services and resolving issues within the camps, but these institutions do not seem to be linked up to similar committees outside the camp. Similarly, many respondents were uncertain to what IDP returnees were represented in committees.

When it comes to rating the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms, the survey results show that grazing-related conflicts reported to local committees receive a score of average to low satisfaction.⁸¹ Exploring this theme further, respondents flag some elements that strengthens conflict resolutions mechanisms' effectiveness. Involvement of all groups was stressed to be key, and similarly that initiatives was firmly rooted in the community. The main challenges and limitations listed for community-based mechanisms to be active and effective include lack of funds, lack of vehicles and fuel to be able to travel within Tawila locality. Apart from additional support, additional training and awareness raising was also voiced by key informants, because the communities themselves need to play a central role in mobilising community members to participate and support conflict resolution mechanisms. 'We have to train the community leaders, IDPs, pastoralists, farmers, youths and women in conflict sensitivity, analysis and management of conflict resolution and the process of peacebuilding as well'.⁸²

Significant numbers of key informants point to the overarching conflict that affects the unstable security situation at the local level. This along with reconciliation between farmers and pastoralists is regarded as requiring intervention *beyond* local community mediation and is considered to be the responsibility of the Government of Sudan. In other words, local community conflict mechanisms can form a part but cannot be expected to solve disputes and conflict that are not confined to the local level. Hence, local level conflict resolution mechanisms need to be joined up with solutions at state and even country-level. On the specific issue of coordination between community-based mechanisms and formal bodies, the Native Administration is considered to play the role of bridge between local communities and the government. The structures are seen as not always in place to facilitate coordination the processes are often not understood. 'The flow of responsibility starts from the village to the four different administrative units, to the locality level and finally to the state level. Every level has its own responsibilities. To improve these processes, we need to train all categories of the community and support their projects.'⁸³

⁸¹ When discussing committees' effectiveness in mitigating and resolving conflict, there is no consensus among key informants. Some say committees are working well, whilst others judge committees to be ineffectual due to conflict. Tawila, North Darfur, interviews with Native Administration members, NGO staff, women and IDPs.

⁸² Tawila, North Darfur, Executive Director for Tawila.

⁸³ Tawila, North Darfur, Tawila locality Omda.

There does appear to be a more general shift towards interaction with government officials plus the manner in which services are coordinated have also started to change since the transitional government in Khartoum took office, which may pave the way for more and better coordination between the locality and state level. For instance, an education coordination committee has been created that includes local authorities, local government and community representatives.⁸⁴ A pastoralist describes this general shift; ‘During the period of the previous regime the Native Administration was marginalised and there was not any interaction with the government, but during the period of Basheer [current Executive Director in Tawila locality] the coordination between government and our administration is very active and we have resolved many problems.’

THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT AND CONFLICT OVER LAND

Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property is central to achieving durable solutions for IDPs as set out by the IASC Framework. The Juba Peace Agreement is in agreement with the IASC criteria and stipulates that ‘all victims of Darfur have a right to seek restoration of property or compensation for their lost or seized property resulting from the conflict in Darfur’.⁸⁵ This right to restitution is not only awarded to individuals but also to communities that have a collective right to pursue restitution for communal property, villages, farms and traditional land. Where it is not possible for IDPs to return, they are entitled to compensation for their loss resulting from forced displacement.⁸⁶ This right is extended to displaced persons regardless of whether they choose to return to their places of origin or not.⁸⁷ Thematic experts warn that the lack of mechanisms to implement restitution and compensation will be an obstacle to durable solutions and peacebuilding efforts.⁸⁸

Interestingly, the peace agreement provides for the review and possible revocation of registration of land that was expropriated or forcibly taken after June 1989.⁸⁹ Potentially, this is a powerful tool to deal with land that is unlawfully occupied even when the resent settlers hold land registration certificates to prove ownership. There is little mention in the agreement of the rights of the ‘secondary’ or settlers unlawfully occupying land apart from chapter two, which specifies that basic services should be provided in areas of resettlement for those who inhabited the lands of others illegally.⁹⁰

The agreement sets out several institutions and their mandates that will govern conflict over land and aid peaceful co-existence between communities. The ‘Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission’ has a mandate to hear and mediate in property restitution claims for individuals, who lost their land because of the conflict in Darfur. It is also tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed land.⁹¹ The National Lands Commission has also been established and is tasked with working in

⁸⁴ The committee was set up in Tawila in November, 2020. Tawila, North Darfur, education official.

⁸⁵ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.3.

⁸⁶ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.3.2.

⁸⁷ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.8.2

⁸⁸ NRC (2021), Housing, Land and Property Rights (HL) in the Juba Peace Agreement. Darfur Track briefing note.

⁸⁹ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.8.1.

⁹⁰ This task is allocated to the Reconstruction and Development Commission. Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 2.18).

⁹¹ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.9.1 and chapter 7.10.11.

tandem with the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, whilst the Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee Commission has been set up to oversee voluntary return and resettlement.⁹² The Commission for the Development of the Nomads is mandated with improving the nomadic pastoralist sector plus regulate relations between farmers and nomadic pastoralists.⁹³

The household survey and area-level analysis focused on conflict drivers, capacities for peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level. At the time of data collection, none of the institutions and mechanisms stipulated in the Juba Peace Agreement were up and running and it is not clear how these will interact with or support efforts at the locality level.

⁹² Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.8.

⁹³ Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.7.1.

CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

Social cohesion is a multi-faceted concept, however, this chapter focuses on specific aspects including participation and inclusion as well as inter-group contacts and perceptions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs specify that displaced persons should be able to exercise the right to participate in public affairs on an equal footing with the non-displaced population without discrimination due to their displacement. People’s civic participation—engagement in public affairs, as well as how groups accept and engage with each other, can offer insights into social cohesion within and between communities. In turn, social cohesion has a bearing on integration and thus are important for durable solutions and peacebuilding. Greater cohesion may facilitate more consensus-oriented or inclusive governance, as well as create resilience to escalating conflict at the individual level.⁹⁴

KEY FINDINGS:

- **A smaller proportion of IDPs living in the camps are engaged in community affairs (42%) compared to IDP returnees (56%) and the non-displaced population (50%).**
- **Intergroup perceptions are positive; the vast majority of households across the three groups rate the relationship with other communities as positive. However, 34% of camp IDPs and 17% of IDP returnees report that they feel unable to participate in decision-making.**
- **The same swing in attitudes is observed among the non-displaced residents. The vast majority welcome IDPs as part of the community (almost 100%), but this drops to 70–80% when it comes to allowing IDPs and returnees to be part of decision-making.**
- **Committees and community-based reconciliation mechanisms are perceived to be inclusive, but women and pastoralists are not well represented.**

INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

The household survey set out to understand how non-displaced, IDPs and returnees, who live side-by-side perceive each other. As a first step, camp IDPs and returnees were asked if they live together with non-displaced families in the same village or physical location. Notably, very few do—only 10% of camp IDPs and 19% of returnees. This shows that IDPs live relatively separately in geographical terms and that the majority of IDP returnees have returned to villages, where no one was left behind. In other words, the entire village was displaced and the current residents are all IDP returnees. The area-level information supports this depiction of living *next to* rather than together. And pastoralists are similarly reported to live in parallel communities amongst themselves. This set up is reflected in how the different groups tend to have separate initiatives and mechanisms serving their individual communities.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ For more on social cohesion analysis, see UNDP (2020) Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications. New York: UNDP.

⁹⁵ Tawila, North Darfur, key informants. This parallel living set up appears to be especially pronounced for camp IDPs and nomads. Camp committees manage competing needs for services in camps, for example, and nomads are reportedly only involved in one or two management conflict resolution mechanisms that cut across communities.

The vast majority of households across the three groups rate the relationship with other communities as positive. Attitudes of non-displaced households around welcoming IDPs to settle in their village, participate in local activities, sharing access to services such as education and clean water are very positive (98–100%). Similarly, IDPs living among non-displaced households overwhelmingly feel welcome to live in the community and participate in community activities. They are friends with people with a non-displaced background and would welcome neighbours into their family through marriage (93–99%).

