

# DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS

for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the  
Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan

**Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding  
for the displacement-affected communities in**

**Um Dukhun locality, Central Darfur**

August 2021



**Suggested citation:** PBF Sudan, DSWG Sudan, UNHCR, JIPS (2021). *Durable Solutions & Baseline Analysis: Key Obstacles to Durable Solutions and Peacebuilding for the Displacement-Affected Communities in Um Dukhun locality, Central Darfur.*

**With special thanks** to Margarita Lundkvist-Houndoumadi (JIPS), Therese Bjorn Mason (consultant to JIPS), Ola Samarah (JIPS) for the analysis and report preparation; Khadra Elmi (UNHCR/ DSWG) for strategic guidance/coordination and the in-depth reviews; Mirjam Kuschnitzki (SUDIA) for the analysis of the area level data and Ghazi Kunna (SUDIA) for the cartography. Profound recognition goes to the communities, who took part in the study and used the findings to identify their priorities, and the Locality and State level authorities for their time, participation, and leadership in the process.

© **All rights reserved.** The copyright for this material lies with exercise partners. It may be reproduced for educational purposes (including training, research, and programme activities) and elements of this report may be quoted in other publications, provided exercise partners are acknowledged as per the above-mentioned suggested citation.

**Supported by:**



**Commissioned and led by:**



With technical guidance by the PBF partners and the Durable Solutions Working Group Sudan:



Technical coordination, analysis and reporting:



Data collection:



# TABLE OF CONTENT

ABBREVIATIONS	1
KEY TERMS	2
INTRODUCTION	4
METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS	8
DISPLACEMENT HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE	11
LIVELIHOODS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES	16
HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY: ACCESS AND TENURE	24
SAFETY, SECURITY, CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW	30
ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING: AVAILABILITY AND ACCESS TO SERVICES	39
CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS	46
PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE	50
CONCLUSIONS: PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND PEACEBUILDING	53
ANNEX 1: DURABLE SOLUTIONS INDICATOR OVERVIEW	61
ANNEX 2: DETAILED OVERVIEW OF SERVICES	62
ANNEX 3: MAPS OF SERVICES	65
BIBLIOGRAPHY	66

# ABBREVIATIONS

**DSWG** Durable Solutions Working Group

**CBM/CBRM** Community-based management resolution mechanism/Community-based management

**CBO** Community-based organisation

**GoS** Government of Sudan

**IASC** Inter-Agency Standing Committee

**IDPs** Internally Displaced Persons

**IOM** International Organisation for Migration

**INGO** International Non-Governmental Organisation

**JIPS** Joint IDP Profiling Service

**OCHA** United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

**SUDIA** Sudanese Development Initiative

**UN-HABITAT**- United Nations Human Settlements Programme

**UNICEF** United Nations Children's Fund

**UNDP** United Nations Development Programme

**UNHCR** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**WFP** World Food Programme

**UNAMID** United Nations African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur

**UNCT** United Nations Country Team

## KEY TERMS

**Displacement affected communities:** refers to displaced persons and the communities affected by their presence, such as host communities, communities in areas of return, or other areas where displaced persons are seeking a durable solution to their displacement.<sup>1</sup>

**Displaced persons:** refers to internally displaced persons, whether they are physically displaced or have returned to the place they lived prior to their displacement.

**Durable solutions:** a durable solution is achieved when displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. A durable solution can be achieved through return, local integration and resettlement.<sup>2</sup>

**Durable solutions process:** a community-based approach to durable solutions planning, based on durable solutions targets identified by displacement-affected communities at a decentralized level, in post-conflict or post-disaster settings.<sup>3</sup>

**Durable solutions analysis:** the purpose of a durable solutions analysis is to provide an evidence base to inform joint responses to displacement. It entails a systematic and principled process in line with the IASC Framework, including IDPs' perspectives and preferences for future settlement options, demographic profile, and the eight durable solutions criteria. The analysis focuses on the specific realities of the displaced populations, whilst making a comparison to the non-displaced populations and taking into account the broader macro environment.<sup>4</sup>

**Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement:** these principles are 30 standards that outline the protections available to internally displaced people (IDPs). They detail the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs: from the beginning of their forced displacement, to IDPs protection and assistance during displacement up to the achievement of durable solutions.

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):** persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.<sup>5</sup>

**IDP returnees/return IDPs:** displaced persons that have returned to their place of origin.

**Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs:** the framework, endorsed by the IASC Working Committee in 2010, addresses durable solutions following conflict and natural disasters. It describes the key human rights-based principles that should guide the search for durable solutions.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.

<sup>2</sup> Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2010) IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, April 2010.

<sup>3</sup> The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.

**Non-displaced persons:** individuals who are not displaced (and may or may not be living in the same areas as displaced persons).

**Peacebuilding:** involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore a relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.<sup>6</sup>

**Protracted displacement:** a situation where IDPs and returnees have been displaced for a longer time period (5 years or more) and where they still have assistance needs linked to their displacement, and are not able to enjoy their human rights for reasons caused by their displacement.<sup>7</sup>

**Refugees:** individuals displaced outside their country of nationality or habitual residence as a consequence of generalized violence, conflict or well-founded fear of persecution.<sup>8</sup>

**Resilience:** refers to the ability of displacement-affected communities to absorb and recover from shocks (such as earthquakes, droughts, floods or conflicts), while positively adapting and transforming their structures and means of living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty.<sup>9</sup>

**Return refugees:** persons who have returned to their home country after seeking international assistance abroad. The home country is legally defined as the country of former habitual residence. It is usually their country of citizenship, but it may be that of their parents or grandparents, who fled many years ago, as many crises span several generations.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2010) UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation

<sup>7</sup> The Global Roster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (2018) The International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS).

# INTRODUCTION

Three decades of war and unrest have dominated the Sudanese political and civil scene but the ousting of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 has offered a window of opportunity for a political transition in Sudan. In 2020, significant political gains were made towards achieving peace in Sudan with the signing of a peace agreement in Juba (South Sudan) between the power-sharing government and five key rebel groups.<sup>11</sup> The current signed peace agreement—a product of a Sudanese-led process—aims to address historically root causes of conflict and marginalized populations in Sudan’s conflict zones.

While the political and overall context in Sudan witnessed a historic shift in the last two years, the humanitarian and development aspects have been subject to continuous and significant challenges. Protracted and new displacements continue to be a major issue—as a result of decades of conflict and natural disasters, there are currently approximately 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country and 800,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries.<sup>12</sup> In the context of efforts to build a comprehensive peace and the ongoing UNAMID drawdown, in September 2019 Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok requested that Sudan be declared eligible for the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In his request, the Prime Minister asked that funding be made immediately available in the three priorities areas identified for Darfur; namely, the rule of law, durable solutions, and peacebuilding at the community level.

Durable solutions have to be an integral part of peacebuilding. Peace in Sudan cannot be divorced from durable solutions and thus must tackle the issue of conflict and protracted displacement in Darfur. ‘There is much talk about peace, but you cannot talk about peace in Sudan in isolation from durable solutions for IDPs and the issues of land and compensation. Peace cannot be reached without addressing these issues.’<sup>13</sup> The Juba Peace Agreement regards solutions for IDPs as an important element of building peace and establishes durable solutions as a key priority. The agreement looks to resolve the consequences of conflict, such as the safe and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their original lands, whilst also paying attention to compensation, development and reconstruction. To support this, the peace agreement contains a protocol that deals with refugee and IDP return with specific attention paid to the situation in Darfur.

Just as durable solutions are integral to peacebuilding, lack of peace is often an obstacle to achieving solutions that are durable. Thus, solutions programming needs to identify the specific challenges and address these with suitable measures. The Juba Peace Agreement acknowledges these linkages and looks to address the root causes of conflict, such as issues of identity, marginalization, the relationship between religion and state, governance, resource-sharing, land issues and social justice.

IDPs living in protracted displacement can contribute to peacebuilding or be an obstacle. In other words, internally displaced persons are both peace and conflict actors. Displacement is highly political

---

<sup>11</sup> Despite the non-signature of two of the most important non-state armed groups—Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Al-Hilu faction and the Sudan Liberation Movement—Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), negotiations continue amongst the parties to join the final agreement.

<sup>12</sup> OCHA (2021) Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview, December 2020.

<sup>13</sup> Donor representative quoted in Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

in Darfur and peacebuilding that includes IDPs and displacement affected communities are less likely to fail. Hence, peacebuilding and supporting durable solutions for IDPs must go together.<sup>14</sup>

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) portfolio involves programming in all of Darfur's five states that supports and underpins peace. The programme strategy recognizes that durable solutions for IDPs, the rule of law and local conflict resolution are building blocks for peace but also interdependent. To build peace and support durable solutions for IDPs and returnees, PBF programming pays special attention to addressing the root causes of Darfur's conflict, thus creating a conducive environment for return and integration of IDPs, strengthening local conflict resolution mechanisms, peacebuilding capacities and the rule of law.

At the request of the Government of Sudan, an integrated political and peacebuilding mission, UNITAMS, has been established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2524 (2020). UNITAMS and its integrated UNCT partners are mandated to support Sudan in achieving a successful transition. UNITAMS has four strategic objectives.<sup>15</sup> The peacebuilding objective provides for support to the implementation of the peace process. It will sustain peace through legitimate and functioning State institutions that provide basic security, protection and services to the population with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

## **A JOINT ANALYSIS AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACH**

The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) in Sudan has been a consistent forum championing joint durable solutions analysis to address protracted displacement. Commencing in 2017, the DSWG oversaw two durable solutions pilots respectively in rural Um Dukhun and two IDP camps situated on the outskirts of El Fasher in North Darfur. The working group followed up this work by commissioning a learning review of the pilots with input and feedback provided by all DSWG members.

The resulting 'lite' durable solutions toolkit and recommendations have provided the foundation and starting point for the PBF programme in Darfur.<sup>16</sup> The DSWG continues to play a strategic role by overseeing and coordinating the overall durable solutions work process and deliverables. In equal measures, the consultative process and the evidence produced need to support the wider humanitarian-development-peace work in Sudan.<sup>17</sup>

Darfur's internal displacement dynamics are complex. This demands that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors require a *shared* multi-sectorial analysis of the needs of the displacement affected communities. Following the collaborative approach piloted in El Fasher, a particular emphasis has been placed on generating shared data and engaging all major stakeholders including IDPs, local and state authorities. Accordingly, the Peacebuilding Fund partners combined all data collection activities using *one* methodology approach and *one* coordinated data collection in eight localities across the five Darfur states—Tawilla, Assalaya, Yassin, Sheiria, Nertiti, Um Dhukun,

---

<sup>14</sup> Humanitarian Policy Forum, 2020, Policy Brief 77: Achieving Durable Solutions by including displacement-affected communities in peacebuilding.

<sup>15</sup> The four strategic objectives of UNITAMS under SCR 2524 (2020) are: (i) Assist the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace. (ii) Support peace processes and implementation of future peace agreements. (iii) Assist peacebuilding, civilian protection, and rule of law, in Darfur and the Two Areas. (iv) Support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

<sup>16</sup> Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit.

<sup>17</sup> The Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) is co-chaired by UNHCR, UNDP and DRC. The working group is mandated to inform and advise, develop policy and coordinate work on durable solutions. DSWG is placing a strong focus on data and HLP issues with sub-working groups dedicated to these issues.



Gereida and Jebel Moon<sup>18</sup>—where they are carrying out comprehensive, area-based joint peacebuilding programming.

## **ACTORS**

The DSWG is central to the Durable Solutions Analysis and Baseline process—it not only oversees *the* durable solutions analysis process and coordinates work streams but also guarantees data has visibility with government authorities as well as the broader humanitarian and development community in Sudan. And works to ensure that data and analysis is used for planning and programming at the locality level and feed into national policy. Support from the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) was requested by the DSWG to develop the methodology approach and indicators for both the survey and area-level analysis. JIPS also conducted the analysis of the results, all in a consultative manner. Remote support and expertise plus Khartoum deployment of a JIPS technical adviser has given quality assurance and provided technical support to field operations and built capacity for the teams deployed in Darfur.

The PBF projects are implemented by UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, UN-Habitat and FAO. The partners have actively taken part in designing the methodology by offering thematic expertise and on-the-ground knowledge of the Darfur localities to develop the indicators and data collection tools. Partners have also been key to raising awareness at the village and locality level, assisting with the training of enumerator teams and trouble-shooting with challenges at the field level in Darfur.

IOM managed all components and stages of the household survey including pre-fieldwork missions, training of enumerators, and operational management of the field data collection. Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA), an experienced national NGO, has been leading the qualitative area-level data collection and analysis. Tasks included development of the qualitative tools, training of interviewers, and identification of respondents in all localities before implementing the key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

## **PROCESS OVERVIEW**

- Methodology approach and objectives shaped with PBF agencies and the DSWG.
- Indicators for population and area-level developed and agreed.
- Survey tools and qualitative tools developed and reviewed by partners and experts.
- Sampling approach designed.
- Testing of the survey tool.
- Pre-field work missions to inform sampling and sketch target villages.
- Training of field teams in all states and pilots.
- Data collection: survey and area-level (December 2020 and January 2021).
- Data analysis of survey results and area-level results jointly, including several thematic consultations with PBF agencies, DSWG and experts for validation.
- Locality-level report with the durable solutions analysis and baseline finalised.

---

<sup>18</sup> Making use of a single methodology and joint data collection in all eight localities also sought to mainstream indicators and allow for a holistic analysis to avoid overburdening communities.

## **OBJECTIVES OF DURABLE SOLUTIONS & BASELINE ANALYSIS**

The durable solutions and baseline analysis exercises in each of the target localities in Darfur aim to:

- Provide the foundation for analysis of displaced and non-displaced populations' progress towards durable solutions, including IDPs, IDP returnees, return refugees and nomads as an integral element to the peacebuilding process.
- Inform PBF programming and durable solutions Action Plan development in each Darfur target locality.
- Provide the baseline of the agreed-upon PBF outcome indicators for measuring programme impact.
- Inform broader Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP) programming beyond the PBF.

## METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The methodology approach was developed based on consultations with the PBF agencies and the DSWG and was strongly shaped by the learning that emerged from the durable solutions analysis conducted in El Fasher in 2019.<sup>19</sup> JIPS consolidated the combination of methods and made sure that agency programming needs, as well as the durable solutions analysis needs, were met. The indicators as were the household survey tool,<sup>20</sup> the key informant interview questions and the joint analysis plan, were reviewed in several rounds by all PBF agencies, relevant technical experts and local partner SUDIA.

### TARGET GROUPS & LOCATIONS

In Um Dukhun, the household survey targeted eleven villages and small towns.<sup>21</sup> The target groups and locations were identified by UNICEF, as the PBF lead agency in Central Darfur in coordination with the authorities at the locality level. The data collection targeted five groups: IDPs that have returned to their village of origin (IDP returnees), IDPs in camps, Sudanese refugees that have returned from neighbouring countries (return refugees), non-displaced residents and, lastly, nomads residing in damrahs. Due to data collection limitations, sufficient samples were not achieved for all target groups and therefore following had to be excluded from the analysis: non-displaced and IDPs in camps.

### A MIXED METHODS METHODOLOGY

Both primary qualitative and quantitative data inform the analysis of progress towards durable solutions on the locality level presented in this report. The approach consists of both a sample-based household survey and area-level key informant interviews. The survey data has been used to produce socio-economic population profiles for each target group at the locality level to conduct a comparative analysis between the groups.

The area-level data collection took place in December 2020 and included a total of 18 key informant interviews (KIIs) targeting respondents on the state and the locality level: four KIIs took place with representatives of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Production in Zalingei. On the locality level, KIIs were conducted with six basic service representatives (education, health, police, judiciary, land and WES) as well as four KIIs with local government and native administration (including local IDP and nomad leaders) and four community members including nomads, women and youth, as well as a representative from the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) working in Um Dukhun locality. Analysis of the interviews and focus groups discussions focused on

---

<sup>19</sup> UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

<sup>20</sup> The PBF indicators were based on: technical lessons from the interagency durable solutions profiling in El Fasher, the PBF Results Framework plus the Interagency Durable Solutions Indicator Library. <https://inform-durablesolutions-idp.org/>

<sup>21</sup> Target villages in Um Dukhun included: Almanajel, Umkaranik, Almidan, Bawda, Delaba, Abushaban, Korlia, Abujradil, Motor Alom (south), Hela Mohajir, Krigi.

the local context concerning issues such as land and resource management, conflict resolution mechanisms, service provision, rule of law and civic participation.

## SAMPLING APPROACH

The sampling followed a stratified multi-stage sampling approach in which villages were the primary sampling unit (PSU) and households were the secondary sampling unit (SSU), while stratification was done by target group. A random sample of households was then selected either based on systematic skips or systematic snowballing. Data collection took place in January 2021.

While five target groups were originally aimed for, sufficient samples were only achieved for two of these groups, namely: return refugees and nomads. A very limited sample was achieved for IDP returnees (which are included in the analysis but with limitations), while non-displaced and IDPs in camps were excluded from the analysis.

Looking at the gender distribution of the respondents to the survey; it is observed that 40% were male and 60% were female. By target group, the distribution varies only minimally.<sup>22</sup>

**TABLE 1: POPULATION BASELINE FOR TARGET LOCATIONS UNDER THE PBF AND SAMPLES (TARGET AND ACHIEVED) BY TARGET GROUP IN UM DUKHUN**

Target group	Population baseline (HHs) <sup>23</sup>	Target sample	Collected sample (individuals)	Collected sample (HHs)
Non-displaced	1,706	389	170	37
IDP-returnees	4,277	259	745	148
IDPs in camps	3,749	232	199	42
Nomads in damrahs <sup>24</sup>	4,078	316	1,619	331
Return refugees	280	77	3,413	677

## SAMPLING LIMITATIONS & SPECIFICATIONS

Following limitations and specification should be kept in mind when reading the analysis:

- The sampling is designed to produce results representative for each target group in the selected geographic scope within the locality. Analysis at the village/town/camp level is not possible, and therefore no reference to specific settlements or breakdown by villages, towns or camps is done in the report. Generalising about the whole of Um Dukhun locality is also not possible without the required weights to adjust to the total population size of each target group in the locality.

<sup>22</sup> These proportions only refer to the samples that were included in the analysis, namely these of IDP returnees; nomads and return refugees.

<sup>23</sup> Population baseline estimates for the target locations were provided in August 2020 by UNICEF as the lead PBF agency in Central Darfur.

<sup>24</sup> Nomads in Um Dukhun were only found in Motor Alom (north) during the time of the data collection (January, 2021).

- In certain villages (Abujradil, Mot Alom) the intended skips in the sampling were not possible because of large distances between households. Other than that, the planned skip and the sample distribution within each village/town was followed as planned.
- The achieved sample sizes for non-displaced and IDPs in camps were too low to include in the analysis and have been excluded (see Table above for sample sizes), while the sample for IDP returnees is very limited and will therefore be included in the analysis only when possible and with limitations flagged.
- The achieved sample for IDP returnees was much lower than expected (148 versus 259 households) while the achieved sample for return refugees was drastically higher than expected (77 versus 677 households). This probably means that return refugees are often accounted for as return IDPs (while the displacement module of the survey was able to distinguish the two groups). It is less likely explained by population movements just before data collection, as the vast majority of return refugees report having returned since 1–5 years, and only 1% report having returned during the 12 months preceding the survey.

# DISPLACEMENT HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

What is the general demographic profile of the target populations? In Um Dukhun the survey captured returnee populations (IDP returnees and return refugees) in addition to nomads residing in damrahs.<sup>25</sup> The basic demographics and the displacement history will be used to understand the key characteristics of the target populations. Breaking the population data into smaller sub-populations based on basic demographics such as sex, age, location, capacities, vulnerabilities and displacement characteristics, makes it possible to discern how different sub-groups within each target group are faring in comparison, thereby acknowledging that each target group is not a homogeneous entity.