PARTICIPATION AND INCLUSION

According to the area-level data, there is a high awareness of community-based mechanisms and committees. While these are considered to be inclusive according to the key informants,⁹⁶ this perspective changes somewhat when it comes to inclusion of specific groups such as women, youth, IDPs and pastoralists. The inclusion of women is chiefly considered as very low. Women are present, but habitually outnumbered by the numbers of men taking part in the forum. Respondents from farming and pastoralists communities both emphasise that nomads seldom take part in community mechanisms.⁹⁷

Participation in public meetings is around half for two of the surveyed groups; IDP returnees (56%) and non-displaced (50%) report having attended a public meeting on community matters in the last 6 months preceding the survey. Comparatively, a smaller proportion of IDPs living in the camps are engaged in community affairs (42%). Reasons for not attending were primarily 'not being invited' or 'not being aware of such meeting or event'.

When the household survey looks closer at participation along a spectrum from involvement to actively taking part in decision-making perceptions significantly change. 34% of camp IDPs and 17% of IDP returnees report that they feel unable to participate in decision-making. A general sense of 'feeling welcome' hence changes when it comes to invites to decision-making meetings and the ability to partake in a meaningful way. This shift is mirrored amongst the non-displaced population's attitudes towards IDPs and IDP returnees, which drops when it comes to accepting the participation of camp IDPs and returnees in decision-making. Approval is close to 100% down to respectively 70% and 80% for allowing IDPs and returnees to partake in making decisions on behalf of the community. Still, both engagement and taking part in decision-making is key to fostering community cohesion.

On the subject of participation in reconciliation and peace processes, the household survey shows that larger proportions of returnees and non-displaced households are participating compare to IDPs in the camps. IDP returnees (40%) and non-displaced residents (38%) said they attended a reconciliation meeting during the last 6 months preceding the survey, in contrast to only 29% of camp IDPs. The area-level examined whether any civil society groups in Tawila locality are advocating for women to participate in reconciliation and Darfur peace processes. Most respondents were unaware of any civil society group engaged in this area, however, one respondent pointed to the Resistance Committee as actively advocating for women's participation in Darfur peace processes. Also, a handful of civil society groups with broader remit were mentioned including Woman and Child Network (Tarney) and the Rahad Judul Society in Tabit administration unit.

⁹⁶ A majority of respondents rated committees and community-based mechanisms as very inclusive, while only some described them as 'medium inclusive'.

⁹⁷ Tawila, North Darfur, key informant interviews (nomads, IDPs, Native Administration representative).

ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING: AVAILABILITY AND ACCESS TO SERVICES

To assess adequate standard of living, this analysis draws on indicators such as availability and access to education, health, water, sanitation, communication and documentation. For displaced persons to enjoy an adequate standard of living is important for durable solutions. By benchmarking against the non-displaced population's level of access to services, the profiling can shed light on possible challenges and vulnerabilities linked to IDPs' and returnees' displacement as well as identify broader area-level development challenges which affect service delivery to all populations.

KEY FINDINGS:


- **The proportion of returnee children attending primary school is considerably higher. Boys (73%) and girls (64%) are enrolled in primary school compared to 45% and 46% of non-displaced boys and girls and 51% of both sexes among camp IDPs.**
- **Nomads have particularly bad access to both primary and secondary schools due to moving household and livestock in search of water and grazing.**
- **Quality of education is poor with low student-teacher ratios, many teachers with no formal qualification plus lack of equipment and teaching resources.**
- **Many schools lack electricity, safe drinking water, latrines and fencing, which negatively affect school attendance and retention.**
- **The main obstacle for sending children to school is financial: 41–47% of all three groups list lack of finances as the main barrier.**
- **Access to health services is a challenge for all groups and in particular the non-displaced. Obstacles include distance and availability of health centres and qualified health workers, but also the cost of consultation and medicines.**
- **IDP returnees have far less access to improved sanitation (11%) compared to about half of the non-displaced (46%) and IDPs (44%). One in four of all groups have access to safe water, however, a significant proportion of camp IDPs (39%) and IDP returnees say they do not have a sufficient amount of water.**
- **A large majority have personal documentation, however, the non-displaced communities have the highest proportion of persons with no documentation. No real difference between the proportion of men and women that holds personal documentation.**
- **A very high percentage of IDP returnees hold personal documentation. This type of documentation is required for land registration, which may explain how come many returnees possess a national ID.**

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Overall, access to school for children between 6 and 18 years of age is highest among IDP returnees (76%) compared to only 56% among camp IDPs and 52% of non-displaced children. Additionally, approximately one-tenth of the children in camps and non-displaced villages are attending informal

religious schools (Khalwa). This means that a significant proportion of children below 18 years of age are out of school: 23% of returnee, 35% of camp IDP and 38% of non-displaced children.

FIGURE 9: SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AMONGST CHILDREN AGED 6–18 YEARS



Access to primary education is lowest among the non-displaced Tawila population; 45% of boys and 46% of girls aged 6–13 years attend school. The enrolment rates for IDPs living in the camps is slightly higher as 51% of boys and girls are pupils. The proportion of returnee children attending school is considerably higher with 73% of boys and 64% of girls enrolled in school. Area-level data considers children of pastoralists to have the worst access to education, partly due to continuously being on the move during most of the year but also in part because pastoralist communities reportedly attach less importance to education.⁹⁸

The household survey data on the proportion of boys and girls attending school is line with official enrolment figures that tally 19,419 primary students of which 54% are boys and 46% are girls. According to key informant data there are reportedly 62 primary schools in Tawila locality, however only 33 schools are in operation. Particular areas are lacking access to education because of long distances to the nearest active school.⁹⁹

There are many factors which must come into play, when assessing the quality of education. In Tawila locality, there is a severe lack of teachers and the student-teacher ratio is very low, but ranges from 1:35 to 1:160. Importantly, many primary teachers are not trained teachers, but volunteer teaching assistants—of 278 primary teachers 122 are volunteers. Overall, there is a lack of resources and equipment in schools including an absence or shortage of chairs and desks. Most schools are equipped with a blackboard, but books, pens, pencils have to be purchased by the students’ families.

Some schools are not protected by a fence and others lack safe drinking water leaving students to drink from unprotected hafirs. Most schools are without latrines, which means students have to defecate in the open.¹⁰⁰ Some of the shortcomings in schools regarding drinking water, latrines, safety fencing and desks affect adversely both access and retention of students. A lack of separate sanitation facilities for boys and girls is regarded as disincentive for girls to attend school. And the absence of school fencing is also connected to recruitment of teachers, who prefer to in a school that has a fence.¹⁰¹ The household survey specifies the main obstacle reported by households for not

⁹⁸ Tawila, North Darfur, Director of Primary Education for Tawila locality.

⁹⁹ Villages lacking access to primary education due to long distances include Fatara in Dobo Admin Unit 2, Konja in Tawila Admin Unit 3 plus Umsiyala in Tawila Admin Unit.

¹⁰⁰ Tawila, North Darfur, Director of Primary Education for Tawila locality.

¹⁰¹ UNICEF Sudan (2019) Education: Annual Report, March 2020.

sending their children to school is financial.¹⁰² Across all groups, 41–47% report financial constraints as the main obstacle.¹⁰³ Primary education is in theory free of charge in Darfur, but in reality, fees are often charged for attending school. Fees are said to cover the cost of running of the school plus act as incentives for volunteer teaching assistants.¹⁰⁴

When it comes to secondary school attendance, the rates are extremely low: less than 5% across all groups. In Tawila locality, there a total of 11 secondary schools. Two located in Tarney and the remaining nine secondary schools in the Tawila administration unit. The total number of students is 1,380 taught by 42 formally trained teachers and 10 teaching assistants. Secondary schools are reported to be better equipped, however, all lack libraries, physics and chemistry labs and in-school health centres.

ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES

The profiling shows that access to health services is a challenge for all groups. According to the household survey data, a large majority of non-displaced (89%), camp IDPs (87%) and returnees (78%) attempted to access healthcare services during the past 6 months. Of those looking for medical assistance, a great majority reported challenges. Non-displaced (81%) Tawila residents, camp IDPs (77%) and returnees (69%) said they faced challenges when accessing healthcare. The barriers flagged by all three groups to accessing medical assistance include the unaffordable cost of services or medicine and secondly, the required medicine is not available at the health facility or pharmacy. These obstacles cited by Tawila residents match the most reported barriers to healthcare in the 2020 multi-sector needs assessment that covers all Sudan's states.¹⁰⁵

The area-level data pinpoints other key barriers to accessing healthcare. Overall, there is a lack of health centres in Tawilia locality. There is one hospital and 17 health centres serving this large geographical area and long distances are reported to severely hinder access.¹⁰⁶ Another obstacle is a shortage of qualified health workers; reportedly there is only one doctor working in the locality along with 72 nurses and health workers. However, most of these are described as volunteers without any formal training.¹⁰⁷ When it comes to rating healthcare services available to Tawila residents, the households survey shows similar proportions of satisfied and dissatisfied respondents in all three groups. Still, this means around 50% of all population groups are 'not satisfied at all' with healthcare services.

Generally, the different groups of the community are deemed to have equal access to health services with the exception of pastoralists, who are reported to mainly access health services during the rainy season or whilst passing through the locality on route. The prevalent perception among the targeted key informants is that IDPs have better access to medical services due to a better healthcare

¹⁰² This question is asked for children aged 6–18 years and hence covers reasons for not sending children to primary and secondary school.

¹⁰³ 31–36% state that children are too young to go to school, whilst 22–26% say that other reasons are behind not sending children to school.

¹⁰⁴ UNICEF Sudan Education Team insights. UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

¹⁰⁵ The Sudan 2020 Multi-sector Needs Assessment show that the two most common barriers to accessing healthcare is 'lack of medicines at the health facility' followed by 'cost of services and/or medicine too high/cannot afford to pay'. REACH (2021) Sudan: 2020 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (March, 2021).

¹⁰⁶ The villages of Konja and Tabasa were particularly highlighted to lack access to healthcare due to long distances. The locality has one ambulance that is currently out of service and no other vehicles to conduct outreach or follow-up visits.

¹⁰⁷ Tawila, North Darfur, Health official.

infrastructure in the IDP camps, whilst returnees and the non-displaced population are worse because of a lack of healthcare facilities in Tawila’s rural areas. According to the household survey data, this picture is only partially accurate. The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator and is often used as proxy for measuring access to healthcare. Births attended by skilled personnel is highest among IDP returnees (24% of births in the year preceding the survey). For camp IDPs, only 11% had a skilled birth attendant helping them during delivery, whilst this number is very low amongst the non-displaced population (5%).

TABLE 3: PLACE OF DELIVERY FOR ALL CHILDREN WHO WERE UP TO ONE YEAR OLD DURING DATA COLLECTION

	Home	Hospital/medical centre
Non-displaced (N=78)	90%	10%
Camp IDPs (N=81)	77%	23%
IDP returnees (N=87)	52%	48%

ACCESS TO WATER AND SANITATION

Access to safe water sources in Tawila needs to be understood in the context of the region’s ecological zone. North Darfur is situated on the edge of the Sahara desert and has low rainfall, whilst climate change has led to more severe and more frequent droughts.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, the geology of the area does not permit much groundwater storage, which in the future will be further impacted by the effects of climate change.¹⁰⁹

The household survey measured access to sanitation and safe drinking water. Just short of half of the non-displaced (46%) and camp IDPs (44%) have access to improved sanitation facilities.¹¹⁰ However, far fewer IDP returnees have access to improved sanitation—merely 11%. The returnees in Tawila locality are also the group that report the greatest dissatisfaction with sanitation; 32% state they are ‘not satisfied at all’ whilst a further 11% appraise sanitation less disapprovingly.¹¹¹ Large proportions of non-displaced, IDPs and returnee respondents stated ‘does not apply’ indicating no provision of sanitation.

The household survey also appraises access to safe drinking water by looking at improved water sources—a water supply that is able to deliver safe drinking water.¹¹² Access to safe drinking water is very similar amongst all the three groups. About a quarter; 24% of non-displaced, 25% of camp IDP and 26% of returnee households have access to improved drinking water. When appraising water services, large proportions of the non-displaced (50%) and camp IDP population (47%) rate services with satisfaction, whilst approval is lower by 13–16 percentage points among returnee communities (34%).

¹⁰⁸ UN RC/HC Sudan (2010) Beyond Emergency Relief: Longer-term trends and priorities for UN agencies in Darfur.


¹⁰⁹ Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Physical Development (2016) National Adaptation Programme of Action.

¹¹⁰ Improved sanitation facilities include pit latrines with slab (shared or not), ventilated pit latrines and flush latrines.

¹¹¹ 11% of the non-displaced households state that they are ‘somewhat satisfied’ with sanitation. Note that this rating belongs in the negative feedback category and means disapproving to a lesser degree, because it is situated between ‘neutral’ and ‘not satisfied at all’.

¹¹² Improved water sources include piped water, boreholes, tube wells, protection dug wells, protected springs, rainwater plus packaged or delivered water.

FIGURE 10: ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER BY SOURCE (%)



When it comes to judging whether their households have adequate water to meet their needs, a much larger proportion of camp IDPs (39%) and IDP returnees (41%) are not satisfied. This is in sharp contrast to only 16% of non-displaced households that deem not having enough water. A plausible reason for the returnees’ dissatisfaction is that they have been used to having higher quantities of water during their displacement. This, on the other hand, does not explain dissatisfaction among the IDPs living in camps. The area-level data suggest that many water sources in return villages are either in disrepair or were destroyed during the conflict. According to the Tawila WES office, coordination with UNCEF is taking place to provide safe water sources in the future to many more communities with particular focus on return villages.¹¹³

Nomads, according to Tawila key informants, do not have a steady access to water due to their continuous movement, but it is emphasised that they often do not have enough water sources close to their seasonal resting places (sawanis). The areas where pastoralists stay for longer period of time often struggle, as demand for water for both animals and people goes up dramatically when pastoralist need to access the same water sources that supply the permanent residents.¹¹⁴

The main water sources in Tawila locality are reported to be chiefly shallow wells, mini-water yards, hand pump wells and hafirs. Hafirs are water catchment basins, which catch water when the rains come and tend to be the main source of water during the rainy season. The area-level information points to several barriers to accessing water but also to providing new water points. Specific challenges to accessing water include insufficient supply of water, lack of fuel to run the water pump, long distances to water points plus the long journeys pose a safety risk for the women fetching water. When it comes to the construction of new water points, the area south-west of Tawila is rocky and mountainous, which makes digging wells challenging. Also, villages are often small and scattered across large areas making it difficult to construct a shared water point.

¹¹³ Tawila locality, North Darfur, WES Director of Tawila locality.

¹¹⁴ Water in around the Tarney area is particularly scarce, because this is an established resting place for pastoralist communities. Tawila, North Darfur, Tarney official.

TABLE 4: WATER SERVICES IN TAWILA¹¹⁵

Administration Unit	Water services	Villages with no access
Tawilla	10 wells	Warai Fata, Talha, Dali Diko
Tarney	2 wells	Shag Elnail, Shikailab, Um ghibaish, Hujaj
Tabit	3 wells	Hashaba and Hilat Seneen
Dobo	Only hafirs and water points	Katour

Water or WASH committees have been set up in some Darfur communities to manage residents' competing demands for water. When exploring the prevalence of water committees among the various population groups, these local institutions are more common in non-displaced communities (73%). This is in comparison to 61% of camp IDPs and 48% of IDP returnees that report to have a water committee to manage the usage of water and mediate in disputes. The area-level data shows that awareness of water committees is high among Tawila residents, and they are regarded as important conflict resolution mechanisms.

From the key informant interviews, there is no obvious reason why water committees are less prevalent in returnee communities, however, returnees may have less water points to manage if a sizeable proportion are not functioning.