## KEY FINDINGS:

- **The vast majority of IDP returnees (84%) and Sudanese refugees (83%) relocated back to Um Dukhun locality between 1 and 5 years ago.**
- **Overall, the targeted population in Um Dukhun is very young; the proportion of persons below the age of 20 years is 64% (returnees), 65% (returned refugees) and 61% among nomads.**
- **There is a significant proportion of female-headed households amongst all groups—approximately one-in-three households are headed up by a woman (33–34%).**
- **Literacy rates are much higher among men compared to women as only 12–13% of women in all population groups can read and write.**
- **A considerable proportion of IDP returnee (56%) and returned refugee (44%) households have a high dependency ratio, which means that there is a heavier burden placed on the working-age members of the family.**

---

## CENTRAL DARFUR—UM DUKHUN LOCALITY

Um Dukhun is a town in Central Darfur located close to the border with the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad. Central Darfur State was created in 2012 as part of implementing the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The state is comprised of nine localities; Nertiti, Um Dukhun, Zalengei, Azoum, Wadi Salih, Mukjar, Bendisi, Rokero and Golo. Nertiti locality is a fertile agricultural area inhabited by sedentary farmers primarily from the Fur tribe but other tribes also live in the towns and surrounding villages including Zaghawa and Berno. Pastoralist live in semi-permanent settlements named damrahs; they are mainly Salamat, Misseriya and Ta'isha. These three tribes live and move between Sudan, CAR and Chad. Especially the Salamat have many tribesmen living in Chad, where even a region is named after the tribe.

Conflict in Darfur has often been presented to be between 'Arab' against 'African' tribes, however, it is not necessarily a helpful lens to view the conflict because present-day identities 'operate within a system of perceptions' that are largely ideological distinctions.<sup>26</sup> And such distinctions can move attention away from the political nuances of the conflict. The conflict in Darfur has been characterised by allegiances to and splits from the previous regime in Khartoum, plus a number of splits within the

---

<sup>25</sup> The non-displaced population, which typically also serves as a benchmark to compare against, in order to assess the extent to which the displaced groups differ, was not possible to include in this study, due to data collection limitations.

<sup>26</sup> Prunier, G. (2005) Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide.

main rebel factions that in turn have become smaller splinter groups and party to the conflict. Also, much of the insecurity in Um Dukhun is caused by conflict and clashes between these three tribal 'nomad' groups; conflict takes place between the Salamat and Ta'isha or the Misseriya and Salamat, although the Ta'isha and Misseriya have also on occasion been known to join forces to fight the Salamat tribespeople. As a result, many of those returning and people still displaced belong to these tribal groupings.

Although the situation in Um Dukhun has been calm enough to allow for return of IDPs and returnees, the situation has been described as with high potential for relapse into conflict. As an example, a situation quickly escalated in 2020 between farmers and nomads leaving 14 people killed. The body of a man from one of the farming communities; relatives followed tracks leading to a nomads' settlement. The two groups clashed leading to the death of three relatives and ten nomads, which in turn caused large gathering of tribesmen in the area.<sup>27</sup>

Livelihoods are mainly dependent on crop agriculture, animal resources, trade and mining. Five migratory routes run through Um Dukhun locality; although two are reported to be permanently blocked leaving three migratory corridors in operation.<sup>28</sup> The three main migratory routes come from Chad and cross Central Darfur via Magan, Moria, Dambar and Sania, however, none of these were demarcated nor were services available for nomads along the routes.<sup>29</sup> Area-level data confirms that there are no mobile services available for nomads to access when moving through the locality. Some animal routes may have been marked at some point, as respondents refer to stones marking the routes being turned upside-down or moved by farmers that have expanded their farms into livestock routes.

Displacement in Um Dukhun is reported to have taken place in two waves—the first in 2003 and a second surge in displacement due to tribal fighting between Salamat Misseriya tribal groups in 2013. Um Dukhun residents fleeing the violence were mainly displaced to Chat (Abukadam, Haraza and Kalmpa camps) and within the borders of Sudan; Um Dukhun town, Zalengei, Garsila, Nyla Markondi, plus Forobanga and Dambar.<sup>30</sup> The main reason for the return of refugees from Chad was the reduction in humanitarian assistance, a restriction of movement imposed and calm security situation in places of origin in relative terms. In 2017, those that had not returned as of yet continued to reside in Chad or IDP camps in West, South and Central Darfur.<sup>31</sup> In 2017, Um Dukhun was part of a durable solutions pilot that covered this rural locality and the urban context of two IDP camps situated on the outskirts of El Fasher. On the back of the durable solutions assessment and recommendations, the locality has received funding from the Darfur Community Peace and Stabilisation Fund (DCPSF).

## **BASIC POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLE**

Um Dukhun locality has a total population of 146,423, with 62,901 IDPs and 19,102 returnees (from 2003–19).<sup>32</sup> The targeted locations in Um Dukhun locality for the survey were identified by the PBF lead agency in Central Darfur together with the local authorities based on the programmatic scope of

---

<sup>27</sup> Dabanga news (2020) 14 killed in Darfur tribal fighting, 25 May 2020.

<sup>28</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, nomad community representative.

<sup>29</sup> Joint Missions in Um Dukhun locality (2017) Central Darfur, Mission report on Recovery, Return and Reintegration (RRR) Sector, Quarter 4, 2017.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> OCHA (2021) Humanitarian Needs Overview Sudan, December 2020. Separate estimates on nomads are not provided.

the fund.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, the samples captured by target group are not necessarily representative of each target group across the locality. Specifically, all IDP returnees targeted are in villages, while the returned refugees are distributed between towns (33%) and villages (67%). All surveyed nomad households resided in damrahs—temporary settlements that are used by nomads use.<sup>34</sup> The achieved samples for IDP returnees and return refugees reveal very different relative sizes of these two groups compared to the expected population sizes.<sup>35</sup> This probably means that return refugees are often accounted for as return IDPs, while it is less likely to be explained by population movements just prior to the data collection.<sup>36</sup> Returned refugees, mostly arriving from neighbouring Chad, thus appear to make up a very big proportion of the returnees in the target areas of Um Dukhun locality.

It is worth noting that classifications are helpful tools, but that it is important to be aware of the conceptual limitations they impose:

- International standards for displacement statistics recommend that **return refugees** are not counted as IDPs upon return, regardless of the period of time they were abroad, to avoid double-counting in official statistics.<sup>37</sup> In the analysis, the two groups (IDP returnees and return refugees) are analysed separately and compared. Attention is given to the extent to which these two groups differ as well as the similarities found when analyzing their re-integration process.<sup>38</sup> Given the proximity and porous nature of the border, it will be discussed whether the conceptual separation of these two groups reflects actual differences or not.
- **Nomads** and pastoralism are generally viewed in opposition to crop farming and sedentary livelihoods, and further complexity follows from the fact that in Sudan the words ‘nomad’ and ‘pastoralism’ refer to economic activity as well as a cultural identity, whilst in reality, the two do not always overlap. Defining nomads against the rural sedentary population can have a number of conceptual consequences; mobility becomes the defining feature of what it means to be nomadic; it creates a contrast between mobility and sedentary so that people can either belong to one classification or the other. Also, by defining nomads based on tribal identity (from the 1970s onwards),<sup>39</sup> ‘the classification excludes in principle that people can move across the categories: people belonging to a ‘nomadic’ tribe remain ‘nomads’ even if they settle. The definition of ‘nomads’ in relation to both mobility and tribe institutionalizes the confusion between economic practices and cultural identity.’<sup>40</sup> In this study, the surveyed households residing in damrahs may not all be viewed as nomadic if considered by their actual strategies of production; better definitions could include agro-pastoralist or semi-nomadic to describe the population. Environmental factors and the conflict in Darfur have demanded flexibility and dynamic adaptation from all population groups, and the inflexibility embedded in the classification will not always be

---

<sup>33</sup> See the methodology section in Introductions’ chapter for details on target locations and baseline population figures for the targeted geographic scope.

<sup>34</sup> Specifically in Motor Alom (north).

<sup>35</sup> See methodology section in introductory chapter for details on sample sizes and population baselines.

<sup>36</sup> The vast majority of return refugees report having returned since 1 - 5 years, and only 1% report having returned the year preceding the survey.

<sup>37</sup> Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (2020) International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS). March 2020.

<sup>38</sup> Re-integration of return refugees is referred to as ‘re-establishment’; however in this report we will be using the term ‘re-integration’ given the joint analysis with the IDP returnees.

<sup>39</sup> In Sudan, the 1955–56 census defined nomads (rohal) by their practice of mobile livestock keeping. But in the 1973 and 1983 census ‘nomads’ were no longer defined by their lifestyle but by administrative categorisation that associated them with a northern identity: a person owing an allegiance to a nomadic sheik. Hence ‘nomads were in practice defined on an administrative bases rather than by empirical observation. Krätli et al. (2013) Standing Wealth: Pastoralist Livestock Production and Local Livelihoods in Sudan.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.



adequate if used as an analytical tool for informing livelihoods and economic development interventions.


The household survey shows that the demographics characteristics are similar among the target population groups in Um Dukhun. Overall, the population in Um Dukhun locality is young—the proportion of persons below the age of 20 years is 64% (returnees), 65% (returned refugees) and 61% among nomads. 23–27% in all population groups are aged between 20 and 39 years, while older people only make up a small proportion of the population (12–13%).

When it comes to gender distribution, the proportion of men and women is very even. Among returned refugees, there is a 50/50 split between men and women. There are 51% are men and 49% women among IDP returnees, and the nomad population is composed of 49% men and 51% women. The number of female-headed households is quite high in Um Dukhun, as about one-in-three households are headed up by a woman among all population groups (33–34%). The size of the household is similar for all of the surveyed groups; a majority of households (60–64%) are made up of 1–5 members. For all population groups, 32–37% of households have between 6 and 9 members, whilst only a very small proportion (3–4%) have 10 or more members.

To gain a more complete picture of household vulnerability, the household survey also recorded whether any family members were disabled. Between 3–4% of all population groups report having a disability that stops them from ‘coping with all the things they need to’. As is not unusual, there is a higher proportion of people living with a disability amongst the older generation above the age of 35 years. Those that report a disability say that it is ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ difficult to cope indicating that their life is impacted significantly.

Literacy rates are used to gauge literacy skills, which span a range of proficiencies. Literacy, the ability to read and write amongst those above 15 years of age, is much higher for men. Nomad (60%), returned refugee (57%) and IDP returnees (44%) men are literate in contrast to only 12–13% of women in all three population groups. Notably, literacy rates among men from nomad communities (60%) is relatively high in comparison to IDP returnees, while almost identical to the literacy rates of nomad men found in Nertiti (59%). There are no large differences between age groups.

**FIGURE 1: LITERACY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN, 15 YEARS OF AGE AND ABOVE**



The age-dependency ratio is used to understand the pressure on the working-age population (15–65 years) to provide for the dependent family members—children 14 years or younger and adult family members above the age of 65 years.<sup>41</sup> The findings show that approximately among half of IDP returnee (56%) and returned refugee households (44%) there is a heavier burden placed on the working-age members to provide for the family, meaning that the working-age members expected to provide for the household are less than then dependent members. Among the nomadic communities in Um Dukhun, fewer households are under extra stress as 32% of households have a dependency ratio greater than 1.

It is common for households to have at least one household member, who is away for more than 6 months per year, primarily for work purposes (and fewer cases for education or other reason). The proportion of households with a member away is 15% across all three target groups; the vast majority of these being men.

## **DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION HISTORY**

The household survey considered the duration of return among IDP returnees and return refugees. It should be noted that the vast majority of returned refugees captured (97%) are back in their village/town of origin (and not just simply back in Sudan). The overwhelming majority of returnees have been back in their village or town of origin between 1 and 5 years —84% of IDP returnees and 83% of return refugees. Very few returnees arrived during the last year (1–5%), and only a small minority returned between 5 and 10 years ago. The survey also looked at nomads' movement patterns. About one-third of nomads had stayed in another settlement in El Geneina before arriving at the current damrah (35%). 21% had arrived from a location with Um Dukhun locality, and 10% from Rehad Albredi and 7% from Saraf Omra.

---

<sup>41</sup> It is the ratio of those not in the labour force (children below 15 years and adults older than 65 years) in relation to the working-age population (15–64 years); the higher the ratio, the greater the pressure is on the working-age members to provide for the dependent members.

# LIVELIHOODS AND HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES

Access to livelihoods is a key factor for local integration—durable solutions for IDPs and IDP returnees require access to employment and livelihoods akin to that of the non-displaced population; while often livelihoods of all displacement and conflict-affected populations are impacted. Considering in more detail households' sources of income and coping strategies provides a more nuanced picture and a better understanding both of particular vulnerabilities as well as of the livelihood opportunities. Sustainable livelihoods and access to required resources is a key challenge in post-conflict settings and an important element to post-conflict redevelopment.

## KEY FINDINGS:


- **Crop farming is central to the livelihoods of all population groups in Um Dukhun—also the nomads residing in damrahs as 51% rely on cultivating crops as their main source of livelihood. For 89% of IDP returnees and return refugees, crop farming is also their main livelihood.**
- **Significant proportions of return IDPs and return refugees say they have no secondary source of income, whilst more nomads appear to have additional income sources (only 13% do not have a second source of income).**
- **Overall, the proportion working for profit or pay is much higher among men compared to women across all groups. 11–12% of women vs. 36–38% among men across all surveyed groups work for profit or pay.**
- **A significant proportion report under-employment; close to 40% of men and 13–17% of women in all population groups are looking for additional work. All identify the same obstacles to finding work; irregular or lack of work opportunities along with inadequate or no skills. Furthermore, a vast majority engaged in subsistence farming only works 5–8 months per year, but so do more than half of those working for profit or pay (53–63%). A quarter of the population less than 5 months per year, and only return IDPs (18%) and refugees (14%) and 22% of nomads work between 9 and 12 months per year.**
- **Among Um Dukhun locality's working-age population, more than half of women (51–58%) and 21–26% of men are outside the labour force in all surveyed communities. The proportion of female youth outside the labour force is very high—66–69% of whom only a small proportion are studying (3–5%). A higher proportion of male youths are enrolled in education, but still, 34% of IDP returnee, 28% of return refugee and 22% of nomad youths are not in education, employment or training (NEET). Both are high proportions compared to Nertiti locality also located in Central Darfur.**
- **All respondents identify high food prices as shocks to their livelihood, while high proportions among all surveyed groups also point to high fuel prices as a shock. Half of all population groups say that COVID-19 restrictions and loss of employment/income were severe shocks, whilst 41–49% of all surveyed households state that 'too much rain' or floods was a significant problem.**
- **A significant number of households are food insecure—return IDP (47%) and refugees (38%) and a smaller percentage of damrah households (28%) did not have enough food the previous 7 days. Female-headed households are considerably more food insecure, as 67% of female-headed households are food insecure across all surveyed population groups.**

## MAIN LIVELIHOOD SOURCES

Agriculture is central to people’s livelihoods. The household survey shows that a majority of the sedentary communities rely on crop farming as their main source of income. Among IDP returnees and returned refugees respectively 89% and 84% depend on crop farming, while small proportions rely on wages (5%). Half of the nomads residing in damrahs also rely on crop farming as their main source of livelihood—a total of 51% of nomad households. Among the surveyed damrah communities 28% rely on livestock, and a further 12% are engaged in subsistence farming involving both crop and livestock farming. Only a small minority of households across all surveyed population groups rely on aid (1–2%) and remittances (2%).

Among the returned refugees and IDP returnees, about one-third report that they have no secondary source of income (29% and 33%), the rest report crop farming (one-fifth of the population), 7% in both groups report selling of livestock goods, around one-tenth sell firewood, while ten percentage point difference is seen among those who rely on salaries or wages as a secondary source of income (5% among IDP returnees and 15% among return refugees). Among the nomads, only a small proportion (13%) say that they do not depend on a secondary source of income, while a quarter report crop farming (26%) and another quarter of nomad households report livestock and trading of goods as an additional source of income.

FIGURE 2: MAIN SOURCE OF LIVELIHOODS FOR HOUSEHOLDS




Considering differences between male and female-headed households, the findings show that it is mainly female-headed households that rely on aid as their main income source (4% among nomad and 6% among return refugee female-headed households versus 1% among male-headed households in both groups). And while reliance on remittances overall is very low, it is higher among female-headed households (3–4% across all groups against 1% among male-headed households). Lastly, among female-headed nomad households, a larger proportion relies on crop farming (61%) compared to the 47% of male-headed households.

## MAIN OCCUPATION: EMPLOYMENT, ‘OWN-USE’ FARMING AND STUDYING

Overall, the proportion working for profit or pay is much higher among men compared to women across all groups. Only 11–12% among woman from the three population groups works for profit or pay, whilst the proportion rises to 36–38% among the men. Similar proportions of men and women

practise subsistence farming with a 4–6 percentage point difference. Among IDP returnees, 36% of men vs. 32% of women depend on subsistence farming; 42% of men and 36% of women among the damrah communities, and 41% of men in contrast to 37% of women among returned refugees.

FIGURE 3: MAIN ACTIVITY OF WORKING-AGE POPULATION (15–64 YEARS OF AGE) BY SEX



Among those Um Dukhun residents that work for profit or pay, similar proportions among the IDP returnees (43%) and returned refugees (38%) work in the private sector and the public sector (10–11%). Respectively, 11% of returnees and 15% of return refugees work in crop farming, but actually a higher proportion among men from the damrah communities (17%) report working in crop farming for profit or pay. Still, a higher proportion of nomad men work in livestock husbandry (26%), while this is also a key industry among nomad women (43%). Firewood collecting is not an important activity among the men in Um Dukhun locality (4–8%), but for IDP returnee and return refugee women it is an important industry (18–20%). Among women across all three population groups, working for profit or pay in the private sector is an important source of income, as IDP returnee (20%), return refugee (24%) and nomad (29%) work in this sector. The public sector is also a significant employer, especially for IDP returnees (20%) but also for return refugees (12%) but less so for women from the damrah communities (7%). Interestingly, respectively 10% and 7% of nomad men and women work in manufacturing, while this is only the case for 4% of men from returnee and return refugee communities.<sup>42</sup>

## UNDER-EMPLOYMENT

Considering under-employment provides a better grasp of people’s employment circumstances. For example, are those who are working searching for more work? Looking for additional work could indicate that people’s current work is not providing enough income to support the household. And looking closer at how much people are working can expose whether people are only working part-time or during certain months of the year. Almost 40% of men in all three surveyed groups (engaged in subsistence farming or working for profit or pay) are looking for additional work, whilst among

<sup>42</sup> Significant proportions of men and women from the IDP returnee and return refugee communities report working in ‘other’ sectors (17–21%).

women that proportion is 13–17%. All population groups point to the same obstacle to finding work (or extra work): irregular or lack of work opportunities as well as inadequate or lack of skills. Among women in Um Dukhun locality, handicraft skills are highlighted—56% of IDP returnees, 31% of return refugees and 27% of nomad women request training in handicraft. 39% of women from damrah communities are looking for agricultural extension skills and this is also flagged by IDP returnee (11%) and return refugee (14%) women. Fewer women are looking for vocational skills (1–5%), while larger proportions among the male population request vocational skills and knowledge and competencies in how to repair TukTuks and electrical items including mobile phones.<sup>43</sup> 17% of nomads are interesting in acquiring livestock extension skills and additional skills in crop agriculture (23%); the former also high on the list of both IDP returnees (31%) and return refugees (20%). Handicraft skill set is not in demand to the same extent as among the women, but still 15–18% among nomad and return refugee men are looking for training in handicrafts. There is also no availability of micro-credit schemes providing small-scale loans to help individuals become self-employed or grow a business.<sup>44</sup>

The household survey found that a high proportion of households own a mobile phone. Mobile phone ownership is much higher amongst men with the highest proportion amongst the nomads (38%). In comparison, 35% of return refugee men 30% of returnee men own a mobile. Only 10% of women from damrah communities and 5–6% of IDP returnee and 6% of return refugee women report owning a mobile phone. A recent ILO report on East Darfur points out that mobile phone could make it easier for businesses and cooperatives to reach markets at the regional, state and potentially at the national level. Also, the Bank of Khartoum has launched a mobile money service (MBok) that has the potential to provide access to banking services despite the absence of financial services providers. With regards to developing skills, repairing mobile phones could become a useful skill for young people in the target communities.<sup>45</sup>

Using a different lens to view under-employment takes into account how much people are working. The vast majority of Um Dukhun residents who work in ‘own-use’ production only work between 5–8 months per year, and hence subsistence farming is a very seasonal occupation. 90–93% of returnees and return refugees engaging in subsistence farming work only 5–8 months, while this is the case for 82% of nomads. Working for profit or pay is also to a large extent seasonal, as more than half across all groups work 5–8 months per year; 62–63% among IDP returnees and return refugees and 53% among the damrah communities, while similar proportions among all the surveyed groups work less than 5 months (20–24%) per year. A somewhat higher proportion among nomads works between 9 and 12 months (22%) per year, while this is the case for 18% of IDP returnees and 14% of return refugees.