Around half of respondents in all groups confirm that their water committee is effectively managing disputes and able to 'solve the problem in a just way'. However, it follows that another 50% of all groups are dissatisfied and do not find the committee's mediation just or effective.

ACCESS TO PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION

Overall, the majority of all strata hold official personal documentation. Remarkably, the non-displaced (30%) with the highest proportion of persons that have no documentation. Compared against 21% of camp IDPs and 11% of returnees with no personal document. IDP returnees, in fact, have the best access to documentation as 84% report having a national ID card. However, high percentages among the non-displaced (65%) and camp IDPs (75%) also have an official ID. No real difference is seen between the proportion of men and women holding official documentation, and those goes for birth certificates for boys and girls as well. Only among the non-displaced women is there a somewhat lower proportion that do not have a personal ID in comparison to the men.

TABLE 5: ACCESS TO DOCUMENTATION

	IDPs in camps (N=1969)	IDP returnees (N=2186)	Non-displaced (N=1187)
No documentation at all	21%	11%	30%
Birth certificate	15%	26%	15%
Birth certificate among children under 5 years	16%	43%	19%
National ID	75%	84%	65%

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

Respondents with no documentation indicate that they have never possessed personal documentation, as only 1–3% say that they previously held such documentation but happened to have lost it. Thus, not many IDP and returnees lost personal documentation due to circumstances linked to their displacement. A majority of all groups mostly indicated ‘lack of relevant office in the area’ as an obstacle to obtaining documentation. A quarter of respondents from all three groups contributed ‘other reason’ as to why they do not possess relevant personal documentation. Potentially, there are other important factors as to how come they have been unable to obtain documentation.

A larger proportion of IDPs and returnees are discontent with official government services (courts, government offices issuing official documents etc.). Twice as many returnees (32%) and camp IDPs (35%) are ‘not satisfied at all’ when it comes to government services compared to only 15% among the non-displaced communities.

The area-level information suggests that documentation is not necessary for accessing education and health services, but that administrative processes linked to land registration do require personal documentation. In view of this, it is possible that IDPs planning their return move have made sure to obtain relevant personal documentation in preparation for their departure.

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

Displaced persons have a right to make informed and voluntary decisions regarding what durable solution is right for them. Understanding IDPs preferences and the perspectives behind their intentions for the future will help relevant actors to support them to realise their preferred durable solutions. IDPs determine whether to pursue a return, settle elsewhere, integrate locally or decide on a mix of options.

KEY FINDINGS:

- **42% of IDPs prefer to leave the camps and the greater majority of them (86%) want to return to their village of origin. The main reasons for wanting to leave include lack of economic opportunity and employment plus a ‘wish to return’.**
- **Safety is the most significant factor influencing the preference to stay. For 70% of those, who prefer to stay, safety is the most important reason.**
- **Among female respondents to the survey 73% intend to stay in the camp; while among male respondents to the survey 58% intent to stay in the camp. That is a significant difference of 15 percentage points.**
- **The IDP households that have retained access to their own land in their place of origin (12%) do not tend to prefer return, as 92% indicate they do not consider leaving the camp.**
- **A further in-depth analysis reveals more about the driving factors which influence the preference to stay or leave. One, more vulnerable households (as measured by the extent to which a household is applying severe coping strategies) tend to prefer staying in the camp. Two, female-headed households being among the less resilient households, likewise tend to stay in the camps. Three, living conditions in the camp do not influence a household’s decision to stay or leave.**

PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

What preferences for the future do IDPs living in Tawila camps have?¹¹⁶ Approximately 58% of the IDP households living in camps indicate a preference to remain. Safety is the most important reason to stay in the camps—more than 70% report safety in their current location as the main reason. The second most cited reason to stay was family-related reasons and access to aid, whilst employment opportunities and access to services were also pull factors reported by camp residents. The area-level study also points to security as the number one factor influencing IDPs decision to stay. Key informants widely agree that basic services influence the decision of whether to return or stay in the camps, but that safety is an overriding concern that relegate all other issues.¹¹⁷

42% indicate a preference to leave the camp, and the vast majority of those who want to leave (86%) specify that they want to return to their village of origin. IDP households that prefer to return or relocate were asked if they plan to depart in the following 12 months, to which 14% answered yes thus indicating concrete plans to move. A majority of IDPs were uncertain when they would be able to

¹¹⁶ The camps included in this study: Rawanda, Bargo, Argo, Dali, Daba Naira.

¹¹⁷ Tawila, North Darfur, key informants (women, IDPs, youth).

move making it more of a general future preference. IDPs' key reasons for preferring to leave the camps were a lack of employment and economic opportunities plus a general 'wish to return'.

Looking at the reported preferences for the future by the gender of the survey respondent, women tend to indicate a preference to stay in the camp (73% intend to stay), while the male respondents are more distributed between the intention to stay (58%) and to leave (42%).¹¹⁸

IDPS IN CAMPS—MORE BACKGROUND AND INSIGHTS

What does the profiling data tell us? What do we know about the IDPs that want to stay, and those who prefer to relocate or return? Firstly, around 80% of IDPs surveyed in the camps are from Tawila locality,¹¹⁹ hence they are displaced from a location relatively nearby.¹²⁰ Secondly, despite the 'localised' displacement, 68% of the households reported that they had not visited their place of origin since their displacement. Furthermore, among the households that had visited the village of origin at least once, typically due to farming, an equal proportion preferred to remain in the camp (43%) and to return (43%). This indicates that the bond kept to their original home area because of going back to cultivate the land does not necessarily correspond to a higher likelihood of preferring to return.¹²¹ Thirdly, regarding access to land, 12% of the camp IDPs report to still have access and ownership rights to land in their place of origin. Interestingly, the vast majority of these households (93%) do not intend to return.

EXPLORING DRIVING FACTORS FURTHER

Neither retaining access to land, residing relatively near to their home area, nor having been back to visit affect decisively IDPs' future intentions. Therefore, the analysis applied a regression analysis to consider the two groups of IDPs; those who prefer to stay in the camp and the group that opts to leave, so to better understand what drives their preferences. The analysis explored potential predictors for the camp IDPs wanting to leave the camps and identified three factors related to household structure, socio-economic characteristics and coping mechanisms.¹²²

The analysis was able to reach three predicting factors. Firstly, the gender of the head of the household affects the intention to leave or stay in the camp. 70% of female-headed households intend to stay in their current location in the camps, whereas that is the case for only 51% of households headed up by a man. Thus, female-headed households more tend to stay in the camps.¹²³ It is not possible to establish why that is for certain, but the fact that female-headed households are less likely to leave the camp could be due to being more vulnerable as a woman alone taking care of the household. The reality of moving is that it typically requires resources and resilience to re-establish the household at the point of destination, and the IDP female-headed households show a somewhat

¹¹⁸ It should be noted that respondents were asked about the intentions of the household and not of them as individuals 'Does your household think about leaving this location at some points in time?'

¹¹⁹ Amongst the remaining: two-thirds are from Kebkabiya (20 households) and one-third from Rokero (10 households).

¹²⁰ The IDP population reside in the following camps that were targeted in the household survey: Rawanda, Bargo, Argo, Dali, Daba Naira.

¹²¹ The majority (78%) of the household members that visit their place of origin, do so to cultivate crops, while the remaining mainly return to check on the land.

¹²² Annex 3 presents the statistical results of the regression analysis.

¹²³ Results of the linear regression test, [F (2,428) = 8.9, P = 0.00] indicate that the movement intentions of camp IDPs are significantly affected by their family structure, measured by two components, the gender of the head of the household and the dependency ratio. See Annex 3 on regression results.

higher vulnerability as shown in earlier chapters.¹²⁴ A contributing factor could also be that moving in Darfur can entail security risks, to which female-headed households would be more vulnerable.

Secondly, IDPs intentions to move away from the camp are connected to their resilience (as measured by the types of coping strategies applied, which is a proxy for gauging a household's level of resilience and vulnerability). Among households that applied negative mechanisms to address a livelihoods shock, or were unable to do anything in response to the shock: 67% intend to stay; while among households that applied positive mechanisms, 53% prefer to stay. The regression analysis confirmed that households applying unsustainable coping strategies are more likely to prefer to stay in the camp.¹²⁵ The conclusion is that households that return are those, who are more resilient.

Thirdly, the living conditions in the camp do *not* influence the decision to stay or leave. The analysis shows that living conditions (consisting of six components: access to livelihoods, satisfaction with services, intergroup relations, participation in public events and sense of safety) in place of displacement do not affect households' preference to stay or leave.¹²⁶ The fact that the living conditions of the camp IDPs do not play a decisive role in their intentions, confirms the importance of security as the decisive push and pull factor. That said, living conditions still need to be improved.

¹²⁴ In the chapter on livelihoods, a higher proportion of female-headed households were shown to be more food insecure, somewhat more female-headed households have an age-dependency ratio higher than 1 translating into a higher burden on the family's working-age members. And lastly, more female-headed households apply 'negative' coping strategies to address livelihoods shocks.

¹²⁵ Results of the linear regression test, [F (1, 404) = 4.2, P = 0.04] indicate that the movement intentions of IDPs is significantly affected by their coping mechanism. See annex 3 on regression results.

¹²⁶ Results of the linear regression test, [F (12, 20) = 1.0, P = 0.46] indicate that the movement intentions of IDPs is not affected by conditions in displacement area. See annex 3 on regression results.

CONCLUSIONS: PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND PEACEBUILDING

TAWILA, NORTH DARFUR: HOW WAS PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTIONS ANALYSED?

Durable solutions for IDPs living in displacement is part of building peace in Darfur. At the same time, peace is also central to achieving solutions that are durable and hence the study paid attention to a number of areas crucial to peace and durable solutions for IDPs and IDP returnees. As per the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, ‘a durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement’. It is of central importance to focus on the non-discriminatory and voluntary nature of solutions, and to measure local integration—whether in the place where people have found refuge or upon return—as a *process* towards overcoming vulnerabilities linked to their displacement. In other words, durable solutions are not defined or achieved merely by the geographic features of the solutions outlined in the IASC Framework—to return, stay or settle elsewhere. What is key is the principles of non-discrimination and the voluntary nature of reaching long-term solutions.

The approach taken by this study is to measure progress towards durable solutions by conducting a **comparative analysis of the socio-economic situation of the displaced populations against the non-displaced**, across the key criteria outlined in the IASC Framework. By identifying the key differences in the situations of displaced and non-displaced, the analysis has pointed to areas where the displaced populations are worse off and can be assumed to still face displacement linked vulnerabilities. In this way, the analysis pinpoints the key obstacles to reaching solutions.

The analysis of the non-displaced population does not only serve as a benchmark to compare against but is also key to get a more complete understanding of the situation in Tawila. This is because the analysis looks at *all* displacement affected populations to understand what challenges are faced by all groups in the area—and thus need to be addressed at an area-level and what are challenges faced by IDPs and returnees.¹²⁷ To further strengthen the understanding of the locality and peacebuilding capacities, the methodology approach combines the comparative population analysis (based on survey results) with the **area-level analysis of the locality** that looks at conflict dynamics, local conflict resolution mechanisms, the capacity of the police and courts to uphold the rule of law, land and resource management structures, availability and capacity of services etc. Lastly, it is critical to also understand the preferences and plans for the future that IDPs have and the factors that drive their intentions.

The guiding questions for the analysis have been:

- To what extent are the displaced populations who have returned and those who are still displaced progressing towards durable solutions? And what are the key obstacles and opportunities in this process?
- What are their own preferences for the future and what is driving these intentions?

¹²⁷ As outlined in the introduction nomads were not possible to capture during data collection.

- How are these integration processes of displaced groups interlinked with the broader peacebuilding process at the locality level?

The above questions were addressed by analysing the following:

- What is the **rule of law** situation in the locality? Do people feel safe and are they able to access the police and courts?
- What land **governance structures and dispute resolution mechanisms** are in place? How are conflicts and disputes resolved within the community?
- What is the **housing, land and property** situation in the place of displacement and return for both displaced and non-displaced households including nomads?
- How is the **standard of living** for the different populations in terms of access to basic services and livelihoods?
- How **socially cohesive** are the communities, to what extent are different groups participating in decision-making, and how active and equipped are civil society organisations?

TO WHAT EXTENT ARE IDPs IN CAMPS LOCALLY INTEGRATING?

Localized displacement: Displacement in Tawila is localized, as the majority of IDPs in Tawila are displaced from within the locality.¹²⁸ Despite not being significantly far away from their village of origin, only 12% of IDP households in the camps report having retained access to the same land they farmed before displacement. The fact that IDPs are still living in protracted displacement and cannot access their land in place of origin is a source of contention and a barrier to peacebuilding. Even for those that have been able to re-access their land, places where land is 'unlawfully' occupied like in the Kolgay mountains, are often cited as instances of injustice and proof of unresolved conflict. Furthermore, only 32% of the households report visiting their place of origin to cultivate the land. In other words, only a minority of the camp IDPs are able to retain the connection to their place of origin.

Conflict and insecurity: the very limited connections to their home villages, even when living in nearby camps, are explained by the security situation. IDPs in camps report that security is the most important reason for staying in the camp and the main obstacle to pursuing a return. Furthermore, insecurity is not only feared in the place of origin; IDPs living in camps are less safe compared to their non-displaced neighbours. They are facing considerably more security incidents such as threats and robberies compared to the non-displaced. Overall, safety and security remain key obstacles to their progress towards a solution, whether these take the form of local integration or return. Few Tawila residents turn to the police for help; merely 17–22% of those that have experienced a crime report it to the police. It is a challenge for the police in Tawila locality to uphold the rule of law as they are required to cover a large geographical area with a limited number of police officers, few vehicles and little fuel. Camp IDPs and IDP returnees are more likely to turn to local committees for help as an alternative to police involvement than non-displaced residents. Although IDPs turn to committees in the camp to mediate disputes between camp residents, these institutions may not have the capacity to mediate in conflicts between camp residents and communities living outside the camp environment. The police's and local courts' limited ability to enforce the rule of law allows for insecurity, which in turn can threaten to undermine peacebuilding efforts.

¹²⁸ This is the case for the IDPs in the camps targeted by the survey; Rawanda, Bargo, Argo, Dali, Daba Naira.

Land tenure insecurity: Even though the great majority of IDPs residing in camps (69%) rely on land as their main livelihood sources—just like the non-displaced households do (73%)—only 14% of camp IDP households have secure tenure rights to the land (i.e. report that they own the land).¹²⁹ The majority of IDPs thus rely on renting land, which is their main source of subsistence and income. This places the majority of IDPs who do not access the land in their original home areas, in a much less secure tenure situation. A key obstacle for IDPs to further progress towards durable solutions in their current location is land tenure insecurity.

Socio-economic situation in camps: When comparing the situation of camp IDPs with that of non-displaced households, findings show that access to basic services (education, health, water and sanitation) and access to employment are similar for both groups. In other words, IDPs do not appear to enjoy a worse standard of living compared to the non-displaced population.

Limited prospects for youth: Despite the general similarity in socio-economic conditions between the displaced and the non-displaced, the analysis identifies some groups which appear particularly vulnerable. One such group is the youth living in the camps and especially female youth. A large proportion of the youth, particularly women, are not engaged in subsistence farming nor working or studying (37% young women in camps and 27% among young returnee women). This can place them at risk of not finding a way to integrate and establish livelihoods in their current location, while they also do not practise agricultural skills that would allow them to later cultivate the land. Limited livelihood options for the camp youth and lack of vocational skills and education are, and increasingly will be, a key obstacle to them finding a durable solution (whether they return or stay). And with few economic and employment opportunities, the young men who form part of this group are more vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups.