## **OUTSIDE THE LABOUR FORCE**

The population referred to as ‘outside of the labour force’ are persons, who are of working-age (15–64 years) but economically inactive. The household survey results also show that more than half of women (aged 15–64 years) in all population groups (51–58%) are outside the labour force. They neither work for profit or pay nor involved in ‘own-use’ production, and instead report taking care of

---

<sup>43</sup> Among IDP returnee men, 14% and 16% request respectively vocational and mechanical and basic electrical engineering skills, while 9% and 11% of nomad men are interested in acquiring these competencies. Return refugee men also request vocational skills (7%) and skills in basic engineering and mechanics (9%).

<sup>44</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, key informant interview.


<sup>45</sup> ILO (2021) PROSPECTS Sudan Baseline Survey. Draft report. March 2021

their family and house or studying as their main occupation. Among the men in Um Dukhun, the proportion that is out of the workforce is between 21–26% among all communities.

When disaggregating this data further by age, figures show that a significantly larger proportion is found among the youth aged 15–24 years. Among male youths, 45–49% across all groups are outside the labour force, in contrast to only IDP returnee (14%), return refugee (11%), and nomad (7%) men between 25 and 64 years old. For women belonging to the age group 25–64 years, a high proportion of IDP returnee women (51%) are ‘inactive’ in comparison to 43% of return refugee and 38% of nomad women. The proportion of female youths outside the labour force is very high (66–69%) for all three population groups. Among female youths outside of the labour force, only a few are studying (3–5%) and are instead primarily taking care of the family and home; IDP returnee (51%), nomad (57%) and return refugee (57%) female youths report they are tending to the home and household. Higher proportions among young men are studying—23% of nomad, 31% of return refugee and 13% of IDP returnee male youths are enrolled in education.<sup>46</sup>

The proportion of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET rate) is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator.<sup>47</sup> It shows the number of young persons as a percentage of the total youth population, who are not in education, employment or training and hence conveys information on the labour market situation for the population of young people. In Um Dukhun locality, there is a significant number of male youths who are not in education, employment or training specifically 34% of IDP returnee, 28% of return refugee and 22% of nomad male youths. This is a high proportion when contrasted against the NEET rate for male youths in Nertiti locality in Central Darfur. In Nertiti locality, merely 7–9% for male youths belonging to IDP and returnee communities and only 2% for nomad male youths, which can be explained by the high numbers of male youth in Nertiti that report that they are in education.

**FIGURE 4: YOUTH (15–24 YEARS) NOT WORKING AND NOT IN EDUCATION - SDG 8.6.1**



The NEET rate is dramatically higher for female youth in Um Dukhun—62–65% of female youth are not participating in the education system nor the labour market. These figures are similarly high when compared to Nertiti locality, where 34–37% of female IDP, returnee and non-displaced youths are not

<sup>46</sup> Note that the total number of individuals (N) in the population is very small.

<sup>47</sup> SDG indicator 8.6.1

in education, employment or training—it is only among nomad damrah communities that 62% of female youths are NEET. In Nertiti locality, a very high number of youths were enrolled in education, while in Um Dukhun very few young women report that they are studying (3–5%). However, among young men, this proportion is higher—23% among nomad youth and 31% among returned refugees—which results in a less high NEET rate for male youths.<sup>48</sup> Female youth between 15–24 years of age mainly report taking care of the family and the home as their main occupation: 51% among IDP returnees, 55% among nomads and 57% among return refugees.

It would be worth exploring in community sessions if lack of education opportunities can at least partly explain the much higher NEET rate among male youth in Um Dukhun and look further into factors that account for the high NEET rate among female youths. A recent study from November 2019 found that youths are vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups and that unemployment and poverty are the main drivers for youth to join conflicts.<sup>49</sup> The same study found that women also join armed groups in Darfur although mainly providing support in terms of cooking, nursing and intelligence gathering.<sup>50</sup>

## SHOCKS TO LIVELIHOODS AND COPING MECHANISMS

During the last couple of years, Sudan has seen soaring price rises for fuel and staple foods such as sorghum, millet and wheat. The household survey also looked at what respondents thought to be the most severe shocks to their livelihoods. Rocketing food prices impacted *all* households across the surveyed population groups (99–100%), while high fuel prices also affected the vast majority; 93–95% of return refugees and nomads and to a lesser extent IDP returnee households (82%). COVID-19 restrictions and loss of income or employment was also a significant livelihoods shock to more than half of households across all groups.<sup>51</sup> ‘Too much rain’ or floods have been an issue for 41–49% of all households, while drought, irregular rainfall or prolonged dry spells presented a shock to livelihoods for 23–24% of return refugee and nomad respondents and 34% of IDP returnee households. A substantial proportion of returnee IDP (67%) and refugee (54%) households were impacted by crop diseases, while more than half of nomads (57%) report livestock loss as a serious shock. Somewhat more nomads reported violence and attacks (20%) to be a shock to their livelihood in contrast to 15% return refugees and 12% of IDP returnees. When asked to identify the most significant shock during the last 12 months, 62–67% of return IDPs and refugees single out high food prices. For 52% of the damrah population the rising food prices was also the most significant shock, but respectively 15% and 16% point to high fuel prices and loss of livestock as the most significant shock impacting their livelihoods.

The household survey also asked households how they dealt with the most significant livelihood shocks and household surveyed were asked if and how they had responded. Selecting from a broad range of coping mechanisms, a picture emerges of how households have coped. Grouping responses into ‘negative’ or non-reversible versus ‘positive’ or sustainable coping strategies is a good predictor of future vulnerability. In other words, to what extent a household is resilient when facing potential future shocks. For example, ‘non-sustainable’ or more extreme coping mechanisms (selling productive assets) suggest serious long-term consequences. Such strategies are less reversible and thus represent a more severe form of coping.<sup>52</sup> Many nomads rely on selling livestock, hence for this

---

<sup>48</sup> The N of young men among return IDPs is very low to report on.

<sup>49</sup> UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> IDP returnee (51%), nomad (57%) and 61% of return refugee households.

<sup>52</sup> The categorization is based on the responses provided to the question ‘what do you do when faced with X shock to your livelihood? Modest coping strategies are easily reversible or strategies that do not jeopardize longer-term prospects, while more extreme coping



population group selling productive assets was not included in the 'non-sustainable' category of responses. The majority of households from all population groups used sustainable mechanisms to address the most significant shock. 83% of damrah households compared to 63–66% of return IDP and refugee households. The recategorization of 'selling of animals' does show the number of animals that households were forced to sell in order to cope, and hence may 'hide' negative coping mechanisms adopted by some households. Among return IDP (30%) and refugee (28%) households, about one-third used unsustainable coping strategies to the most significant livelihood shock they faced, while only 11% of nomads had to resort to severe coping mechanisms.

## **FOOD SECURITY**

Households were asked if there had been times when they did not have enough food or money to buy food during the past 7 days. Findings show that more return IDP (47%) and refugees (38%) did not have enough food during the previous week compared to damrah households (28%).

The reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) is an indicator of household food security. The rCSI assesses how people cope when they do not have enough to eat or any money to buy food. The proxy tool takes into account how often particular strategies are used and the severity of the strategies employed, by categorizing the way households are coping into low, medium and high coping strategies with the latter being the most severe.<sup>53</sup> Among the households that reported not having enough food the previous week, the majority in all surveyed groups used low or medium coping mechanisms—practically none of the households used 'high' coping strategies (1–2%). Return refugees (54%), IDP returnees (63%) and 70% of nomad households used coping mechanisms classified as low or medium in severity.

Looking in more detail at the food insecure households, namely those that did not have enough food or money to buy food, the data shows that among return refugees living in towns a smaller proportion is food insecure (33%) compared return refugees residing in villages. And with regards to the nomad population, the household survey indicates that a higher proportion of those relying on crop farming is food insecure than nomad households that depend on livestock and salaries.

## **FOCUS ON FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS**

Female-headed households make up a considerable proportion of households—return IDPs and nomads (33%) plus 34% of return refugees—and it is, therefore, important to understand if and to what extent these households may be more vulnerable. The data shows that female-headed households are significantly more food insecure. Among the IDP returnee population, 67% of female-headed households are food insecure compared to 37% of households headed by a man. A lower proportion of return refugee female-headed households are food insecure (52%) but this is in contrast


---

mechanisms have longer-term consequences. Categories for coping were reviewed by UNDP Sudan colleagues. Based on feedback, the coping mechanisms were grouped according to severity into non-sustainable/irreversible and sustainable/reversible. For example, 'sold farm area', 'reduced food consumption', 'selling animals' were categorized as 'non-sustainable', whilst 'selling more crops', 'starting a new business', 'received help from an NGO' were grouped as less severe/reversible coping mechanisms.

<sup>53</sup> The reduced CSI has been developed to compare food security across different contexts. It is a sub-set of the context-specific CSI but food security is calculated using a specific set of behaviours with a universal set of severity weightings for each behaviour. Thus, the reduced CSI uses a standard set of five individual coping behaviours that can assess food security of households in any context: eating less-preferred foods, borrowing food/money from friends and relatives, limiting portions at mealtimes, limiting adult food intake, and reducing the number of meals per day. Maxwell, D. and Caldwell, R. (2008) The Coping Strategies Index. Field Methods Manual (March, 2008).

to 31% of male-headed return refugee households. Among the nomad damrah communities surveyed, 43% of female-headed households are food insecure compared to only 22% of family units headed up by a man. Interestingly, the proportion of households that resort to unsustainable coping mechanism is much higher among male-headed households than female-headed households in return IDP and refugee communities. The data shows that 38% of male-headed households vs. 14% of female-headed households among IDP returnees resort to unsustainable coping mechanisms as a response to food insecurity, whilst among return refugees, this is the case for 32% of male-headed household compared to 21% of households headed up by a woman.

**FIGURE 5: MALE AND FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS THAT DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FOOD OR MONEY TO BUY FOOD THE 7 DAYS PRECEEDING THE SURVEY (JANUARY, 2021)**



# HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY: ACCESS AND TENURE

The enjoyment of housing, land and property rights is key to achieving durable solutions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs regards effective accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP) as crucial criteria to determine if IDPs have reached a durable solution. This is because housing, land and property underpin people's livelihoods and standard of living.

This chapter explores IDPs' and returnees' access to land.<sup>54</sup> Have they managed to regain their land and rebuild their livelihoods? What are the specific obstacles to this? Drawing on the data of the non-displaced population as a benchmark, the analysis looks to explore and explain obstacles faced by IDPs and returnees.

From a peacebuilding perspective, violations of IDPs' housing, land and property (HLP) rights are a major obstacle to durable solutions for IDPs but are also integral to reaching peace, because land is a primary cause *and* ongoing driver of conflict between communities. The Juba Peace Agreement recognises the importance of land—land is a resource for the good of all people of Sudan. The agreement specifies that Individuals and communities have the right to restitution of lands lost as a result of the conflict in Darfur and where a return of the land is not possible, IDPs are entitled to compensation. As part of the peace agreement, several structures and institutions have been established with particular mandates relating to land issues.

## KEY FINDINGS:

- **Very high proportions of return IDP and refugee (93–94%) households have access to land, but the household survey also shows that 70% of nomads residing in damrahs have access to agricultural land. A majority of surveyed return refugee (81%) and IDP returnee (72%) households have managed to regain access to the same agricultural land that they farmed before being displaced.**
- **Land ownership is the dominant form of tenure and 68% of return refugees and 46% of IDP returnees report owning agricultural land. A further quarter of IDP returnees rent land, and so do 14% of return refugees, while similar proportions (14% and 17%) among both population groups say they borrow land for free.**
- **Among the households that report owning the land they cultivate, substantial proportions of IDP returnees (36%) and return refugees (40%) claim customary rights, and a further 51–55% say that they have no evidence or proof of land ownership.**
- **A majority of nomad households have access to grazing land (77%), and so do female-headed households in the damrah communities (70%).**
- **70–78% of return refugees and IDPs say they own their residential plot in contrast to 25% of surveyed nomad households. Among the households residing in damrahs, 65% report living on government land.**

---

<sup>54</sup> Access refers to obtaining or using land. Access to land is governed through land tenure systems, which is a 'relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups with respect to land.' A land tenure system determines who can use what land, for how long and under what terms. FAO (2002) Land Tenure Studies (4). Gender and access to land.

## ACCESS TO LAND & TENURE TYPE

Access to land is central to the livelihoods of the majority of people in Um Dukhun locality, as livelihoods chiefly depend on crop agriculture. 84–89% of return IDPs and refugees rely on crop farming as their main source of income, but as discussed previously more than half of nomad households (51%) also depend on crop farming as their main source of livelihood.<sup>55</sup> Very high proportions (93–94%) among the IDP returnees and return refugees report having access to farming land, and access to agricultural land is not lower among female-headed households (90–94%). Among nomad households residing in damrahs, the data shows that a high proportion—70%—have access to agricultural land.<sup>56</sup> Most respondents interviewed for the area-level analysis state that nomads do not own land in Um Dukhun locality, but that they can use land while they move through the area.<sup>57</sup> This view does not seem to be necessarily shared by nomad damrah communities, as one nomad leader asserts that nomad communities own the land where the damrahs are located and live in seasonal houses.<sup>58</sup> Other respondents report that most nomads move seasonally with their animals, but that some do own land outside of the damrahs in villages such as Abu Jaradil.<sup>59</sup> Area-level analysis suggests that damrahs were originally built on government-owned land, and nomads would stay in these seasonal resting places while migrating through a specific area. Longstanding agreements between local tribes and nomads would allow for seasonal stays and grant nomads passage. Nowadays, however, this has changed and damrahs are now sites of settled villages and even small towns with markets, permanent houses, schools and health centres. And most of the nomads have permanently settled in the damrahs in Um Dukhun, where they farm the land and keep some animals.

A high percentage of all groups must walk more than 30 min from their dwelling to their agricultural land, although a higher proportion of IDP returnee has a shorter way to walk to get to their fields. Return refugees (76%) and IDP returnees (50%) have 30 min or more walking distance to reach the fields they cultivate. Respectively, 23% of return IDPs and 14% of return refugees have 20–30 min walking distance, while another 20% of IDP returnees only need to walk 10 min to reach their land. Access to agricultural land follows a traditional setup, where dwellings are clustered in villages and fields positioned some distance away.<sup>60</sup>

Looking in more detail at households' tenure of agricultural land, findings show that owning is the principal form of tenure, but that renting or borrowing land for free is also common.<sup>61</sup> 68% of return refugees and 46% among IDP returnees report owning the land they cultivate. A higher proportion of return IDPs rent agricultural land (26%) compared to return refugees (14%), while similar proportions (14–17%) say that they borrow at no cost the agricultural land they farm. In the context of Central Darfur, what does it involve to borrow or rent land for cultivation? For many return IDPs or refugees

---

<sup>55</sup> Among the damrah communities, respectively 28% depend on livestock and 12% on subsistence farming including both crop farming and livestock production.

<sup>56</sup> Numbers of households that report crop farming as their main livelihood source, plus those nomad households that say they primarily rely on livestock but report crop farming as a secondary source of livelihood.

<sup>57</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, representatives from CRS, the Land Use Office, Native Administration, and community representatives (women).

<sup>58</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun, nomad leader.


<sup>59</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, community representative, youth leader.

<sup>60</sup> Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In *War and Society* Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156–181

<sup>61</sup> Note that the household survey did not capture damrah communities land tenure or documentation due to the false assumption that nomad communities do not access or own agricultural land, this has however been refuted by the results.

that no longer have access to land in their place of origin, renting land is the next best option.<sup>62</sup> Rent can be paid in currency, part of the harvest yield or in services. The cost of renting agricultural land is quite expensive and those renting often have to pay a considerable proportion of their produce—a quarter or more of harvested crops—to cover the rent of the land. Poor households are reported not to be able to afford to rent land. On some occasions, farmers can negotiate more favourable rent terms when bargaining as a group.<sup>63</sup>

**FIGURE 6: TENURE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND AMONG HOUSEHOLDS WITH ACCESS TO LAND**



With regards to regaining access to the same land, a very high proportion among the return refugees (81%) report that they can access the same agricultural land as before being displaced. For the IDP returnees, a somewhat smaller proportion (72%) have managed to access the same farmland that they cultivated before their displacement. Among the return IDP and refugee households unable to access the same land, more than half (52–54%) report still holding a legal title or access rights to the parcel of land they farmed prior to their displacement. A considerable proportion among those that cannot access the same land report issues related to re-accessing their land—55% of return IDPs and 70% of return refugees that are unable to farm their previous land point to problems as the reason for currently not farming the land.

Considering grazing land, a majority of nomadic pastoralist generally report having access to grazing land. 77% of surveyed nomads report having access to grazing land, and this is only slightly less among female-headed households (70%). About a third of return refugees (28%) and IDP returnees (33%) also report having access to grazing land. Most nomads report (46%) having to walk more than 30 min from their dwelling to reach the grazing land, but 32% have a shorter distance (20–30 min) to the grazing land they use). A majority of return IDPs and refugees (65%) have to walk between 20 to 30 min to access grazing land. Among the damrah residents that say that have access to grazing land, a little more than half report (56%) that the land belongs to the government, while 40% graze the animals on communal grazing land.

## THE DARFURI HAKURA LAND TENURE SYSTEM

Darfur is governed by plural legal land tenure systems. Since the start of the joint authority Anglo-Egyptian rule of Sudan, modern statutory laws have existed alongside traditional customary laws. In

<sup>62</sup> Consultation with UN thematic experts.