Household resilience: The vast majority of households have experienced serious livelihood shocks the year preceding the data collection, including high food prices, crop diseases and COVID restrictions (which also meant closed markets). This has taken a toll especially on the displaced; IDPs in camps appear to be more prone to food insecurity,¹³⁰ plus resort to a greater extent to 'high' coping strategies,¹³¹ and have a higher age-dependency ratio.¹³² This trend is particularly seen among female-headed households, which make up 35% of the households compared to only 25% among the non-displaced population.

Local participation and reconciliation mechanism: 42% of IDP returnees are engaged in community affairs and (29%) say that they have taken part in a reconciliation meeting in the last 6 months, which is the lowest percentage among the three groups. At the same time, the results show that non-displaced are less likely to accept IDPs taking part in local decision-making (68% of non-displaced residents accepts IDPs taking part in decision-making compared to 79% accepts returnees doing so). IDPs in camps are reporting security incidents to the police to the same extent as non-displaced (21%), while a bigger proportion reports to a local committee (37%) which is significantly

¹²⁹ These are more or less the same households that have managed to retain access to their land in the place of origin, and who therefore still hold ownership rights.

¹³⁰ 68% of camp IDPs did not have enough food the week preceding the survey compared to 52% among non-displaced. It should though be noted that both numbers are high, despite their relative difference.

¹³¹ 10% of camp IDPs resort to high coping strategies compared to 4% among the non-displaced, as per the rCSI.

¹³² 48% of camp IDPs compared to 39% among non-displaced, indicating a greater burden on the working-age members to take care of the dependent household members.

more than the non-displaced. Satisfaction, however, with the outcome of the resolution, is very low (15%).

IDPS IN CAMPS—OWN PREFERENCES

42% of the IDP households in the camps consider leaving (the majority returning) while the rest do not consider leaving the camp. Understanding the factors driving these intentions are key in order to support the IDPs in their pursuit of the durable solution that they prefer. Security is the most important factor preventing households who wish to return from doing so. But beyond this, what else characterizes the households that prefer to locally integrate versus return? The analysis showed that it is not living conditions and access to services that play a decisive role, given that most households find themselves in a very similar situation when it comes to their basic standard of living. Rather, it is the households' resilience that appears more decisive—the households that intend to return tend to use positive coping strategies to a higher degree and be less impacted by food insecurity. In other words, the households that prefer to stay, are inclined to resort to negative coping strategies to a higher degree. Amongst the less resilient households, are the female-headed households, which also tend to prefer staying in the camp.

Interestingly, the households that prefer to return are not those who have retained access to their land in their place of origin. On the contrary, these households prefer to stay in the camp. This points to the fact, that while regaining access to their land and this access secures tenure rights, it is not necessarily linked to a more permanent return.

The most decisive factor influencing preferences remains the security situation above everything else. And thus, with renewed violence and displacement in North Darfur and Tawila locality, a hybrid solution for IDPs may be the most pragmatic and resilient approach to deal with this highly changeable, tumultuous and insecure environment. Actors may need to recognize and facilitate a mixed hybrid approach, where IDPs return to lands and properties to pursue some rural activities, while other members of the family stay in the camp. Ensuring security and conflict resolution is a longer-term process, which might require flexible and adaptive solutions. An example may be the approach taken by some IDP households who remain in the relative safety of the area of displacement, while seasonally cultivating their lands in place of origin. However, should the situation deteriorate in their place of origin, they are not at risk of becoming displaced again.

TO WHICH EXTENT ARE IDP RETURNEES RE-INTEGRATING?

It is important to state that IDP returnees have not achieved a durable solution merely based on their physical return. Their progress towards a durable solution in their place of origin needs to be assessed, as is done with the IDPs in displacement.

Regained access to land & livelihoods: IDP returnees have managed to a high degree (77%) to regain or retain ownership of their agricultural land, indicating that they have re-established their most important livelihood source upon return. A higher proportion of IDP returnees appear to have access to land, compared to non-displaced Tawila residents, and are more reliant on agriculture as their main livelihood source. Nevertheless, a large proportion (66%) report difficulties ensuring enough food for the household, while a comparatively larger proportion of households (compared to the non-

displaced) had to rely on 'high' coping strategies to address not having enough food. These indicators hint at the fact that returnees still face specific vulnerabilities.

So, even though they have returned and have access to land, they have *not* overcome vulnerabilities linked to their displacement and key obstacles to achieving solutions persist. What are these main obstacles?

- **Safety and security:** IDP returnees report the highest rates of security, incidents including threats and robberies, as well as damage to property and assets, such as crops and livestock. Up to 50% of the households reported such damage inflicted during the 12 months preceding the survey. Safety and security remain key obstacles to re-integration and are not less a challenge upon return, on the contrary.
- **Resilience and coping:** The ability to cope and resilience is likely linked to the security situation and the damages inflicted on property and assets (including crops and livestock), as well as the general shocks endured by all households (such as high food and fuel prices plus the impact of COVID restrictions). Findings show IDP returnee households are more vulnerable; a higher number of households face food insecurity and more resort to unsustainable coping strategies.
- **Access to services:** Access to schools and health services is better compared to the non-displaced, while improved sanitation and water is worse. The area-level data indicates a general sense that returnee households are worse off in all aspects, however, this picture is only partially true.
- **Prospects of youth:** returnee youths are found in significant proportions to be outside the labour force (not working nor being engaged in own use farming), while also not in education or training. As already discussed, this poses a risk to the prospect of youths to continue to reintegrating in these return villages if they have no own means of subsistence.
- **Local participation and reconciliation mechanisms:** 56% of IDP returnees are engaged in community affairs and (40%) say they have taken part in a reconciliation meeting in the last 6 months, which is the highest percentage among the three groups. IDP returnees are more likely to turn to local committees for help as an alternative to police involvement. Satisfaction with how these local conflict resolution mechanisms addressed the issue is low among returnees. The local conflict resolution mechanisms' ability to mediate in disputes need to be strengthened as pointed out by key informants, but also need to be joined up to higher levels of reconciliation and peacebuilding. In other words, there is a limit to the effectiveness of local conflict resolutions mechanisms when it comes to addressing the overall security situation.

DATA TO INFORM GOVERNMENT-LED AND COMMUNITY-DRIVEN PLANNING

The analysis points to specific displacement linked obstacles that IDPs face while residing in the camps in Tawila and upon return to their village of origin; these are linked primarily to the security situation and land tenure. The analysis also points to general development linked obstacles that all population groups in Tawila are facing, such as the poor availability and capacity of basic services as well as employment prospects for youth. When looking closer at these obstacles to solutions, it is important to take into account, on one hand, the capacities, skills and vulnerabilities of the populations, which vary not only by displacement status but also by age and sex. And on the other

hand, the governance structure in Tawila, the existing community-based organizations and the wider peacebuilding process.








IDPs uprooted by conflict and displacement affected communities are not merely people in need of assistance, but dynamic actors who must not be left on the sidelines. Community-driven planning with displacement affected communities at the centre is key to finding solutions to displacement. This durable solutions analysis is an important step to inform priorities centred on evidence-based analysis that builds on representative samples of the displacement affected population as well as key informant interviews with central stakeholders in Tawila. However, inclusion must go beyond ensuring that the realities of the displacement affected communities are analysed. Therefore, key results from this analysis were presented to communities (in May 2021) in order to validate and prioritize the most significant obstacles to solutions as seen from their perspective. Subsequently, the obstacles and barriers prioritized by the community formed the point of departure for the drafting of the durable solutions Action Plan for Tawila locality. This happened during a two-day joint workshop with the relevant stakeholders from the locality and state level authorities as well as the humanitarian and development community. The Action Plans will serve as a roadmap to link the results on barriers and solutions to concrete programming activities that can support communities in overcoming those same barriers.

ANNEX 1: DURABLE SOLUTIONS INDICATORS OVERVIEW

DURABLE SOLUTIONS CRITERIA	KEY INDICATORS	Camp IDPs	IDP returnees	Non-displaced
Long-term safety and security	HHS having experienced physical threats in the past 12 months	35%	36%	12%
	HHS having experienced robbery in the past 12 months	41%	46%	27%
	HHS having experienced damage of property/assets (incl crops) in the past 12 months	32%	51%	24%
	HHS having experienced security incident(s) who reported to police	21%	17%	22%
	HHS having experienced security incident(s) who reported to village committee	37%	50%	20%
	HHS having experienced security incident(s) who did NOT report at all	37%	29%	53%
	HHS having reported incident and reporting that issue was fairly resolved	15%	15%	25%
	Reported feeling of being safe when walking in the night- SDG indicator 16.1.4	54%	55%	84%
Adequate standard of living / access to basic services (health, education, water, sanitation, documentation)	HHS facing challenges when needing to access health services in the past 6 months	77%	69%	81%
	Births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) - SDG 3.1.2	11%	24%	5%
	Access to improved drinking water sources	25%	26%	24%
	Perception of drinking water being sufficient for the HH, the past summer	19%	57%	73%
	Access to improved sanitation facilities	44%	11%	46%
	Primary school attendance amongst boys - 6-13 years old	51%	73%	45%
	Primary school attendance amongst girls 6-13 years old	51%	64%	46%
	Men above 15 years of age who are literate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	87%	92%	83%
	Women above 15 years of age who are literate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	59%	74%	54%
	Persons who own/access a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	49%	61%	49%
Access to employment and livelihoods	HHS having NOT had enough food or money to buy food the week preceding the survey	68%	66%	52%
	HHS applying 'high coping' strategies based on the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI)	10%	18%	4%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) working for profit or pay	32%	30%	32%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) working for profit or pay	18%	19%	25%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use farming	31%	32%	41%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use farming	44%	33%	50%
	Male youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	24%	19%	13%
	Female youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	37%	27%	18%
	HHS relying on agriculture as their main livelihoods source (whether for own use or selling)	69%	84%	73%
	HHS with access to agricultural land in current location	70%	93%	90%
	HHS with ownership/secure rights over agricultural land - SDG 5.a.1	14%	70%	70%
	HHS with ownership certificates amongst those who report owning land	*	3%	6%
Access to documentation	Persons with birth certificate	15%	26%	15%
	Persons with national ID	75%	84%	65%
	Children under 5 years of age with a birth certificate - SDG 16.9.1	16%	43%	19%
Access to effective mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP)	Displaced HHS that still access the same land as before displacement	12%	77%	n/a
	Displaced HHS that do NOT access same land but still have the rights over that land	45%	31%	n/a
	Displaced HHS that do NOT access same land and have issues re-accessing	67%	37%	n/a
	Displaced HHS NOT accessing same land, reporting main issue being: land occupied unlawfully	49%	*	n/a
	Displaced HHS NOT accessing same land, reporting main issue being: grazing routes not followed	25%	*	n/a
Civic participation in local community	HHS attended local reconciliation initiatives the past 6 months	29%	40%	38%
	HHS reporting presence of water committees	61%	48%	73%
	Displaced HHS reporting they can participate in local decision making (linked to SDG 16.7.2)	66%	84%	n/a
	Non-displaced HHS reporting that IDPs should be able to participate in local decision making	n/a	n/a	73%
	Non-displaced HHS reporting they welcome Camp IDPs in their community	n/a	n/a	79%
	Non-displaced HHS reporting they welcome IDP returnees in their community	n/a	n/a	68%

ANNEX 2: DETAILED OVERVIEW OF SERVICES¹³³







Primary Education Tawilla locality – Capacity per school

Villages	School name	Teacher number Formal (F) and volunteers (V)	Student number Male(m) and female(f)	Fence	Seating seating for x % of students	Latrines
		Teacher : Student Ratio				
						
Tawilla Administration Unit						
Dali Dicco Village	Dali Dicco Mixed School	4 (4V)	467 (m:265 male, f: 202)	Local materials	80%	5
		1:117				
Kunjara village	Kunjara Ambrunga Mixed School	7 teachers (6F, 1V)	441 (m:203 male, f: 238)	Local materials	50%	3
		1:63				
Tawilla town	Hamdan Bin Rashid for boys	13 teachers (13F)	463 students m	Full fencing	100%	20
		1:36				
Tawilla south	Khalid Ibn Elwaleed Mixed school	8 teachers (5F, 3V)	666 (m:373 male, f: 323)	Local materials	40%	6
		1:83				
Tawilla south	Tabara mixed school	10 teachers (5F, 5V)	991 (m:514 male, f: 477)	Local materials	45%	10
		1:99				
Tawilla south	Abudigana Mixed school	12 teachers (8F, 4V)	953 (m:445 male, f: 508)	Local materials	60%	10
		1:79				
Tawilla south	Daba Nayra Elwihda Mixed school	10 teachers (7F, 3V)	474 (m:254 male, f: 220)	Local materials	100%	10
		1:47				
Tawilla town	Abubakar Elsideeg for Boys	15 teachers (13 F, 2V)	1054 students m	Local material	65%	10
		1:70				
Tawilla town	Osama Ib Zaid for Boys	13 teachers (9F, 4V)	898 students m	Brick wall and local materials	60%	10
		1:69				
Tawilla Town	Ibn Seena for girls	11 teachers (9F, 2V)	1288 students f	Brick wall	100%	10
		1:117				
Tawilla Town	Omer Ibn Elkhatab for boys	10 teachers (7F, 3V)	1003 students m	Brick wall and local materials	80%	10
		1:100				
Tawilla village	Um Elmoninain for girls	24 teachers (13F, 11V)	1363 students f	Full fencing	70%	6
		1:57				
Towri village	Towri Mixed school	3 (3V)	480 (m:310 male, f: 170)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:160				
Tawilla AU Summary: The teacher student ratio in Tawilla on average is 1:76. 68% of the teaching staff are formal teachers and 32% are volunteers. There are more male students (54%) than female students (45%). Out of a total of 13 schools, 7 are mixed schools, 4 are boys' schools and only 2 are girls' schools. The mixed school in Towri village has particularly bad capacities with only 3 volunteering staff, no school latrine and fences made out of local material.						
Tabit Administration Unit						
Magareen Village	Magareen school for boys	9 teachers (6F, 3V)	373 students	Local materials	45%	5
		1:71				




¹³³ Villages marked with a * are not included in the maps.

Magareen Village	Magareen school for girls	9 teachers (5F, 4V)	369 students	Local materials	45%	5
		1:51				
Tabit Village	Eldawha School for boys	13 teachers (13F)	929 students	Full fencing	100%	10
		1:41				
Tabit Village	Eldawha School for girls	13 teachers (13F)	658 students	Full fencing	100%	10
		1:41				
Tabit Village	Tabit Mixed School	7 teachers (4F, 3V)	411 (m:215 male, f: 196)	Bricks and local materials	40%	5
		1:59				
<p>Tabit AU Summary: The teacher student ratio in Tabit on average is 1:54. 80% of the teaching staff are formal teachers and 20% are volunteers. There are more male students (55%) than female students (45%). Out of a total of 5 schools, 1 is a mixed school, 2 are boys' schools and 2 are girls' schools. Overall, the capacities in Tabit AU are better than in other AUs with all schools having latrines available and at least some seating and some brick wall fencing.</p>						
Dobo Administration Unit						
Dobo Village	Dobo Elomda Mixed school	4 teachers (1F, 3V)	141 (m:75 male, f: 66)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:58				
Dobo Village	Elkifah Mixed school	7 teachers (1F, 6V)	657 (m:390 male, f: 267)	Local materials	30%	Local latrine
		1:74				
Fia Mural Village*	Fia Mural Mixed school	7 teachers (1F, 6V)	658 (m:320 male, f: 338)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:57				
Hashaba Village	Hashaba Mixed school	4 (4V)	115 (m:70 male, f: 45)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:93				
Kamboor Village*	Kamboor mixed school	8 teachers (2F, 6V)	466 (m:235 male, f: 231)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:54				
Katour Village	Katour Mixed school	10 teachers (1F, 9V)	543 (m:252 male, f: 291)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:35				
Konjo Village*	Konjo Mixed school	8 teachers (3F, 5V)	455 (m:225 male, f: 230)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:94				
Rotawra Village*	Rotawra Mixed school	6 teachers (1F, 5V)	223 (m:115 male, f: 108)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:37				
Sodo Farda Village	Elkholafa Elrashideen Mixed school	8 teachers (2F, 6V)	747 (m:369 male, f: 378)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:106				
Tabasa Village	Tabasa Mixed School	7 teachers (1F, 6V)	516 (m:240 male, f: 276)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:94				
Tera Village*	Tera mixed school	3 teachers (1F, 2V)	318 (m:162 male, f: 156 female)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:106				
<p>Dobo AU Summary: The teacher student ratio in Dobo on average is 1:67. Only 19% of the teaching staff are formal teachers and 81% are volunteers. There are slightly more male students (51%) than female students (49%). All the schools are mixed schools with very simple structures: all fences are only made of local materials, there is no seating in all but one school and the schools have no latrines.</p>						
Tarney Administration Unit						
Boby Sigilie Village	Boby Sigilie Mixed school	4 teachers (3F, 1V)	260 (m:145 male, f: 115)	Local materials	0%	4
		1:120				
Khazan Tunjur Village	Khazan Tunjur Mixed school	4 teachers (1F, 3V)	478 (m:258 male, f: 220)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:88				
Kunjara Tarney Village	Kunjara Tarney mixed School	5 teachers (1F, 4V)	441 (m:203 male, f: 238)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:45				
Tarney Village	Dinar mixed School	2 teachers (1F, 1V)	90 (m:48 male, f: 42)	Local materials	0%	Local latrine
		1:65				
<p>Tarney AU Summary: The teacher student ratio in Tarney on average is 1:85. Only 40% of the teaching staff are formal teachers and 60% are volunteers. There are more male students (52%) than female students (48%). All 4 schools are mixed schools with fences made of local materials only, no seats in any of the schools and only 1 school has latrines.</p>						