<sup>63</sup> Consultation with UN thematic experts.

practical terms, this legal pluralism means that there are ‘overlapping institutions for accessing land’.<sup>64</sup> The customary ‘Hakura’ system is the traditional way to manage land in Darfur. Ownership of land does not correspond to the Western legal concept. Following the customary system, rights are not exclusive and land is ‘owned’ or belong to a community. Land in Darfur is split into tribal homelands, which is named a Dar. Generally, the homeland belongs to a major tribe, which gave this tribe monopoly over land but crucially also leadership and political representation and power.<sup>65</sup> A tribal sheikh from the dominant homeland tribe can assign a piece of land (Hakura) to a group of people, family or person. Permission is granted for a time period and in case the land allocated is not being used, then the sheikh may reallocate it to another person or group.<sup>66</sup> Crucially, not all groups have a Dar—tribes can be categorized as land-holding and non-landing tribes. Sheikhs not belonging to a tribe that do not have a homeland are known as ‘sheikh of the people’ and has no authority over land.<sup>67</sup> A recent UN-Habitat report assesses that the customary ‘Hakura’ system is still the predominant way to manage land in Darfur and that registered land ownership cover less than 1% of the land in Darfur with very few registered parcels of land in rural locales.<sup>68</sup> The household survey results from Um Dukhun locality are in line with this description—none of the households surveyed indicates that they hold a land registration certificate. Respectively 36% and 40% of IDP returnees and return refugees claim customary rights to their agricultural land, whilst a further 51–55% state that they have no evidence or proof of their land ownership. According to thematic experts, this refers to a situation when a sheikh allows for people to use a piece of land but does not allocate the land as owned by the land users.<sup>69</sup>

The ‘Hakura’ system itself represents an obstacle to accessing land for some groups. Key informant interviews (KIIs) with Central Darfur respondents flag that women face inequalities when it comes to land ownership. According to tribal customs and traditions, women are not able to own land in their own right but can cultivate land.<sup>70</sup> The area-level analysis in Um Dukhun indicates that women are not able to own land due to Darfuri culture and traditions, but that they are able to cultivate land. Most of the land that women cultivate belongs to a male family member such as a husband or husband.<sup>71</sup> Some respondents point out that women can own land if they purchase or inherit land and that it is easier for women to own land in bigger towns and cities.<sup>72</sup>

Pastoralist nomads is also a group that traditionally did not have access to land as an outcome of how the customary ‘Hakura’ system manages access to land. According to ‘Hakura’ nomads do not have access to land due to their movement because traditional land rights are linked to agricultural use of land. Communal ownership of land was traditionally not attainable for nomadic communities. Instead, pastoralist had transient rights including access to water for animals and humans plus access to grazing land and livestock routes.<sup>73</sup> Hence, sheikhs from pastoralist communities that do not have

---

<sup>64</sup> Satti, H., Sulieman, H., Young, H., Radday, A. (2020) Natural Resources Management: Local Perspectives from North and Central Darfur.

<sup>65</sup> Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.

<sup>66</sup> UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.

<sup>67</sup> East Darfur, key informant—Native Administration

<sup>68</sup> UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.

<sup>69</sup> IOM key informant.

<sup>70</sup> Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—youth leader and local government, nomad, Native Administration representatives.

<sup>71</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun Local Government, Local land use office, Omda of Nomads, Women, Omda, Youth leader

<sup>72</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun, Community representative, Nomad leader

<sup>73</sup> Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.

a homeland—a Dar—would not have land to offer members of their tribe, whereas leaders of sedentary communities traditionally could assign or lease land.

Many Darfur experts argue that the inability of the indigenous ‘Hakura’ system to allow for full participation by nomadic pastoralists aggravated divisions between sedentary farmers and nomads and thus was a major factor in the development of the conflict. This is because a Dar—a homeland—is traditionally linked to political participation and comes with formal leadership positions in local and regional state institutions and have excluded nomadic pastoralists and smaller tribes. The area-level analysis in Nertiti includes many statements by key informants that refer to nomads, who settled on the land of IDPs after they were displaced.<sup>74</sup> And that the land now settled by people belonging to pastoralist nomadic tribes was ‘historically owned based on the norms and traditions of Darfur [...]’.<sup>75</sup>

### **THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT—STIPULATED CHANGE**

The Juba Peace Agreement sets out some changes to the hierarchy of the statutory and customary land tenure systems. The government of Jafar Numeiri enacted the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, which brought all land not formally registered into government ownership. In practice, the Act asserted government ownership over lands that were already claimed under the customary land tenure ‘Hakura’ system and administered by the Native Administration. The Juba Peace Agreement signed in 2020 explicitly recognises traditional ownership of tribal lands (referred to as Hawakeer), historic rights to lands plus customary livestock routes and opportunities to access water.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, customary law takes precedence in the event that there is a conflict between Sudanese statutory law and customary law relating to land. Subsequently, laws should be amended to include land rights ‘according to the norms, traditions, and inherited practices of land tenure in Darfur’.<sup>77</sup> It is unclear whether these changes to land tenure in the peace agreement represent a view as to whether formal land registration in Darfur is the right tool for reducing conflict over land or not. But certainly, some Darfur scholars hold the view that it is the inherent flexibility and ambiguity of customary tenure that allows for the ‘elasticity required in the tenure system to accommodate livestock migrations and pursue options in drought years’.<sup>78</sup>

### **DEMARCATION AND REGISTRATION CERTIFICATES FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND**

Very low proportions of the return IDP and refugee households reported that their farmland is demarcated. Only 1% of IDP returnees and 2% of return refugees have demarcated land. Having land demarcated is the first step to obtaining an official land registration certificate, which involves both the Native Administration and the Land Use Office.

The commonly held logic behind wanting to demarcate and legally register land is to establish clarity on boundaries and ownership, and in turn, reduce conflict over land.<sup>79</sup> How come only a small percentage of people possess a legal certificate documenting ownership of their land? One explanation is that it is a complicated, lengthy process that only grants ownership for a relatively short

---

<sup>74</sup> Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—Native Administration, local NGO representatives.

<sup>75</sup> Central Darfur, Nertiti locality—Land Use Office key informant.

<sup>76</sup> Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.1

<sup>77</sup> Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.5

<sup>78</sup> Unruh, J. (2016) Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict.

<sup>79</sup> Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In War and Society Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

time period (6–7 years).<sup>80</sup> The issue of costs was also highlighted by thematic experts, who say that IDPs and returnees complain that the cost of the official GPS demarcation is high; it costs 200 SDG per feddan.<sup>81</sup> The process of obtaining a land registration certificate is not only costly and lengthy but also complicated because it involves dealing with both the Native Administration, who oversees the customary tenure system and the formal legal judiciary in charge of the formal registration of land.

Some Darfur commentators suggest a different explanation; that demarcation has been ‘actively resisted’ by the population that claim customary ownership of land. The rejection, it is argued, had to do with limited trust in the government and the government institutions that were involved in demarcation and land registration.<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, thematic experts point out that the process involved in the official land registration of farmland is open to manipulation. The process involves the Native Administration signing and endorsing a written form. The land claim is broadcast on local radio, if no one disputes the claim it will be officially registered using GPS mapping to demarcate. People can register land, but it is very hard to verify that it is, in fact, their land. Are the Omdas, the original tribal leaders of the land in question or more recent arrivals? Therefore, the process itself needs to be strengthened or changed.

## **HOUSING AND RESIDENTIAL LAND**

When asked about the tenure of their resident land, a majority among return IDPs and refugees reported that they own their housing plot. 70% of IDP returnees and 78% return refugees say they own their residential plot, but in contrast, only 25% of nomad damrah residents report owning. Among the damrah communities, 65% say they live on land that belongs to the government. This is also the case for 20% of return IDPs, whilst 8% return refugees are living on a residential plot of land provided for free by a friend or relative. The greater part of those that report owning their residential plot is not able to prove ownership—IDP returnees (71%), nomads (62%) and 56% of return refugees cannot prove ownership. Around one-third of nomad households (32%) claim customary rights to their housing plot, whereas 29% and 20% of respectively return refugees and IDPs own their residential plot according to customary law. Some refer to a decision by the local administration as proof of ownership; 12% of return refugees, 5% of nomads and 4% of IDP returnees. 3% among the return IDP and refugee households have a sales receipt, and only 1% of return refugees hold a registered area certification proving ownership of their residential land.

The vast majority of IDP returnees (94%) and return refugees (88%) have regained access to the same residential plot. And among those that have not managed to regain access to the same plot, 25% of IDP returnees report that they used to live on government-owned land, while another 25% previously live on land that was provided for by relatives or friends. The situation is different for the majority of the surveyed return refugees, as 81% report previously owning their residential plot of land.

---

<sup>80</sup> Consultation with a thematic expert from UN-Habitat, February 2021.

<sup>81</sup> Consultation with UN thematic experts, March 2021.

<sup>82</sup> Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In *War and Society* Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181



# SAFETY, SECURITY, CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW

Perceptions of safety and security are key criteria for durable solutions. The analysis aims to understand if IDPs and returnees experience a higher degree of security incidents in comparison to the non-displaced population. What type of insecurity and conflict do residents face?

Lack of security has the ability to erode the overall confidence in peacebuilding processes and therefore restoring the rule of law is imperative. Peacebuilding is ultimately concerned with transforming post-conflict societies so that political, social disputes and conflict are managed and resolved through non-violent means. The rule of law is a framework for the peaceful management of conflict and fair administration of justice through institutions, mechanisms and procedures.<sup>83</sup> Ensuring the rule of law relies on the capacity of the police and formal courts, but how effective are the police and courts in Um Dukhun locality? The role of civil society in conflict resolution and peacebuilding is also important in Darfur and therefore local conflict resolution mechanisms are reviewed and their perceived effectiveness assessed. Key informants also provide insight into the limitations of local conflict resolution mechanisms, but also how local mechanisms can be strengthened and local peacebuilding capacities supported.

## KEY FINDINGS:

- **A majority of all population groups feel safe during the day, but the proportions of returnees in the target areas of Um Dukhun as well as nomad damrah residents that report feeling very safe drops during nighttime. Looking at gendered differences, 8–11% of male respondents, across the groups, report that walking during the night is ‘unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’ while among female respondents the equivalent range is 4–6%.**
- **In the target areas of Um Dukhun locality, high proportions among all population groups register damage to property or livestock. This type of incidents is highest among the damrah dwellers (49%) compared to return IDPs and refugees ((26–30%). Robbery is also experienced by a higher proportion of nomads by 10 percentage points, as 42% of nomads residing in damrahs compared to 32% among return IDPs and refugees reported having been robbed.**
- **Conflict drivers are predominantly related to land, but disputes and tensions over water is also not uncommon. Unlawful or violent acquisition of land is also regarded as a key source of tension by area-level respondents. The survey shows that 8–9% of return IDPs and refugees report that they face issues linked to the farming land. While the majority of return refugees (90%) and IDP returnees (77%) have managed to gain access to the same land, among those that have not regained their land (10% and 23%), the main reasons is ‘land unlawfully occupied by others’ and ‘disputed ownership’.**
- **According to the area-level analysis, blocked livestock routes are a problem in Um Dukhun locality. Both nomad leaders and NGO representatives say that 5 animal routes used to run through the locality, but that most of these corridors no longer exist because the land is not cultivated by farmers.**

---


<sup>83</sup> Kritz, N. J. (2007) *The Rule of Law in Conflict Management* in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.) (2007) *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*.

- Um Dukhun locality is served by 10 police posts plus one police centre in Um Dukhun town. A further four police points are under construction. However, the police points are tasked with providing policing for a large geographical area and is described as inadequate to serve the area.
- The area-level data points to the Peaceful Coexistence Committee as the most effective local conflict resolution mechanism, followed by the Harvest Protection Committee,<sup>84</sup> which both work in tandem with the local government present in the locality.
- The household survey findings show that relatively small proportions of residents in target areas turn to Water Committees for help. The survey results show that 21% of nomad residents in damrahs and 32% among IDP returnees have access to water committees, as opposed to 54% among returned refugees.

## PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY INCIDENTS

Respondents were asked how safe they and their household members feel when walking in their neighbourhood or area during the day and during nighttime on a scale from 'very safe', 'safe', 'unsafe' and 'very unsafe'. 80% of all surveyed groups in Um Dukhun locality report feeling 'very safe' during the day while another significant proportion (18–20%) of nomads, return IDPs and refugees say that they feel 'safe'. Only small percentages among IDP returnees (3%) and return refugees (2%) report feeling 'unsafe' during daylight hours.

FIGURE 7: HOUSEHOLDS BY DEGREE OF SAFETY WHEN WALKING AROUND IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD/AREA IN THE NIGHT - SDG INDICATOR 16.1.4



Perceptions of safety drop markedly among all population groups when asked about feeling safe when walking at night. Among damrah residents (41%) and DP returnees (47%) and returned refugees (44%), less than half say they feel 'very safe' walking at night, while most of the remaining households report feeling 'safe'. A similar 5–7% across the groups report feeling 'unsafe' and only 1% report feeling 'very unsafe'.

<sup>84</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, local government official, Native Administration representatives (nomad Omda, Omda and Sheikh of IDPs), and women and nomad community representatives.

Do perceptions of safety differ between men and women? While information on perceptions of safety was collected at the household level the analysis has checked the responses provided by the sex of the respondent.<sup>85</sup> Perceptions during daytime do not significantly differ. However, perceptions of safety during nighttime, show that more than twice as many female respondents compared to male respondents, report they do not walk around at night and a larger proportion of male respondents report lack of safety. Specifically, between 8–11% of male respondents, across the groups, report that walking during the night is ‘unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’ while among female respondents the equivalent range is 4–6%.

To identify the kinds of threats and confrontation that communities in Um Dukhun locality face, respondents were asked about incidents that they had experienced during the 12 months prior to the survey. The household survey findings show that it is uncommon for all population groups to experience verbal and physical threats. 10–13% of return IDPs and refugees report having experienced either verbal or physical threats at least once during the previous 12 months, while the proportion among damrah residents is a little higher (17–18%).<sup>86</sup> It is more common for survey respondents to state that such incidents happen ‘rarely’ or ‘sometimes’ rather than describing incidents to take place often. In comparison to Nertiti locality in Central Darfur, these figures are low: 53–7% of the IDP and returnee population as well as 47% of non-displaced residents said that they had experienced verbal and physical threats.

In Um Dukhun locality, high proportions among all population groups register damage to property or livestock. This type of incidents is highest among the damrah dwellers (49%), whereas 26–30% of return IDPs and refugees report damage to their property or livestock during the past 12 months. Robbery is also experienced by a higher proportion of nomads by 10 percentage points. 42% of nomads residing in damrahs compared to 32% among return IDPs and refugees reported having been robbed. The data analysis sought to discern any differences in terms of safety and types of settlement. Overall, the data does not show any great differences between those living in town or villages apart from robbery, which tends to happen more often to return refugees and IDP returnees residing in town areas by 10 percentage points.

## **PREVALENCE OF CONFLICTS LINKED TO LAND**

Conflict drivers in Um Dukhun locality are predominantly related to land, but disputes and tensions over water are also not uncommon. Conflicts around land and water are described as occurring between pastoralists and farmers, while boundary conflicts happen between farmers. Conflicts linked to the destruction of farm crops by pastoralists’ animals and farmers’ expansion of farms into animal routes, and boundary conflicts only involving farmers are regarded as the most common problems in regards to land. Unlawful or violent acquisition of land is also regarded as a key source of tension and conflict by area-level respondents.<sup>87</sup> Less mentioned sources of conflict include animal theft and intra-family disputes. Livestock theft is described as having increased dramatically in recent years, and disputes between family members are linked to rising rates of divorce.<sup>88</sup>

---

<sup>85</sup> Namely, the respondent was asked ‘How safe do you or anyone in your HH feel walking alone in your area/ neighbourhood during the day/night?’

<sup>86</sup> This result is similar to the findings for nomads in Nertiti locality; 18% and 20% of the damrah residents experienced respectively verbal and physical threats.

<sup>87</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, youth leader and Native Administration representatives (Omda and Sheik of IDPs).

<sup>88</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, police official, community representatives—youth and nomad leaders.

In Um Dukhun locality, the household survey shows that 8–9% of return IDPs and refugees report that they face issues linked to the farming land that they are now accessing. Return IDP and refugees were asked if they have managed to re-access their land upon return. The majority of return refugees (90%) and IDP returnees (77%) have managed to gain access to the same land but among those that have not regained their land (10% and 23%), the main reasons for not accessing this land are 'land unlawfully occupied by others' and 'disputed ownership'. The area-level study provides context to the household survey findings. Violent land acquisition and unlawful occupation of land are regarded as a key problem flagged by many respondents. The people that are now occupying the land are referred to as 'newcomers', who are said to have taken and 'exploit' the land of IDPs and refugees with the backing of the previous regime. Some but not all respondents refer to the newcomers as nomads.<sup>89</sup>

Boundary conflicts between farmers are considered the most often frequently occurring type of conflict and exist in most villages in Um Dukhun.<sup>90</sup> This type of conflict is cyclical and is reported to take place at the beginning of the rainy season every year when farmers are planting their crop and push into the fields of neighbouring farmers.<sup>91</sup> This type of conflict between farmers is considered by respondents to be solved successfully by the Native Administration in most instances.

Area-level data and household survey findings identify conflict linked to livestock migratory routes a problem. Also, when surveyed nomads were asked whether they followed designed livestock movement routes, 81% confirmed that they did. The main reasons given for not following livestock corridors was to look for grazing and water (47%), while insecurity, risks to safety and crime (37%) were also reasons as to why nomads had changed course and not followed defined livestock routes. Although this type of conflict is not mentioned by return IDP and refugees in the household survey, 12% of surveyed damrah residents report issues with grazing land. This finding should also be viewed in contrast to Nertiti locality, where only 5% of surveyed nomads reported conflict linked to grazing land. Conflict linked to pastoralists' grazing routes is also seasonal. In Darfur, pastoralist tribes move their livestock from north to the south in the course of the dry season and head back north during the rainy season dry season.<sup>92</sup> The pastoralists use traditional livestock corridors (masarat) and have customary rights to graze their animals on rainfed farmland (talique) after the harvest.<sup>93</sup> Although the 'Hakura' system gives farmers customary rights to land, these rights are not exclusive and pastoralists have temporary rights to graze their herds on what is left of the harvested crops. Normally, a talique date for when pastoralists can graze their animals is agreed between farmers and pastoralists with the help of the local authorities or the Native Administration to avoid crop losses and conflict.<sup>94</sup> Disputes and conflict happen when talique agreements are violated by either side. Violations of these agreements are often caused by a poor rainy season, which press pastoralists to move their herds much earlier in search of pasture and water. This, in turn, causes damage to crops before the harvest and farmers are known to deny pastoralists passage or block passage by expanding their farms into these livestock migratory routes.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>89</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, representatives from CRS, Omda and Sheick of IDPs from the Native Administration, and women community representatives.

<sup>90</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, local government official and Native Administration (nomad Omda).

<sup>91</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, community representatives—nomad and youth leaders.

<sup>92</sup> UN-Habitat (2020) Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations.

<sup>93</sup> Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In *War and Society* Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156-181

<sup>94</sup> The talique date is referred to as a customary institution that has 'evolved through local practices of local communities, their leadership, and formal government structures. Osman, A.M.K., Young, H. Houser, R.F., and Coates, J. C. (2013) *Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur*.

<sup>95</sup> Satti, H., Sulieman, H., Young, H., Radday, A. (2020) *Natural Resources Management: Local Perspectives from North and Central Darfur*.

According to the area-level analysis, blocked livestock routes are a problem in Um Dukhun locality. Both nomad leaders and NGO representatives say that 5 animal routes used to run through the locality, but that most of these corridors no longer exist because the land is not cultivated by farmers.<sup>96</sup> The animal routes used to be demarcated by stones that marked the width of the route, but 'most of the stones that mark out the route have been turned by farmers so they can cultivate the [land that makes up] the animal routes, particularly the Kamjar and Himdiat animal routes.'<sup>97</sup> Boundary conflicts between farmers and nomads and the resulting insecurity is reported to limit people's movement and as a result their access to services.

## REPORTING SAFETY INSTANCES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

The household survey sought to understand how residents report incidents and to who they turn to for solving disputes and effective remedies. Households that experienced a security incident during the 12 months preceding the survey, were asked to think about the most serious incident and indicate whether they sought help. The findings show very similar trends across the groups: about half of all groups are not reporting security incidents. Slightly more than one-fourth across the groups (IDP returnee 26%, returned refugees 27%, nomads 26%) reported security incidents to the Native Administration the year preceding the study. Only 12% IDP returnees, 16% returned refugees and 14% nomad residents in damrahs reported to the police.

Satisfaction with the way an issue was resolved was overall low among IDP returnees and nomads who did report an incident.<sup>98</sup> 85% of IDP returnees and 67% of nomads indicate that the outcome of their reporting to the Native Administration or the police was 'ineffective' meaning that the problem reported was not resolved. The remaining reported the outcomes as being 'somewhat ineffective', and only 13% among IDP returnees and 26% of nomads reporting the outcome to be 'effective and just'. Among return refugees, the picture is more positive with 50% among those who reported an issue indicating that the outcome was fair and the matter justly resolved, while (only) 43% reported the outcome to be 'ineffective'.

This trend towards not reporting crime and security incidents to the police could be linked to the capacity of the police and the courts to respond to incidents. Um Dukhun locality is served by 10 police posts plus one police centre in Um Dukhun town. A further four police points are under construction in Slili, Kabar, Muradef and Batabbay villages, and there are plans for additional police points in Um Dukhun locality. However, the police points that are up and running are tasked with providing policing for a large geographical area and is described as inadequate to serve the area. There is a total of 160 police officers working in Um Dukhun locality. Some staff have received training from SAF, UNDP, or UNAMID, but most have not been trained.<sup>99</sup> In regards to capacity, the police representative interviewed lists a number of challenges including lack of trained staff, appropriate offices, equipment, training and not enough vehicles to respond to security incidents. Other gaps in the police's capacity that were highlighted include no family and child protection police, lack of a Civic Registration Office and a Prosecution Office. Because of the nearby borders with Chad and Central

---

<sup>96</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, nomad community leader, representatives from CRS.

<sup>97</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, representatives from local NGO and CRS.

<sup>98</sup> It should be kept in mind that only small proportions across the groups reported incidents and therefore the proportions indicated here on perceived effectiveness reflect the rather small number of responses, specifically: IDP returnees N=40 HHs; 'etu'<sup>n</sup> refugees N= 176 HHs; <sup>n</sup>omads N=108.

<sup>99</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun, Security services, Police officer.

African Republic, the police force in Um Dukhun locality is said to face particular challenges concerning the import of drugs and other criminal cross-border activity. Challenges are compounded by the fact that the border areas on the CHAD and CAR sides of the border have very few police posts.<sup>100</sup>

A member of the police force says of the situation, 'I have been one year in this locality, and my observations are that the situation in this locality is very bad in all aspects. The community suffer from the lack of basic services, particularly education, health and security. The institutions [providing] justice—the judiciary, police and prosecutor—are not completed in the locality, which demonstrates the gap in security in the locality'.<sup>101</sup>

Some villages, like Matour village, do not have access to the police because of long distances. In theory, women have equal access to the police but are reported not to seek help from police forces because local traditions and customs prohibit women from doing so. Nomad pastoralists reportedly are said not to have access to the police; the household survey findings show that only 2% of nomads residing in damrahs report security incidents to the police but this could also be due to a preference for reporting matters to the Native Administration.

The police force works with the Rural Court located in Um Dukhun town, which serves all the administrative units in the locality. The role of the Rural Court is to resolve relatively simple problems and disputes in the locality. Rural courts serve as the entry point to the judicial system as these customary courts form part of the formal judiciary structure in Sudan as stipulated by the 2004 Town and Rural Courts Acts. Rural Court judges are tasked with promoting dialogue and mediation as avenues to justice and reconciliation.<sup>102</sup> More complex cases are referred to the Formal Court in Zalingei. According to the area-level data, the locality does not have Prosecution Office and members of the Rural Court has as of yet not received any training. The main challenges for the Rural Court include the ongoing insecurity which restricts movement, lack of funding, vehicles, fuel and furniture for the court premises. Key informants say that the various local committees refer cases to the Rural Court, but that no cases were referred to the court during the past 6 months.<sup>103</sup> In terms of access, there is reportedly poor access for women to rural courts. Because of local traditions, women are prohibited from accessing rural courts, while youths and nomads are considered to have equal access and nomad leaders are members of the Rural Court.<sup>104</sup>

There are several alternative dispute resolution mechanisms available in Um Dukhun locality. Several committees exist at the local level; some with wider mandates such as the Peaceful Coexistence and Reconciliation Committee and others that manage competing demands and conflict linked to specific natural resources including the Harvest Protection Committee and Water or WASH Committee. Other grassroots level mechanisms include the Native Administration and Judiya. Local mediators are part of the Judiya traditional mediation mechanism at the community level that resolves conflicts between community members. Judiya is a grassroots system of mediation that centres on reconciliation and repairing of social relationships and tackle low-level crime that does not need to be dealt with by the courts. The Judiya arbitrators are named ajaweed and are respected community members, who have

---

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Tubiana, J., Tanner, V. and Abdul-Jalil, M. (2012) Traditional authorities' peacemaking in Darfur. Peaceworks No. 83.

<sup>103</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, Native Administration representatives—Omda and nomad Omda.

<sup>104</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, Head of the Rural Court in Um Dukhun.

knowledge of customary law and inter-tribal history. They are not neutral mediators, rather their role is to exert pressure on a party to accept the settlement.<sup>105</sup>

## **RATING LOCAL COMMUNITY RESOLUTION MECHANISMS**

How do the local communities in Um Dukhun regard these conflict resolution mechanisms? Water Committees operate at the local level and focus on maintaining water points and manage access to water including mediating if disputes and conflict around water usage arise.

The household survey findings show that relatively small proportions of residents in Um Dukhun turn to Water Committees for help. A higher proportion of nomads (12%), however, look to the Water Committee for help to resolve disputes around access to water, while this is the case for only 5% of return IDPs while no one from return refugee communities did so (0%). The survey results point to the fact that only 21% of damrah residents and 32% among IDP returnees have access to water committees, as opposed to 54% among returned refugees.

Area-level respondents do not mention Water or WASH Committees, apart from a representative from a local NGO who remarks on WASH committees that have been set up by NGOs.<sup>106</sup> When asked specifically about Water Committees, a nomad representative says that ‘they are not able to resolve conflicts around water in this locality. And they [in fact] are part of the conflicts around water’.<sup>107</sup> However, the survey results show that satisfaction with the Water Committees varies greatly between the groups; while only 23% among IDP returnees assess that the committees effectively fairly solved problems, that is the case for 54% of return refugees and 78% of nomads.

The area-level data points to the Peaceful Coexistence Committee as the most successful, followed by the Harvest Protection Committee,<sup>108</sup> which both work in tandem with the local government present in the locality.<sup>109</sup> Overall, respondents generally emphasise that those mechanisms that include all population groups are the most successful and hence best placed to resolve disputes and conflict. Both the Peaceful Coexistence and Reconciliation Committee and the Harvest Protection Committee comprises all representatives from all groups, while the latter also includes the Executive Director for Um Dukhun, the police and a government official from the Land Use Office. The Native Administration is flagged as the most important stakeholder in resolving conflict, but are mentioned as part of the above two committees, which are both led by the Native Administration. Then respondents were asked about how many disputes or conflicts were resolved through the Native Administration, key informants believe that more than half of the reported conflicts have been resolved through local conflict resolution mechanisms during the last 12 months.<sup>110</sup> This is very much in line with the survey results among returned refugees, where almost everyone that reports an incident, does so to the Native Administration, and half are satisfied with the outcome and find it fair.

When it comes to disputed ownership of land and unlawful occupation of land, key informants in Um Dukhun locality regard these conflicts as particularly complicated and call on the Government to resolve the ‘issue of the newcomers’, as it is regarded as beyond the scope of the Native

---

<sup>105</sup>Young, H. et al (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Boston: Feinstein International Center.

<sup>106</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, local NGO representative.

<sup>107</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, community representatives—nomad leader.

<sup>108</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, local government official, Native Administration representatives (nomad Omda, Omda and Sheikh of IDPs), and women and nomad community representatives.

<sup>109</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, police official.

<sup>110</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, Native Administration representatives (nomad Omda and Omda of IDPs).

Administration or local committees.<sup>111</sup> A Sheikh says, 'The conflicts between the pastoralists and farmers have continued for decades [...] and this kind of conflict is controlled, but the problems of the newcomers is very complicated.'<sup>112</sup>

## **STRENGTHENING CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING MECHANISMS**

The area-level analysis explored challenges and elements that would strengthen the effectiveness of existing conflict resolution mechanisms. The issues flagged by respondents can shed some light on why small proportions of the population turn to committees and conflict resolution mechanisms for help when faced with a security incident or crime. Provision of security, especially in return areas, is regarded by many respondents as key to better address existing conflicts. A key issue impacting security is the spread of weapons, which makes it hard for the Native Administration to mediate in conflict and impose their authority.<sup>113</sup> Some respondents thus argue that the role of the Native Administration needs to be strengthened.<sup>114</sup> Empowering the Native Administration should also include strengthening of relevant laws and support by the Government, plus financial and logistic support to help the Native Administration to fulfil its mandate.

The Government of Sudan should take the lead and facilitate reconciliation between farmers and nomads with the support of the Native Administration, NGOs and the communities. In the words of an Um Dukhun Sheikh, it should be the government who 'sits with both parties and creates common ground for them'.<sup>115</sup> Such overarching reconciliation efforts are regarded as the responsibility of the Government, as local community conflict mechanisms can form a part but cannot resolve disputes and conflict that are not confined to the local level.<sup>116</sup> Many respondents place more emphasis on the community itself and want to see the Native Administration and community leaders mobilise the communities to prepare them for taking part in reconciliation and peace processes.<sup>117</sup> Several respondents also believe that sustainable solutions will need to involve the provision of basic services serving all communities equally.<sup>118</sup>

## **THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT AND CONFLICT OVER LAND**

Effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property is central to achieving durable solutions for IDPs as set out by the IASC Framework. The Juba Peace Agreement agrees with the IASC criteria and stipulates that 'all victims of Darfur have a right to seek restoration of property or compensation for their lost or seized property resulting from the conflict in Darfur'.<sup>119</sup> This right to restitution is not only awarded to individuals but also to communities that have a collective right to pursue restitution for communal property, villages, farms and traditional land. Where IDPs cannot return, they are entitled to compensation for their loss resulting from forced displacement.<sup>120</sup> This right is extended to displaced persons regardless of whether they choose to return to their places

---

<sup>111</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, Native Administration representative (Omda).

<sup>112</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, Native Administration representative (Sheikh of IDPs).

<sup>113</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, local government official and Omda.

<sup>114</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, nomad community representative.

<sup>115</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, IDP Sheikh.

<sup>116</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, police official, Native Administration representatives.

<sup>117</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, local government official, community representatives, nomad leader and Native Administration representatives (Omda and nomad Omda).

<sup>118</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, local government official and community representatives.

<sup>119</sup> Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.3.

<sup>120</sup> Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.3.2.



of origin or not.<sup>121</sup> Thematic experts warn that the lack of mechanisms to implement restitution and compensation will be an obstacle to durable solutions and peacebuilding efforts.<sup>122</sup>

Interestingly, the peace agreement provides for the review and possible revocation of registration of land that was expropriated or forcibly taken after June 1989.<sup>123</sup> Potentially, this is a powerful tool to deal with land that is unlawfully occupied even when the resent settlers hold land registration certificates to prove ownership. There is little mention in the agreement of the rights of the 'secondary' or settlers unlawfully occupying land apart from chapter two, which specifies that basic services should be provided in areas of resettlement for those who inhabited the lands of others illegally.<sup>124</sup>

The agreement sets out several institutions and their mandates that will govern conflict over land and aid peaceful co-existence between communities. The 'Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission' has a mandate to hear and mediate in property restitution claims for individuals, who lost their land because of the conflict in Darfur. It is also tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed land.<sup>125</sup> The National Lands Commission has also been established and is tasked with working in tandem with the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, whilst the Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee Commission has been set up to oversee voluntary return and resettlement.<sup>126</sup> The Commission for the Development of the Nomads is mandated with improving the nomadic pastoralist sector plus regulate relations between farmers and nomadic pastoralists.<sup>127</sup>

The household survey and area-level analysis focused on conflict drivers, capacities for peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level. At the time of data collection, none of the institutions and mechanisms stipulated in the Juba Peace Agreement was up and running and it is not clear how these will interact with or support efforts at the locality level.

---

<sup>121</sup> Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 4.11.8.2

<sup>122</sup> NRC (2021), Housing, Land and Property Rights (HL) in the Juba Peace Agreement. Darfur Track briefing note.

<sup>123</sup> Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.8.1.

<sup>124</sup> This task is allocated to the Reconstruction and Development Commission. Juba Peace Agreement, chapter 2.18).

<sup>125</sup> Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), 7.9.1 and chapter 7.10.11.

<sup>126</sup> Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 5.8.

<sup>127</sup> Jube Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020), chapter 7.7.1.

# ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING: AVAILABILITY AND ACCESS TO SERVICES

To assess adequate standard of living, this analysis draws on indicators such as availability and access to education, health, water, and sanitation. For displaced persons to enjoy an adequate standard of living is important for durable solutions.<sup>128</sup> The analysis draws on: the survey data focusing on the access to services among returnee populations (IDP returnees and refugee returnees) as well as nomad residents in damrahs within the targeted areas. And secondly, the area-level analysis mapping out the availability and capacities of services across the locality.

## KEY FINDINGS:

- **Formal primary school attendance (net) for children between 6–13 years is exceptionally low in the targeted returnee area of Um Dukhun locality. Just 3% of nomad, 7% of IDP returnee and 13% of return refugee boys and girls attend formal primary school.**
- **When considering education for children between 6–18 years, the findings show that a high proportion of children attend informal khalwa schools compared to formal state-run schools. 38–39% of boys and 14–16% of girls in all surveyed groups are enrolled in a khalwa school.**
- **Importantly, figures show that a large proportion of children are out of school (48–58% of boys) and 73–84% among girls between 6 and 18 years of age. Several issues affect school attendance; the absence of schools in return areas or long distances to the nearest school, little recognition by parents of the importance of education especially among damrah communities, and cost associated with schooling.**
- **Access to health services is a challenge for all surveyed population groups in the targeted Um Dukhun areas. The poor provision of healthcare is reflected in low the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (3–5%). A vast majority among all groups face challenges when attempting to access healthcare: 86–90%. Distance to services is a key barrier for return IDPs (51%) and nomads (54%), while the cost of services or medicine is the most frequently reported obstacle reported by return refugees (47%), although the cost is also an issue for return IDPs (23%) and nomads (30%).**
- **Access to improved drinking water is similar for all targeted groups (27–35%). A considerable proportion of the population depend on surface water, unprotected streams and unprotected dug wells, however, a big proportion of nomads have water delivered by tanker trucks (28%). Access to improved sanitation is very low (5–6%) for all Um Dukhun residents in the targeted returnee area, while about a third of return IDPs and return refugees plus 23% of nomads use latrines without slabs. The remainder of the population defecate in the open; a practice that constitutes a serious hazard to public health especially for children.**

---


<sup>128</sup> Typically, a durable solutions analysis will benchmark against the non-displaced population's level of access to services, and thus shed light on possible challenges and vulnerabilities linked to IDPs' and returnees' displacement as well as identify broader area-level development challenges, which affect service delivery to all population groups.

- **Almost half of the population (44–49%) of nomads, return IDPs and return refugees do not have personal documentation, and there is no government office in the area where residents can obtain a personal ID or birth certificate. The area-level information suggests that administrative processes linked to land registration do require personal documentation.**

## ACCESS TO EDUCATION

The findings show that formal primary school attendance in Um Dukhun locality among the surveyed groups is extremely low. Only 7% of IDP returnee, 13% of return refugee and 3% of nomad girls and boys between 6–13 years old go to school. Looking at education for 6–18 years shows that a high proportion of primary and secondary aged children attend informal khalwa schools compared to state-run schools. 38–39% of boys in all surveyed groups attend a khalwa school, while 14–16% of girls from return IDP, return refugee and damrah communities are enrolled in a khalwa school. The household survey shows that high proportions of children aged between 6–18 years are out of school—respectively 53% and 48% of return IDP and return refugee boys are not attending school at all, while this proportion is even higher (58%) among the nomad population in Um Dukhun. The proportion of girls out of school is even higher, as 78% of IDP returnee, 73% of return refugee and 84% of nomad girls are neither attending a formal or khalwa school.

FIGURE 8: SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FOR ALL BETWEEN 6–18 YEARS OF AGE



In none of the other Darfur localities surveyed for the PBF do children attend khalwa school to the extent that they do in the target returnee area of Um Dukhun locality. Khalwa is a religious Quranic school, where pupils learn to read and interpret the Quran. Families consider khalwa schools to be an alternative to mainstream education, especially in remote villages where there might not be any government-run schools.<sup>129</sup> Thematic experts point out that the relatively high numbers of children attending khalwa schools are a symptom of the poor provision of education in these areas. In other

<sup>129</sup> Al-Hamdani, F.R. (2020) Going undercover in the schools that chain boys, BBC News, 7 December 2020.

words, many choose to enrol their children at a khalwa school than not send them to school at all.<sup>130</sup> The household survey results support the area-level perspective on school attendance. For example, among return refugees (6–18 years old) 25% of children living in towns attend a formal school, whereas only 6% of children in villages go to a government-run school.

Three main reasons were given for 6–18-year-old children not attending formal school. IDP returnees (51%), return refugees (36%) and 17% of nomads say that there is no nearby school for their children to attend.<sup>131</sup> Significant proportions of households say that education is not important or not a priority—this is the case for IDP returnees (26%), return refugees (17%) and 36% of damrah residents. Area-level data also points to the poor enrolment rates in Um Dukhun locality as partly a result of negative attitudes to education among the population. The education of girls is by many parents not considered important ‘due to negative beliefs and habits regarding girls’ education in the locality’.<sup>132</sup> Reportedly, the value of education is not appreciated and attending school is not encouraged especially among the nomads.<sup>133</sup> The third most reported reason is the lack of financial resources; 17% return refugees, 9% of nomads and 4% amongst IDP returnees say they cannot cover the cost of educating their children. Primary education is in theory free of charge, but in reality, fees are often charged for attending school. Fees are said to cover the cost of running the school plus act as incentives for volunteer teaching assistants.<sup>134</sup> Thematic experts say that school feeding programmes and clean drinking water can play a decisive factor as to whether children attend school, and currently there are no such programmes in any of the locality schools.<sup>135</sup>

In Um Dukhun locality, there is a total of 41 primary schools. 14 located in Um Dukhun Administrative Unit (AU), nine in Magan AU, and 13 in Kabar AU as well as five in Abu Jaradil AU. There are nine schools serving the nomad communities in the damrahs, 33 mixed schools, plus a further three boys’ and two girls’ schools. There are 8,834 students in the locality and 150 teachers, of which 75% are said to be trained. There is only one secondary school in Um Dukhun locality according to the area-level service mapping. According to the local education official, there is an overall lack of resources and equipment in the schools including seating mats. Most of the students drink from handpump wells, but most of the schools do not have latrines. A lack of separate sanitation facilities for boys and girls is regarded as a disincentive for girls to attend school. Books, pens, pencils have to be purchased by the students’ families. Some schools have no fence, while others have fences constructed from local materials. Many schools lack trained teachers and struggle to provide accommodation for teachers that are not from the local area. The local education authority does not have a vehicle to facilitate the administration of education in the locality. Additionally, Educational Councils are reported to be traditional and not innovative in their approach to education.<sup>136</sup>

## ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES

---

<sup>130</sup> Consultation with thematic expert based in Central Darfur.

<sup>131</sup> The area-level data point to access to education is particularly limited in Munawar, Surray and Milla village because of insecurity. While the scope of the study included the following locations: Almanajel, Umkaranik, Almidan, Bawda, Delaba, Abushaban, Korlia, Abujradil, Motor Alom (south), Hela Mohajir, Krigi.

<sup>132</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, education official.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> UNICEF Sudan Education Team insights. UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan.

<sup>135</sup> Consultation with thematic experts.

<sup>136</sup> Centra Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, education official.