Health services Tawilla locality – Capacity per health

Villages	Active	Condition	Electricity	Clean Water	Latrines
					
Tawilla Administration Unit					
Boby Sigily	Yes	old	No	Yes	No
Kunjara Ambrunga	Yes	old	No	Yes	No
Dali	Yes	New	Solar Energy	Yes	Yes
Tabara	Yes	New	No	Yes	No
Tina	No	old	No	No	No
Argo Camp	Yes	old	No	Yes	Yes
Rownda Camp*	Yes	old	No	Yes	Yes
Shakshako	No	No building	No	No	No
Daba Nayra	Yes	old	No	Yes	No
Tabit Administration Unit					
Khartoum Jadid	No	old	No	No	No
Galab	Yes	New	No	Yes	No
Hashaba	Yes	old	No	No	No
Tabit	Yes	New	Electricity	Yes	Yes
Al Maktoum*	Yes	New	Solar Energy + Generator	Yes	Yes
Dobo Administration Unit					
Martal	Yes	old	Solar Energy	Yes	No
Tabasa	Yes	New	Solar Energy	Yes	No
Koja*	No	No building	No	No	No
Zindia*	No	No building	No	No	No
Dobo	Yes	New	No	Yes	No
Katour	Yes	New	No	Yes	No
Dobo Madrasa	No	No building	No	No	No
Tarney Administration Unit					
Taradonat	Yes	New	No	Yes	Yes
Khazan Tunjur	Yes	New	No	Yes	Yes
Kunjara North	Yes	Local material	No	Yes	No
Tarny West	No	old	No	No	No

ANNEX 3: MAPS OF SERVICES¹³⁴



¹³⁴ The maps are created by SUDIA based on key informant interviews – a detailed overview of the services can be found in annex 2.

ANNEX 3: REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS

Are 'IDPs intentions for movement' affected by their family structure?						
Family structure is defined by the following two components:						
a) Gender of the head of the household						
b) Age dependency ratio; dependent members are those below 15 and above 65						
Linear Regression Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	<i>Regression</i>	4.20	2	2.10	8.90	.000 ^c
	<i>Residual</i>	100.95	428	0.24		
	<i>Total</i>	105.15	430			
One-Way ANOVA	Component	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	Gender of Head of HH					
	<i>Between Groups</i>	3.67	1	3.67	15.52	0.000
	<i>Within Groups</i>	101.47	429	0.24		
	<i>Total</i>	105.15	430			
	Dependency Ratio					
	<i>Between Groups</i>	0.38	2	0.19	0.77	0.464
	<i>Within Groups</i>	104.77	428	0.24		
	<i>Total</i>	105.15	430			
Are 'IDPs intentions for movement' affected by the living conditions in the area of displacement?						
Living conditions in area of displacement is defined by the following two components:						
a) Access to livelihoods:						
Access to agricultural land						
Employment (more than 50% of the working-age HH members work)						
b) Satisfaction with services						
c) Intergroup relations: Perceptions about the non-displaced specifically						
d) Participation in public events						
e) Sense of safety to walk around at day and night						
Linear Regression Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	<i>Regression</i>	0.48	9	0.05	0.66	0.743
	<i>Residual</i>	4.10	50	0.08		
	<i>Total</i>	4.58	59			
One-Way ANOVA	Component	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	Access to agricultural land					
	<i>Between Groups</i>	0.38	1	0.38	1.57	0.211
	<i>Within Groups</i>	104.76	429	0.24		
	<i>Total</i>	105.15	430			
	Access to employment					
	<i>Between Groups</i>	0.01	1	0.01	0.03	0.873
	<i>Within Groups</i>	92.09	375	0.25		
	<i>Total</i>	92.10	376			
	Satisfaction with services					
	<i>Between Groups</i>	0.02	1	0.02	0.08	0.774
	<i>Within Groups</i>	103.77	424	0.24		
	<i>Total</i>	103.79	425			
	Intergroup relations: IDPs/IDP-returnees, nomads and the non-displaced should have equal access to education and health					
	<i>Between Groups</i>	0.21	1	0.21	0.86	0.359
	<i>Within Groups</i>	10.42	42	0.25		
	<i>Total</i>	10.64	43			
	Intergroup relations: You have non-displaced friends					
	<i>Between Groups</i>	0.02	1	0.02	0.07	0.795
	<i>Within Groups</i>	10.62	42	0.25		
	<i>Total</i>	10.64	43			
	Intergroup relations: You welcome non-displaced neighbours into your family through marriage					
	<i>Between Groups</i>	0.01	1	0.01	0.06	0.817
	<i>Within Groups</i>	10.45	41	0.26		
	<i>Total</i>	10.47	42			
	Intergroup relations: Recently-arrived community members (such as you or your HH members) are able to participate in decision-making in the village, or can lead on some issues such as service provision and conflict resolution.					
	<i>Between Groups</i>	0.23	1	0.23	0.90	0.347
	<i>Within Groups</i>	10.06	40	0.25		
	<i>Total</i>	10.29	41			

Intergroup relations: You feel welcomed to participate in local joint activities with your non-displaced neighbours					
<i>Between Groups</i>	0.02	1	0.02	0.07	0.795
<i>Within Groups</i>	10.62	42	0.25		
<i>Total</i>	10.64	43			
Sense of Safety					
<i>Between Groups</i>	2.26	2	1.13	4.68	0.010
<i>Within Groups</i>	100.09	415	0.24		
<i>Total</i>	102.35	417			
Attendance of public events (local reconciliation initiatives or peace processes)					
<i>Between Groups</i>	2.28	1	2.28	9.50	0.002
<i>Within Groups</i>	102.87	429	0.24		
<i>Total</i>	105.15	430			
Attendance of public events (community affairs)					
<i>Between Groups</i>	0.12	1	0.12	0.50	0.482
<i>Within Groups</i>	105.02	429	0.24		
<i>Total</i>	105.15	430			
Are 'IDPs intentions for movement' affected by the sustainability of their coping mechanisms?					
Sustainable coping mechanisms:					
Unsustainable coping mechanisms:					
Linear Regression Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
<i>Regression</i>	1.02	1	1.02	4.25	.040 ^c
<i>Residual</i>	97.11	404	0.24		
<i>Total</i>	98.13	405			

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