The household survey results show that access to health services is a challenge for all surveyed groups. A majority among IDP returnees (67%), return refugees (68%) and 66% of nomads attempted to access health services in the past 6 months preceding the survey. Of those, the greater majority reported that they faced challenges accessing healthcare; 89% of return IDPs, 86% of return refugees and 91% of nomads). All groups specified the barriers to accessing healthcare to include the cost of services or medicine too high, low quality or availability of services at the health facility or pharmacy and long distances to reach health services. The challenges cited match the most reported barriers to healthcare in the 2020 multi-sector needs assessment that covers all Sudan's states.<sup>137</sup> When asked to identify the most significant obstacle to accessing healthcare, a majority of return IDPs (51%) and nomads (54%) point to long distances to reach services. Distance seems to be less of a problem among the return refugee population in Um Dukhun as only 16% identify this as the most important barrier. For the return refugees, the cost of services is the chief obstacle to accessing healthcare. 47% of return returnees state that cost is the most important barrier, and this is also a problem for 30% of nomads and 23% of IDP returnees. A similar proportion of return IDPs (25%) say that the availability and quality of services is an obstacle, while this is the case for more return refugees (34%) but a smaller proportion of the damrah residents (16%).

The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator (SDG 3.1.2) and is often used as a proxy for measuring access to healthcare. The vast majority of births are attended by a relative, friend or traditional birth attendant. The proportion of births attended by skilled personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) is very low—between 3–5% among all population groups.<sup>138</sup> Um Dukhun's MoH official says that especially women living in villages face problems; the distance to the nearest health unit is often very long, and on their journey, many are robbed or sexually assaulted.<sup>139</sup>

According to the area-level analysis, 18 health facilities serving Um Dukhun communities. Six are located in Abu Jaradil AU, five in Kabar AU plus another five in Magan AU and lastly two health centres in Um Dukhun AU. Two of these health centres situated in Kara Kara and Gartaga village (Kabar AU) are under construction and temporarily not in operation. There are currently no mobile health services that target nomad communities. 15 health centres are reported to have clean water, while seven have access to sanitation. Three health centres have electricity and one is fitted with a solar power panel. There are only two doctors serving residents of the locality, assisted by six nurses, four medical assistants and 36 health workers. On average, they treat 1,400 patients per month.<sup>140</sup> The area-level data supports the household survey findings, as the local Ministry of Health (MoH) official says that a number of villages do not have access to health services due to long distances. Villages with no access include Dingo, Milla, Matour, Maagoola and Um Froot, but there are plans to include these villages in the locality's health provision.<sup>141</sup> The main challenges for providing health services in Um Dukhun locality are described by the MoH official to include a lack of trained staff, a lack of training of existing staff, insufficient medical equipment and not enough medicines to treat the patients. A lack of vehicles and transportation also adds to the difficulties running the health facilities.

---

<sup>137</sup> The Sudan 2020 Multi-sector Needs Assessment show that the two most common barriers to accessing healthcare are 'lack of medicines at the health facility' followed by 'cost of services and/or medicine too high/cannot afford to pay'. REACH (2021) Sudan: 2020 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (March, 2021).

<sup>138</sup> Note that the total number of births (N number) captured by the survey was low; return IDPs (49 births), return refugees (213 births), and nomads (82 births).

<sup>139</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, MoH official.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.


According to the MoH representative, these challenges have to be addressed jointly by the MoH, UN agencies and NGOs.

Remarkably, IDP returnees (37%), return refugees (41%) and 31% of nomad residents in the targeted returnee areas of Um Dukhun say that they are satisfied with the provision of health services. The rates of satisfaction with health services seem high when taking into account the proportions of all groups that reported obstacles accessing healthcare. It is worth noting that satisfaction rates are both subjective and relative perceptions, hence depend on what the services are benchmarked against. For the returnees, it is possible that they have experienced worse health provision during their displacement.

## ACCESS TO WATER AND SANITATION

The household survey measured access to improved sanitation and improved drinking water sources. Around a third of the surveyed households report having access to improved sources of drinking water, although somewhat fewer return IDPs have access (27%) compared to return refugees and nomads (35%).<sup>142</sup> The remaining households rely on unimproved water sources.<sup>143</sup> Considerable proportions of the population rely on water from unprotected dug wells, especially among the return IDPs (45%) and refugees (37%) but also 25% of damrah households. Around one-tenth depend on surface water from wadis, dams, streams, irrigation channels etc., while respectively 12% and 18% among IDP returnees and return refugees get their water from unprotected springs. A large proportion of the damrah population has water delivered by tanker truck (28%), while 5% of return IDPs rely on water tankers for their household water needs.

FIGURE 9: ACCESS TO WATER BY TYPE OF SOURCE



Satisfaction with the amount of water available to households varies. Among the damrah residents, 81% are satisfied and say they have sufficient amounts of drinking water in contrast to 68% of return

<sup>142</sup> Improved drinking water sources include the following: piped water into dwelling, yard or plot; public taps or standpipes; boreholes or tube wells, protected dug wells; protected springs; packaged water; delivered water and rainwater.

<sup>143</sup> Unimproved drinking water sources include unprotected dug well, unprotected spring, cart with small tank/drum, tanker truck, and surface water (river, dam, lake, pond, stream, canal, irrigation channels), bottled water.

refugees and 55% of IDP returnees. Similarly, high proportions among the nomad (75%) respondents say that they are satisfied with the amount of water for livestock, while among return IDPs and refugees that have livestock satisfaction ranges between 56–59%. The high rates of satisfaction with water for animals are somewhat surprising because area-level data point to nomads struggling to find enough water to cover the households and their animals.<sup>144</sup> Access to water is also reported to be especially limited in return areas. Generally, women are said to be affected the most by lack of water services, as women, girls, and sometimes young boys, are responsible for fetching water. Having to travel long distances through insecure areas to access water means they are more exposed to threats and violence.<sup>145</sup>

The household survey also assessed access to improved sanitation.<sup>146</sup> All population groups in the targeted returnee areas of Um Dukhun locality have extremely low access to improved sanitation—only 5–6% of surveyed residents. 32% of return IDPs and refugees and 23% of nomads use a pit latrine without a slab, but the vast majority defecate in the open. The practice of open defecation is a major problem as water and sanitation-related diseases are one of the leading causes of death for children under five caused by diarrhoea. It is also a cause of acute malnutrition associated with repeated diarrhoea or worm infections, and hence poses a major risk to public health. Although access to improved sanitation is very low, the findings show that about a third or more of the population is content with sanitation services. 42% of IDP returnees and 32–34% of return refugees and nomads say they are satisfied with the provision of sanitation.

## **ACCESS TO PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION**

The survey household asked all persons if they possess any official documentation. Almost half of all groups (44–49%) report that they have no personal documentation, while the rest of the surveyed population mainly have national IDs—return IDPs (52%), return refugees (50%) and 56% of damrah residents. In other localities surveyed for the PBF fund, the vast majority of residents hold a national ID. Birth certificates are only held by a very small number of persons. For example, the proportion in the Yassin, Assalaya and Sheiria localities in East Darfur that do not hold any formal documentation is 20% among non-displaced, 21% among returnees and 27% among IDPs did not have any form of personal identification. The majority of nomads in these three East Darfur also possessed a national ID. Those that possess no personal documentation were asked if they had previously had such documentation. The vast majority (96% to 99% across the groups) said that is not the case. The few who reported having lost documentation were mainly among the returned refugees. With regards to obstacles reported to obtaining personal documentation, the feedback mainly focuses on ‘no office to obtain such documents in the area’.


---

<sup>144</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, local government official, nomad leader and community representatives.

<sup>145</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, local NGO representative.

<sup>146</sup> Improved sanitation facility includes pit latrine with slab (shared or not), ventilated pit latrine, flush latrine.

**FIGURE 10: PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION HELD**



The area-level information suggests that documentation is not necessary for accessing education and health services, but that administrative processes linked to land registration do require personal documentation. Before the Ministry of Interior national ID card initiative, many nomadic pastoralists did not possess personal documentation, which made it harder for nomads to own residential land.

Looking at satisfaction with government administrative services (courts, government offices etc.) is relatively high. 50–58% of all Um Dukhun residents report that they are satisfied with government services. In comparison, satisfaction among IDP returnees with government services in Nertiti locality was 7%, while 18% of non-displaced 24% of nomad residents were content with administrative services.



# CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS

Social cohesion is a multi-faceted concept, however, this chapter focuses on specific aspects including participation and inclusion as well as inter-group contacts and perceptions. The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs specify that displaced persons should be able to exercise the right to participate in public affairs on an equal footing with the non-displaced population without discrimination due to their displacement. People’s civic participation—engagement in public affairs, as well as how groups accept and engage with each other, can offer insights into social cohesion within and between communities. In turn, social cohesion has a bearing on integration and thus are important for durable solutions and peacebuilding. Greater cohesion may facilitate more consensus-oriented or inclusive governance, as well as create resilience to escalating conflict at the individual level.<sup>147</sup>

## KEY FINDINGS:

- **The vast majority of IDP returnees and returned refugees (97%) report that there are no non-displaced households in their village, this clearly indicates that the target areas are made up only of returning populations.**
- **A small proportion (17%) of nomad households, does report that non-displaced are present in their area. Within this group that reports living together with non-displaced, the vast majority (98%) reports good relations with their non-displaced neighbours, while these positive rates drop a somewhat when reporting on the ability to take part in decision-making.**
- **Reportedly, there is good awareness in the communities of community-based mechanisms and they are viewed to be inclusive of the different population groups including nomads, who not only participate but also lead some initiatives. These local mechanisms are said not to be inclusive of women, but also do not involve youth as they are deemed to lack experience.**
- **45% of all surveyed population groups take part in meetings concerning community affairs, but participation in reconciliation meetings is higher (50–53%). 15% of non-displaced residents did not think IDP returnees should participate in decision-making, which is concerning as the ability to take part in decision-making is important vis-à-vis building community cohesion.**

---

## INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS<sup>148</sup>

The survey set out to understand how the different target groups perceive each other. As a starting point, return IDP and refugee households were asked if they live together with non-displaced families in the same village or location. The vast majority of IDP returnees and returned refugees (97%) report that there are no non-displaced households in their village, this clearly indicates that the target areas

---

<sup>147</sup> For more on social cohesion analysis, see: UNDP, 2020. Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications.

<sup>148</sup> The module of the questionnaire focusing on intergroup perceptions only captures the attitudes between displaced and non-displaced groups. Because non-displaced households were not captured in Um Dukhun, no analysis is provided on their attitudes vis-à-vis the returnee and nomads groups. Furthermore, the module was not designed to capture the attitudes of the displaced/returnees vis-à-vis the nomads. For a comprehensive analysis of attitudes between displaced and non-displaced groups, refer to the Nertiti locality analysis.

are made up only of returning populations. This is an important factor when trying to understand the social cohesion in these communities at the micro-level.

A small proportion (17%) of nomad households, does report the presence of non-displaced in their area. Within this group that reports living together with non-displaced, the vast majority (98%) reports good relations to the non-displaced neighbours. These positive rates drop a bit when reporting on the ability to take part in decision-making (10% report this not being possible) while 20% disagree with welcoming non-displaced persons into their family through marriage.

## **PARTICIPATION, PEACEBUILDING AND COORDINATION AT COMMUNITY-LEVEL**

Among the communities in Um Dukhun, there is good awareness of community-based mechanisms and area-level respondents describe these as inclusive of all Um Dukhun population groups apart from women. Then again, when respondents are asked in more detail, the representation of youth is described as weak in the Harvest Protection Committee, Peaceful Coexistence and Reconciliation Committee as well as the WASH Committee, because young people are deemed to lack enough experience.<sup>149</sup> Nomads are said to participate and also lead initiatives,<sup>150</sup> while participation of both IDP and refugee returnees is reported to be low. And IDPs do participate but in the initiatives set up in the IDP camps.

Women are said to not be included in community conflict resolution mechanisms due to local customs and traditions. The area-level analysis sought to find out whether any civil society groups are advocating for women to participate in reconciliation and Darfur peace processes. The Native Administration in Um Dukhun describe youth-led initiatives, for instance, the Freedom and Change Committee, to be inclusive of women, however, the nomad Omda says that no such forums exist in the locality. Moreover, such forums were not mentioned by women informants or in any focus group discussions (FDGs), thus it seems more likely that women are excluded from local committees and peace processes. Women make up more than half of the population in Um Dukhun locality and are important peace and conflict actors. A recent Darfur study by UNDP found that women play a significant role in conflict including instigating men to use violence—often singing traditional Hakamat songs to spur on the men to fight, they prevent pastoralists from accessing water, but also partake directly in conflict by providing cooking, nursing and intelligence to combatants.<sup>151</sup>

The household survey examines participation in public meetings and reconciliation meetings. Findings show that around 45% of all surveyed groups have attended a public meeting on community matters during the last 6 months. Participation in reconciliation meetings is a little higher—50% of return refugees and nomads have attended such peacebuilding and reconciliation meetings, while 53% of IDP returnees have taken part during the last half-year. The reasons for not attending among all groups were primarily 'not invited', 'not interesting in attending' and 'not aware of such a meeting'. A higher proportion of return refugees (40%) reported that they were not invited, whereas respectively 27% of IDP returnees and 22% of nomads said that they had not been invited to take part. A number reported not to be aware of such a meeting or event, while around one-third of nomads (30%) and return refugees (27%) and 18% of IDP returnees stated that they were not interested in such events. Among nomads who report residing together with (or close to) non-displaced communities, 10% report not being able to take part in local decision-making. While this is not a very large proportion, it

---


<sup>149</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, women community representatives.

<sup>150</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, nomad leader and youth leader.

<sup>151</sup> UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur.

is nonetheless a concern, as the ability to meaningfully take part in decision-making is imperative vis-à-vis building community cohesion. For similar reasons, it is concerning that ten out of 37 non-displaced households do not think that residents belonging to the nomad communities should have equal access to services.<sup>152</sup> Looking at differences in participation between male and female-headed households, the data shows that female-headed households attend reconciliation meetings to a much lower degree: while 62–69% of male-headed returnee households attend, this only the case for 22–26% of female-headed households. Among nomads the trend is the same.

**FIGURE 11: PARTICIPATION IN RECONCILIATION MEETINGS BY MALE AND FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS AT LEAST ONCE DURING THE 6 MONTHS PRECEDING THE SURVEY**



As discussed in a previous chapter, findings show that significant proportions of Um Dukhun residents own a mobile phone, especially among the men.<sup>153</sup> In regards to peacebuilding, mobile phones may present an opportunity to share information or send messages relevant to peacebuilding. The Tadoud programme, for instance, equipped community leaders with mobile phones, credit and facilitated contact between leaders so that, in times of crisis, they were able to communicate and resolve issues even when in two different locations. With the current fuel shortages, communication by phone might be easier to facilitate than face to face meetings.

The area-level analysis explored collaboration and interaction between community members, the local government and local authorities. Respondents state different bodies at the community level do coordinate and that it is primarily the Native Administration that is the main communication channel between the community and local government and hence enables coordination and communication between all three.<sup>154</sup> According to a youth respondent, the youth-led Resistance Committee and the Freedom and Change Committee also form part of the bridge between the community members and local government as well as Native Administration.<sup>155</sup> The local Land Use office does point out that communication, coordination and collaboration could improve if more funding was available.<sup>156</sup>

<sup>152</sup> As indicated in the methodology description, the sample of non-displaced was too small to include in the analysis (37 households in total). In this section, the results are included only as an indicative trend and should be interpreted with caution.

<sup>153</sup> Among nomad men, 38% own a mobile phone, while 35% return refugees and 30% of IDP returnee men report owning a mobile phone.

<sup>154</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, Land Use Office official, nomad leader, Native Administration representative, Rural Court official.

<sup>155</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, youth community representative.

<sup>156</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, locality Land Use Office.

Local government departments providing basic services (health, education etc.) do often provide a link between the local government and the community they serve. In some cases, departments coordinate with NGOs and the local department is currently coordinating with NGOs in the locality working in health; regular weekly meetings take place where activities are discussed and upcoming health activities planned.<sup>157</sup>

When asked who they would turn to if there were any grievances in the village, respondents point to several community-level mechanisms that they would turn to for help including the youth-led Resistance Committee and Services Committee,<sup>158</sup> the Native Administration,<sup>159</sup> community leaders and elders,<sup>160</sup> as well as any group that represents the community. Respondents flagged that in order for civil society organisations to collaborate with the local government and foster greater accountability, there would need to be more awareness in the community for community members to hold the local government to account.<sup>161</sup>

---

<sup>157</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, Health service official.

<sup>158</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, officials from the Land Use Office, health and education services.

<sup>159</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, officials from the local Land Use Office, Rural Court and education services.

<sup>160</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, officials from the local health and education services.

<sup>161</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, Health service official and nomad leader.

# PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

Displaced persons have a right to make informed and voluntary decisions regarding what durable solution is right for them. Understanding preferences and the perspectives behind the intentions for the future will help relevant actors to support the preferred durable solutions. Displaced households—whether in displacement or their return location—determine whether return and re-integration in the place of origin, settling elsewhere, local integration in the place of displacement or a mix of options is the preferred solution. This study employs a wide lens and examines the preferences for the future not only amongst IDPs but also amongst IDP returnees, whose return might not have proved durable, as well as amongst non-displaced households and nomads, to also understand the general mobility in the area. The analysis in Um Dukhun centres on the intentions of IDP returnees and refugee returnees as well as of nomads residing in damrahs.

## KEY FINDINGS:

- **The vast majority among IDP returnees (93%) among Sudanese refugees (90%) that have returned to their location of origin intent to stay in the current location.**
- **The ‘pull’ factors—the reasons for wanting to stay—that households themselves highlight centre around safety and being in their home area. Area-level respondents refer to security as a precondition for return but also crucial for returnees’ ability to reintegrate.**
- **‘Push’ factors highlighted by the household survey include lack of education and healthcare; a quarter of return IDPs and refugees point to these two services as the main reason for wanting to leave. Access to basic services is confirmed by the area-level analysis to play a major role in IDPs’ decision to return and returnees’ ability to stay. Another 22% of respondents say that lack of employment and more general economic reasons are behind their intentions to move elsewhere.**
- **76% of damrah residents do not intend to leave their current location, which indicates that many residents from nomad damrah communities no longer move but have settled. 51% of damrah residents report crop farming as their main source of livelihood, which is another indication of households having permanently settled in villages rather than practising a nomadic way of life.**

---

## PREFERENCES FOR THE FUTURE

What preferences for the future do returnee populations have? Findings show the vast majority among IDP returnees (93%) and among Sudanese refugees (90%) having returned to their location of origin and intent to stay.<sup>162</sup> This is a strong indication of a preference among returnees to continue re-integrating in their places of origin, to which they have returned within the past 1 to 5 years.<sup>163</sup>

The ‘pull’ factors—the reasons for wanting to stay—that households themselves highlight centre around safety and being in their home area. Asking returnees why they prefer to stay in their current

---

<sup>162</sup> 97% of the returned refugees are residing in their villages/towns of origin. Only a very small proportion of 3% (21 households) are not in their location of origin.

<sup>163</sup> 83% in both groups have returned to their place of origin within the past 1–5 years, while the remaining have returned either the year preceding the survey or more than 5 years ago.

location, around a third among return IDP and refugee returnees say that safety in their current area is the main reason. More than one-fourth indicates family reasons while a fifth reports 'access to home' as the main reason for wanting to stay. The main reasons for return of refugees from Chad are reported to be the reduction in humanitarian assistance and a restriction in movement imposed in the neighbouring country. Refugees and IDPs alike were also encouraged to return because of the relative calm security situation in their places of origin.<sup>164</sup> The area-level analysis explored, through key informant interviews, factors that influence IDPs' decision to return and to stay in the locality. Respondents highlight that security is a precondition for return but is also crucial for integration because conflict and insecurity affect return IDPs' and refugees' ability to reintegrate—access to land and livelihoods as well as access to services.<sup>165</sup> Respondents also emphasise that land ownership strongly impacts IDPs' and refugees' decision to return and that where land is occupied and used by 'newcomers', returns are not possible. Displaced persons are said to 'no longer own land because their land is occupied by newcomers'.<sup>166</sup> No land has been demarcated for displaced households in Um Dukhun and movement to places of origin of IDPs and Sudanese refugees from neighbouring countries is reported to be mainly seasonally.<sup>167</sup>

Looking at the small group of households among the return refugees (10%) that indicated an intention to leave their current location,<sup>168</sup> the following 'push' factors were provided: one-fourth of the households intending to move reported lack of access to education and healthcare as the main reason, while most of the remaining households reported lack of employment or more generally economic reasons (22%), while only eight households (11%) indicated a lack of safety in the area as the reason. This group of households intending to leave were also asked about the main obstacle (if any) for moving; obstacles were mainly linked to a 'lack of funds or productive assets to re-establish themselves' (32%) while few households reported 'finding new shelter' and 'lack of transportation' as the key obstacle.

According to the area-level analysis, the availability and accessibility of basic services play a major role in regards to the return of IDPs and refugees and their decision to stay. One Omda recounts, 'I have an experience of return in the Surray area, where 130 families had returned to the village and the government had promised to provide basic services for them but did not. So, most of the IDPs left again and went [back] to the host communities. I want to say that the provision of basic services in the return areas is a main factor [impacting] the decision of IDPs to return'.<sup>169</sup>

The same questions regarding plans to move were also posed to the nomad households interviewed in the damrahs; surprisingly, 76% responded that they had no intention to leave their current location, which contradicts the assumption that nomad pastoralists reside only temporarily in the damrahs. In Nertiti locality, the proportion intending to stay was even higher at 96% of surveyed nomads. In Um Dukhun, 51% of the nomad households in the targeted damrahs reported crop farming as their main livelihood source, while 70% are assumed to have access to agricultural land.<sup>170</sup> The reliance of

---

<sup>164</sup> Joint Missions in Um Dukhun locality (2017) Central Darfur, Mission report on Recovery, Return and Reintegration (RRR) Sector, Quarter 4, 2017.

<sup>165</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, local government official, Native Administration representative (Omda).

<sup>166</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, women community representatives.

<sup>167</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, Native Administration representatives (Omda and Sheikh of IDPs).

<sup>168</sup> Push factors are only reported for the returned refugees, as among the IDP returnees, the proportion of households intending to leave is too small to further analyse (3% of the already limited sample amounts to 10 households total).

<sup>169</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, Native Administration representative (nomad Omda).

<sup>170</sup> While households in damrahs were not asked about land tenure, the proportion having access to land is deducted based on the households reporting crop farming as either primary or secondary livelihood source.

nomad households in Um Dukhun on land as their primary or secondary source of income explains this high proportion of households intending to stay. Area-level data also points to many nomads in Um Dukhun as settled rather than intermittently moving with their animals. Nomads are described as living in settled villages, riding donkeys and cultivating crops.<sup>171</sup>

---

<sup>171</sup> Central Darfur, Um Dukhun locality, youth community representative.

# CONCLUSIONS: PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND PEACEBUILDING

## UM DUKHUN, CENTRAL DARFUR: HOW WAS PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTIONS ANALYSED?

Durable solutions for IDPs living in displacement is part of building peace in Darfur. At the same time, peace is also central to achieving solutions for the displaced population that are durable—the two aspects are intrinsically linked. It is impossible to envisage stability and security in the long-term without sustainable return of those who fled the conflict.

This study paid attention to a number of areas crucial to peace and durable solutions for IDPs, return refugees and IDP returnees. Importantly, the analysis included the views and concerns of Um Dukhun nomad communities, whose perspectives need to be mainstreamed into conflict analysis and any peacebuilding approach informing future activities—whether with a humanitarian, development or durable solution focus.

As per the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, ‘a durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement’. It is of central importance to focus on the non-discriminatory and voluntary nature of solutions, and to measure local integration—whether in the place where people have found refuge or upon return—as a *process* towards overcoming vulnerabilities linked to their displacement. In other words, durable solutions are not defined or achieved by merely the geographic features of the solutions outlined in the IASC Framework—to return, stay or settle elsewhere. What is key is the principles of non-discrimination and the voluntary nature of reaching long-term solutions.

The approach designed for this study is to measure progress towards durable solutions by conducting a **comparative analysis of the socio-economic situation of the displaced populations against the non-displaced**, across the key criteria outlined in the IASC Framework. By identifying the key differences in the situations of displaced and non-displaced, the analysis has pointed to areas where the displaced populations are worse off and can be assumed to still face displacement-linked vulnerabilities. In this way, the analysis pinpoints the key obstacles to reaching solutions. However, while this approach was taken in all other localities covered under the Peacebuilding Fund, Um Dukhun is, unfortunately, the exception as the non-displaced population was not captured adequately during data collection. Instead, the analysis in Um Dukhun focuses on the displaced populations that have returned (IDP returnees and refugee returnees) as well as the nomads residing in damrahs.<sup>172</sup>

To strengthen the understanding of the locality and peacebuilding capacities, the methodology approach combines the population analysis (based on household survey results) with the area-level analysis of the locality that looks at conflict dynamics, local conflict resolution mechanisms, the capacity of the police and courts to uphold the rule of law, land and resource management structures,

---

<sup>172</sup> Only capturing very low numbers of non-displaced households in the survey left the analysis without a benchmark against which to compare the return IDPs and refugees. This also meant that additional context information was not available for gaining a complete understanding of the situation in Um Dukhun locality, which is also a limitation to the durable solutions analysis.



availability and capacity of services etc. Lastly, it is critical to also understand the preferences and plans for the future that displaced populations have and the factors that drive their intentions.

#### **The guiding questions for the analysis have been:**

- To what extent are the displaced populations, who have returned and those who are still in displacement, progressing towards durable solutions? And what are the key obstacles and opportunities in this process?
- What are their preferences for the future and what is driving these intentions?
- How are these integration processes of displaced groups interlinked with the broader peacebuilding process at the locality level?

The above questions were unpacked by analysing the following:

- What is the **rule of law** situation in the locality? Do people feel safe and are they able to access the police and courts?
- What land **governance structures and dispute resolution mechanisms** are in place? How are conflicts and disputes resolved within the community?
- What is the **housing, land and property** situation in the place of displacement and return for both displaced and non-displaced households including nomads?
- How is the **standard of living** for the different populations in terms of access to basic services and livelihoods?
- How **socially cohesive** are the communities, to what extent are different groups participating in decision-making, and how active and equipped are civil society organisations?

## **PEACEBUILDING CONSIDERATIONS**

**Rule of law and insecurity:** Um Dukhun locality is situated on the border with Chad and Central African Republic. Due to its location, the locality is reported to be affected by illegal cross-border trade, including drug trafficking. The border area presents a unique challenge for providing effective policing because of the cross-border criminality and lack of counterparts to work with on the Chad and CAR side of the border.

All types of security incidents—robbery, damage to property and physical as well as verbal threats—are common and experienced by all population groups. Robbery is experienced by one-third among both returnee groups and 42% of nomads. Damage to property, crops, livestock or other assets, is experienced by approximately half of the nomad households (49%) and by significant proportions of return IDPs (30%) and return refugees (26%). Physical threats are experienced by 13–17% across the groups, which is significantly lower compared to other localities, yet still constitute substantial rates. The area-level analysis highlights that access to health is affected because reaching healthcare facilities involves travelling long distances, which presents a risk of robbery and assault including SGBV.

Amidst these high levels of crime experienced by all population groups, the results show that around 50% of each group do not report security incidents. Somewhat more than a quarter of all population groups report to the Native Administration, while only 12–16% report to the police. Upholding the rule of law relies partly on the capacity of Um Dukhun's police and rural courts, however, the area-level analysis highlights that both face a lack of staff, resources and funding. The lack of an effective police

force working in tandem with a functioning justice system has resulted in impunity and a lack of faith in the police, which is reflected in the very low numbers that turn to the police for help.

**Conflict and local conflict resolutions mechanisms:** Conflict in Um Dukhun is predominantly linked to land and centres around boundary conflicts, livestock migratory routes, but violent acquisition and unlawful occupation of land is also a major issue for IDPs. While only 8–9% of all population groups report conflict linked to the farming land they are currently accessing, it should be kept in mind that the returnee target groups captured by the study have returned because they were able to re-access their agricultural land.<sup>173</sup>

When it comes to local conflict resolution mechanisms as an alternative to reporting incidents to the police, only about a quarter among all population groups report security incidents to the Native Administration or one of the conflict resolution committees that are headed by the Native Administration (26–27%). The Native Administration and local conflict resolution mechanisms (CRM) manage to resolve about 50% of cases referred, however, there is scope for improvement in terms of the proportion of cases reported to local CRM's and the number of conflicts that are successfully managed through mediation. The prevalence of small arms not only leads to an increase in criminal activity but also constitutes a key challenge because it makes it difficult for the Native Administration to assert its authority.<sup>174</sup> Area-level informants emphasize that committees and the Native Administration need to be supported and empowered to more effectively mediate conflicts. Especially, the issue of unlawful occupation appears to present a particular challenge as the land was offered to the 'new settlers' by the previous regime. Respondents emphasize that this central issue needs to be addressed by the government albeit with the support of the Native Administration and the communities. The Native Administration and committees have never previously been tasked with resolving issues of this magnitude and political significance but rather focused on boundary disputes between farmers and conflicts related to migratory routes.

Conflict involving access to water is perceived as less of a conflict trigger in comparison to conflict over land, but is not uncommon. In other contexts in Darfur and Sudan, Water or WASH committees have proven that they can play a key role in preventing and resolving conflict and even improve social cohesion when adhering to conflict-sensitive principles and following the participatory Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) approach.<sup>175</sup> In Um Dukhun, many communities do not have a Water Committee to manage the competing needs of water users and area-level data indicates that few residents are aware of the ones that do exist. The survey results show that damrah residents (21%), IDP returnees (32%) and 54% of return refugees report that they have access to a Water Committee in their community. Furthermore, relatively few turn to water committees for help; return IDPs (5%) and refugees (0%) and 12% of damrah residents. Both findings indicate a gap and future potential for better management of a scarce resource that is central to the livelihoods of all—that can 'easily escalate into ethnic conflict as different user groups often represent ethnic groups who already have a history of violent conflict and mistrust'.<sup>176</sup>

**The Juba Peace Agreement:** The peace agreement brokered in November 2020 specifically recognizes the Native Administration in relation to administering land, which may help strengthen this

---

<sup>173</sup> The survey did not capture IDPs in Um Dukhun nor Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries to assess the extent to which these displaced groups are having issues with the land they farmed prior to their displacement.

<sup>174</sup> DRC (2020) Conflict analysis, Central Darfur, Sudan.

<sup>175</sup> Corbijn, C. and Elamen, M.H.M. (2021) Technical paper on Integrated Water Resource Management and Peace in Sudan.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

institution when it comes to land management and arbitration in disputes. The agreement also stipulates the establishment of the Commission for the Development of the Nomads with a mandate to improve the nomadic pastoralist sector plus manage relations between farmers and nomadic pastoralists plus the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission, which is tasked with arbitrating and adjudicating in cases of disputed land. The creation of such commissions could help mitigate conflict over land and grazing in Darfur and potentially be a key tool in peacebuilding.

**Livelihoods and competition over natural resources:** The household survey shows that 51% of nomad households residing in damrahs rely on crop farming, while another 26% report crop farming as a secondary source of income. The area-level analysis describes many of the damrah residents as permanently settled in houses with some animals. Hence, the data indicates that households are adopting a mix of livelihood strategies, and the diversification makes the households both more productive but also more resilient to livelihood shocks.<sup>177</sup> The household survey captured that conflict over land involves boundary conflicts between farmers and also expansion into livestock migratory routes. Darfur studies have documented degradation of natural resources, which in turn led to an expansion of the land cultivated, which involved clearing forested areas that were sources of livestock fodder.<sup>178</sup> Changing cultivation patterns, from leaving agricultural land fallow to continuous cultivation reduced the fertility, means farmers require more land, which in turn, is intensifying competition for land plus leading to further degradation of agricultural land.<sup>179</sup> In general, conflict and blocking of livestock migratory routes have meant that many pastoralists no longer practise long-distance mobility. This often means that nomad communities choose to stay in areas they consider safe and practice short or medium distance mobility.<sup>180</sup> For the livestock to range over less land also means asserting additional pressure on land. Community sessions could offer a forum to explore these dynamics in more detail.

**Women:** Local conflict resolution mechanisms and committees do not appear to include women representatives and the survey results show that female-headed households participate in reconciliation meetings to a significantly lower degree compared to male-headed households. 62–69% of male-headed returnee households attend, but this is only the case for 22–26% of female-headed households. The trend is the same among nomads. Women account for half of the population in Um Dukhun locality and are important conflict actors in their communities. Although seldom directly involved in fighting, women partake by blocking pastoralists from accessing water or instigating men to use violence in Hakamat songs, hence peacebuilding efforts will need to involve women's active participation.<sup>181</sup>

**Youth:** There is a very high proportion of male youths (15–24 years) not in education, employment or training (NEET) in targeted returnee areas of Um Dukhun locality. IDP returnees (34%), return refugees (28%) and 22% of nomad male youths, in contrast to just 7–9% of IDP and returnee and 2% of nomad male youths in Nertiti locality. The NEET rate is even higher among female youths, as 62–65% of female youth are not in education or participating in the labour market. These high rates for both male and female youth in Um Dukhun is directly linked to the low numbers of 15–24-year-olds enrolled in education. The education system in Um Dukhun is not only failing this age group but also younger children as very large proportions of boys (48–58%) and girls (73–84%) are out of school.

---

<sup>177</sup> Fitzpatrick, & Young (2016) Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur.

<sup>178</sup> Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.

<sup>179</sup> Osman, et al. (2013) Agricultural Change, Land and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur.

<sup>180</sup> Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.

<sup>181</sup> UNDP (2019) Conflict analysis Darfur.

Young people, who are not receiving training or education nor gaining practical work or farming experience risk remaining outside the labour market. Furthermore, a recent study from November 2019 found that youths are vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups and that unemployment and poverty are the main drivers for youth to join conflicts.<sup>182</sup> The same study found that women also join armed groups in Darfur although mainly providing support in terms of cooking, nursing and intelligence gathering.<sup>183</sup>

**Peaceful co-existence and social cohesion:** The vast majority of IDP returnees and return refugees (97%) report that no non-displaced households are living in their village, which clearly indicates that the target areas are exclusively made up of return IDPs and return refugees. The consequence of the target area demographics is that it is not possible to gauge inter-group perceptions and social cohesion through the survey tool. Only a small proportion of the nomads (17%) report living next to non-displaced residents. Results show that within this group that reports living together with non-displaced, the vast majority (98%) reports good relations with their non-displaced neighbours, but rates drop somewhat when questioned about the ability to take part in decision-making. Similarly, 10 out of 37 non-displaced households do not think that residents belonging to the damrah communities should have equal access to services. The ability to actively take part in decision-making is imperative vis-à-vis building community cohesion and a cornerstone of peaceful coexistence, hence the findings are concerning. However, not as alarming as the Nertiti results where 67% of non-displaced households do not think nomads should participate in decision-making and 33% believe they should not have equal access to services.

**Access to services** is a challenge faced by all population groups, and therefore a development challenge. The long-term processes of economic and political marginalization of Darfur by the central government in Sudan is well documented, and how this led to resentment and encouraged many to join the armed resistance, which in turn, led to war in 2003. The marginalization resulted in inequality and underdevelopment in the shape of poor education, healthcare, transport, and other services affecting *all* communities in Darfur, but not to the same extent.<sup>184</sup> That Darfuri pastoralist nomad communities were sidelined to an even greater extent through active and passive neglect of pastoralist groups, is perhaps a less known fact as it took place within the wider marginalization of Darfur and other peripheral regions.<sup>185</sup> The neglect of nomad pastoralists' rights to veterinary services, healthcare and education affected their relationship with sedentary communities and was a factor in the conflict. In the light of this history of marginalization, providing services to all Darfuri communities on an equitable basis will be an important factor for social cohesion between communities.

## TO WHICH EXTENT ARE RETURNEES RE-INTEGRATING?

**IDP returnees and return refugees:** International standards for displacement statistics recommend that return refugees are not counted as IDPs upon return, regardless of the period they were abroad, in order to avoid double-counting in official statistics.<sup>186</sup> In the analysis, the two groups (IDP returnees

---

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Young, H. and Osman, A. K. (2006) Challenges to peace and recovery in Darfur. A situation analysis of the ongoing conflict and its continuing impact on livelihoods.

<sup>185</sup> For an in-depth study of marginalization of Darfuri pastoralist communities, see Young et al. (2009) The study specifically focuses on the Northern Rizaygat but many observations relate to other pastoralist communities as well. Young et al. (2009) Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur.

<sup>186</sup> Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (2018) The International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS).

and return refugees) are analysed separately and compared. The reported population figures for the targeted scope indicated a significantly larger IDP returnee population (94% of the total returnees),<sup>187</sup> and a very small refugee returnee population (6% of the total returnees).<sup>188</sup> These proportions were refuted by the study, which found a significantly larger return refugee population and a much lower IDP returnee population than expected. Of the total returnee sample which was randomly selected, IDP returnees made up 18% while the remaining 82% was return refugees. This indicated that the distinction between the two groups is not clear,<sup>189</sup> which is explained by the similarities of the two groups when it comes to their demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Given the proximity and porous nature of the border, the Sudanese refugees returning from Chad are not encountering a situation much different from that of IDP returnees in the same area.

**It is important to state that returnees have not achieved a durable solution merely based on their physical return.** Their progress towards a durable solution in their place of origin needs to be assessed, as is done with the IDPs in displacement. As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, the fact that non-displaced populations were not included in the Um Dukhun study prevents a proper durable solutions analysis based on a comparison between the displaced and non-displaced groups. Thus, the conclusions provided below rely on a description of the situation of returnees without a comparative benchmark.

**Regained access to land & livelihoods:** IDP returnees (72%) and refugee returnees (81%), captured in the study, have managed to a very high degree to regain or retain access to the same agricultural land they cultivated before displacement. Additionally, 70% of IDP returnees and 78% of return refugees are residing on the same residential plot they had before displacement. Hence, they have re-established their most important livelihood source upon return. This is also reflected by the fact that the vast majority of IDP returnees (93%) and return refugees (90%) report that they prefer to stay in their current location.

**So, even though they have returned and have to a high degree access to the same land, they have *not* overcome vulnerabilities linked to their displacement and key obstacles to achieving solutions persist. What are these main obstacles?**

- **Safety and security:** IDP returnees and return refugees report very similar rates of security incidents including threats, robbery and damage to property and assets, with roughly one-third reporting robberies and damage to assets during the 12 months preceding the study. The insecurity in Um Dukhun impacts return IDPs' and refugees' daily life and access to healthcare. However, without the non-displaced population to benchmark against, it is hard to discern if this is a vulnerability linked to their previous displacement or whether insecurity affects all Um Dukhun residents to the same degree.

---

<sup>187</sup> Target villages in Um Dukhun locality included: Almanajel, Umkarani, Almidan, Bawda, Delaba, Abushaban, Korlia, Abujradil, Motor Alom (south), Hela Mohajir, Krigi.

<sup>188</sup> The population baseline figures were provided in August 2020 to inform the sampling and cover the targeted geographic scope within Um Dukhun, i.e. not the entire locality. For exact figures see the methodology section.

<sup>189</sup> The achieved samples for IDP returnees and IDP refugees reveals very different relative sizes of these two groups compared to the expected population sizes. This probably means that return refugees are often accounted for as return IDPs, while it is less likely to be explained by population movements just before data collection. The vast majority of return refugees report having returned between 1–5 years earlier, and only 1% say they returned the year preceding the survey.

- **Food security and coping:** Food insecurity affects IDP returnees (47%) and return refugees (38%) to a higher extent than the nomads residing in damrahs (28%); while generally the area is less affected by food insecurity compared to Nertiti locality (where 72% of returnee households did not have enough food in the 7 days prior to the survey). Households in villages are somewhat more food insecure than in towns, and female-headed households are significantly more food insecure.
- **Access to services:** Access to basic services appears to be very similar across the groups, indicating an area-level challenge: 27% of IDP returnees and 35% of return refugees have access to improved water sources (which is the same for nomads—35%), while access to sanitation is very low across all groups (5–6%). Access to education is dramatically low among the returnee (and nomad) populations in the target areas: only 7% among IDP returnees and 13% among return refugees in the 6–13 years age group are attending primary education. While the area-level results do point to gaps in availability and capacities of schools, the returnee area targeted by the study is characterized by the lowest attendance rates seen across the localities included in the PBF analysis. Additionally, the survey found that more than a third of returnee boys between the ages of 6 and 18 years are attending Khalwa schools—this is the highest in any of the localities analysed under the PBF.
- **Prospects of youth:** Linked to the above results on very limited access to education, the results show that between 38–34% of young men (15–24 years) and 62–63% of young women are not working or studying (SDG indicator on NEET). These are very high rates compared to other localities and reflect the very low school attendance combined with the low employment rates of youth. These results are of concern because it poses a risk to the prospects of the youth (especially young women) to continue to reintegrate if they have no skills.
- **Local participation and reconciliation mechanisms:** The vast majority of IDP returnees and returned refugees (97%) report that there are no non-displaced households in their village, which clearly indicates that the target areas are made up only of returning populations. This is an important factor when trying to understand the social cohesion in these communities at the micro-level. Findings show that around 45% has attended a public meeting on community matters during the last 6 months, and approximately half have attended peacebuilding and reconciliation meetings. It is important to note that female-headed households participate to a significantly lower degree compared to male-headed households. Satisfaction with how local conflict resolution mechanisms address issues is low among IDP returnees, while a bit more nuanced among return refugees (among whom a higher proportion is satisfied with the Native Administration’s ability to solve conflicts). Such local mechanisms to mediate in disputes need to be strengthened as pointed out by key informants, but also need to be joined up to higher levels of reconciliation and peacebuilding. In other words, there is a limit to the effectiveness of local conflict resolution mechanisms when it comes to addressing the overall security situation.

## DATA TO INFORM GOVERNMENT-LED AND COMMUNITY-DRIVEN PLANNING

The analysis points to specific displacement linked obstacles that returnee populations (IDP returnees and return refugees) face in the targeted returnee areas of Um Dukhun locality; these are linked primarily to the security situation and land tenure. The analysis also points to general development linked obstacles that all population groups in Um Dukhun locality are facing, such as the poor

availability and capacity of basic services as well as employment prospects for youth. When diving into these obstacles to solutions, it is important to take into account, on the one hand, the capacity, skills and vulnerabilities of the populations, which vary not only by displacement status but also by age and sex. And on the other hand, the governance structure in Um Dukhun locality, the existing community-based organizations and the wider peacebuilding process.

IDPs uprooted by conflict, returnees and displacement affected communities are not merely people in need of assistance, but dynamic actors who must not be left on the sidelines. Community-driven planning with displacement affected communities at the centre is key to finding solutions to displacement. This durable solutions analysis is an important step to inform priorities centred on evidence-based analysis that builds on representative samples of the displacement affected population as well as key informant interviews with key stakeholders in Um Dukhun. However, inclusion must go beyond ensuring that the realities of the displacement affected communities are analysed. Therefore, key results from this analysis were presented to communities (May 2021) in order to validate and prioritize the most significant obstacles to solutions as seen from their perspective. Subsequently, the prioritized obstacles and the community's vision will form the point of departure for the drafting of the durable solutions Action Plan for Um Dukhun locality. This will happen during a joint workshop with the relevant stakeholders from locality and state-level authorities as well as the humanitarian and development community. The Action Plans will serve as a roadmap to link the results on barriers to solutions, and will inform concrete programming activities that can support communities in overcoming those barriers.

# ANNEX 1: DURABLE SOLUTIONS INDICATOR OVERVIEW








DURABLE SOLUTIONS CRITERIA	KEY INDICATORS	IDPs returnees (small N=138 HHs)	Return refugees (N=677 HHs)	Nomads (N=331 HHs)
Long-term safety and security	HHS having experienced physical threats in the past 12 months	13%	12%	17%
	HHS having experienced robbery in the past 12 months	32%	32%	42%
	HHS having experienced damage of property/assets (incl crops) in the past 12 months	30%	26%	49%
	HHS having experienced security incident(s) who reported to police	12%	16%	14%
	HHS having experienced security incident(s) who reported to Native Administration	26%	27%	26%
	HHS having experienced security incident(s) who did NOT report at all	51%	49%	50%
	HHS having reported incident and reporting that issue was fairly resolved	13%	49%	26%
	Reported feeling of being safe/very safe when walking in the night- SDG indicator 16.1.4	80%	85%	84%
Adequate standard of living / access to basic services (health, education, water, sanitation, documentation)	HHS facing challenges when needing to access health services in the past 6 months	89%	86%	91%
	Births attended by skilled health personnel (doctors, nurses or midwives) - SDG 3.1.2	4%	3%	5%
	Access to improved drinking water sources	27%	35%	35%
	Perception of drinking water being sufficient for the HH, the past summer	55%	68%	81%
	Access to improved sanitation facilities	6%	5%	5%
	Primary school attendance amongst boys - 6-13 years old	7%	13%	3%
	Primary school attendance amongst girls 6-13 years old	7%	13%	3%
	Men above 15 years of age who are literate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	45%	57%	60%
	Women above 15 years of age who are literate (can read and write) - SDG indicator: 4.6.1 (a)	13%	12%	12%
	Men who own/access a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	30%	34%	38%
Women who own/access a mobile phone - SDG indicator 5.b.1	5%	6%	10%	
Access to employment and livelihoods	HHS having NOT had enough food or money to buy food the week preceding the survey	47%	38%	28%
	HHS applying 'high coping' strategies based on the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI)	1%	1%	1%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) working for profit or pay	38%	36%	37%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) working for profit or pay	11%	11%	12%
	Male working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use production	36%	41%	42%
	Female working age persons (15-64 years) engaged in own-use production	32%	37%	36%
	Male youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	34%	28%	22%
	Female youth (15-24 years) not working and not studying - SDG indicator 8.6.1	62%	63%	65%
	HHS relying on crop farming as their main livelihoods source (selling of goods)	84%	89%	51%
	HHS with access to agricultural land in current location	94%	93%	70%
	HHS with ownership/secure rights over agricultural land - SDG 5.a.1	46%	68%	*
	HHS with ownership certificates amongst those who report owning land	2%	2%	*
Access to documentation	Persons with birth certificate	1%	2%	2%
	Persons with national ID	52%	50%	56%
	Children under 5 years of age with a birth certificate - SDG 16.9.1	1%	1%	1%
Access to effective mechanisms to restore housing, land and property (HLP)	Displaced HHS that access the same agricultural land as before displacement	72%	81%	n/a
	Displaced HHS that still have rights over that land in place of origin (out of those NOT accessing this land)	52%	54%	n/a
	Displaced HHS that have issues re-accessing the land in place of origin (out of those NOT accessing same land)	55%	70%	n/a
	HHS that access same residential plot as before displacement	94%	88%	n/a
Civic participation in local community	Male headed HHS attended local reconciliation initiatives the past 6 months	69%	62%	63%
	Female headed HHS attended local reconciliation initiatives the past 6 months	22%	26%	21%
	HHS reporting presence of water committees	32%	54%	81%

\*Not available information; \*\*Too few observations



## ANNEX 2: DETAILED OVERVIEW OF SERVICES<sup>190</sup>







### Primary education

Village	School name	Teacher	Ratio	Student number		Fence	Seating seating for x % of students	Latrines
				Male	Female			
								
<b>Abu Jaradil Administrative Unit</b>								
<b>Abu Jaradil</b>	Abu Jaradil Mixed	6	74	251	194	Local Material	30%	2
<b>Bigaira Shayla</b>	Bigaira Shayla mixed	3	37	60	50	Local Material	10%	2
<b>Elgantour</b>	Elgantour mixed	3	32	64	33	Local Material	5%	2
<b>Elgaraaya</b>	Elgaraaya mixed	5	53	136	131	Local Material	10%	3
<b>Marari</b>	Marari mixed	4	26	60	42	Local Material	0%	3
<b>Kabar Administrative Unit</b>								
<b>Kabar</b>	Elanwar mixed	4	68	178	95	Traditional Bricks	40%	3
<b>Kabar</b>	Elbayan mixed	5	30	93	55	Local Material	20%	3
<b>Kabar</b>	Elfath Elmubeen mixed	5	27	87	48	Bricks	80%	6
<b>Kabar</b>	Elmanarat mixed	5	22	94	18	Local Material	10%	4
<b>Kabar</b>	Elmustafa mixed	5	42	122	87	Local Material	10%	4
<b>Elsiraif</b>	Elsiraif mixed	6	41	100	145	Local Material	0%	4
<b>Kabar North</b>	Kabar North mixed (Inactive)	0	0	0	0	No Fence	0%	0
<b>Kabar South</b>	Kabar South mixed	5	70	198	150	Traditional Bricks	55%	4
<b>Kara Kara A</b>	Kara Kara A mixed	4	30	80	40	Local Material	30%	4
<b>Kara kara B</b>	Kara kara B mixed (inactive)	4	31	87	38	No Fence	0%	4
<b>Muradaf</b>	Muradaf mixed	6	70	291	130	Local Material	40%	4
<b>Sabkhara</b>	Sabkhara nomads	0	0	0	0	No Fence	0%	0
<b>Silili</b>	Silili Mixed	3	29	69	19	Local Material	35%	2
<b>Magan Administrative Unit</b>								
<b>Anjkow</b>	Anjkow mixed nomads (Inactive)	3	0	0	0	No Fence	0%	0




<sup>190</sup> Villages marked with a \* are not included in the maps.

<b>Baltabay</b>	Baltabay mixed nomads	3	47	92	48	Local Material	30%	4
<b>Daba Nayra</b>	Daba Nayra	3	32	59	37	Local Material	20%	4
<b>Dima Soya</b>	Dima Soya mixed	3	28	62	23	Local Material	20%	4
<b>Magan</b>	Magan mixed school	4	22	69	17	Local Material	10%	4
<b>Muraya</b>	Muraya mixed	3	29	48	40	50% Local Material	20%	4
<b>Soof Eleyoun</b>	Soof Eleyoun mixed (Inactive)	0	0	0	0	No Fence	0%	0
<b>Surray</b>	Surray mixed	4	26	58	47	Local Material	10%	2
<b>Um dujjo</b>	Um dujjo mixed school nomads	3	20	43	16	Local Material	5%	2
<b>Um Dukhun Administrative Unit</b>								
<b>Abubakar</b>	Abubakar mixed	7	58	323	172	Bricks	75%	4
<b>Bilal</b>	Bilal mixed	4	36	83	61	Traditional Bricks	10%	2
<b>Elfaroug</b>	Elfaroug (Inactive)	0	0	0	0	No Fence	0%	0
<b>Elikhlas</b>	Elikhlas for girls	8	87	0	693	Bricks	80%	6
<b>Elmanar</b>	Elmanar for for boys	6	96	518	60	Bricks	75%	6
<b>Um Dukhun</b>	Elmustagbal mixed	4	43	100	71	Traditional Bricks	70%	6
<b>Um Dukhun</b>	Elnahda A mixed school	4	46	98	84	Traditional Bricks	35%	3
<b>Um Dukhun</b>	Elnahda B mixed school	4	41	80	85	Traditional bricks	50%	3
<b>Um Dukhun</b>	Elnamozajja for boys	7	48	337	0	Bricks	80%	6
<b>Um Dukhun</b>	Elwohda mixed	6	40	237	0	Traditional bricks	70%	4
<b>Elsalam</b>	Elsalam for boys	7	61	250	177	Traditional Bricks	50%	2
<b>Kamjar</b>	Kamjar mixed (Inactive)	0	0	0	0	No Fence	0%	0
<b>Khalid ibn Elwaleed</b>	Khalid ibn Elwaleed mixed	5	40	126	75	Traditional Bricks	60%	3
<b>Um Elmomineen</b>	Um Elmomineen for girls	8	51	0	406	Traditional Bricks	75%	3

## Health services

Village/Health centre	Active	Condition	Electricity	Clean Water	Latrines
					
<b>Abu Jaradil Administrative Unit</b>					
<b>Abu Jaradil Health Centre</b>	Active	old	Solar Energy	Yes	yes
<b>Kamjar Health Unitj</b>	Active	old	No	Yes	Yes
<b>Gantoor Health Unit</b>	Active	old	No	Yes	No
<b>Garaya Heath Unit</b>	Active	New	No	Yes	No
<b>Bigaira Shayla Health Unit</b>	Active	old	No	No	No
<b>Amsori Dilaiba</b>	Active	old	No	yes	No
<b>Kabar Administrative Unit</b>					
<b>Kabar Health Centre</b>	Inactive	old	yes	yes	yes
<b>Kara Kara – under construction</b>	Inactive	Under construction	No	No	No
<b>Silili Health Unit</b>	Active	old	No	Yes	No
<b>Muraduf Health Unit</b>	Active	New	No	Yes	No
<b>Gartaga health Unit – under construction</b>	Inactive	Under construction	-	-	-
<b>Magan Administrative Unit</b>					
<b>Magan Health Centre</b>	Active	New	No	Yes	Yes
<b>Suray Health Unit</b>	Active	New	no	Yes	No
<b>Muraya Zayda Heath Unit</b>	Active	New	No	Yes	No
<b>Baltabay Health Unit</b>	Active	old	No	Yes	No
<b>Marari</b>	Inactive	old	No	Yes	Yes
<b>Um Dukhun Administrative Unit</b>					
<b>Um Dukhun rural Hospital</b>	Active	old	yes	Yes	yes
<b>Health Insurance Centre</b>	Active	old	yes	yes	yes

# ANNEX 3: MAPS OF SERVICES<sup>191</sup>



<sup>191</sup> Maps are created by SUDIA based on key informant interviews – detailed overview can be found in Annex 2.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdul-Jalil, M. and Unruh, J. (2013) Land Rights under Stress in Darfur: A Volatile Dynamic of the Conflict. In *War and Society* Vol 32, no. 2 p. 156–181
- Al-Hamdani, F.R. (2020) Going undercover in the schools that chain boys, BBC News, 7 December 2020. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-55213710>
- Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2010) IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, April 2010. Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c5149312.html>
- Corbijn, C. and Elamen, M.H.M. (2021) Technical paper on Integrated Water Resource Management and Peace in Sudan. Khartoum: Aqua4Sudan Partnership. Available at: <https://www.zoa-international.com/news/technical-paper-on-integrated-water-resource-management-and-peace-in-sudan/>
- Dabanga news (2020) 14 killed in Darfur tribal fighting, 25 May 2020. Available at: <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/14-killed-in-central-darfur-tribal-fighting>
- Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (2020) International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS). March 2020. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020. doi:10.2785/18809 Available at: <https://www.jips.org/uploads/2021/01/EGRIS-IRIS-IntRecommendationsIDPstatistics-EN.pdf>
- FAO (2002) Land Tenure Studies (4). Gender and access to land. Rome: FAO Available at: <http://www.fao.org/3/Y4308E/y4308e00.htm#Contents>
- Fitzpatrick, & Young (2016) Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. Boston: Feinstein International Center. Available at: [https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/RisksandReturns\\_draft\\_v-2.pdf](https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/RisksandReturns_draft_v-2.pdf)
- The Global Cluster for Early Recovery (2017) Durable Solutions in Practice, September 2017. available at: [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/durable\\_solutions\\_in\\_practice\\_-\\_handbook\\_sept\\_2017.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/durable_solutions_in_practice_-_handbook_sept_2017.pdf)
- Humanitarian Policy Forum (2020) Policy Brief 77: Achieving Durable Solutions by including displacement-affected communities in peacebuilding.
- ILO (2021) PROSPECTS Sudan Baseline Survey. Draft report. March 2021
- Jacobsen, K. and Bjorn Mason, T. (2020) Measuring Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Darfur: Evaluation of the Pilot in El Fasher & A Lite Toolkit. Khartoum: UNCT. <https://bit.ly/3nGcJH3>
- Joint Missions in Um Dukhun locality (2017) Central Darfur, Mission report on Recovery, Return and Reintegration (RRR) Sector, Quarter 4, 2017. Available at: [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/201711\\_12\\_rrr\\_mission\\_report\\_umd\\_final.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/201711_12_rrr_mission_report_umd_final.pdf)
- Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process (2020). Available at: <https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/Juba%20Agreement%20for%20Peace%20in%20Sudan%20-%20Official%20ENGLISH.PDF>
- Krätli et al. (2013) Standing Wealth: Pastoralist Livestock Production and Local Livelihoods in Sudan. Khartoum: UNEP

Kritz, N. J. (2007) *The Rule of Law in Conflict Management* in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.) (2007) *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Maxwell, D. and Caldwell, R. (2008) *The Coping Strategies Index. Field Methods Manual* (March, 2008). Atlanta: CARE USA

NRC (2021), *Housing, Land and Property Rights (HL) in the Juba Peace Agreement*. Darfur Track briefing note.

OCHA (2021) *Humanitarian Needs Overview Sudan, December 2020*.

Osman, A.M.K., Young, H. Houser, R.F., and Coates, J. C. (2013) *Agricultural Change, Land, and Violence in Protracted Political Crisis: An Examination of Darfur*. Oxfam America 1–43.

Prunier, G. (2005) *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. London: Hurst & Co.

REACH (2021) *Sudan: 2020 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment* (March, 2021). Khartoum: REACH

Satti, H., Sulieman, H., Young, H., Radday, A. (2020) *Natural Resources Management: Local Perspectives from North and Central Darfur*, Boston: Feinstein International Center

Tubiana, J., Tanner, V. and Abdul-Jalil, M. (2012) *Traditional authorities' peacemaking in Darfur*. Peaceworks No. 83. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace

Unruh, J. (2016) *Indigenous land rights and conflict in Darfur: the case of the Fur tribe in Tidwell, A, and Zellen, B. (eds) 2016 Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict*. Abingdon: Routledge Press

UNCT, Government of Sudan, JIPS, World Bank (2019). *Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP camps: Durable Solutions Analysis, Sudan*. Khartoum: UNCT. Available at: <https://www.jips.org/jips-publication/profiling-report-sudan-2019/>

UNDP (2019) *Conflict analysis Darfur*. Khartoum: UNDP (Research commissioned by the Darfur Community, Peace and Stabilization Fund and carried out by Transition International in collaboration with SUDIA).

UNDP (2020) *Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications*. New York: UNDP. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/publications/strengthening-social-cohesion-conceptual-framing-and-programming-implications>

UN-Habitat (2020) *Darfur Land Administration Assessment: Analysis and Recommendations*. Khartoum: UN-Habitat. Available at: [https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2020/08/darfur\\_land\\_administration\\_report\\_final\\_30.07.2020.pdf](https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2020/08/darfur_land_administration_report_final_30.07.2020.pdf)

UNHCR, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109. Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3c3da07f7.html>

UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2010) *UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation*. Available at: [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/peacebuilding\\_orientation.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf)

Young et al. (2009) *Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur*. Boston: Feinstein International Center. Available at: <https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/livelihoods-power-and-choice-2/>

Young, H. et al. (2019) Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Boston: Feinstein International Center. Available at: <https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taadoud-ii-improving-natural-resource-management/>

Young, H. and Osman, A. K. (2006) Challenges to peace and recovery in Darfur. A situation analysis of the ongoing conflict and its continuing impact on livelihoods. Boston: Feinstein International Center.